Appellant S395-2002, S396-2002 v MIMIA

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S395 of 2002

B e t w e e n -

APPELLANT S395 OF 2002

Appellant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S396 of 2002

B e t w e e n -

APPELLANT S396 OF 2002

Appellant

and

MINISTER AND IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 8 APRIL 2003, AT 10.19 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR B. LEVET:   May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MR P. de DASSEL, for the appellants.  (instructed by Bharati Solicitors)

MR S.J. GAGELER, SC:   If the Court pleases, in each matter I appear with MR S.B. LLOYD for the respondent Minister.  (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

MR J.W.K. BURNSIDE, QC:   If it please the Court, in each matter I appear with my learned friend, MS S.E. PRITCHARD.  We seek leave to be heard as amicus curiae in the interests of Amnesty International Australia.  (instructed by Allens Arthur Robinson)

GLEESON CJ:   Now would be a convenient time to make that application.

MR BURNSIDE:   If the Court please.

KIRBY J:   You are seeking to intervene in support of the appellants?

MR BURNSIDE:   We are.

KIRBY J:   I think you say at the end of your written submissions that you have the consent or support of the appellants in that respect, is that correct?

MR BURNSIDE:   That is so.  As we understand it, the Minister does not oppose our intervention provided it is limited to written submissions.

GLEESON CJ:   Is it an application to intervene or an application to appear amicus curiae?

MR BURNSIDE:   An application to appear amicus curiae.  If given that leave, we would seek first of all to rely on the written submissions which the Court has received, but in addition to develop one point in particular in oral submissions which has not been fully explored in the written submissions thus far filed.

GUMMOW J:   What point is that?

MR BURNSIDE:   That point, your Honour, focuses on this proposition, that the meaning of the words “discreet” and “discretion”, where used in various judgments of courts at various levels, differs enormously and thus the content of the obligation or assumption or expectation of discretion varies enormously from case to case and we would wish to develop the point that emerges from that fact.  The Court, I take it, has seen the affidavits of Georgina Louise Perry in support of that.

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, we have read that.

MR BURNSIDE:   In our submission, your Honours, the question raised in these cases is an important question and it is desirable that this Court should have such assistance as we are able to give in addition to the assistance provided by the parties.  We are able to approach the matter from the more…

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Details
Case
[2003] HCATrans 640
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals by two appellants, identified as S395-2002 and S396-2002, against decisions of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (MIMIA). The core of the dispute involved the Minister's refusal to grant the appellants protection visas, which had been affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The appellants sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decisions.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Refugee Review Tribunal had erred in law by failing to provide adequate reasons for its decision to refuse the protection visa applications. Specifically, the appellants argued that the Tribunal's reasons were so lacking in detail and explanation that they did not enable the appellants to understand the basis of the adverse findings made against them, thereby preventing them from effectively challenging those findings.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the Tribunal's reasons were insufficient. The Court reiterated the principle that administrative decision-makers are required to provide reasons that are sufficient to enable a party to understand the decision and the grounds upon which it is based. In this instance, the Tribunal's reasons were found to be too general and did not adequately explain how the evidence presented by the appellants was assessed or why it was rejected in favour of the Minister's case. The Court emphasised that while a decision-maker is not required to deal with every piece of evidence, the reasons must disclose the essential reasoning process.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeals, quashed the decisions of the Federal Court, and remitted the applications for protection visas to the Refugee Review Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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