SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeals to a Single Judge: Civil)
ANDRESSEN v BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LTD
[2016] SASC 111
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker
28 July 2016
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW - SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION - UNDER OTHER LEGISLATION AND RULES OF COURT - VALIDITY
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW - JURISDICTION - SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION
PROCEDURE - COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY - COURTS - RULES OF COURT - POWERS OF COURT IN RELATION TO COURT
Appeal against the decision of a Judge of the District Court refusing an appeal from the decision of a Master. The respondent Bank filed a statement of claim in the District Court seeking to recover from the appellant $155,823.45 remaining outstanding under the terms of a loan agreement. Shortly after the proceedings were issued the appellant left the jurisdiction. The Bank obtained orders for presumptive service under rule 69 of the District Court Rules. The appellant made an application for an order restraining the Bank from entering judgment. A Master dismissed the application and upheld the validity of the presumptive service order. The matter was appealed to a Judge of the District Court. The Judge found for the Bank and held that the Master was entitled to make the order for presumptive service. The matter was then appealed to a single Judge of the Supreme Court. The issues are whether permission to appeal ought to be granted and whether a summons in an action in personam could be effected by presumptive service at a time when the defendant was not in Australia.
Held per Parker J dismissing the appeal:
(1) Permission to appeal is granted. The appeal raises a serious question about the operation of the District Court Rules. The Appellant has an arguable case that the matter was not correctly decided by the Judge and the Master.
(2) The Judge erred in finding that at common law it was sufficient for a defendant to be within the jurisdiction at the time the writ was issued. The service of a writ, rather than its issue, is the basis for jurisdiction and substituted service cannot be effected after the defendant has left the jurisdiction.
(3) Section 50A of the District Court Act 1991 empowers the District Court to make orders that extend its jurisdiction beyond the limits that exist at common law. Thus, the Master’s orders allowed presumptive service regardless of whether or not the appellant was overseas at the time of service.
(4) Obiter: there was no authority in support of a constructive presence principle in relation to service of a writ. Such a principle would have rendered superfluous the consideration given by the courts to the issue of substituted service on persons outside the jurisdiction.
District Court Civil Rules 2006 r 10(2), r 40, r 40(1), r 40(2), r 40(3), r 41AD, r 69, r 69(2), r 69(3) r 117(2); District Court Act 1991 s 8, s 50A, s 50A(1), s 50A(2), s 50(1), s 51, s 51(1)(g);
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- Case
- [2016] SASC 111
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether service of a summons in an action in personam could be effectively executed by presumptive service when the defendant was not in Australia. This hinged on the scope of the District Court's rule-making power and the operation of the District Court Civil Rules 2006. The court had to determine whether the Master of the District Court had the authority to order presumptive service and if such an order was valid under the circumstances.
The court found that the Master's order for presumptive service was valid. It concluded that the District Court had the requisite rule-making power under the District Court Act 1992 and that the order for presumptive service was consistent with the District Court Civil Rules 2006. The court emphasized that the validity of the order did not depend on Dr Andressen's actual presence in Australia at the time of service. The court also addressed the common law principles regarding service outside the jurisdiction, noting that while the defendant needed to be amenable to the court's jurisdiction, the focus should be on the defendant's presence at the time the writ was issued. Ultimately, the court granted permission to appeal, dismissing the appeal and directing that the parties be heard regarding costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In support of the submission that Dr Andressen was constructively within the jurisdiction, counsel for the Bank noted that the firm of solicitors acting for him had actively participated in the proceedings. They had applied to set aside the original default judgment, had requested documents referred to in the statement of claim, presumably for the purposes of defending the action, and had appeared and made submissions through counsel at the hearing of the application by the Bank for presumed service. It was clear that the proceeding served under the order made by the Master on 21 November 2014 had come to the attention of Dr Andressen. However, his instructions apparently fell short of what counsel described as “the proper thing to do” which was to instruct his solicitors to accept service. It was apparent that Dr Andressen had an agent in South Australia and that agent was an officer of the court. As an officer of the court the solicitor was under a duty to avoid unnecessary delay. In these circumstances it was open to the Court to use its powers to avoid the effect of the unnecessary delay that was being caused by the limited instructions given by Dr Andressen to his solicitor. Thus, it was open to the Court to treat Dr Andressen as being within South Australia.ConsiderationService outside the jurisdiction at common law After considering the relevant authorities I find that the Judge was in error when he relied upon the opinion of Dr Schmitthoff that at common law it was sufficient for a defendant to be within the jurisdiction at the time the writ was issued. The defendant in Laurie v Carroll was a resident of England who had been briefly in Victoria conducting business that had allegedly given rise to a legal liability.[24] The Chief Justice authorised service of the writ upon his solicitors although he had left Victoria before the writ was issued. It is important to note that, contrary to the situation in Laurie v Carroll, Dr Andressen was in the jurisdiction when the proceedings were issued. [24] (1958) 98 CLR 310. The High Court noted that, at common law, the jurisdiction of the courts on actions in personam had depended upon the defendant being amenable or answerable to the command of the writ. That depended, and still primarily depends, upon presence within the jurisdiction. In support of that proposition the High Court cited with approval[25] the following passage in Dicey’s Conflict of Laws:[26]The service of the writ, or something equivalent thereto, is absolutely essential as the foundation of the court’s jurisdiction. Where a writ cannot legally be served upon a defendant the court can exercise no jurisdiction over him. In an action in personam the converse of this statement holds good, and wherever a defendant can be legally served with a writ, there the court, on service being effected has jurisdiction to entertain an action against him. Hence, in an action in personam, the rules as to the legal service of a writ define the limits of the court’s jurisdiction. Now, a defendant who is in England can always, on the plaintiff’s taking proper steps, be legally served with a writ. The service should be personal, but if personal service cannot be effected, the court may allow substituted or other service. In other words, the court has jurisdiction to entertain an action in personam against a person who is in England at the time for the service of the writ. [25] Ibid at 324.[26] (6th ed, 1949) at 172.