Anthonypillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Anthonypillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1368

MIGRATION – protection visa – finding by Tribunal that as the applicant concocted detention and mistreatment claims any inquiry of an attorney who could give evidence corroborating the claims would not assist the Tribunal – whether a duty to inquire – whether the Tribunal failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant’s detention and mistreatment claims

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 427(1)

Majeed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 470 - applied
Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1277 - applied
Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 96 FCR 125 – cited
Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 172 - cited
Addo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 940 - cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845 - cited
Kahn v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291 – applied
Hindi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 20 FCR 12-15 – applied
Brouussard v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 21 FCR 472 – applied
Surinakova v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 33 FCR 87 – cited
Mocan v Refugee Review Tribunal (1966) 42 ALD 241 – cited
Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28 - cited
Baban v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1341 – cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka (1998) 84 FCR 411 – cited
Hill v Green (1999) 48 NSWLR 161 - cited

ANTHONYPILLAI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 464 OF 1999

JUDGE:         MERKEL J
PLACE:         MELBOURNE
DATE:           27 SEPTEMBER 2000

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 464 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

RAVINDRAKUMAR ANTHONYPILLAI
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MERKEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 SEPTEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 16 July 1999 be set aside.

2.   The matter be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal to be determined in accordance with law.

3.   The respondent pay the applicant’s taxed costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 464 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

RAVINDRAKUMAR ANTHONYPILLAI
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MERKEL J

DATE:

27 SEPTEMBER 2000

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant, who is a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived in Australia on 3 December 1996.  He claimed to be entitled to a protection visa on the ground that, as he has a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of his race and political opinion if he returned to Sri Lanka, he is entitled to refugee…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1368
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Anthonypillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs concerns a Sri Lankan national who applied for a protection visa in Australia, claiming persecution in his home country. The Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) dismissed his claims, leading to an application for judicial review under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant argued that the RRT failed to properly consider the evidence, particularly a letter from a Sri Lankan lawyer corroborating his detention claims. The court examined whether the RRT gave proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the applicant's detention claims, considering the attorney's letter, which provided direct confirmation of some of the detentions.

The central legal issue was whether the RRT properly fulfilled its duty to consider all material evidence before it and to give genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant's claims. The court noted that the RRT had a duty to review the delegate's decision on the merits and consider all material facts. The attorney's letter provided direct, non-hearsay evidence that corroborated the applicant's claims, yet the RRT did not fully consider this evidence in light of its earlier adverse findings about the applicant's credibility. The court concluded that the RRT's decision-making process was flawed because it did not genuinely consider the attorney's letter as it should have, given the material facts it contained.

The court found that the RRT's failure to give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the applicant's detention claims meant it did not discharge its statutory duties. Consequently, the decision of the RRT was set aside, and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal for redetermination. The respondent was also ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 16 July 1999 be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal to be determined in accordance with law.

3. The respondent pay the applicant’s taxed costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ravindrakumar Anthony Pillai, a Sri Lankan national, applied for a protection visa in Australia. He alleged that he had been detained multiple times by the Sri Lankan authorities on suspicion of involvement with terrorist activities. He claimed that he was arrested in June 1996 in Colombo, in October 1996 in Kandy, and again in December 1996 in Colombo. Each time, he was detained under the Terrorism Act. He further claimed that the third detention was due to allegations of collecting funds for terrorists. He stated that he was released each time with the intervention of a Sri Lankan attorney at law, Miss Thilaga Subramaniam, who provided a letter dated 28 March 1997 corroborating his claims. Miss Subramaniam's letter stated that it was not safe for Mr. Anthonypillai to return to Sri Lanka as it would endanger his life. The Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) did not accept Mr. Anthonypillai's claims regarding his detention and mistreatment by the Sri Lankan authorities. The RRT found that Mr. Anthonypillai had concocted a number of instances of detention and did not accept the evidence in the attorney's letter.

Mr. Anthonypillai applied for a review of the RRT's decision under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The RRT had affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant him a protection visa. The primary matter before the court was the application for judicial review of the RRT's decision, on the ground that the RRT erred in law and did not observe procedures required to be observed in connection with the making of the decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The RRT did not accept the applicant’s claims in relation to his detention and mistreatment by the Sri Lankan authorities and affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant him a protection visa. The applicant has applied to review the decision of the RRT under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on the ground that it erred in law and did not observe procedures that were required to be observed in connection with the making of the decision.The RRT decision The RRT did not accept the applicant’s evidence in relation to his detention, stating that it was satisfied that:“the applicant has been prepared to concoct a number of instances of detention.” The RRT then turned to consider a letter dated 28 March 1997 signed under seal by Miss Thilaga Subramaniam, a Sri Lankan attorney at law and notary public (“the attorney’s letter”). The letter states:“This is to confirm that Mr. Ravindrakumar Anthony Pillai being a Sri Lankan Jaffna Tamil, and a married man with wife and child, was arrested by the Police on suspicion in June 1996 when he was in Colombo. He was detained under the Terrorism Act and was alleged to have been helping in numerous ways under false grounds. On my intercession he was released.Again he was arrested in October 1996 in Kandy on the false charges of collecting funds for the Terrorists, and was detained. This was brought to my notice and with great difficulty and using some influence I got him released.Then he was taken to custody for the third time from temporary resident in Colombo. Again using some influence he was released from Police custody with greatest difficulty.Since his life is in danger and in order to save his life and further harassment from the Police on my advice the said Ravindrakumar Anthony Pillai left Sri Lanka end 1996I vouch for the above facts in my opinion, it is not safe for him to return to Sri Lanka as it will endanger his life.This letter is given on request of Ravindrakumar Anthony Pillai outlining assistance provided to Ravindrakumar Anthony Pillai in the past, whom now residing in Australia.” During the hearing, the RRT (constituted by Mr Kissane) expressed certain concerns about the attorney’s letter to both the applicant (through his interpreter) and his solicitor (Mr Clutterbuck):“MR KISSANE: …lawyers tend to be very precise, and it seems to me that if a lawyer is asked to provide information about what it is that – what actions they have taken on your behalf in the past that they will go to a file and look up the dates and say that, ‘I helped him on the 6th of June. I helped him in September on this particular date. I helped him in October.’ But when I look at the letter it just says, ‘June ’96,’ then it says, ‘September ’96,’ then it says, ‘October ’96.’ It doesn’t give any dates at all.THE INTERPRETER: I didn’t have it in control or if we have to accept what she has said, but there is a phone number on the letterhead and if you want you can contact her and verify the dates, but I can’t help, it’s – not being in my country.MR KISSANE: It just seems to me that the way that letter is written indicates that you or your wife have gone to lawyer, or got some letterhead or something and contrived a letter in vague sort of way, whereas if you had really been detained the dates would be set out in there.THE INTERPRETER: I came here just to save my life, to avoid the trouble. I didn’t come prepared to come and stay here and prepare any documents and come in ready – come ready for all those things. I just because my adviser asked me to obtain this letter from you I rang my wife to obtain one, and she obtained one and sent. I have – I never – what I am doing and what I am telling is true, and I am not – I have not pre-planned or done anything to obtain – to scheme this situation. Everything that is happening to me is putting me in trouble and in the wrong – if I prepared and produced things like that and things I will not produce – I will do more, I can’t – I would not give all these things.MR CLUTTERBUCK: Can I just make two points just about that letter? Firstly the applicant has offered to the Tribunal for the Tribunal to contact the lawyers independently. If it is suggested that the applicant has somehow been involved in obtaining this letter, and the Tribunal wants to object to the information, the applicant can really do no more than suggest to the Tribunal that they contact them independently completely of himself. That’s all the applicant can do.The second thing we would say is that it is difficult for us to know exactly what sort of filing systems that are kept in Sri Lanka. Obviously Sri Lanka is not as advanced as Australia in many respects. Just with ourselves in our office, we do not keep files for more than two years we archive it. So any folders that are over two years old are archived, so if one of our former clients comes to us and says, ‘I want a letter of my situation from ’92,’ we would be able to say, ‘Well, we’ve got your name here, we’ve got the date we first acted for you, the date your file was closed and the result, we have got no more details than that.MR KISSANE: But the lawyer doesn’t say that. The lawyer doesn’t say, ‘I can’t access the details because it has been – because the information has been archived.’ I mean, if you are a lawyer and that is the situation that is what you say, isn’t it, Mr Clutterbuck? You say, ‘I am sorry, I can’t provide the information because it’s in the – in all the information that has been archived.MR CLUTTERBUCK: Well, it is hard to know because it has been indirect to you, but the applicant’s wife has approached the lawyer and said ‘Can you confirm that you acted for him in ’96 possibly?’ And she said, ‘All right.’ And she’s looked up her records probably and said, ‘I confirm that I acted for him in ’96.’ The applicant said here today he didn’t give full instructions, he didn’t say, ‘I want a comprehensive breakdown of every time Mrs Subramaniam was acting for me.’ We are submitting that things can sometimes get lost or simplified in those situations.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the present case the RRT considered making, but declined to make, any further inquiries in relation to the events detailed in the attorney’s letter. The RRT concluded that, given its adverse findings in respect of the applicant’s credibility, it was not necessary for it to make the requested inquiries of the attorney in relation to the matters set out in her letter. However, it does not follow that the RRT discharged its statutory duties in the matter by stating that the making of inquiries of the attorney would not assist it. That statement raises the issue of whether the RRT gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant’s detention claims.Proper, genuine and realistic consideration It is well established that the RRT is under a duty to review the decision of the delegate of the Minister on the merits and, in doing so, must have regard to all of the material and evidence before it and make findings on all of the material questions of fact raised by that material and evidence: see Addo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 940 at [19] and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845 at [52]. It is also well established that, in arriving at its decision, the RRT is under a duty to determine the material questions of fact before it for its determination after giving “proper, genuine and realistic consideration upon the merits” to those questions of fact: see Kahn v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291 at 292 per Gummow J; Hindi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 1 at 12-15 per Sheppard J; Broussard v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 21 FCR 472 at 483 per Gummow J; Surinakova v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 33 FCR 87 at 96 per Hill J; Mocan v Refugee Review Tribunal (1997) 42 ALD 241 at 245 per Merkel J and Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 28 at 64 per Merkel J. I have concluded that on a fair reading of the reasons of the RRT as a whole:· the RRT arrived at the finding that “the applicant has been prepared to concoct a number of instances of detention” before considering the attorney’s letter, which proffered direct corroboration of some of those instances of detention; and· in doing so the RRT failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration upon the merits to the applicant’s detention claims. My reasons for those conclusions are as follows. The attorney’s letter corroborated the applicant’s claims in respect of the 1996 detentions. The corroboration was contained in material that was not based on hearsay evidence but, rather, was in a statement by an attorney purporting to have direct knowledge of the 1996 detentions: cf Baban v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1341 at [22]. The alleged detentions were material facts, in the sense that they were facts upon which the applicant’s case was likely to turn.