FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AOA16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ORS | [2017] FCCA 189 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection (Class XA) visa – request to the Minister to exercise power under s.48B(1) to allow a further application for a protection visa – Minister’s Guidelines – determination by the Minister in advance – effect of s.476(2) is to preclude Court from reviewing decision in question. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.48A, 48B, 417, 474, 476 |
| Cases cited: Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] HCA 31 |
| Applicant: | AOA16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| Third Respondent: | NICKY SHAW, IN THE CAPACITY OF AN OFFICER OF THE COMMONWEALTH, OR IN THE CAPACITY OF AN OFFICER OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S DEPARTMENT |
| File Number: | MLG 515 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge McNab |
| Hearing date: | 7 October 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 7 October 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 8 February 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Krohn of Counsel |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Ambi Associates |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Ms Arduca |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The applicant’s application filed on 5 March 2016 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $3,606.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 515 of 2016
| AOA16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
Second Respondent
| NICKY SHAW, IN THE CAPACITY OF AN OFFICER OF THE COMMONWEALTH, OR IN THE CAPACITY OF AN OFFICER OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S DEPARTMENT |
Third Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Nature of Application
By an application filed 15 March 2016, the applicant sought an order that the respondents show cause why a remedy should not be granted in the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The applicant is seeking judicial review of a determination of the second and third respondents that the applicant did not meet the Ministerial Guidelines: Section 48A Cases and Request for Section 48B Ministerial Intervention (“the Guidelines”).
Background
The first respondent summarised the background of this matter in the outline of submissions filed 4 October 2016 as follows:
3.The applicant arrived on Christmas Island as an Illegal Maritime Arrival on 10 June 2012. He applied for a protection visa on 9 September 2012. The application was refused on 23 November 2012. The former Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed the decision on 22 January 2014.
The applicant appealed to the Federal Circuit Court on
18 February 2014 and the case was dismissed on 27 March 2015. An appeal to the Full Federal Court, made on
16 April 2015, was dismissed on 28 August 2015.
4.On 24 September 2015, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) received a request…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read AOA16 v Minister for Immigration and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCCA 189
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the Minister's power to intervene under sections 48B and 417 of the Act, or the processes undertaken by departmental officers in relation to these powers, attracted a requirement to observe procedural fairness. Specifically, the court considered whether the Minister had a duty to respond to a request for consideration of the exercise of these powers, or a duty to consider any class of case for such exercise, independent of a request. The court also examined the effect of section 474 of the Act, which designates certain decisions as "privative clause decisions" that are final and conclusive and cannot be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed, or called into question in any court.
The court reasoned that the powers conferred by sections 48B and 417 of the Act are discretionary and that the Minister is under no statutory duty to respond to a request for consideration of their exercise, nor is there a duty to consider any class of case independently. Consequently, when the Minister declines to embark upon such consideration, no question of procedural fairness arises. The court affirmed that the processes undertaken by departmental officers under ministerial guidelines, which involve acquiring information and categorising requests, constitute an executive function incidental to the administration of the Act and do not attract a requirement to observe procedural fairness. This reasoning was supported by reference to High Court decisions in *Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship* [2012] HCA 31 and *AAG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection* [2016] HCATrans 131.
The court found that the applicant had not identified a denial of procedural fairness and did not disclose an arguable case that the determination was unreasonable or irrational to the extent of affording a distinct ground of review. Furthermore, the court noted that section 476(2) of the Act precludes judicial review of decisions where the Minister has not personally made a procedural or substantive decision. As the applicant's claim did not fall within the exceptions to section 474, the decision was considered a privative clause decision and therefore not subject to review.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court in the matter of Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] HCA 31, considered the application of ss.48B and 417 of the Act which confers powers upon the Minister to intervene with respect to the granting of visas under the Act. In that matter, the plaintiffs submitted that in deciding whether or not to exercise the relevant powers, the Minister was obliged to afford procedural fairness to the plaintiffs. French CJ and Kiefel J held at [50] –[51]:50.The purpose and nature of the powers conferred by each of the dispensing provisions in these proceedings appears from their respective texts. It is clear from their terms that the Minister is under no duty to respond to a request for his or her consideration of the exercise of those powers. Nor is the Minister under a duty, independent of any such request, to consider any class of case for the exercise of those powers. With no statutory duty to consider the exercise of the Minister's powers being enlivened by a request or by the occurrence of a case to which the power might apply, no question of procedural fairness arises when the Minister declines to embark upon such a consideration. If, on ministerial instructions, certain classes of request or case are not even to be submitted to him or her for consideration, the position in law is unchanged. There is no exercise of a statutory power under the Act conditioned upon compliance with the requirements of procedural fairness.…There is, however, nothing about the character of the guideline processes, as an exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth or otherwise, that attracts to them a requirement to observe procedural fairness. Procedural fairness can be implied only as a condition of the exercise of a statutory power.[1] In a matter such as this, where the Minister had not personally made a procedural decision of a personal or substantive nature, the effect of s.476(2) of the Act is to preclude this Court from engaging in a review of this decision.[1] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTZ1 [2016] HCA 29 at [75] Furthermore, the applicant has not identified the manner in which he was denied procedural fairness and does not disclose an arguable case that the determination was unreasonable or irrational to the extent that it may afford a distinct ground of review. The proper approach to the resolution of the issues raised by this application were considered by Nettle J in an application to show cause in the High Court in AAG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCATrans 131 (3 June 2016). His Honour stated in relation to whether there was a requirement to observe procedural fairness on the part or departmental officers when considering the guidelines or whether the guidelines imposed an obligation on the Minister to intervene:Furthermore, as was held in Plaintiff S10 of 2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 246 CLR 636 at 654‑655 paragraphs 50 and 51 in the joint judgment of Chief Justice French and Justice Kiefel; and at 668 paragraph 100 in the joint judgment of Justices Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell, the Minister is under no duty to respond to a request for his or her consideration of the exercise of the power conferred by section 417, and it makes no difference at law that, on the basis of the ministerial instructions laid down in the guidelines, certain classes of requests are not to be submitted to the Minister for his or her consideration. See also Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134 of 2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441 at 460‑461 paragraphs 44‑48; and 474 paragraphs 99‑100 in the judgment of Justices Gaudron and Kirby. The work done by officers acting under the guidelines involves the acquisition of information and categorisation of requests or cases. It is an executive function incidental to the administration of the Act which stands outside the conventional statutory regime. Nothing about the character of the guideline processes, whether as an exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth or otherwise, is sufficient in itself to attract a requirement to observe procedural fairness or to impose an obligation on the Minister to intervene.