Apple Inc.
[2025] ATMO 132
•8 July 2025
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
ReInternational Registration 1722400 (9) - Australian Trade Mark Application number 2347460 (9) – CALLKIT - in the name of Apple Inc.
Delegate: Nicholas Smith Representation: Holder: Gabriella Rubagotti of Counsel instructed by Ruth Horvai of Baker McKenzie Decision: 2025 ATMO 132
Regulation 17A.24: final decision on examination – consideration of section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 – IRDA to be accepted for possible extension of protection to AustraliaBackground
On 27 February 2023, Apple Inc. (‘Holder’) applied to extend protection to Australia of International Registration 1722400 under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘Act’) and Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (‘Regulations’). Such an application is referred to as an International Registration Designating Australia (‘IRDA’). The current details of the IRDA appear below:
Application No.:
2347460
International Reg.
1722400
Filing Date:
27 February 2023
Priority Date
31 August 2022[1]
Goods: Class 9: Downloadable application development software; downloadable computer software for use as an application programming interface (API) for building software applications.
(‘Holder’s Goods’)Trade Mark:
CALLKIT
(‘Trade Mark’)
[1] Convention priority claimed from Jamaican trade mark number 87377.
The IRDA was examined as required under reg 17A.12 of the Regulations. On 17 April 2023 IP Australia issued a first adverse examination report which amounted to a Notification of Provisional Refusal of the IRDA, identifying a ground for rejection pursuant to s 41 of the Act in respect of the Holder’s Goods (‘First Report’). With respect to the s 41 ground, the examiner stated that the Trade Mark is not capable of distinguishing the specified services because the mark is comprised to the words CALL and KIT indicating that the Holder provides a set of software development tools, API calls, and related goods, for the development of software, including software for making phone calls, and that these goods are provided in the form of a software development kit, and that other traders should be able to use the descriptive term CALLKIT in connection with the Holder’s Goods.
Subsequent to this, the Holder and this office engaged in further correspondence with IP Australia issuing two further examination reports maintaining the s 41 ground for rejection in respect of the Holder’s Goods. The Holder then requested to be heard by the Registrar of Trade Marks under reg 17A.17 of the Regulations.
This matter was listed for hearing on 3 June 2025. On 27 May 2025 the Holder filed written submissions that supplement the earlier submissions made by the Holder to the examiner (‘Holder’s Submissions’) as well as the declaration of Jackson Ion Moir, Paralegal at Baker McKenzie, the Holder’s representatives dated 27 May 2025 with Annexures JIM-1 to JIM-16 (‘Moir Declaration’). The Holder’s Submissions indicated that they would rely on the Moir Declaration as well as evidence previously filed in this matter, being a declaration of Thomas R. LaPerle, Assistant Secretary and Senior Director of the Holder’s legal department dated 1 October 2023 with Annexures TRL-1 to TRL-11 1 (‘LaPerle Declaration’) and a declaration of Rebecca Lousie Rumens, Trade Mark Searcher at Baker McKenzie dated 3 October 2024 with Annexures RLR-1 to RLR-6 (‘Rumens Declaration’). At the hearing Gabriella Rubagotti of Counsel instructed by Ruth Horvai of Baker McKenzie made further oral submissions to support the Holder’s Submissions.
The present matter is a hearing under reg 17A.17 (which is similar in nature to a request for hearing under s 33(4) of the Act). As noted in MHFC Holdings Pty Ltd[2] as well as other decisions of the Registrar (Teraglow Pty Ltd[3] and TOM Organic Pty Ltd[4]), the purpose of such a hearing is not a review of the examiner’s decision but rather a fresh consideration of the ground for rejection, in this case the ground for rejection under s 41 of the Act. Any decision I shall make is not a review of the examiner’s approach and I am not bound in any way to follow it. Rather this proceeding will consider afresh the s 41 ground for rejection under this Act as it applies to the IRDA for the Holder’s Goods.
[2] [2016] ATMO 96, [9] (Hearing Officer Wilson).
[3] [2016] ATMO 32 (Hearing Officer Worth).
[4] [2018] ATMO 46 (Hearing Officer Worth).
Legislative framework
Reg 17A.24 of the Regulations provides that:
(1)The Registrar must, after the examination, accept the IRDA unless he or she is satisfied that:
(a)it is not in accordance with this Division; or
(b)there are grounds for rejecting it.
…
(3)The Registrar must reject an IRDA, in whole or in part, if the Registrar is satisfied that:
(a)it is not in accordance with this Division; or
(b)there are grounds for rejecting it, in whole or in part.
Regarding the present application, the only unresolved ground for rejection identified is under s 41 of the Act. The capacity of the Trade Mark to distinguish the Holder’s Services must be assessed at the filing date, being 27 February 2023 (‘relevant date’) however evidence of use after that day may be relevant, to the extent that such evidence can illustrate factors in place at the relevant date.[5]
[5] Austereo Pty Ltd v DMG Radio (Australia) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 968, [32] (Finn J).
Section 41 of the Act provides:
41 – Trade Mark not distinguishing applicant’s goods or services
(1)An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered (the designated goods or services) from the goods or services of other persons.
Note: For goods of a person and services of a person see section 6.
(2)A trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons only if either subsection (3) or (4) applies to the trade mark.
(3)This subsection applies to a trade mark if:
(a)the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and
(b)the applicant has not used the trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application to such an extent that the trade mark does in fact distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant.
(4)This subsection applies to a trade mark if:
(a)the trade mark is, to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and
(b)the trade mark does not and will not distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant having regard to the combined effect of the following:
(i)the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services from the goods or services of other persons;
(ii)the use, or intended use, of the trade mark by the applicant;
(iii)any other circumstances.
Note 1:Trade marks that are not inherently adapted to distinguish goods or services are mostly trade marks that consist wholly of a sign that is ordinarily used to indicate:
(a)the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or some other characteristic, of goods or services; or
(b)the time of production of goods or of the rendering of services.
Note 2: For goods of a person and services of a person see section 6.
Note 3: Use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an applicant and an authorised use of a trade mark by another person are each taken to be use of the trade mark by the applicant (see subsections (5) and 7(3) and section 8).
(5)For the purposes of this section, the use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an applicant for the registration of the trade mark is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the applicant.
Note 1: For applicant and predecessor in title see section 6.
Note 2: If a predecessor in title had authorised another person to use the trade mark, any authorised use of the trade mark by the other person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the predecessor in title (see subsection 7(3) and section 8).
With respect to s 41 it is appropriate to discuss the ‘presumption of registrability’. As was explained by the Hearing Officer in Unilever plc v Beiersdorf AG with respect to s 33 of the Act, which corresponds to Reg 17A.24:
Section 33 of the Act states that the Registrar must accept an application unless satisfied that it has not been made in accordance with the Act, (which is not relevant here), or that there are grounds under the Act for rejecting it. In this regard s 33 embodies what is often referred to as a ‘presumption of registrability.’ As was explained in Blount Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks[6] (‘Oregon’), however, prior to the [Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (“the Amending Act”)] ss 41(5) and (6) as they then were, (which essentially correspond to current ss 41(4) and (3) respectively), effectively shifted the onus onto an applicant. Section 41 was thus amended to address that inconsistency, with the Explanatory Memorandum to the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 (‘the EM’) stating at page 146:
[6] (1998) 40 IPR 498, 505 (Branson J).
The changes are intended to clarify that the presumption of registrability, as provided for in section 33, does apply to section 41. … The intention is that, if the Registrar is equally unsure of whether the mark is or is not capable of distinguishing, that doubt should be resolved in the applicant’s favour.
The Amending Act was not however intended to alter the relevant standard for registrability. In this regard the EM goes on to state (also at page 146):
Note that while the amendment [to s 41] ensures that the onus rests with the Registrar during examination, it is not intended to require that the trade mark should clearly not be registered. Rather, as with other grounds it is intended that the delegate need only be satisfied that a ground exists on the balance of probabilities.
The amendments are not meant to alter the key concepts of “inherently adapted to distinguish”, “capable of distinguishing” and “does or will distinguish”. The judicial tests for these terms are settled and the amendments are not intended to change the legal concept of a trade mark distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services from others.
Branson J’s analysis at 504 in Oregon of the operation of s 41 as it stood prior to the Amending Act, as paraphrased below, also remains apt in relation to the amended section:
Having taken [the extent of inherent adaptation] into account, it is theoretically open to [me] to conclude:
(a) that the [Trade Mark] is inherently adapted to distinguish the [Applicant’s Services] from the goods or services of other persons and capable, on that basis alone, of so distinguishing the [Applicant’s Services]; [that is, neither s 41(3) nor s 41(4) applies] or
(b) that the [Trade Mark] is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the [Applicant’s Services] from the goods or services of other persons; [that is, s 41(3) applies] or
(c) that the [Trade Mark] is to some extent inherently adapted to distinguish the [Applicant’s Services] from the goods or services of other persons, but there is uncertainty, on that basis alone, that the trade mark is actually capable of so distinguishing the [Applicant’s Services]. [that is, s 41(4) applies][7]
[7] [2017] ATMO 25, [38]-[40] (Hearing Officer Kirov).
In Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd, the Full Court summarised the principles in respect of s 41 as follows:
(1) In deciding whether or not a trade mark is capable of distinguishing the designated services from the service of others, the first question is the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated services from those of others: s 41(2) and (3).
(2) In determining whether a trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the services of a trader, the answer largely depends upon whether other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their businesses and without any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in connection with their goods: Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (“Clark Equipment”) [1964] HCA 55; (1964) 111 CLR 511 per Kitto J at 514.
(3) The question of whether a trade mark is adapted to distinguish the services of the applicant is to be tested by reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and being actuated only by proper motives (in the exercise of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage for the sake of the signification which the words ordinarily possess) will think of the word and want to use it in connection with similar goods in any manner which would infringe the trade mark once registered: Clark Equipment at 514.(4) Directly descriptive words, like geographical names, are not prima facie suitable for the grant of a monopoly conferred by registration of a trade mark because use of them, as trade marks, will “rarely eclipse” their “primary” (that is, their ordinary) signification. Such words (or a word) are unlikely to be inherently, that is to say, “in [their] own nature”, adapted to distinguish the applicant’s goods. Traders may legitimately want to use such words in connection with their goods or services “because of the reference they are ‘inherently adapted to make’ to those goods”: Cantarella Bros Pty Limited v Modena Trading Pty Limited (“Cantarella”) [2014] HCA 48; (2014) 254 CLR 337 at [57] per French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ.
(5) The principles derived from the observations of Kitto J in Clark Equipment apply with as much force to directly descriptive words as they do to words which are, according to their ordinary signification, geographical names: Cantarella at [57].
(6) In determining whether a word is (or words are) inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services of an applicant, the question is to be examined from the point of view of the “possible impairment” of the rights of “honest traders” and from the “point of view of the public”: Cantarella at [59].
(7) In determining whether a word contains (or words contain) a “direct reference” to the relevant goods or services (and thus prima facie not registrable as a trade mark) or whether the word (or words) makes a “covert and skilful allusion” to the relevant goods or services (and thus prima facie registrable as a trade mark), the “ordinary signification” of the word or words to persons who will purchase, consume or trade in the goods or services, must be considered: Cantarella at [59].
(8) Where the question is whether there are other traders who may legitimately want to use or apply a word or words in connection with their goods or services (other than a geographical name or a surname), the test refers to the “legitimate desire of other traders to use a word which is directly descriptive in respect of the same or similar goods”: Cantarella at [59].(9) Consistent with the proposition at (7), the test described at (8) does not encompass the desire of other traders to use a word or words which in relation to the goods or services are “allusive or metaphorical”: Cantarella at [59].
(10) In determining whether a trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services for the purposes of s 41(3), the ordinary signification of the word or words are to be considered from the perspective of “any person in Australia concerned with the goods or services to which the trade mark is to be applied”: Cantarella at [70].
(11) Consideration of the “ordinary signification” of any word or words said to constitute a trade mark is “crucial”: Cantarella at [71]. That is so whether the word (or words) is said not to be registrable because: it is not an invented word and has direct reference to the character or quality of the goods or services; or, the word is laudatory; or, the word is a geographical name; or, the word has either lost its distinctiveness or it never had the requisite distinctiveness from the outset: Cantarella at [71].
(12) The process of reasoning in addressing s 41(3) of the Act involves first identifying the “ordinary signification” of the word in question and then undertaking an enquiry into whether other traders might legitimately need to use the word in respect of their goods: Cantarella at [71]. If a word contains an allusive reference to goods or services it is, prima facie, qualified for the grant of a monopoly as a trade mark under the Act. If, on the other hand, the word is understood, by the target audience, as having a directly descriptive meaning in relation to relevant goods or services then, prima facie, the proprietor is not entitled to a monopoly in respect of the word. As a general proposition, a word or words which are prima facie entitled to a monopoly secured by registration as a trade mark under the Act, according to this method, are inherently adapted to distinguish: Cantarella at [71].[8]
[8] [2017] FCAFC 56, [236] (Greenwood, Besanko and Katzmann JJ).
As noted in paragraph 6 above, the process I am required to undertake is not a review of the examiner’s reasoning. However, it is useful to understand how the examiner considered the question of inherent adaption to distinguish in respect of the Trade Mark. The term CALLKIT does not have a dictionary definition. Nor do the dictionary definitions of CALL and KIT necessarily result in a term that is descriptive in respect of the Holder’s Goods (as opposed to, for example GREENAPPLE in respect of apples). Rather in the examination reports the examiner stated that ‘CALL is descriptive in relation to API calls as part of a software development KIT, and is also descriptive in relation to phone call software development. The word KIT has several relevant descriptive meanings in relation to the goods, most notably indicating that goods take the form of, or are connected with, a software development kit, or SDK. In relation to your goods, your trade mark indicates that you provide a set of software development tools, API calls, and related goods, for the development of software, including software for making phone calls, and that these goods are provided in the form of a software development KIT.’ For the reader I note that an API call is a request made by one program to another to access data – it is a particular mechanism enabling a program to interact with another program.
The Holder commences its submissions by addressing the exact nature of the goods for which extension of protection is sought, which it characterises as software tools, platforms and programs that can be downloaded and installed to assist developers in creating, testing, debugging and deploying software platforms. Its specification also refers to application programming interface software that provides a set of protocols, tools or functions that developers can use to enable communication and data exchange between different software components or systems during development.
The Holder submits that the Trade Mark has no dictionary meaning and that the term ‘CALLKIT’ is not in common use in Australia or elsewhere, rather that it comprises an unusual juxtaposition of words similar to TUB HAPPY (referring to the well-known decision discussed later in these reasons) with no ordinary meaning in the English language. It submits that, in the context of the Holder’s Goods the term does not have a sufficiently precise meaning for an ordinary signification to be established, noting that there are numerous different meanings for the terms ‘call’ and ‘kit’.
In the main, I accept the Holder’s submissions. While there is clearly some use of the constituent elements of the Trade Mark to refer to aspects of software development, I am unaware of any use of the combined term by third parties, and the meaning of the combined term is so imprecise, that I am not satisfied that the search results conducted by the examiner, nor any obvious meaning derived from the words constituting the Trade Mark definitively identify an ordinary signification for the Trade Mark, such that I can then determine if other traders in the Holder’s Goods may want to use that term in respect of their goods.
In particular while I accept that the term ‘kit’ could be used to refer to (or as an abbreviation of) a software development kit, I am not satisfied that the market for the Holder’s Goods would necessarily see the reference to ‘call’ as a reference to an API call (also known as an API request) nor am I satisfied that the combination of the two words, that may separately have meanings in the world of software development, results in a word with a precise and clear description, such that I could conclude that the Trade Mark is descriptive of the Holder’s Goods. Indeed, in the examiner’s report the suggested definition of CALLKIT was that the Holder ‘provide a set of software development tools, API calls, and related goods, for the development of software, including software for making phone calls, and that these goods are provided in the form of a software development KIT’. This does not appear to be a coherent definition of the term, in that it simply combines two possible meanings of the constituent words CALL KIT and suggests that the word would necessarily refer to both those elements.
The Holder submitted that at most the Trade Mark could refer to one aspect of the role that API software plays, which involves the making and receiving of requests from different pieces of software but this would at its highest involve an allusive reference to an aspect of the role that API software plays which would not trigger the operation of s 41. I accept this submission and consider that even to reach this conclusion would require the sort of search for meaning identified as an error in the case below.
Finally, I note that a CALL KIT could describe a tool for making phone calls but that is not descriptive of the Holder’s Goods which are for software development so I do not consider this ordinary signification of the Trade Mark to be relevant or descriptive in the context of the Holder’s Goods.
I note that in Mark Foy's Limited v Davies Coop and Company Limited (‘Tub Happy’), Dixon CJ stated that:
It is, I think, a mistake first to assume that words like “Tub Happy” do convey a meaning either to people in general or to a particular class of persons and then on that assumption to inquire what exactly the meaning is. Indeed to institute a search for a meaning almost necessarily implies that in ordinary English speech the words do not possess a connotation sufficiently definite to amount to a direct reference to the character or quality of the goods. And that is true even when to standard English usage is added all the figurative idiomatic and slang phraseology that may be currently in use. Once, however, the question is asked what do the words mean and there is started a search for a meaning, a process of analysis and of reasoning by exclusion of alternatives is begun. No doubt such a search may, without any sacrifice of logic, end in construing the words as meaning that the garments will emerge happily from the washtub. But if they are so interpreted, the interpretation is chiefly the consequence of failure to find another meaning. I venture to think, however, that a man, or for that matter a woman, hearing for the first time the words used in combination and in connection with cotton garments, would not so understand the words at once. Certainly such a person would not so understand them intuitively and without stopping to reflect and ask himself or herself what meaning the words could really possess.
The fallacy of asking what is the meaning of the phrase lies in the basal assumption that the words are intended to convey some definite meaning and perhaps the further assumption that the meaning has reference to the garments or the cottons. The assumption is fallacious because it overlooks the fact that language is not always used to convey an idea. Many uses of words are purely emotive. A word or words are often employed for no purpose but to evoke in the reader or hearer some feeling, some mood, some mental attitude. [9]
[9] [1956] HCA 41; (1956) 95 CLR 190, 194.
In order to reach the conclusion that the Trade Mark has any signification relevant to the Holder’s Goods, including the signification identified by the examiner, I would have to conclude that because the words ‘call’ and ‘kit’ have separate meanings in the field of software development, that a word combining the two must have meaning and then synthesise the proposed signification from that (very limited and apparently diffuse) use. This assumption is precisely the error identified in Tub Happy.
In Red Energy Pty Limited v Registrar of Trade Marks, which concerned the trade mark EVENPAY, the Federal Court stated:
In my view on the material before me, it would seem that EVENPAY does not have an ordinary meaning or signification in respect of the designated Goods or Services. In this respect:
(a) EVENPAY appears to present as an invented word.
(b) EVENPAY appears not to have a meaning in the context of these services that a consumer would immediately perceive.
(c) EVEN would seem to have multiple meanings, adding to the ambiguity and richness of meaning from a consumer standpoint. Those meanings include being divisible by two, level, smooth or balanced. It is also used as an adverb to give emphasis to an action, as in ‘she will even travel to...’.
(d) Further, the apparent lack of any ordinary signification or meaning appears to be reinforced by the removal of the space between EVEN and PAY.(e) Further, whilst being formed from the combination of two words, the combination seems to me to be syntactically unusual which takes it outside of ‘the common stock’.[10][10] [2018] FCA 1449, [13] (Beach J).
I consider the Trade Mark to have each of the features identified by Beach J in the case above. In particular, I note the multiple meanings of the term ‘call’ both generally and in the field of software development which further make it difficult to identify an ordinary signification. I do not accept that the Trade Mark has the signification identified by the examiner. I cannot, either through the use of ordinary dictionary definitions or any material before me, identify any particular ordinary signification of the Trade Mark that would amount to a direct reference to the character and quality of the Holder’s Goods. As such, I do not need to consider the second of the two steps established by Cantarella (including a review of the material provided by the Holder) and I find that the ground for rejection has not been established.
Decision
Regulation 17A.24 provides:
17A.24Final decision on examination
(1)The Registrar must, after the examination, accept the IRDA unless he or she is satisfied that:
(a)it is not in accordance with this Division; or
(b)there are grounds for rejecting it.
(2)The Registrar may accept the IRDA subject to conditions or limitations.
(3)The Registrar must reject an IRDA, in whole or in part, if the Registrar is satisfied that:
(a)it is not in accordance with this Division; or
(b)there are grounds for rejecting it, in whole or in part.
As I am not satisfied that there is a ground for rejecting the IRDA under section 41 of the Act I must accept the IRDA for possible extension of protection in Australia. As a delegate of the Registrar, I now do so.
Nicholas Smith
Hearing Officer
Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks
8 July 2025
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