Angel v National Australia Bank Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Angel v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] FCA 1053

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – motion by respondent to strike out applicants’ claim as an abuse of process – applicants had mortgaged their property to respondent to secure a fixed loan – later applied for overdraft facility – overdraft facility granted and secured by up-stamping mortgage – mortgage was an “all moneys” security – applicants exceeded their overdraft limit almost immediately – respondent, after several warnings, called up the loans, including the moneys overdrawn – respondent, after serving notice demanding possession, sued applicants in Supreme Court of Western Australia for possession of the mortgaged property – applicants entered an appearance by their solicitors – respondent applied for summary judgment – one applicant swore affidavit to show cause that there was an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried – specific allegation of unconscionable conduct raised in that affidavit – Master ordered judgment in favour of respondent for possession of mortgaged property – applicants did not appeal – six months later applicants sued respondent in Federal Court seeking damages and relief under the Trade Practices Act in respect of alleged misleading or deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct including but extending beyond that relied upon by them in the Supreme Court proceedings, alternatively damages at common law for the respondent’s alleged negligence – applicants sought interlocutory injunctive relief restraining respondent from exercising its rights under the mortgage – whether subject matter of proceedings res judicata – whether issue estoppel applied to bar the proceedings – whether the principle in Anshun should apply – interlocutory injunctive relief refused – application struck out as abuse of process.

Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 referred to
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 applied
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 referred to
Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128 referred to
Golski v Kirk (1987) 14 FCR 143 referred to
Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 510 referred to
Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 referred to
Bulurru Australia Pty Ltd v Oliver (2000) 49 IPR 384 applied
Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251 distinguished
Linprint Pty Ltd v Hexham Textiles Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 508 referred to
Carl Ziess Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No. 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 referred to
Morlend Finance Corporation (Vic) Pty Ltd v Levine [1990] VR 193 referred to
Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 [67 ER 313] applied
Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581 referred to

JOHN JAMES STEWART ANGEL and GLENYSE JOY ANGEL v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
W 207 of 2001  

CARR J
3 AUGUST 2001 
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 207 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

JOHN JAMES STEWART ANGEL and
GLENYSE JOY ANGEL
Applicants

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
(ACN 009 230 433)
Respondent

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1053
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Angel v National Australia Bank Ltd, the applicants, Angel, brought proceedings against the respondent, National Australia Bank Ltd, seeking various reliefs including an interlocutory injunction to restrain the bank from exercising its power of sale over their property. The bank, in turn, moved to have the applicants' claim struck out on the basis that it constituted an abuse of process. The matter was heard in the Federal Court, where Justice von Doussa examined the applicants' claims and the bank's motion to strike out. The central legal issue was whether the applicants' proceedings amounted to an abuse of process, warranting the dismissal of their claims and an order for them to pay the bank's costs on an indemnity basis.

Justice von Doussa concluded that the applicants' claims were indeed an abuse of process. The reasoning behind this decision included the applicants' weak case for an interlocutory injunction and their failure to substantiate claims of unconscionable conduct or breach of duty of care. The applicants' motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed on the basis that they had not raised a serious question to be tried, and their case was weak on several fronts, including their characterization of certain representations and their allegations of unconscionable conduct. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicants' originating application and ordered that the applicants pay the bank's costs of the application, albeit on a party and party basis rather than an indemnity basis, due to the lack of special circumstances that would warrant such an order.

The final orders included the dismissal of the applicants' motion for an interlocutory injunction, with the applicants to pay the bank's costs of that motion. Additionally, the bank's motion to strike out the applicants' claims was granted, and the applicants were ordered to pay the bank's costs of the application. The court's decision underscored the importance of substantiating claims in court and the potential consequences of pursuing proceedings that are deemed an abuse of process.

Orders

Orders of the court

A. Applicants’ motion filed 29 June 2001

1. The motion be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

B. Respondent’s motion filed 3 July 2001

1. The application, filed on 5 June 2001, be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The second motion is the respondent’s motion for an order that the applicants’ claim be struck out and that the applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application on an indemnity basis. The relevant Federal Court Rule under which the respondent brings its application is not identified in its notice of motion. However, from the affidavit of Ms June Evelyn Bartlett, a partner in the respondent’s solicitors, sworn on 3 June 2001 it appears that the basis for the motion is that the applicants’ proceedings constitute an abuse of process. This was confirmed in the respondent’s written outline of submissions. The motion can thus be seen to have been brought under Order 20 rule 2(1)(c) which relevantly provides that where in any proceeding it appears to the Court that in relation to the proceeding generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceeding, the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court, it may order that the proceeding be stayed or dismissed generally or in relation to the claim for relief in the proceeding. Order 20 rule 2(2) provides that the Court may receive evidence on the hearing of such a motion. I propose to turn first to the factual and procedural background, then to consider the respondent’s motion and finally to consider the applicants’ motion. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I should emphasise that in referring to factual matters I am in no way to be taken as making final findings of fact. I am simply referring to the state of the evidence which is at present before the Court, most of which (but by no means all) is not in issue. On 19 June 1995 the applicants became the registered proprietors of an estate in fee simple in the land comprised within Certificate of Title Vol 1939 Folio 326. From the transfer of land, which is in evidence, it appears that the purchase price was $230,000 including $8,000 which was allocated to chattels. On the same date there was registered a mortgage of that land from the applicants to Elders Ltd. The land comprises a farm property of just over 30 hectares adjoining the South Western Highway approximately 12 kms south of Manjimup. I shall refer to that land as “the Property”. The applicants’ evidence is that since acquiring the Property they have made substantial changes to it, transformed its former pastoral use into intensive horticulture and made improvements to a café which is situated on the Property. In 1997 the applicants were appointed by Woolworths Supermarkets to be a supplier of horticultural produce including cauliflower, broccoli, brussel sprouts, squash, cucumber and runner beans. At some time before 30 January 1998 the applicants had discussions with the respondent about re-financing their existing facilities with Elders Ltd. It would appear that they asked the respondent for a loan. On 30 January 1998 the respondent wrote to the applicants declining what was described in that letter as their application for finance. It would also appear that there were subsequent discussions which resulted in the respondent agreeing to re-finance the applicants’ existing facilities by lending them $444,000 to be secured by a mortgage over the Property. The terms of the loan were that the applicants would initially only have to pay interest on the principal for the first two years, with a debt reduction programme to commence in March 2000 on the basis of a proposed annual reduction of a minimum of $37,000. On 13 May 1998 the respondent loaned $444,000 to the applicants. On that date their mortgage to Elders Ltd was discharged and mortgage G790569 (which I shall refer to as “the Mortgage”) from the applicants to the respondent was registered.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

CARR J
I think that the rule in Anshun applies to the present application. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons the applicants’ originating application should be struck out as an abuse of process. The respondent seeks costs of the application on an indemnity basis. In my view, there should be party and party costs, not indemnity costs. My short reasons for this are that I do not think that the circumstances are sufficiently special – see the recent discussion of the matter of indemnity costs by Harper J in Ugly Tribe Co Pty Ltd v Sikola [2001] VSC 189. In particular, I do not think that it was sufficiently obvious that the applicants’ claims were an abuse of process to warrant the sanction of an indemnity costs order being imposed. THE APPLICANTS’ MOTION FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION Strictly speaking, in view of my above conclusion in respect of the respondent’s motion, it is not necessary to consider the applicants’ motion. However, I shall do so briefly in case I am held to be wrong in my above conclusion. The applicants’ motion was filed on 29 June 2001. I have set out (at para 1 above) the terms of the orders sought. In summary, the applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent from exercising its power of sale of the Property and from forcing the applicants to give the respondent vacant possession of the Property, subject to certain conditions (see paragraph 1 above). The motion was supported by an affidavit sworn by Mrs Angel on 28 June 2001. It would appear from paragraph 79 of that affidavit that at that time the applicants were still in possession of the Property. In a subsequent affidavit, sworn by Mrs Angel on 12 July 2001, she asserted that the respondent had, since 28 June 2001, taken possession of the Property by forcing entry and changing the locks to the shed and residence on the Property. The respondent’s evidence and submissions are that it obtained possession of the Property between 28 June 2001 and 12 July 2001 by the sheriff of the Supreme Court of Western Australia executing a writ of possession requested by the respondent on 5 April 2001. It appears from Mrs Angel’s second affidavit that the applicants now seek to regain possession of the Property. She swears to her belief that it would be in the interests of both the applicants and the respondent if the applicants were allowed to “regain possession and attend to the maintenance of the farm property”. She further swears that the applicants are willing to undertake to consent to the sale of the farm property “… provided the sale takes place at a reasonable price and we are able to maintain the farm property pending sale.” Finally Mrs Angel swears to her belief that economic conditions are such in the Manjimup district and the south-west timber communities that the Property will be sold at a “gross under-value” and probably for an amount below the moneys owed to the respondent. I first consider whether the applicants have raised a serious question or questions to be tried. The authorities show that the various discretionary factors relating to the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief are not to be put into separate compartments, but are to be considered together. I do so, but as I say, I consider this question first. In my view, on the current state of the evidence, the applicants’ case is a weak one. For example, I do not consider that the representations upon which they rely lend themselves readily to the characterisation which the applicants assert. Nor do I regard the allegations of unconscionable conduct as being firmly based. They reflect a situation in which the applicants, at a very early stage, exceeded their overdraft limit and immediately had their attention drawn to that default. Then they were given notice that the respondent regarded these breaches seriously and eventually the respondent enforced its rights. Unconscionable conduct on the respondent’s part is not readily apparent. Nor do I consider that the claim based on alleged breach of duty of care has much in the way of substance.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CARR J

Full text does not contain this section.