ARJ24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

ARJ24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1100

File number(s): PEG 55 of 2024
Judgment of: DEPUTY CHIEF JUDGE MERCURI
Date of judgment: 23 July 2025 
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – protection (subclass 866) visa – where the applicant claims the Tribunal’s decision was not capable of being reached on the material before it or on lawful grounds – no jurisdictional error established – applicant dismissed with costs
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 65, 116
Cases cited:

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 56
Date of hearing: 10 February 2025
Place: Perth
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr Glenister of William Gerard Legal Pty Ltd
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms Scott of Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

PEG 55 of 2024

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ARJ24

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

DEPUTY CHIEF JUDGE MERCURI

DATE OF ORDER:

23 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in a sum to be fixed if not agreed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DEPUTY CHIEF JUDGE MERCURI:

  1. Before the court is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) filed on 23 October 2024. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (‘the Minister’) not to grant the applicant a protection (subclass 866) visa (‘protection visa’) under section 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’).

    BACKGROUND

  2. The applicant is a Malaysian citizen.[1]

    [1] Court book at pages 21 and 41.

  3. The applicant arrived in Australia on 27 July 2016.[2]

    [2] Court book at pages 27 and 56.

    Application for a protection visa on 29 September 2017

  4. The applicant made an application for a protection (class XA) (subclass 866) visa on 29 September 2017.[3]

    [3] Court book at pages 13 to 41.

  5. In his application for a protection visa, the applicant, in…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ARJ24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involves the applicant, a Malaysian citizen, challenging the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) to affirm the Minister's refusal of their application for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958. The applicant arrived in Australia in 2016 and lodged an application for a protection visa in 2017, citing threats and violence from loan shark gangsters in Malaysia as the reason for seeking asylum. The Tribunal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a protection visa.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's decision was not capable of being reached on the material before it or on lawful grounds, and if there was any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's decision was illogical and irrational, claiming that had the Tribunal not made a particular finding, there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome, indicating jurisdictional error. The court considered the principles of judicial review and the threshold for finding a decision to be illogical or irrational.

In assessing the Tribunal's decision, the court noted that the reasons provided by the Tribunal were rational, logical, and based on the evidence presented. The court highlighted the importance of not over-scrutinising the reasons for an administrative decision and the high threshold required to find a decision to be illogical or irrational. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was open to a logical and rational person based on the evidence and that there was no jurisdictional error. The court dismissed the application for judicial review with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Before the court is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) filed on 23 October 2024. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (‘the Minister’) not to grant the applicant a protection (subclass 866) visa (‘protection visa’) under section 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’). BACKGROUND The applicant is a Malaysian citizen.[1] [1] Court book at pages 21 and 41. The applicant arrived in Australia on 27 July 2016.[2][2] Court book at pages 27 and 56. Application for a protection visa on 29 September 2017 The applicant made an application for a protection (class XA) (subclass 866) visa on 29 September 2017.[3][3] Court book at pages 13 to 41. In his application for a protection visa, the applicant, in response to a question as to why he left Malaysia, said:[4]MY STORY STARTED WHEN I BECOME GUARANTOR TO MY UNCLE, I HAVE BEEN A VICTIM AT THEIR OFFEND THREATENED BY USING VIOLENCE TO ME WHO FAILED TO PAY ON THE TIME, THEY SPLASHED WITH THE RED PAINT AND PIG HEAD ON MY FAMILY HOUSE THEIR ALSO WRITING ABUSIVE WORDS TO ME, EVERDAY TOTAL LOANS IS HIGHER AND I CONNOT AFFORD TO PAY IN JUST I'M AS A GUARANTOR. I AM VERY DEPRESSED AND A MAKES ME SOUL BECAUSE OF PRESSURED IN OFFEND INTERRUPTED BY THEM, I CONNOT FACE IT AT ALL ANYMORE AND I DECIDE TO LEAVE BECAUSE NOW MY LIFE IS IN DANGER AND HAYING A BIG RISK, I COME TO AUSTRALIA TO SEEK PROTECTION AND HOPE THE AUSTRALIA GOVERNMENT WILL HELP ME AND I GET PEACEFUL LIFE HERE, I HAVE NO CHOICE THAN LEAVING MY COUNTRY.[4] Court book at page 36. The applicant further stated that if he returned to Malaysia he would not feel safe from the debt collectors and the loan shark gangsters who ‘are still hunting’ him.[5] He also stated that:[6] THEY HIT ME AND THREATENED IF I DO NOT PAY THEY WILL BURN MY MOTHER HOUSE AND FORCE MY FAMILY TO MADE A PAYMENT ALSO MY FAMILY MEMBER AS WELL’. [5] Court book at page 36.[6] Court book at page 37. The applicant stated that he made a police report, and no action was taken by the police.[7] He claims that he tried to deal with the situation by moving from his hometown to Kuala Lumpur, but the same thing happened there.[8][7] Court book at pages 37 and 38. [8] Court book at page 37. In response to a question as to whether he felt that he would be harmed or mistreated if he were to return to Malaysia, the applicant said:[9]I’M SURE THEY WILL FIND ME IF I RETURN TO MY COUNTRY. I’M NOT BE ABLE TO BEAR THE RISK PROBLEMS AND I PRAY TO GOD. I DON’T WANT MY FAMILY MEMBER ALSO IN DENGER AND FALL VICTIM TO THEIR ATROCITY. I DIDN’T FIND A SOLUTION BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM AT THE DEBTS BECAUSE THE AMOUNT WAS TOO HIGH. THE BANK IN MY COUNTRY PROVIDE FINANCIAL LEADING TO HELP ME. [9] Court book at page 38. On 28 November 2017, the applicant was notified by letter that a delegate of the Minister had refused his application for a protection visa.[10][10] Court book at pages 52 to 64. Application for review in the Tribunal on 10 December 2017

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 2 February 2024, the applicant was notified by letter that the Tribunal had affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse the applicant a protection visa.[18][18] Court book at page 101.TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal’s reasons of 1 February 2024 are set out at pages 103 to 110 of the Court Book. At paragraphs [2] to [9] of the Tribunal’s reasons, the member set out the background to the application for review. Relevantly, at [4], the Tribunal set out the basis of the applicant’s claim for protection. At paragraph [8], the Tribunal records that the applicant gave oral evidence at the hearing on 15 December 2023 and that whilst a Malay interpreter was available, the applicant ‘used the interpreter at his discretion’. At paragraphs [10] to [18], the Tribunal identified the relevant refugee criteria and the complementary protection criteria, as well as the law that applies. At paragraph [19], the Tribunal identified the key issue in the review, namely ‘whether the applicant meets the visa criteria set out in s 36 of the Act’. The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s identity and citizenship.[19] The Tribunal then went on to set out the applicant’s claims.[20] [19] Tribunal decision record dated 1 February 2024 at paragraphs [25] and [64]. [20] Tribunal decision record dated 1 February 2024 at paragraphs [19] to [63]. At paragraphs [21] – [24], the Tribunal set out the applicant’s background in Malaysia including his family and educational background. At [25] the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s evidence about these matters and was satisfied that the applicant was a Malaysian citizen. At paragraphs [26] to [44], the Tribunal set out the applicant’s evidence about the circumstances which led him to leave Malaysia, in particular, the circumstances in which the applicant assisted his uncle (Uncle K) to borrow money from a money lender in mid-2015. The Tribunal notes the applicant’s claim that the loan shark told him that if his uncle was not able to repay the money on the agreed terms then he, the applicant would become liable to do so.[21] [21] Tribunal decision record dated 1 February 2024 at paragraphs [27] and [28]. The Tribunal then sets out the applicant’s evidence regarding his Uncle’s failure to meet the repayments to the loan shark and the consequences for him personally, including an attempt by two men to pull him into their car to take him away to assault him.[22] [22] Tribunal decision record dated 1 February 2024 at paragraphs [29] to [31]. The applicant told the Tribunal that although his uncle continued to try and meet the repayments, he, the applicant, continued to be intimidated by the loan shark’s people.[23] The applicant told the Tribunal that he tried move to Kuala Lumpur to stay with another uncle, Uncle S. At paragraph [36], the Tribunal records that the applicant became aware that Uncle S was going to try and go to Canada or Australia for work and he decided to join Uncle S in this endeavour. [23] Tribunal decision record dated 1 February 2024 at paragraph [34].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Moreover, it is submitted for the applicant that had the Tribunal not made this finding, which was not open to it, the Tribunal would have had to go on to consider whether the applicant faced a risk of harm, if the debt remained active. Had the Tribunal considered this, there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome such that jurisdictional error is made out. CONSIDERATION For the following reasons, I do not accept the applicant’s submission and find that the Tribunal’s findings at paragraph [68] when read in context of the reasons as a whole and in particular when read in the context of paragraphs [67] to [69], were rational, logical and were based on probative evidence. In considering the Tribunal’s reasons, it is important to have regard to the observations of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at [31]:31.These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. … At the heart of the applicant’s ground of review, is that the Tribunal’s findings were illogical or irrational. The test for illogicality or irrationality requires, by its nature, has a high threshold. This is necessarily so to avoid the court, on review, impermissibly entering the realm of merits review. As noted by Crennan and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611:130.In the context of the Tribunal’s decision here, “illogicality” or “irrationality” sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is “clearly unjust” or “arbitrary” or “capricious” or “unreasonable” in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case. 131.… The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. …133.… the correct approach is to ask whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did make on the material before it. ……135.On the probative evidence before the Tribunal, a logical or rational decision maker could have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal. Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker did not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.