Andressen v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeals to a Single Judge: Civil)

ANDRESSEN v BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LTD

[2016] SASC 111

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker

28 July 2016

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW - SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION - UNDER OTHER LEGISLATION AND RULES OF COURT - VALIDITY

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW - JURISDICTION - SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION

PROCEDURE - COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY - COURTS - RULES OF COURT - POWERS OF COURT IN RELATION TO COURT

Appeal against the decision of a Judge of the District Court refusing an appeal from the decision of a Master. The respondent Bank filed a statement of claim in the District Court seeking to recover from the appellant $155,823.45 remaining outstanding under the terms of a loan agreement. Shortly after the proceedings were issued the appellant left the jurisdiction. The Bank obtained orders for presumptive service under rule 69 of the District Court Rules. The appellant made an application for an order restraining the Bank from entering judgment. A Master dismissed the application and upheld the validity of the presumptive service order. The matter was appealed to a Judge of the District Court. The Judge found for the Bank and held that the Master was entitled to make the order for presumptive service. The matter was then appealed to a single Judge of the Supreme Court. The issues are whether permission to appeal ought to be granted and whether a summons in an action in personam could be effected by presumptive service at a time when the defendant was not in Australia.

Held per Parker J dismissing the appeal:

(1)  Permission to appeal is granted. The appeal raises a serious question about the operation of the District Court Rules. The Appellant has an arguable case that the matter was not correctly decided by the Judge and the Master.

(2)  The Judge erred in finding that at common law it was sufficient for a defendant to be within the jurisdiction at the time the writ was issued. The service of a writ, rather than its issue, is the basis for jurisdiction and substituted service cannot be effected after the defendant has left the jurisdiction.

(3) Section 50A of the District Court Act 1991 empowers the District Court to make orders that extend its jurisdiction beyond the limits that exist at common law. Thus, the Master’s orders allowed presumptive service regardless of whether or not the appellant was overseas at the time of service.

(4)  Obiter: there was no authority in support of a constructive presence principle in relation to service of a writ. Such a principle would have rendered superfluous the consideration given by the courts to the issue of substituted service on persons outside the jurisdiction.

District Court Civil Rules 2006 r 10(2), r 40, r 40(1), r 40(2), r 40(3), r 41AD, r 69, r 69(2), r 69(3) r 117(2); District Court Act 1991 s 8, s 50A, s 50A(1), s 50A(2), s 50(1), s 51, s 51(1)(g);

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Details
Case
[2016] SASC 111
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Andressen v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd involved Dr Andressen, an employee of Flinders University, and the Bank, formerly Adelaide Bank Ltd and later Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd, who had entered into a loan agreement and mortgage with Dr Andressen in 2005. Following a default in payments, the Bank took possession of the mortgaged property and sold it, finding a shortfall of $155,823.45. The Bank filed a statement of claim in the District Court in May 2012, attempting to recover the shortfall. Dr Andressen, who was teaching overseas at the time, was not successfully served with the summons. The Bank applied for and was granted an order for presumptive service. Dr Andressen later argued that the order for presumptive service was invalid as he was not in Australia at the time of service.

The primary legal issue was whether service of a summons in an action in personam could be effectively executed by presumptive service when the defendant was not in Australia. This hinged on the scope of the District Court's rule-making power and the operation of the District Court Civil Rules 2006. The court had to determine whether the Master of the District Court had the authority to order presumptive service and if such an order was valid under the circumstances.

The court found that the Master's order for presumptive service was valid. It concluded that the District Court had the requisite rule-making power under the District Court Act 1992 and that the order for presumptive service was consistent with the District Court Civil Rules 2006. The court emphasized that the validity of the order did not depend on Dr Andressen's actual presence in Australia at the time of service. The court also addressed the common law principles regarding service outside the jurisdiction, noting that while the defendant needed to be amenable to the court's jurisdiction, the focus should be on the defendant's presence at the time the writ was issued. Ultimately, the court granted permission to appeal, dismissing the appeal and directing that the parties be heard regarding costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

I consider that the real question was not whether the Master could validly make an order for presumptive service but rather whether service of a summons in an action in personam could be effected by presumptive service at a time when the defendant was not in Australia. I have found that the answer to that question turns upon the scope of the rule making power of the District Court and the operation of the District Court Civil Rules 2006 (“District Court Rules”). Background Dr Andressen was and is an employee of Flinders University. The plaintiff was Adelaide Bank Ltd. Following a restructure of its business in 2008, the plaintiff became Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd (“the Bank”). In or about February 2005 Dr Andressen entered into a loan agreement and mortgage with the Bank. In May 2006 Dr Andressen ceased making scheduled payments of interest and principal on the loan. This Court made an order for vacant possession and in September 2006 the Bank took possession of the land under the order. The Bank sold the land. Settlement took place in June 2007 with an alleged shortfall of $155,823.45 remaining outstanding under the terms of the loan agreement. In April 2012 Dr Andressen arranged to teach in a joint international relations program involving Flinders University and Nankai University. The program is taught in China. He also teaches in Spain. On 23 May 2012 the Bank filed a statement of claim in the District Court seeking to recover the sum of $155,823.45. The Bank instructed a process server to effect personal service on Dr Andressen between 25 and 29 May 2012. The attempt to effect service was unsuccessful. On 19 July 2012 Dr Andressen left Australia for the purpose of teaching in China. He remained overseas until 1 October 2012. At the time Dr Andressen left Australia he apparently had no knowledge that a summons and statement of claim had been filed or that attempts had been made to effect service on him. On 2 August 2012 the Bank conducted further unsuccessful searches to locate Dr Andressen. The Bank sought an order for presumptive service on 13 August 2012. A Master of the District Court made an order for presumptive service on 23 August 2012. The conditions of the order required that a copy be sent to Dr Andressen’s email address at Flinders University. On 24 August 2012 the Bank emailed a copy of the order with the necessary documents for presumptive service to Dr Andressen’s Flinders University email address. The Bank received neither a “delivery” nor a “read” receipt for the email. The Bank also sent the documents in a sealed envelope addressed to Dr Andressen at Flinders University. On or about 28 August 2012 the bank instructed a process server to attempt to serve Dr Andressen personally with the documents, including the order for presumptive service, the summons and the statement of claim. That was unsuccessful. On 1 October 2012 Dr Andressen re-entered Australia. He stayed for six days before leaving again on 7 October 2012. On 26 October 2012 the Bank applied for and was granted default judgment against Dr Andressen. On 5 November 2012 Dr Andressen returned to Australia but left again on 17 November 2012.

Decision

Reasons for decision

No reference was made by counsel to any authority in support of a constructive presence principle and nor am I aware of any. The existence of such a principle would have rendered superfluous the consideration given over many years by courts in England and in Australia to the question whether substituted service was permitted upon persons who had not been in the jurisdiction when proceedings were instituted or were absent when service was effected. The decided cases have proceeded on the basis that actual rather than constructive presence was in issue. Whether the common law should develop to recognise such a principle is a question for another day.Conclusion I grant permission to appeal. The order made by the Master validly authorised presumptive service to be effected upon Dr Andressen regardless of whether or not he was overseas at the time of service. I dismiss the appeal. I will hear the parties as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In support of the submission that Dr Andressen was constructively within the jurisdiction, counsel for the Bank noted that the firm of solicitors acting for him had actively participated in the proceedings. They had applied to set aside the original default judgment, had requested documents referred to in the statement of claim, presumably for the purposes of defending the action, and had appeared and made submissions through counsel at the hearing of the application by the Bank for presumed service. It was clear that the proceeding served under the order made by the Master on 21 November 2014 had come to the attention of Dr Andressen. However, his instructions apparently fell short of what counsel described as “the proper thing to do” which was to instruct his solicitors to accept service. It was apparent that Dr Andressen had an agent in South Australia and that agent was an officer of the court. As an officer of the court the solicitor was under a duty to avoid unnecessary delay. In these circumstances it was open to the Court to use its powers to avoid the effect of the unnecessary delay that was being caused by the limited instructions given by Dr Andressen to his solicitor. Thus, it was open to the Court to treat Dr Andressen as being within South Australia.ConsiderationService outside the jurisdiction at common law After considering the relevant authorities I find that the Judge was in error when he relied upon the opinion of Dr Schmitthoff that at common law it was sufficient for a defendant to be within the jurisdiction at the time the writ was issued. The defendant in Laurie v Carroll was a resident of England who had been briefly in Victoria conducting business that had allegedly given rise to a legal liability.[24] The Chief Justice authorised service of the writ upon his solicitors although he had left Victoria before the writ was issued. It is important to note that, contrary to the situation in Laurie v Carroll, Dr Andressen was in the jurisdiction when the proceedings were issued. [24] (1958) 98 CLR 310. The High Court noted that, at common law, the jurisdiction of the courts on actions in personam had depended upon the defendant being amenable or answerable to the command of the writ. That depended, and still primarily depends, upon presence within the jurisdiction. In support of that proposition the High Court cited with approval[25] the following passage in Dicey’s Conflict of Laws:[26]The service of the writ, or something equivalent thereto, is absolutely essential as the foundation of the court’s jurisdiction. Where a writ cannot legally be served upon a defendant the court can exercise no jurisdiction over him. In an action in personam the converse of this statement holds good, and wherever a defendant can be legally served with a writ, there the court, on service being effected has jurisdiction to entertain an action against him. Hence, in an action in personam, the rules as to the legal service of a writ define the limits of the court’s jurisdiction. Now, a defendant who is in England can always, on the plaintiff’s taking proper steps, be legally served with a writ. The service should be personal, but if personal service cannot be effected, the court may allow substituted or other service. In other words, the court has jurisdiction to entertain an action in personam against a person who is in England at the time for the service of the writ. [25] Ibid at 324.[26] (6th ed, 1949) at 172.