Anne Margaret Bryant v Edward John Kowcun

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CITATION:Anne Margaret BRYANT v Edward John Kowcun [2017] NTLC 032

PARTIES:Anne Margaret BRYANT

V

Edward John KOWCUN

TITLE OF COURT:  LOCAL COURT

JURISDICTION:  Criminal

FILE NO(s):21634093

DELIVERED ON:  21 December 2017

DELIVERED AT:  Darwin Local Court

HEARING DATES:  11 July 2017 & 02 November 2017

JUDGMENT OF:  Chief Judge John Lowndes

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW - DEFENCE OF MENTAL IMPAIRMENT UNDER SECTION 77 OF THE MENTAL HEALTH AND RELATED SERVICES ACT – THE SCHEME OF THE ACT – SUBSTANCE INDUCED MENTAL ILLNESS – PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF SECTION 77 CERTIFICATE – BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF - EVALUATION OF EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE

Mental Health and Related Services Act ss 6 and 77
Criminal Code s 43A
O’Neill v Lockeyer [2012] NTSC 10 followed
Mununuggur v Gordon & Anor [2011] NTSC 82 followed
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Prosecution:  Mr Rowbottam

Defendant:Mr Jehne

Solicitors:

Prosecution:  DPP

Defendant:NTLAC

Judgment category classification:        A

Judgment ID number:  [2017] NTLC 032

Number of paragraphs:  114

IN THE LOCAL COURT
AT DARWIN IN THE NORTHERN
TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

No. 21634093

BETWEEN:

Anne Margaret BRYANT

Plaintiff

AND:

Edward John KOWCUN

Defendant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 21 December 2017)

CHIEF JUDGE LOWNDES:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The defendant was charged with various offences: assaulting a police officer whilst in the execution of his duty, resisting a member of the police force in the execution of his duty and engaging in offensive conduct. The defendant subsequently sought to have the charges dismissed pursuant to s 77(4) of the Mental Health and Related Services Act (the Act), which provides for a statutory defence of mental impairment.

  2. The dismissal process is instigated by the court requesting from the Chief Health Officer a certificate stating:[1]

    (a) whether at the time of carrying out the conduct constituting the alleged offence, the person was suffering from a mental illness or a mental disturbance; and

    (b) if the person was suffering from a mental illness or mental disturbance – whether the mental illness or mental disturbance is likely to have materially contributed to the conduct.

  3. After receiving the certificate, the court must dismiss the subject charge or charges if satisfied that at the time of carrying out the conduct constituting the alleged offence:

    (a) the person was suffering from a mental illness or mental disturbance;[2] and

    (b)  as a consequence of the mental illness or mental disturbance, the person:[3]

    (i)did not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or

    (ii)did not know the conduct was wrong; or

    (iii)was not able to control his or her actions.

  4. In accordance with s 77(2) and (4) of the Act a certificate was provided by the Chief Health Officer which stated that although at the time of the alleged offending the defendant was suffering from a mental illness, the mental illness did not materially contribute to the conduct constituting the alleged offence.

  5. The report upon which the certificate was based was prepared by Ms Fiona Towns. Both the prosecution and defence sought to rely…

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Details
Case
[2017] NTLC 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Anne Margaret Bryant v Edward John Kowcun, the defendant, Edward John Kowcun, sought to raise a defence of mental impairment under Section 77 of the Mental Health and Related Services Act. The dispute revolved around whether the defendant was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the alleged offences, which would have impaired his ability to understand the nature and quality of his conduct, or to know that it was wrong, or to control his actions. The case was heard in the relevant court where the defendant attempted to rely on expert opinion evidence to support his claim of mental impairment.

The primary legal issues for the court to decide were whether the defendant had established the requisite facts to prove his mental impairment defence on the balance of probabilities, and if the court could be satisfied that the defendant's mental illness materially contributed to his alleged offending. The court had to assess the admissibility and probative weight of the expert opinion evidence provided by Dr Walton, considering whether the facts assumed to exist for the opinion had been proved. The court also needed to determine if the statutory requirements for the defence of mental impairment were met, particularly under Section 77(4)(b) of the Act.

The court found that while Dr Walton's expert opinion evidence was admissible, the probative weight of the evidence was insufficient. The factual basis for Dr Walton's opinion did not adequately support the conclusion that the defendant was suffering from a mental illness at the material time, nor did it sufficiently establish that the mental illness materially contributed to the alleged offending. The court concluded that the defendant had not satisfied the court on the balance of probabilities that he was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the alleged offences and that such illness impaired his understanding or control of his actions. Therefore, the court dismissed the application under Section 77 of the Act.

The final orders of the court were that the application for a defence of mental impairment under Section 77 of the Mental Health and Related Services Act was dismissed, and the defendant's defence was not accepted. The case proceeded to trial with the defendant's mental impairment defence not being considered.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It follows from the majority decision in Dasreef that “if the opinion evidence is to be admitted, assessment of the weight to be given to the opinion will necessarily require consideration whether any facts assumed to have existed for the opinion have been proved to exist”.[28] In other words, a failure to prove the facts underlying the opinion goes to the probative weight of the evidence.EVALUATION OF THE EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE In my opinion, the expert evidence contained in Dr Walton’s two reports and the oral evidence he gave at the hearing satisfied the pre-conditions for admissibility as discussed by the majority in Dasreef, and therefore was admissible. However, the probative weight to be given to Dr Walton’s evidence remains to be determined. The probative value of his evidence depends largely upon whether the factual substratum for his opinion has been established to the satisfaction of the court and whether the proven factual bases validly support the opinion proffered by Dr Walton. In his initial report, Dr Walton stated that he examined the defendant on 15 February 2017. He mentioned that he had been provided with copies of the charges, the statement of facts, witness statements and the defendant’s prior criminal history, as well as correspondence from Ms C Lightowler, community support worker, Banyan House and Ms S Abraham, Alcohol and Other Drugs Clinician, Banyan House, the report of Ms F Towns, social worker and the s 77 certificate from the Chief Health Officer, as well as the discharge summary from Cowdy Ward. The doctor also stated that he had spoken to the defendant’s mother. Dr Walton noted in his report that the defendant was admitted to Cowdy Ward on 3 August 2016 (some 11 days after the alleged offending) and discharged on 19 August 2016. He also stated that it was documented that the defendant had presented himself to the Royal Darwin Hospital Emergency Department on 28 July 2016 (5 days after the alleged offending), at which time he was considered to be in a state of “early relapse of psychosis”. However, he was not admitted because he was not considered to be at risk. Dr Walton went on to report:By the time he underwent more extensive assessment preceding the admission to hospital, he was exhibiting clear cut auditory hallucinations and paranoid and religious delusions. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia. The history of substance abuse was noted. In preparing his report, Dr Walton noted the observations made by Constable George Ciolka in his statutory declaration dated 23 July 2013 concerning the incident that gave rise to the laying of the charges against the defendant.[29] Those observations were that the defendant was “acting in an erratic manner by the way he was pacing and there was spittle coming from his mouth and I could see that his eyes were bloodshot”. Dr Walton also noted the observations made by Constable P Annakin which were to the effect that the defendant was intoxicated, and was using abusive language as well as being unco-operative.[30] He also noted the observations made by the defendant’s wife which were to the effect that the defendant became agitated and was laughing and talking to himself, with his voice becoming louder.[31] He further noted the following narrative given by the wife: “I came outside and tried to calm the situation as the yelling was getting worse. He was talking to a person who was not present and swearing”. Dr Walton also reported that the defendant was not aggressive towards her.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Dr Walton’s oral evidence adds little, if nothing, to the probative value of his expert opinion that the defendant was suffering from a mental illness at the material time and that the illness made a material contribution to the alleged offending. The bases upon which he formed his opinion do not support the opinion.DECISION In my opinion, the defendant has failed to satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities that at the time of carrying out the conduct constituting the alleged offences he was suffering from a mental illness and as a consequence of the mental illness he:(a) did not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or(b) did not know the conduct was wrong; or(c) was not able to control his actions. The factual substratum for Dr Walton’s opinion that the defendant was suffering from a mental illness at the material time was either not established to the satisfaction of the court, or if established did not sufficiently support the opinion such that the court could be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was at the time of carrying out the relevant conduct suffering from a mental illness. Furthermore, even if the defendant had been found to have been suffering from a mental illness, the matters set out in s 77(4)(b) of the Act have not been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the court. The court therefore dismisses the application under s 77 of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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