ANE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ANE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 305

Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: ANE17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2145
File number: NSD 1699 of 2017
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 20 February 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time within which to file an application for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court – where substantive merits of the proposed appeal grounds are determinative – where no apparent error by primary judge shown – application dismissed  
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Pt 7AA, ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473BA, 476

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 44.12(2)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 35.14(3)(d)

Cases cited:

BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 169

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136

MZYXS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 614

SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936

Date of hearing: 20 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person, assisted by an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R White
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1699 of 2017
BETWEEN:

ANE17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)

LEE J:

A        INTRODUCTION

  1. On 27 September 2016, the applicant filed an application for extension of time and leave to appeal, together with an affidavit he had affirmed four days earlier.  The affidavit did not annex a copy of a draft notice of appeal (as is required by FCR 35.14(3)(d)).  Having noted that, under the heading “Grounds of application”, the following three matters were identified:

    (1) Jurisdictional error

    (2) Error of law on the face of the IAA decision

    (3) I still rely on the grounds and details stated in my Federal Circuit Court decision and the application filed.

    (Uncorrected)

  2. The primary judge delivered his reasons on 5 September 2017, which dismissed an application for an order to show cause made pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), which sought review of a decision of the second respondent (IAA

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 305
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ANE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved a Sri Lankan citizen who arrived in Australia by boat and applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The applicant claimed to be a Tamil and a Hindu who fled Sri Lanka due to persecution and a violent altercation following an election. Despite the delegate's acceptance of the applicant's credibility and consistency, the delegate refused the visa application, finding that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious or significant harm upon return to Sri Lanka. The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal the interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the application for an extension of time to appeal the interlocutory decision should be granted. The court also needed to determine if there was an arguable case of error in the primary judge's decision. The applicant argued that the delegate's decision was flawed due to the failure to invite him to comment on adverse information and the lack of common law procedural fairness. The court examined these arguments in the context of the statutory regime governing fast-track reviews, specifically sections 473DA, 473DC, and 473DD of the Migration Act.

The court found no arguable case of error in the primary judge's decision. It determined that the Immigration and Asylum Reviewer (IAA) had comprehensively considered the applicant's claims and that the findings made were open to the IAA on the available material. The court further held that there was no jurisdictional error in the IAA's consideration of the applicant's refugee claims when assessing his claims under the complementary protection provisions. The court rejected the applicant's contention that he was entitled to common law procedural fairness, as the statutory regime for fast-track reviews did not require such procedural fairness. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time and refused leave to appeal, with costs.

The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed with costs. The court emphasized that the decision was based on the comprehensive consideration of the applicant's claims and the absence of any arguable case of error in the primary judge's determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is convenient to now turn to the way in which the matter was presented before the primary judge in the application made to the Federal Circuit Court. However, before doing so, I should provide some very brief background details.B RELEVANT BACKGROUND The applicant is a Sri Lankan citizen, and it is common ground that he arrived in Australia at an excised offshore place, by boat, on 26 October 2012. This is of significance, because it means that the applicant is an unauthorised maritime arrival subject to the fast-track review process introduced by the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth), which relevantly inserted Pt 7AA into the Act. It is unnecessary for me to summarise the statutory regime introduced by Pt 7AA, as it has been considered in some detail in two recent decisions of the Full Court: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136 at [11]-[26] per Griffiths J and BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 169 at [64]-[75] per Charlesworth J. It suffices to note that, as the simplified outline in s 473BA of the Act provides, Pt 7AA: Provides a limited form of review of certain decisions…to refuse protection visas to some applicants, including unauthorised maritime arrivals who entered Australia on or after 13 August 2012, but before 1 January 2014, and who have not been taken to a regional processing country. In any event, in April 2016, the applicant lodged an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa and set out his claims for protection, claiming that he was a Tamil and a Hindu born in the Ampari District in Sri Lanka and that he subsequently moved to the capital, Colombo, for work in 2010. The applicant claimed, as he repeated in oral submissions before me, that in 2004, his mother, sister and brother were killed in a tsunami and, after living in a refugee camp for one year from January 2005, he went to live with his grandmother and brother. On any view of it, the applicant’s circumstances present a very sad situation. The applicant claimed that after voting in an election in August 2012, he and his friends were approached by a man who demanded they go back and vote again for a particular political organisation. The applicant and his friends refused, the consequence of which was a violent altercation during which a friend of the applicant was stabbed. Following the altercation, the applicant retreated, fearing for his life and remained in hiding while associates of the provocateurs came looking for him at his home. The applicant feared harm, and made arrangements to travel out of Sri Lanka. He departed in October 2012 and made claims that, on several occasions, persons have returned to his grandmother’s house looking for him. The applicant attended an interview before a delegate of the Minister in September 2016. Notably, the delegate found that the applicant was a credible witness who provided a generally consistent account of his experiences, and accepted most of his claims. Notwithstanding this, the delegate refused to grant the applicant a visa on the basis that following an assessment of the claims and evidence, including, importantly, the relevant country information, the delegate was not satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm on return to Sri Lanka.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In accordance with the reasoning of the majority in SZTAL, it could not be said that the findings made by the IAA lead to a conclusion that the period of remand that the applicant would face would amount to an act or omission by which there was intentional infliction of, or the intention of causing, harm to the applicant. As the plurality (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ) in SZTAL explained (at 943 [26]-[27]), knowledge or foresight does not equate to intent, and the natural and ordinary meaning of the word “intends” informs the way in which the complementary protection regime of the Act is to be interpreted. Accordingly, it cannot not be said that anything about the subsequent decision in SZTAL affects the determination that his Honour made in the present matter.E CONCLUSION Having found that no arguable case of error exists, it seems to me that the only appropriate exercise of discretion in the circumstances is to refuse the application for an extension of time and also refuse leave to appeal. The application must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Dealing with Ground 2, his Honour observed at [30]-[33]:In Ground 2, the applicant complains that the Authority erred by not inviting him to an interview or to comment on, or respond to, adverse information that was relied on to refuse his protection visa application. He erroneously contends the Authority was required to invite him to provide his comments in writing and to appear in order to give evidence and present arguments. He claims he indicated to the Authority that he was “willing to provide further evidence” to substantiate his claims.There is no evidence to support the applicant’s assertions in this ground. Nor does the applicant even identify what adverse information he contends the Authority was required to invite him to comment upon or respond to.In any event, the applicant’s complaints in ground two misconceive the review function of the Authority and the accompanying statutory regime governing fast-track reviews. The applicant’s fast track review was subject to s.473DA and the applicant was not owed common law procedural fairness in respect of the fair hearing rule. The limited nature of the scheme or review conducted by the Authority was recently affirmed by the Federal Court. Further, s.473DB(1) compels the Authority, subject to Part 7AA, to review a fast track reviewable decision referred to it on the papers, that is, by considering the review material provided to the Authority under s.473CB “without accepting or requesting new information”. Section 473DC(1) specifies that the Authority may, subject to Part 7AA, “get any documents or information (new information)” that “were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65” and “the Authority considers may be relevant”. However, s.473DC(2) confirms the discretionary nature of the power in subsection (1) by stating the Authority “does not have a duty to get, request or accept any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances”. Further, s.473DD specifies that new information must not be considered unless the Authority is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist, the information could not have been provided to the Minister and is credible personal information which was not previously known.(Citations omitted)D CONSIDERATION Having reviewed the relevant material, I find it impossible to disagree with the primary judge’s conclusion that the IAA: comprehensively considered the applicant’s claims against the refugee and complementary protection criteria; concluded that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious or significant harm; and that the findings made by the IAA were findings open to it on the available material. Put bluntly, what was sought below is essentially what is sought here: an impermissible merits review of the assessment made by the IAA. Moreover, as the primary judge correctly observed at [37], there was no jurisdictional error in the IAA referring to its findings of fact in relation to the applicant’s refugee claims when assessing his claims under the complementary protection provisions: see SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774 at [54]-[56] per Robertson J; MZYXS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 614 at [31] per Marshall J.