SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCR 2011 0208
| GEOFFREY LESLIE ARMOUR | |
| Applicant | |
| v | |
| THE QUEEN | Respondent |
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JUDGES: | MAXWELL P and MANDIE JA | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 10 August 2012 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 10 August 2012 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2012] VSCA 188 | |
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | ||
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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Sentence – Murder - Guilty plea – 26 years’ imprisonment, non-parole period 21 years – Co-offender pleaded not guilty – Convicted and sentenced by same judge to same sentence – Parity – Moral culpability – Application of principles in Verdins v The Queen – Manifest excess – Limited role of appeal court – Whether findings reasonably open – Sentence within range – Grounds not reasonably arguable – Leave to appeal refused.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr J McLoughlin | Victoria Legal Aid |
| For the Respondent | Mrs C Quin | Mr C Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
MAXWELL P
MANDIE JA:
On 20 January 2011 the applicant pleaded guilty before a judge in the Trial Division to one count of murder. He was sentenced on 10 August 2011 to 26 years' imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 21 years. Pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act1991, the sentencing judge declared that, had it not been for the applicant’s plea of guilty, he would have sentenced the applicant to a term of imprisonment of 30 years with a non‑parole period of 25 years. There was, accordingly, a discount of four years' imprisonment on account of the plea of guilty. The applicant's co‑offender, Judith Moran, pleaded not guilty to a count of murder but, after a jury trial, was found guilty of that offence on 9 March 2011. The judge sentenced her on the same day as the applicant and imposed the same sentence and non‑parole period.
On 25 June 2012, Harper JA refused the applicant leave to appeal on all three grounds. As he was entitled to do, the applicant subsequently elected under s 315(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 to renew his application for leave to appeal.
The offence took place just before midday on 15 June 2009 at a café at 191 Union Road, Ascot Vale, in a busy shopping district. The applicant, in front of several innocent bystanders, shot the victim, Desmond Moran, seven times. Two shots struck him in the head, three in the chest and two in the neck. The trial judge found that the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement made between the applicant and Judith Moran. The judge found that the applicant ‘had planned to shoot [the victim] for some time and prepared accordingly, in return for a financial benefit’ received from Judith Moran.[1]
[1]R v Armour [2011] VSC 376 (10 August 2011), [30] (‘Reasons’). The judge found that Judith Moran had purchased a new Land Rover Discovery valued at $75,000 for the applicant, in exchange for carrying out the murder: at [7].
His Honour, in…
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- AGLC
- Armour v The Queen [2012] VSCA 188
- Case
- [2012] VSCA 188
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the appellant's sentence was manifestly excessive and whether it accorded with the principle of parity. The appellant argued that his sentence was manifestly excessive because he had pleaded guilty, whereas his co-offender had not. The appellant also argued that his sentence did not accord with the principle of parity because he had played a limited role in the offence. The Crown argued that the sentence was within the appropriate range and that the appellant's limited role did not warrant a lesser sentence.
The court noted that the principles in Verdins v The Queen applied to this case. The court held that the appellant's sentence was not manifestly excessive because it was within the appropriate range. The court also held that the principle of parity did not require the appellant to receive a lesser sentence because his limited role did not warrant a reduction in his sentence. The court held that the findings of the primary judge were reasonably open and that the grounds of appeal were not reasonably arguable. Leave to appeal was refused.
The High Court of Australia refused the appellant leave to appeal against his sentence. The court held that the appellant's sentence was not manifestly excessive and that the principle of parity did not require a lesser sentence. The court held that the findings of the primary judge were reasonably open and that the grounds of appeal were not reasonably arguable.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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