FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ANDRADE v GOODYEAR & DUNLOP TYRES (AUST) PTY LTD | [2018] FCCA 634 |
| Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – Application for leave to join three additional respondents to proceedings under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether applicant can proceed against proposed additional respondents where no Fair Work Commission certificate was issued in relation to dismissal dispute – jurisdictional objection – discretionary factors – application for leave refused. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.45, 340, 342, 361, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 539, 544, 545, 550, 570 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.11.02, 45.06 |
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 634
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether Mr Andrade was precluded by section 370 of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth) from making a general protections court application in relation to his dismissal dispute, and if so, whether he could nonetheless pursue claims against the individual officers on the basis of their alleged involvement in contraventions of section 340 of the Act. Specifically, the court had to determine if the prohibition in section 370, which requires a certificate from the FWC under section 368(3) before a court application can be made for a dismissal dispute, applied to claims against the officers for alleged contraventions of section 340, even if those contraventions were linked to the dismissal.
Judge Barnes reasoned that section 370 of the *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth) imposes a jurisdictional bar on bringing a general protections court application in relation to a dismissal dispute unless the FWC has issued a certificate under section 368(3)(a). Mr Andrade conceded that this section prevented him from seeking orders against Goodyear in relation to his dismissal. The court considered whether this prohibition extended to claims against the individual officers for alleged involvement in contraventions of section 340 of the Act, which were said to consist of his dismissal and investigation by Goodyear. The judge concluded that if the prohibition in section 370 applied, the court would lack jurisdiction to hear such claims against the officers.
Background
Background to the litigation
Section 370 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) is particularly relevant to the jurisdictional issue in this case. This section prohibits a person from making a general protections court application in relation to a dismissal dispute unless certain conditions are met, such as the FWC issuing a certificate under section 368(3)(a) and the application being made within 14 days of the certificate being issued, or within a period allowed by the court. Mr Andrade acknowledged that section 370(a)(i) precluded him from making a general protections court application against Goodyear regarding his dismissal dispute in the absence of a section 368(3) certificate. Consequently, in the current proceedings, Mr Andrade cannot seek orders against Goodyear under Division 2 of Part 4-1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) for any contravention of Part 3-1 of the Act "in relation to" his dismissal.
The central issue in dispute is whether Mr Andrade can make an application to the Court under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) seeking orders against Messrs Hamilton, Beh, and Cross on the basis that they were involved in an alleged contravention or contraventions of section 340 of the Act by Goodyear, which includes his dismissal and his investigation by Goodyear. If section 370 does apply, then the Court would lack jurisdiction in relation to these claims.
The matter of Andrade v Goodyear and Dunlop Tyres (Aust) Pty Ltd came before the court as an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court. This case originated from a dismissal dispute where Mr Andrade was dismissed from his employment by Goodyear on 13 June 2017. Mr Andrade applied to the Fair Work Commission (FWC) on 1 September 2017, which was outside the 21-day limit stipulated under section 366(1)(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Consequently, the FWC declined to grant an extension of time as allowed under section 366(2) of the Act, and dismissed Mr Andrade's application. As a result, the FWC did not deal with the dispute and did not issue a certificate under section 368(3)(a). The central issue in this appeal pertains to whether Mr Andrade can seek orders against Messrs Hamilton, Beh, and Cross under Part 4-1 of the Fair Work Act on the basis of their involvement in an alleged contravention by Goodyear, despite the prohibition in section 370 of the Act. The matter is significant as it concerns the jurisdictional boundaries of the court in relation to dismissal disputes and general protections court applications under the Fair Work Act.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was Mr Andrade's application to the FWC "made" under s.365 in accordance with s.366(1) or was an extension of time granted by the FWC?
2. Does the prohibition in s.370(a)(i) of the FW Act apply to prevent Mr Andrade from making a general protections court application against Goodyear in relation to his dismissal dispute in the absence of a s.368(3) certificate?
3. If the prohibition in s.370 applies, can Mr Andrade still make an application to the Court under the FW Act seeking orders against Messrs Hamilton, Beh and Cross for alleged contraventions of s.340 of the FW Act by Goodyear?
4. Does the Court have jurisdiction to hear Mr Andrade's claims against Goodyear and Messrs Hamilton, Beh and Cross under Part 4-1 of the FW Act?
5. If the Court does not have jurisdiction, is it possible to seek orders against Goodyear and Messrs Hamilton, Beh and Cross under any other provision of the FW Act?
Held
1. The Court held that Mr Andrade's application to the FWC was not "made" under s.365 in accordance with s.366(1) and no extension of time was granted by the FWC. As a result, the FWC did not issue a s.368(3) certificate.
2. The prohibition in s.370(a)(i) of the FW Act applies, preventing Mr Andrade from making a general protections court application against Goodyear in relation to his dismissal dispute in the absence of a s.368(3) certificate.
3. If the prohibition in s.370 applies, the Court held that Mr Andrade can still make an application to the Court under the FW Act seeking orders against Messrs Hamilton, Beh and Cross for alleged contraventions of s.340 of the FW Act by Goodyear.
4. The Court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Mr Andrade's claims against Goodyear and Messrs Hamilton, Beh and Cross under Part 4-1 of the FW Act.
5. The Court held that it is not possible to seek orders against Goodyear and Messrs Hamilton, Beh and Cross under any other provision of the FW Act.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Had the application to the FWC been “made” by Mr Andrade under s.365 in accordance with s.366(1) (or had an extension of time been granted by the FWC) then s.368 would have come into play. It is relevantly as follows: Dealing with a dismissal dispute (other than by arbitration)(1) If an application is made under section 365, the FWC must deal with the dispute (other than by arbitration).…(3) If the FWC is satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute (other than by arbitration) have been, or are likely to be, unsuccessful, then:(a) the FWC must issue a certificate to that effect; and(b) if the FWC considers, taking into account all the materials before it, that arbitration under section 369, or a general protections court application, in relation to the dispute would not have a reasonable prospect of success, the FWC must advise the parties accordingly.(4) A general protections court application is an application to a court under Division 2 of Part 4-1 for orders in relation to a contravention of this Part. It is not in dispute that Mr Andrade was dismissed from his employment by Goodyear on 13 June 2017. He applied to the FWC on 1 September 2017. This was outside the 21 day limit in s.366(1)(a). The FWC did not allow an extension of time as provided for in s.366(2) of the FW Act. His application was dismissed (see the discussion by Gooley DP in Andrade v Goodyear & Ors). Hence the FWC did not deal with the dispute and did not issue a s.368(3) certificate. Section 370 of the FW Act is of central significance in relation to the jurisdictional objection. It provides:Taking a dismissal dispute to courtA person who is entitled to apply under section 365 for the FWC to deal with a dispute must not make a general protections court application in relation to the dispute unless:(a) both of the following apply:(i) the FWC has issued a certificate under paragraph 368(3)(a) in relation to the dispute;(ii) the general protections court application is made within 14 days after the day the certificate is issued, or within such period as the court allows on an application made during or after those 14 days; or(b) the general protections court application includes an application for an interim injunction.… Mr Andrade accepted that s.370(a)(i) prevented him from making a general protections court application against Goodyear in relation to his dismissal dispute in the absence of a s.368(3) certificate. This means that in the present proceedings he cannot seek orders against Goodyear under Division 2 of Part 4-1 of the FW Act in relation to a contravention of Part 3-1 of the Act “in relation to” his dismissal. What is in issue is whether Mr Andrade can nonetheless make an application to this Court under the FW Act seeking orders against Messrs Hamilton, Beh and Cross under Part 4-1 of the Act on the basis that they were involved in the s.550(1) sense in an alleged contravention or contraventions of s.340 of the FW Act by Goodyear said to consist of his dismissal and his investigation by Goodyear. If the prohibition in s.370 does apply, then the Court would have no jurisdiction in relation to such claims.