FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
APH15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1160
Appeal from: APH15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 547 File number: NSD 465 of 2017 Judge: BROMWICH J Date of judgment: 29 September 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal against decision of primary judge dismissing application for judicial review of adverse International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) decision – prior protection visa application – impact of Data Breach – alleged error by primary judge to fail to adequately consider post-data breach circumstances of appellant – separation of family claim – alleged failure to consider all integers raised – held: no failure to consider any integers that were relevant to non-refoulement obligations of Australia as part of ITOA process – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 48B, 189, 195A, 417
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 art 33(1) (entered into force 22 April 1954)
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 arts 1(1), 3 (entered into force 26 June 1987)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 arts 6(1), 7 (entered into force 23 March 1976)
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty. Opened for signature 15 December 1989, 1642 UNTS 414 (entered into force 11 July 1991)
Cases cited: ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 279
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; 233 FCR 136
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; 333 ALR 653
Date of hearing: 11 August 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 47 Counsel for the Appellant: P Bodisco Solicitor for the Appellant: Michaela Byers Solicitors Counsel for the Respondents: J Davidson Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 465 of 2017 BETWEEN: APH15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
MILAN OZEGOVIC, IMA PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMWICH J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 SEPTEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BROMWICH J:
This is an appeal from orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the primary judge had failed to adequately consider the impact of the data breach on the appellant's circumstances and whether the primary judge had failed to consider all relevant integers raised in the appeal. The court also had to consider whether the primary judge's decision was affected by any jurisdictional error.
The court found that the primary judge had not failed to consider the impact of the data breach on the appellant's circumstances, as the data breach did not go to the issue of non-refoulement, which was the purpose of the ITOA process. The court also found that the primary judge had not failed to consider all relevant integers raised in the appeal, as the four matters raised by the appellant were not integers that were relevant to the non-refoulement obligations of Australia as part of the ITOA process. The court found that the primary judge had considered the separation of family claim, which was the only matter that went to the issue of non-refoulement.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the appeal as agreed or assessed. The court found that the Minister's submissions were compelling and should be accepted. The court found that the primary judge had not committed any jurisdictional error in their assessment of the appellant's circumstances. The court found that the primary judge had considered all relevant integers raised in the appeal and that there was no failure to consider any integers that were relevant to the non-refoulement obligations of Australia as part of the ITOA process. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) process was implemented to determine whether the appellant's circumstances engaged any non-refoulement obligations. The ITOA process was conducted to consider whether Australia had any non-refoulement obligations under the three treaties under consideration. The primary judge dismissed the appeal and found that the ITOA process had adequately considered the appellant's circumstances and relevant integers.
The case came before the court as an appeal against the decision of the primary judge dismissing the appellant's application for judicial review of the adverse ITOA decision. The appellant argued that the primary judge failed to adequately consider the post-data breach circumstances and family separation. The appellant further argued that the primary judge did not consider all relevant integers raised in the case. The court considered the appeal and the submissions made by both parties, including written and oral submissions by the Minister and correspondence from the Department.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It was submitted on behalf of the Minister that the only issue to which the asserted claims might have had a bearing on non-refoulement, being separation of the family unit, was specifically considered by the assessor, effectively addressing the third and fourth asserted integers identified by counsel for the appellant. There was no suggestion that the adverse ASIO assessment had formed any part of the Data Breach, which disposed of the first and second asserted integers identified by counsel for the appellant to the extent that they might be seen as going beyond the family separation issue expressly addressed by the assessor. It was further submitted that, contrary to an assertion on behalf of the appellant, those four matters were not sidestepped by the ITOA process, but were rather referred so that they could be separately addressed in a process which might be able to take them into account, being the exercise of the Minister’s wider discretion.Consideration The decisions relied upon by the appellant of Dranichnikov and Htun must be read and applied in a way that focuses not on every assertion made, but instead more narrowly upon those assertions which are integers of the claim being made, in this case for the engagement of non-refoulement obligations by reason of the three treaties under consideration. It follows that there was no jurisdictional obligation to consider facts or claims which can properly be regarded as not going to an integer of the claim being made. Of course, if an incorrect assessment is made by a decision-maker as to whether or how an assertion is directed to a claim, or integer of a claim, that may result in a jurisdictional error, as indeed happened in Dranichnikov and Htun. In Dranichnikov, the particular social group defined by the then Refugee Review Tribunal for the purposes of the application of the Refugees Convention was cast too broadly as business people, rather than business people in public protest about state-sanctioned corruption, including violence. Mr Dranichnikov claimed to belong to a group of legitimate businessmen who posed a threat to organised crime and had taken a stance against crime, which could be seen to be a social group at greater risk of persecution than businessmen more generally. As a result of this characterisation error, the Tribunal misstated the basis for a finding that Mr Dranichnikov’s asserted fear of persecution was not well-founded. That characterisation error led to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction because the Tribunal asked itself the wrong question for the purposes of assessing the asserted grounds for claiming a fear of persecution. It was also said to constitute a denial of procedural fairness by at least two justices of the High Court. In Htun, one of the bases for a sur place claim was not addressed, being again a central aspect of the claims made for the purposes of the application of the Refugees Convention. It may therefore be seen that both Dranichnikov and Htun were dealing with situations in which the claim that was misconstrued or otherwise overlooked went directly to the basis for the claim for refugee status, and thereby a protection visa. In a like fashion, for a jurisdictional error of this kind to have been committed by the assessor in this case, an assertion that was shown to have been overlooked had to be capable of being characterised as one that went to the issue of non-refoulement, being the purpose of the ITOA process, and not to some other issue or concern. That was the jurisdiction being exercised by the assessor.