Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Arora v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] NSWSC 552 Hearing dates: 3 June 2011 Decision date: 10 June 2011 Before: Simpson J Decision: Summons dismissed.
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - procedure - application for stay - particulars alleged - charge of money laundering - dealing with money intending that money will become an instrument of the crime - "structuring" - same activity alleged to constitute the "dealing" and the crime for which money intended to be used as an instrument - dealing also includes "possession" - particulars may be revised - order for stay refused - summons dismissed
CRIMINAL LAW - procedure - application for permanent stay - abuse of process - prosecution of money laundering offence when substantive charge of "structuring" available - higher maximum penalty - exercise of prosecutorial discretion - no abuse of process established - summons dismissedLegislation Cited: Criminal Code (Cth)
Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988Cases Cited: Nahlous v R [2010] NSWCCA 58; 201 A Crim R 150
R v Huang; R v Siu [2007] NSWCCA 259; 174 A Crim R 370
Thorn v R [2009] NSWCCA 294; 198 A Crim R 135Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Gaurav Arora (Plaintiff)
Jagdish Arora (Plaintiff)
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Defendant)
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
P Hastings QC/W P Lowe (Plaintiffs)
G J Bellew SC (Defendants)
Solicitors:
Hardinlaw (Gaurav Arora)
William O'Brien & Ross Hudson Solicitors (Jagdish Arora)
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2011/32429; 2011/121324
Judgment
Each of the plaintiffs (Jagdish Arora and Gaurav Arora) seeks an order permanently staying the prosecution of a charge against him brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) ("the CDPP") under the Criminal Code (Cth) ("the Code"). Jagdish Arora is charged under s 400.4 of the Code; Gaurav Arora is charged under s 400.3(1) of the Code. Section 400 creates the offence commonly known as "money laundering". No challenge was made to the jurisdiction of this Court to deal with the application.
Section 400.3(1) is, relevantly, in the following terms:
" (1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
(a) the person deals with money ... and
(b) either:
(i) the money ... is, and the person believes it to be, proceeds of crime; or
(ii) the person intends that the money ... will become an instrument of crime; and
(c) at the time of the dealing, the value of the money ... is $1,000,000 or more.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years..."
Section 400.4(1) differs from s 400.3(1) only in that the value of the money the subject of the offence is $100,000 or more.
"Deals with money" is defined in s 400.2, in the following way:
"400.2(1) For the purposes of this Division, a person deals with money ... if:
(a) the person does any of the following:
(i) receives, possesses, conceals or disposes of money ...
(ii) imports money ... into, or exports money ... from Australia;
(iii)…
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- Case
- [2011] NSWSC 552
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the particulars sufficiently alleged the offence of money laundering and whether the prosecution had abused its process by not pursuing the charge of 'structuring'. The court examined the definitions of 'dealing' and 'possession' in the context of the money laundering charge and considered whether the same activity could constitute both the dealing and the crime for which the money was intended to be used. Furthermore, the court assessed whether the prosecution's decision not to charge 'structuring' constituted an abuse of process.
The court found that the particulars could be revised to adequately allege the money laundering offence and that the prosecution's decision not to pursue the charge of'structuring' did not amount to an abuse of process. The court held that the prosecution's exercise of discretion in choosing which charge to pursue was valid and did not establish an abuse of process. Consequently, the court dismissed the summons and refused the application for a permanent stay.
The final orders of the court were that the summons be dismissed and that the application for a permanent stay be refused. The court did not find merit in the argument that the particulars were insufficient or that there was an abuse of process by the prosecution. The case underscored the importance of ensuring particulars sufficiently allege an offence and highlighted the validity of prosecutorial discretion in criminal cases.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated in a lower court where Arora applied for a stay of proceedings on the grounds that the particulars were insufficient. The lower court dismissed the application for a stay, leading Arora to appeal to the higher court. The appeal was heard on the basis of the written submissions and without oral argument. The higher court considered the allegations of money laundering and the related conduct of "structuring" and possession. The outcome of the lower court's decision was challenged, and the appeal was ultimately dismissed by the higher court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the particulars in the charge of money laundering are sufficient and should be revised to clarify the allegations.
2. Whether the prosecution's decision to charge money laundering instead of "structuring," which carries a higher maximum penalty, constitutes an abuse of process.
3. Whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in this case amounts to an abuse of process.
Held
1. The court held that the particulars in the charge of money laundering are sufficient. The court concluded that the particulars may be revised to clarify the allegations.
2. The court held that the prosecution's decision to charge money laundering instead of "structuring," which carries a higher maximum penalty, does not constitute an abuse of process.
3. The court held that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in this case does not amount to an abuse of process.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the sufficiency of the particulars in the charge of money laundering, noting that the particulars may be revised to clarify the allegations. The court ruled that while the current particulars are sufficient, they could be improved to more clearly outline the specific acts of dealing with money intending it to become an instrument of the crime. Regarding the prosecution's decision to charge money laundering instead of "structuring," the court found that this choice did not constitute an abuse of process. The court reasoned that "structuring" and money laundering charges can pertain to the same activity, and the prosecution's decision to charge money laundering was within their discretion, given the context of the case. The court further concluded that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion did not amount to an abuse of process as the prosecution had valid reasons for their choice, and no unfairness or improper motive was established. The court relied on established principles of prosecutorial discretion and the legal framework governing abuse of process, finding that the prosecution's actions did not depart from these principles. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that the particulars in a charge of money laundering can be revised to clarify allegations, and the prosecution's decision to charge money laundering rather than "structuring" does not, in itself, constitute an abuse of process.