SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Guy [2024] QSC 97
PARTIES:
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(applicant)
v
EDWIN ARTHUR GUY(respondent)
FILE NO/S:
BS 11336 of 2016
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
22 May 2024
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
20 May 2024
JUDGE:
Cooper J
ORDER:
1. Pursuant to s 30(1) of the DPSO Act, the decision made on 27 March 2017 that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of an order pursuant to Division 3 of the DPSO Act, be affirmed.
2. Pursuant to s 30(3)(a) of the DPSO Act, the respondent continue to be subject to the continuing detention order made on 27 March 2017.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING ORDERS – ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS – DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER – GENERALLY – where the respondent has been subject to a continuing detention order under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (DPSOA) since 2017 – where the Attorney-General applied for a review of the respondent’s continuing detention order under s 27(2) of the DPSOA – where the respondent’s continuing detention order was subsequently reviewed in 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 – where, on each of those reviews, the Court ordered that the respondent continue to be subject to the continuing detention order – where the basis for the respondent’s continuing detention is that due to his age and high care needs, no accommodation is available where he could receive the care and support he requires in a setting that limits his access to potential victims and in which he could otherwise be reasonably and practically managed under a supervision order – where psychiatric evidence considered the respondent’s risk of recidivism to be moderate or below and that that risk could be reduced by a supervision order which, inter alia, allowed him to reside at suitable accommodation and limited his access to potential victims – where the only form of accommodation available to the respondent if he were to be released is not suitable for the respondent’s care needs – where neither Queensland Corrective Services nor the respondent had been able to identify suitable accommodation for the respondent where his risk could be reasonably and practically managed if he were to be released – whether, in those circumstances, the respondent should continue to be subject to a continuing detention order
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act2003 (Qld), s 27, s 30
Attorney-General (Qld) v Francis [2007] 1 Qd R 396, cited
Attorney-General (Qld) v Guy [2017] QSC 105, cited
Attorney-General (Qld) v Guy [2022] QSC 174, citedCOUNSEL:
J Rolls for the applicant
C Reid for the respondent
SOLICITORS:
Crown Solicitor for the applicant
Legal Aid Queensland for the respondent
This is an application by the Attorney-General under s 27(2) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (the…
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- Case
- [2024] QSC 97
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the psychiatric evidence, which indicated that the respondent's risk of recidivism was moderate or below and could be reduced if he were subject to a supervision order that limited his access to potential victims. However, the court found that neither Queensland Corrective Services nor the respondent had identified suitable accommodation that met both the respondent's care needs and limited his risk. The court acknowledged the ongoing concern that individuals like the respondent remain in detention due to the absence of suitable accommodation, highlighting a systemic issue that affects the practical application of the DPSOA.
The court concluded that, in the absence of suitable accommodation, the respondent's risk could not be reasonably and practically managed in the community. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a Division 3 order and upheld the continuing detention order. This decision underscores the tension between legislative intent and the practical challenges of implementation, particularly in the context of managing high-risk offenders.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to s 30(1) of the DPSO Act, the decision made on 27 March 2017 that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of an order pursuant to Division 3 of the DPSO Act, be affirmed.
2. Pursuant to s 30(3)(a) of the DPSO Act, the respondent continue to be subject to the continuing detention order made on 27 March 2017.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: CJ J
Concerns have been raised on several occasions about the lack of suitable accommodation and it being the cause of the respondent’s continued detention.[6] However, the respondent did not advance an argument that his continued detention due to there being no suitable accommodation where his supervision could be reasonably and practically managed by QCS affected the valid operation of the DPSO Act.[7] Counsel for the respondent also frankly conceded that no supervision order could be made until suitable accommodation has been secured. That is, accommodation which meets the respondent’s need for care and support but in a setting that limits his access to potential victims.[6]See particularly the comments of Holmes CJ in Attorney-General (Qld) v Guy [2017] QSC 105, [5]-[8]; the comments of Davis J in Attorney-General (Qld) v Guy [2018] QSC 179, [20]-[21]; and the comments of Applegarth J in Attorney-General (Qld) v Guy [2022] QSC 174, [51]-[89].[7]See the comments of Applegarth J in Attorney-General (Qld) v Guy [2022] QSC 174, [74]-[89].Consideration The evidence before me, including that given by the psychiatrists on the question of the risk of sexual reoffending, is acceptable and cogent. On the basis of that evidence, and having regard to the matters set out in s 13(4), I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a Division 3 order and that the decision made on 27 March 2017 should be affirmed. Turning then to question of what type of order should be made, I find myself in the same position as that of Applegarth J on the previous review. The absence of suitable accommodation means that the risk the respondent presents is not able to be reasonably and practically managed in the community under a supervision order. In those circumstances, I have no real choice but to refuse to make an order that the respondent be released subject to a supervision order and, instead, order that the respondent continue to be subject to the continuing detention order. During oral submissions, counsel for the Attorney-General submitted that the respondent’s specific circumstances and the absence of accommodation where QCS could reasonably and practically manage his supervision meant that, unlike some others who come within the operation of the DPSO Act, the default position for the respondent is not that of release under a supervision order but of his continued detention.[8] This is both an accurate description of the respondent’s position and a matter of great concern. It is, as counsel for the Attorney-General submitted, the result of the operation of the DPSO Act. But it is also the result of the executive government’s continuing failure to find, and refusal to provide or facilitate, suitable accommodation for persons in circumstances such as those of the respondent. [8]Transcript 1-34:32-36. The respondent’s position was also aptly described by Applegarth J as that of being in a revolving door.[9] More than 18 months after that decision was delivered the door continues to revolve; the position remains essentially the same as it has been since the continuing detention order was made.[9]Attorney-General (Qld) v Guy [2022] QSC 174, [7]-[8].