Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3)

Link copied
Case Copied 10 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3)
[2012] FCA 788

Citation: Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [2012] FCA 788
Parties: JAMES HUNTER ASHBY v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA and PETER SLIPPER
File number: NSD 580 of 2012
Judge: RARES  J
Date of judgment: 20 July 2012
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 75, 140
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pt VB, ss 24(1A), 24(1D)(b), 31(A), 37N(1)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 5.22, 5.23(2), 26.01(1)(a), (b) and (e),
Cases cited: Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [No 3] (1996) 64 FCR 55 distinguished
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 considered
Collex Waste Management Pty Ltd v Waste Recycling & Processing ServiceNew South Wales [1999] FCA 787 referred to
Re Luck 203 ALR 1 applied
Date of hearing: 20 July 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 12
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr MBJ Lee SC with Ms R Francois and Ms J McDonald
Solicitor for the Applicant: Harmers Workplace Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr JWK Burnside QC with Ms M Richards
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr I Neil SC with Mr D Chin
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Maruice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Subpoenaed Party: Mr A Leopold SC
Solicitor for the Subpoenaed Party: Ashurst Australia

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

NSD 580 of 2012

BETWEEN:

JAMES HUNTER ASHBY
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

PETER SLIPPER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES  J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 JULY 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory applications be adjourned to 23 July 2012 at 9:30 am.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

NSD 580 of 2012

BETWEEN:

JAMES HUNTER ASHBY
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

PETER SLIPPER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES  J

DATE:

20 JULY 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. The Commonwealth and Peter Slipper, who are the respondents in these proceedings, filed interlocutory applications last month seeking orders pursuant to r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that judgment be given against James Ashby, the applicant, because the proceeding against each of them, relevantly, was an abuse of the process of the Court and or vexatious or alternatively that the proceedings be permanently stayed on that footing. Relevantly, rr 26.01(1) and (2) provide:

    “26.01  Summary judgment

    (1)A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:

    (a)the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or

    (b)       the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious;  or

    (c)       no reasonable cause of action is disclosed;  or

    (d)…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2012] FCA 788
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3), the case was before the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary issue revolved around the admissibility of evidence in interlocutory proceedings and the applicability of section 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The court had to determine whether the hearsay rule, as stipulated in the Act, applied to the interlocutory applications filed in the proceedings. The nature of the dispute involved an examination of the character of the proceedings, whether they were interlocutory or final, which would subsequently dictate the rules governing the admissibility of evidence.

The legal issues before the court included the interpretation and application of section 75 of the Evidence Act, which generally excludes the hearsay rule in civil proceedings, and section 140, which deals with the standard of proof in civil matters. Specifically, the court had to decide if the hearsay rule should be applied in interlocutory proceedings and whether any hearsay evidence could be sufficient to discharge the burden of proof for the parties seeking relief. This involved an analysis of the quality of evidence presented and whether it met the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities.

In reaching its conclusion, the court determined that the proceedings were indeed interlocutory and that section 75 of the Evidence Act did not automatically exclude the application of the hearsay rule in such cases. The court held that while the nature of the proceedings could affect the admissibility of evidence, it did not negate the requirement for the judge to assess the evidence in accordance with section 140 of the Act. Consequently, the court ruled that the hearsay rule would not apply by force of section 75, but this did not necessarily mean that hearsay evidence would be sufficient to meet the burden of proof required for the granting of the relief sought by the parties.

The court ordered that the interlocutory applications be adjourned to 23 July 2012, at 9:30 am. This decision underscores the necessity for a careful assessment of evidence in interlocutory proceedings, ensuring that the standards of proof are met, regardless of the nature of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory applications be adjourned to 23 July 2012 at 9:30 am.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) revolves around the admissibility of evidence in interlocutory proceedings and whether certain judgments are final or interlocutory. The proceedings concern an application to stay or dismiss certain claims made by Ashby against the Commonwealth, as well as an application for an order that certain material not be disclosed. The facts leading up to these applications include Ashby's previous legal actions against the Commonwealth regarding alleged misleading and deceptive conduct in relation to the National Broadband Network. The Commonwealth sought to stay or dismiss certain claims, arguing that they were res judicata, while Ashby opposed these applications. The case also involves the admissibility of certain evidence, specifically whether the hearsay rule should apply in the interlocutory applications.

The matter came before the court as a result of applications filed by the Commonwealth to stay or dismiss certain claims made by Ashby. These applications were based on the argument that the claims were res judicata. The court was required to determine the nature of the interlocutory proceedings and whether the hearsay rule should apply. The case involved previous decisions from earlier proceedings between Ashby and the Commonwealth, and the current applications were the latest in a series of legal disputes between the parties. The court had to assess the admissibility of evidence in the interlocutory applications, taking into account the nature of the issues and the standard of proof required.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is a variety of situations in which s 75 operates that can give rise to the debate as to whether judgments are final or interlocutory. But, ultimately, whether the character of the present proceedings is interlocutory or final, must be determined by the nature of the order that results from their determination. Much will depend on the nature of the issues in the interlocutory proceedings. The fact that proceedings are interlocutory, so that s 75 applies to the admissibility of evidence in them, does not dispense with the necessity for the judge hearing them to assess the evidence adduced having regard to, and in accordance with, s 140 of the Act. Thus, the judge must consider the quality of the evidence, including, if it is hearsay, whether it is sufficient in all the circumstances to discharge or negate the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities.CONCLUSION For these reasons I am satisfied that the hearing of the two interlocutory applications fixed for 23 July 2012, will be an “interlocutory proceeding” in which the hearsay rule will not apply by force of s 75 of the Evidence Act. That is not to say that any hearsay evidence will or will not be sufficient to discharge the moving parties’ onus of proof to the standard requisite under s 140 of the Act so as to justify the grant of the relief sought.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court found that the nature of the order resulting from the interlocutory applications would determine if the proceedings were considered final or interlocutory. It concluded that the proceedings were interlocutory as they did not result in a final determination of the substantive issues in the case. The court emphasised that the application of s 75 of the Evidence Act, which governs the admissibility of evidence in interlocutory proceedings, does not exempt the judge from assessing the quality of the evidence, including hearsay, in accordance with s 140 of the Act. The court held that the judge must consider whether the hearsay evidence is sufficient to discharge the standard of proof on the balance of probabilities. However, the court did not determine if the hearsay evidence presented in this case was sufficient to meet the required standard. The binding principle established by the decision is that while s 75 of the Evidence Act governs the admissibility of hearsay in interlocutory proceedings, the court must still assess the sufficiency of hearsay evidence in accordance with s 140 of the Act.