FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
ARJ24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1100
File number(s): PEG 55 of 2024 Judgment of: DEPUTY CHIEF JUDGE MERCURI Date of judgment: 23 July 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – protection (subclass 866) visa – where the applicant claims the Tribunal’s decision was not capable of being reached on the material before it or on lawful grounds – no jurisdictional error established – applicant dismissed with costs Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 65, 116 Cases cited: DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of hearing: 10 February 2025 Place: Perth Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr Glenister of William Gerard Legal Pty Ltd Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms Scott of Australian Government Solicitor Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
PEG 55 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ARJ24
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
DEPUTY CHIEF JUDGE MERCURI
DATE OF ORDER:
23 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in a sum to be fixed if not agreed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DEPUTY CHIEF JUDGE MERCURI:
Before the court is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) filed on 23 October 2024. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (‘the Minister’) not to grant the applicant a protection (subclass 866) visa (‘protection visa’) under section 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a Malaysian citizen.[1]
[1] Court book at pages 21 and 41.
The applicant arrived in Australia on 27 July 2016.[2]
[2] Court book at pages 27 and 56.
Application for a protection visa on 29 September 2017
The applicant made an application for a protection (class XA) (subclass 866) visa on 29 September 2017.[3]
[3] Court book at pages 13 to 41.
In his application for a protection visa, the applicant, in…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1100
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's decision was not capable of being reached on the material before it or on lawful grounds, and if there was any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's decision was illogical and irrational, claiming that had the Tribunal not made a particular finding, there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome, indicating jurisdictional error. The court considered the principles of judicial review and the threshold for finding a decision to be illogical or irrational.
In assessing the Tribunal's decision, the court noted that the reasons provided by the Tribunal were rational, logical, and based on the evidence presented. The court highlighted the importance of not over-scrutinising the reasons for an administrative decision and the high threshold required to find a decision to be illogical or irrational. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was open to a logical and rational person based on the evidence and that there was no jurisdictional error. The court dismissed the application for judicial review with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Moreover, it is submitted for the applicant that had the Tribunal not made this finding, which was not open to it, the Tribunal would have had to go on to consider whether the applicant faced a risk of harm, if the debt remained active. Had the Tribunal considered this, there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome such that jurisdictional error is made out. CONSIDERATION For the following reasons, I do not accept the applicant’s submission and find that the Tribunal’s findings at paragraph [68] when read in context of the reasons as a whole and in particular when read in the context of paragraphs [67] to [69], were rational, logical and were based on probative evidence. In considering the Tribunal’s reasons, it is important to have regard to the observations of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at [31]:31.These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. … At the heart of the applicant’s ground of review, is that the Tribunal’s findings were illogical or irrational. The test for illogicality or irrationality requires, by its nature, has a high threshold. This is necessarily so to avoid the court, on review, impermissibly entering the realm of merits review. As noted by Crennan and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611:130.In the context of the Tribunal’s decision here, “illogicality” or “irrationality” sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is “clearly unjust” or “arbitrary” or “capricious” or “unreasonable” in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case. 131.… The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. …133.… the correct approach is to ask whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did make on the material before it. ……135.On the probative evidence before the Tribunal, a logical or rational decision maker could have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal. Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker did not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.