FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
APP17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 794
ORDERS
NSD 319 of 2018 BETWEEN: APP17
First Applicant
APQ17
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMWICH J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 MAY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application as assessed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BROMWICH J:
This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for judicial review of a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to refuse an extension of time in which to bring an application for judicial review of a…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 794
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court needed to decide revolved around the scope of judicial review under section 39B of the Judiciary Act and the specific requirements of section 477(2) of the Migration Act. The applicants argued that the refusal to extend time constituted jurisdictional error, as it was either a mistaken assertion or denial of jurisdiction or a misapprehension of the nature or limits of the Federal Circuit Court’s functions or powers. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection contended that the application should not have been brought without identifying clear jurisdictional error, as the scope of judicial review in such circumstances is limited to the quashing of the impugned order or decision for established jurisdictional error.
The court held that the application should be dismissed, as it did not identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Federal Circuit Court. The court emphasised that the scope of judicial review in such cases is narrow and limited to established jurisdictional error, as outlined in Craig v South Australia. The court noted that the refusal to extend time, even if considered erroneous, did not amount to jurisdictional error as it did not involve a mistaken assumption or denial of jurisdiction or a misapprehension of the nature or limits of the Federal Circuit Court’s functions or powers. The applicants had not identified any such error on the face of the record, and thus the application was without merit.
ORDERS:
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application as assessed or agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application as assessed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for judicial review of a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to refuse an extension of time in which to bring an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, as provided for by s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, to refuse the grant of protection visas to the applicants. Section 476A(3)(a) of the Migration Act provides that no appeal may be brought from an order or a refusal to make an order under s 477(2). Section 477(2) provides:The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:(a)an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and(b)the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order. The primary judge not only refused the extension of time application, but also added, unnecessarily but understandably, an order that the application was “otherwise dismissed”. An appeal against that otiose order would not be incompetent because it would not be, strictly speaking, contrary to the prohibition in s 476A(3)(a): see SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 26; 200 FCR 207 at [19]; but cf SZRBN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 984 at [21]-[23] and BZABK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 774; 205 FCR 83 at [35]-[38]. The applicant initially brought such an appeal, but it had no meaningful content, because even if the otiose order that the application for an extension of time was “otherwise dismissed” was overturned, the specific order dismissing that application would remain in force. In apparent recognition of this, that appeal proceeding was abandoned and dismissed, with a consent order as to costs in the Minister’s favour. This proceeding was commenced in replacement of the appeal. This application is therefore not an appellate procedure, enabling any general review of the primary judge’s order refusing an extension of time, or his Honour’s reasons for doing so. No more can be sought or granted than the quashing of the impugned order or decision, relevantly in this case, for established jurisdictional error, there being no suggestion of any error on the face of the record (that is, error of law on the face of the impugned order itself, without reference to the reasons, transcript or evidence unless somehow incorporated in the order: see Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163 at 180-183). It is helpful to begin with a short outline of the nature of jurisdictional error, a vexed topic. In Craig, as directly relevant to this application (omitting footnotes), the High Court:(1)non-exhaustively identified the nature of errors that will be jurisdictional (at 177):An inferior court falls into jurisdictional error if it mistakenly asserts or denies the existence of jurisdiction or if it misapprehends or disregards the nature or limits of its functions or powers in a case where it correctly recognises that jurisdiction does exist. Such jurisdictional error can infect either a positive act or a refusal or failure to act. Since certiorari goes only to quash a decision or order, an inferior court will fall into jurisdictional error for the purposes of the writ where it makes an order or decision (including an order or decision to the effect that it lacks, or refuses to exercise, jurisdiction) which is based upon a mistaken assumption or denial of jurisdiction or a misconception or disregard of the nature or limits of jurisdiction.(2)gave a number of examples of jurisdictional error, and commented upon its application to a statute conferring jurisdiction (at 177-178):… jurisdictional error will occur where an inferior court disregards or takes account of some matter in circumstances where the statute or other instrument establishing it and conferring its jurisdiction requires that that particular matter be taken into account or ignored as a pre-condition of the existence of any authority to make an order or decision in the circumstances of the particular case. Again, an inferior court will exceed its authority and fall into jurisdictional error if it misconstrues that statute or other instrument and thereby misconceives the nature of the function which it is performing or the extent of its powers in the circumstances of the particular case. In the last-mentioned category of case, the line between jurisdictional error and mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction may be particularly difficult to discern.and(3)outlined what will generally not constitute a jurisdictional error (at 179-180):… the ordinary jurisdiction of a court of law encompasses authority to decide questions of law, as well as questions of fact, involved in matters which it has jurisdiction to determine. The identification of relevant issues, the formulation of relevant questions and the determination of what is and what is not relevant evidence are all routine steps in the discharge of that ordinary jurisdiction. Demonstrable mistake in the identification of such issues or the formulation of such questions will commonly involve error of law which may, if an appeal is available and is pursued, be corrected by an appellate court and, depending on the circumstances, found an order setting aside the order or decision of the inferior court. Such a mistake on the part of an inferior court entrusted with authority to identify, formulate and determine such issues and questions will not, however, ordinarily constitute jurisdictional error. Similarly, a failure by an inferior court to take into account some matter which it was, as a matter of law, required to take into account in determining a question within jurisdiction or reliance by such a court upon some irrelevant matter upon which it was, as a matter of law, not entitled to rely in determining such a question will not ordinarily involve jurisdictional error.