ARM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ARM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 184

Appeal from: ARM15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 108
File number: VID 98 of 2017
Judge: BEACH J
Date of judgment: 28 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – failure to take into account relevant considerations – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – appeal dismissed
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTQS (2015) 148 ALD 507; [2015] FCA 1069

Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28; [1998] FCA 1693

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 405; [2017] HCA 34

Date of hearing: 26 February 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 53
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Krohn
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ambi Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice.

ORDERS

VID 98 of 2017
BETWEEN:

ARM15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BEACH J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEACH J:

  1. The appellant is a non-citizen of Australia who on 23 November 2012 applied to the first respondent (the Minister) for a protection visa. A delegate of the Minister refused that application. The appellant then applied to the then Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) for a review of the delegate’s decision, but the Tribunal on 13 April 2015 affirmed the delegate’s decision. The appellant then applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review, but that Court dismissed that application on 25 January 2017. The appellant now appeals to this Court from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court.

  2. For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.

    Background

  3. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia by boat on 20 June 2012. He is of Tamil ethnicity and is also a Hindu. 

  4. Before the Tribunal, the appellant claimed that he was threatened, beaten and detained by the Karuna group (a pro-government paramilitary force) in 2006 and forced to work for them as an electrician on various occasions. He also claimed that his family supported the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) but did not fight for them.

  5. He claimed that he and his family supported the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and that he had campaigned in (and 6 months prior to) the 2010 election campaign for a TNA candidate. During this campaign and because of his political opinions, he and other TNA supporters were apparently harassed,…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 184
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In ARM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a Sri Lankan national, sought protection from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellant had previously arrived in Australia by boat and claimed to be in fear of harm due to his Tamil ethnicity, his political affiliations, and his status as a returned asylum seeker. The Tribunal had previously found that while the appellant had suffered harassment and exploitation, it was reasonable for him to relocate to Colombo, Sri Lanka, to avoid further harm. The appellant challenged the Tribunal's decision, arguing that the Tribunal had failed to consider relevant factors and had erred in its assessment of the appellant's fears and relocation options.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had failed to take into account relevant considerations in its decision and whether it had erred in finding that the appellant could reasonably relocate within Sri Lanka to avoid harm. The court examined the evidence presented to the Tribunal, including the appellant's claims of past harassment and threats, and the country information provided about Sri Lanka. The court also considered the appellant's arguments regarding the Tribunal's failure to consider relocation options and the potential for family members to act as guarantors.

The court found that the appellant had not presented any evidence to support his claims regarding family members acting as guarantors or the difficulties associated with such relocation. The court also noted that the appellant had the opportunity to challenge the country information presented to the Tribunal but failed to do so. The court concluded that the Tribunal had considered all relevant information and made reasonable findings about the appellant's ability to relocate within Sri Lanka. The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had not demonstrated any jurisdictional errors by the Tribunal.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, to be taxed in default of agreement. This decision underscores the importance of providing comprehensive evidence and challenging relevant information presented in immigration cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.Background The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia by boat on 20 June 2012. He is of Tamil ethnicity and is also a Hindu. Before the Tribunal, the appellant claimed that he was threatened, beaten and detained by the Karuna group (a pro-government paramilitary force) in 2006 and forced to work for them as an electrician on various occasions. He also claimed that his family supported the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) but did not fight for them. He claimed that he and his family supported the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and that he had campaigned in (and 6 months prior to) the 2010 election campaign for a TNA candidate. During this campaign and because of his political opinions, he and other TNA supporters were apparently harassed, threatened and beaten by members of the Karuna group. Apparently, after the occasion when the appellant and other TNA supporters were harassed, threatened and beaten, the appellant was twice threatened with death by the leader of the local Karuna group, once in his house and once at a cricket ground. The appellant claimed that he subsequently went into hiding, first at the house of the MP whose election he had supported, and then in Colombo. Whilst in Colombo, apparently he received on his mobile telephone a number of threats from the leader of the Karuna group, although the Tribunal expressed doubts as to this. Apparently, the appellant went home briefly three times during his time in Colombo; he was discreet about his visits. Before the Tribunal the appellant claimed to fear harm from the leader and others of the Karuna group, and that there was nowhere that he could safely live in Sri Lanka. The appellant also claimed to fear harm as a person who had left Sri Lanka illegally to go to Australia and feared harm as a failed asylum seeker. Generally, before the Tribunal the appellant claimed to fear harm from the government and from paramilitary groups for reasons that included the following:(a)first, because of his race as a Tamil; (b)second, for his political opinions (actual or imputed) in support of the TNA and for opposition to the Karuna group; (c)third, for being a member of the social group of wealthy Tamils; and(d)fourth, for membership of the social group of returned asylum seekers. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant had suffered harassment and that his labour had been exploited (to say the least) on a Karuna construction site. The Tribunal also accepted that he had been the subject of threats and beatings in connection with his work for the TNA, as well as being threatened at gunpoint by the leader of the local Karuna group because of his activities in support of the TNA. Accordingly, the Tribunal accepted that the appellant if he returned to his village had a real chance of suffering serious harm at the hands of the Karuna group and its leader in the appellant’s home area because of a combination of his work for the TNA during the 2010 election and his personal disputes with the leader. But the Tribunal found that it was possible for the appellant to relocate to Colombo and that it was reasonable in all the circumstances for him to do so.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I reject this ground of appeal. There are a number of difficulties for the appellant. First, the appellant never submitted to the Tribunal nor was there any material put before the Tribunal suggesting that it was a realistic possibility that there was a difficulty in a family member acting as a guarantor. Second, there is no material suggesting that the findings made by the Tribunal at [65] to [67] including the finding at [66], namely, that any period of detention would be short and confined to at most a few days, were not open. Moreover, the appellant had the opportunity to consider and to controvert those matters, but did not avail himself of that opportunity. Third, relevant country information was put to the appellant and accurately characterised by the Tribunal (see at [64]). The appellant does not suggest to the contrary. Fourth, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTQS (2015) 148 ALD 507; [2015] FCA 1069 is of little assistance to the appellant given that in that case the relevant finding turned on a debate as to the quality of the evidence before the Tribunal (see at [71]). But in the present case, relevant information was put to the appellant which was not controverted or sought to be questioned in any way. Fifth, to the extent that this ground tangentially (if at all) also relates to complementary protection, there was nothing in the material before the Tribunal to establish the requisite subjective intention in any event of the type discussed in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 405; [2017] HCA 34 at [26] to [29] per Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ. Conclusion None of the grounds of appeal have been made out. The asserted jurisdictional errors made by the Tribunal have not been made good. Accordingly, the primary judge was not in error in failing to find any such jurisdictional error. The appeal will be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the appellant's claims and the Tribunal's assessment of those claims. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations, but the court found that the appellant did not provide any material to suggest that it was unrealistic for a family member to act as a guarantor. Additionally, the court found that the Tribunal's findings regarding the short period of detention and the characterisation of relevant country information were accurate and supported by the evidence. The court noted that the appellant had the opportunity to challenge these findings but did not do so. The ratio decidendi of this case is that when a Tribunal has made findings based on evidence presented and the appellant fails to challenge those findings, the court will not interfere with those findings unless there is a clear error in the decision-making process. The court also emphasised that the burden of proof lies with the appellant to establish that the Tribunal's decision was flawed.