AMP Henderson Global Investors v Valuer-General

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      AMP Henderson Global Investors v The Valuer General [2004]  NSWCA 264

FILE NUMBER(S):
40179/04
40180/04

HEARING DATE(S):               13 July 2004

JUDGMENT DATE: 06/08/2004

PARTIES:
AMP Henderson Global Investors Limited
255 George Street Investment A Pty Limited
255 George Street Investment B Pty Limited
The Valuer General

JUDGMENT OF:       Mason P Giles JA Tobias JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Land & Environment Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          LEC 31066/02, LEC 31069/02

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Cowdroy J

COUNSEL:
Mr T Craig QC / Ms J Jagot
Mr J Maston SC

SOLICITORS:
A: Mallesons Stephen Jaques, Sydney
R: Crown Solicitors, Sydney

CATCHWORDS:
REAL PROPERTY - Valuation of land - Improvements - Deducing land value component of improved sale - Depreciation of improvements - Rate - Whether single or variable - Whether some evidence of value - Comparable sales - Of improved land - Adjusting - Which sales relevant - Multi-storey CBD commercial buildings

LEGISLATION CITED:
Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW)
Valuation of Land Act 1916 (NSW)

DECISION:
(a) Appeals allowed
(b) Set aside the orders made by Cowdroy J on 18 February 2004 and 3 June 2004
(c) Order that the appeals be remitted to the Land and Environment Court for determination by that court in accordance with the decision of this Court
(d) The summonses of the respondent for leave to cross-appeal be dismissed
(e) Order that the respondent pay the appellants' costs of the appeals and of the summonses for leave to cross-appeal.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40179/04      
LEC 31066/02

CA 40180/04
LEC 31069/02

MASON P
GILES JA
TOBIAS JA

Friday 6 August 2004

AMP HENDERSON GLOBAL INVESTORS LTD & ORS v
THE VALUER GENERAL

AMP HENDERSON GLOBAL INVESTORS LTD v VALUER GENERAL

On 1 July 2001 (the base date) the appellants were notified by the respondent, pursuant to the Valuation of Land Act 1916 (NSW) (the Act), of the determination of the land value of two parcels of land in the Sydney CBD. Pursuant to the Act the appellants applied to the Land and Environment Court disputing the valuations. There both parties adopted the comparable sales method of valuation. The appellant attempted to rely upon some post base date CBD sales of improved land, but this evidence was rejected upon a failure to establish that the sales were made in similar economic circumstances. This resulted in the only comparable sales being two sales of improved land (only relied upon by the appellant) and one sale of vacant land (relied upon by both). However, the primary judge rejected the use of the improved land due to the appellants’ reliance upon a single depreciation rate for improvements. The primary judge accepted the respondent’s submission that a reliable depreciation rate would need to consist of various depreciation rates taking account of all the separate components of an improvement. Further, the vacant land sale was also rejected purportedly upon the authority of Maurici v Chief Commissioner…

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Details
Case
[2004] NSWCA 264
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

AMP Henderson Global Investors (the appellants) appealed to the Court of Appeal from decisions of the Land and Environment Court concerning the valuation of commercial CBD properties. The primary judge had dismissed the appellants' appeals against the Valuer-General's (the respondent) assessments of land value, and had ordered that each party bear their own costs. The appellants contended that the primary judge had erred in law in his determination of the valuation issues. The respondent sought leave to cross-appeal on the question of costs.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge had erred in law in his approach to determining the value of the land component of improved sales, particularly in relation to the deduction of the value of improvements and the depreciation applied thereto. The court was also required to consider whether the primary judge had erred in law in his selection and treatment of comparable sales, including the relevance of sales occurring after the valuation base date and the adjustments required for economic conditions and market changes.

The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge's reasoning contained inconsistencies and errors of law. Specifically, the court noted that the primary judge appeared to reject certain historic land sales relied upon by the Valuer-General on the basis of their remoteness in time, while simultaneously acknowledging that the market conditions had changed between the period of those sales and the base date. The court also observed that the primary judge had not adequately addressed the requirement for evidence to demonstrate that economic circumstances and land values had not changed between the base date and the date of any subsequent comparable sales. The court considered that the primary judge's approach to deducing the land value component from improved sales, by deducting the value of improvements calculated on a cost less depreciation basis, required further scrutiny in light of the evidence presented.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the primary judge, and remitted the matters to the Land and Environment Court for redetermination in accordance with the Court of Appeal's decision. The respondent's applications for leave to cross-appeal on costs were dismissed, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeals and the cross-appeal applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

(a) Appeals allowed

(b) Set aside the orders made by Cowdroy J on 18 February 2004 and 3 June 2004

(c) Order that the appeals be remitted to the Land and Environment Court for determination by that court in accordance with the decision of this Court

(d) The summonses of the respondent for leave to cross-appeal be dismissed

(e) Order that the respondent pay the appellants' costs of the appeals and of the summonses for leave to cross-appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of AMP Henderson Global Investors v Valuer-General concerns the valuation of two parcels of land in the central business district (CBD) of Sydney, specifically the land on which National Australia Bank House and The Colonial Centre are situated. The appellants, AMP Henderson Global Investors, appealed against the dismissal of their appeals in the Land and Environment Court. The primary judge, Cowdroy J, had dismissed the appeals on 18 February 2004, and subsequently made orders on 3 June 2004 that each party bear their own costs. The appellants' right of appeal was limited to questions of law under section 57(1) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979.

The valuation evidence presented before the primary judge involved two registered valuers: Mr Grant Jackson, who was relied upon by the appellants, and Mr Derek Hill, who was relied upon by the respondent. Both valuers agreed on the areas of the land and the floor space areas of the buildings. They also agreed on one common sale, the amalgamation of four sites at 232-248 Pitt Street and 161-167 Castlereagh Street, which was considered a vacant land sale. However, they differed in their selection of comparable sales for the valuation of the improved land. Mr Jackson considered five sales of improved land in addition to the common sale, while Mr Hill focused on the economic conditions of the market at the time of the historic land sales.

Mr Jackson deduced the land value component of the improved sales by calculating the added value of the improvements and applying depreciation rates based on physical, functional, and economic obsolescence. He compared the sale of the vacant land to that of 233 Castlereagh Street to determine if a premium was paid for vacant land in the CBD. In contrast, Mr Hill argued that there was no significant difference in economic and market conditions between the time of the historic land sales and the base date, and therefore no adjustment to those sales was necessary. The primary judge rejected Mr Hill's historic land sales as being too dated to be comparable, while accepting Mr Jackson's evidence that the market conditions were different between 1995-1997 and 2001. This led to an inconsistency in the primary judge's reasoning, which the appellants sought to appeal.

The appeals in AMP Henderson Global Investors v Valuer-General were heard in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales. The primary judge, Cowdroy J, dismissed the appeals on 18 February 2004, and subsequently, on 3 June 2004, issued orders for the costs to be borne by the respective parties. The appellants, AMP Henderson Global Investors, appealed the primary judge's decision, asserting that it contained errors of law. The scope of the appeal was limited to questions of law pursuant to section 57(1) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979. Additionally, the respondent applied for leave to cross-appeal regarding the costs, claiming that the primary judge's discretion in awarding costs was misapplied. The appeals were consolidated and heard in Class 3 of the court's jurisdiction as stipulated by section 19(b) of the same Act. The decision to allow the appeals and remit the matter to the Land and Environment Court for further determination was made, while the respondent's application for leave to cross-appeal was dismissed, with the respondent ordered to pay the appellants' costs associated with the appeals and the cross-appeal applications.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appeals were heard together in Class 3 of the Land and Environment Court's jurisdiction: s 19(b) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (the Court Act). On 18 February 2004, the primary judge, Cowdroy J, dismissed the appeals. On 3 June 2004, his Honour made orders whereby each of the appellants and the respondent was left to pay their own costs. The appellants appeal to this Court from his Honour's orders asserting that his decision contained errors of law. In this respect, the appellants' right of appeal is confined to questions of law: s 57(1) of the Court Act. The respondent applied for leave to cross-appeal in relation to costs, asserting that his Honour's discretion miscarried.The valuation evidence Before the primary judge the appellants relied upon the valuation evidence of Mr Grant Jackson, a registered valuer with significant experience in valuing CBD property. The respondent relied upon the valuation evidence of Mr Derek Hill, a registered valuer who also was reasonably experienced in valuing such land. They agreed that the relevant area of the NAB land was 3,220 m2 and that National Australia Bank House had a floor space area (FSA) of 44,875.70 m2. The land area of the Colonial land was agreed at 3,558 m2 and the FSA of The Colonial Centre at 45,862.60 m2. Each valuer adopted the comparable sales method of valuation. However, they diverged as to which sales were comparable. They agreed on only one common sale, namely, that of 232-248 Pitt Street and 161-167 Castlereagh Street which was an amalgamation of four sites sold in April 2001, June 2001, July 2001 and December 2001 for a total price of $54,350,000 with a total land area of 4,490 m2. Both valuers accepted this sale as being a vacant land sale. I shall refer to it in these reasons as 232-248 Pitt Street. Mr Jackson also had regard to five sales of improved land, four of which were common to each site (233 Castlereagh Street which sold in December 2002; 25 Bligh Street which sold in January 2001; 14 Martin Place which sold in September 2001 and 23-25 O'Connell Street which sold in January 2001). In addition, he relied upon the improved sale in October 2001 of 92 Pitt Street in valuing the Colonial land and that of 200 George Street in September 2001 in valuing the NAB land. To deduce the land value of the improved sales, Mr Jackson calculated the added value of the improvements in each sale by reference to available technical and other information about the improvements on a cost less depreciation basis. The depreciation rates selected by him were explained in the evidence as reflecting an assessment of the physical, functional and economic obsolescence of the improvements in each case. This amount was deducted from the sale price together with deductions reflecting the value of any income stream and loss of interest. He also compared the sale of 232-248 Pitt Street to that of 233 Castlereagh Street in order to determine whether purchasers of commercial land in the CBD at the base date paid a premium for vacant land. He determined that such a premium was paid which, in relation to the comparison referred to, he determined at 20%.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On the other hand Mr Hill, relying to a significant degree upon the same economic data as Mr Jackson, concluded that based upon that data, including low interest rates and consumer price indexes, the commercial market for premium office space was stronger in 2001 than in previous years. He therefore considered that there was no significant difference between the economic and market conditions which prevailed at the time of the historic land sales and as at the base date. Accordingly, no adjustment to those sales was required. The primary judge's decision The primary judge summarised the evidence of the two valuers on the issue of economic conditions in [43] to [53] of his judgment. In [54] he rejected Mr Hill's historic land sales in the following terms:"Despite the above economic evidence, the Court regards Mr Hill's remaining land sales as being too dated to constitute comparable sales. Adjustments would be necessary to Mr Hill's sales to reflect all of the economic factors between 1995-1997 and 2001 which might impact upon property values in the Sydney CBD. It is evident from the difference in land sales themselves (seven such sales between 1995-1997 and one land sale in 2001) that the market in 1995-1997 for properties in the CBD was different to that in 2001." There are some difficulties with his Honour's reasoning in this passage. On the one hand, he seems to consider that Mr Hill's historic land sales were too remote in time from the base date to be comparable. He expresses this view "[d]espite the above economic evidence". This understanding of his Honour's reasons is supported by his observation in [55] that "[c]omprehensive evidence of real estate sales would be required before the Court could be satisfied that sales completed up to 6 years prior to the base date could be regarded as truly comparable." On the other hand, his Honour seems to have accepted Mr Jackson's evidence that the market in 1995-1997 for properties in the CBD was different to that in 2001. If that is so, then the differential in time between the historic land sales relied upon by Mr Hill and the base date would not, of itself, be a basis for the rejection of those sales. However, there appears to be some inconsistency between this conclusion and that articulated by his Honour in [69] where he said:"The economic evidence summarised above indicates that the absorption rates for CBD office accommodation was increasing between 1995 and the base date. Such evidence suggests that developers would regard the purchase of new sites for future office accommodation as a viable investment as at the base date. The court cannot conclude that such market was declining as submitted by the applicant." As far as Mr Jackson's post base date sales are concerned, the primary judge acknowledged that authority existed for the proposition that comparable sales after the base date need not be disregarded. However, he said (at [46]) that"evidence must exist to show that the economic circumstances and land values have not changed between the base date and the date of the subsequent sale."

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined whether the primary judge erred in law by rejecting Mr Hill's historic land sales as being too dated to constitute comparable sales. The court identified an inconsistency in the primary judge's reasoning. On one hand, his Honour considered the sales too remote in time, but on the other hand, accepted that the market for properties in the CBD was different in 1995-1997 compared to 2001, as evidenced by Mr Jackson's testimony. The court noted that if the market was indeed different, then the time differential alone should not be a basis for rejecting Mr Hill's sales. The primary judge's reasoning seemed to contradict itself by rejecting Mr Hill's sales based on their recency while simultaneously acknowledging that the market conditions differed between the sales periods.

The court scrutinized whether the primary judge's acceptance of Mr Jackson's evidence that the market for CBD properties was different in 1995-1997 compared to 2001 was consistent with his rejection of Mr Hill's sales based on the time differential. The court found a discrepancy in the primary judge's approach. His Honour accepted that market conditions were different, yet still rejected Mr Hill's sales due to their recency. This inconsistency suggests that the temporal gap alone should not have been the sole reason for dismissing the historic sales, as the differing market conditions could have warranted adjustments rather than outright rejection.

In considering whether the primary judge correctly applied the law in assessing the comparability of sales and the necessity of adjusting sales to reflect economic factors, the court found that the primary judge did not fully address the economic evidence provided. While his Honour accepted that economic conditions had changed, he did not adequately consider how these changes could be accounted for in the valuation process. The court emphasized that adjustments should be made to reflect economic factors, rather than rejecting sales outright.

The court evaluated whether the primary judge's conclusion that the economic evidence suggested a viable investment in CBD office accommodation at the base date was supported by the evidence. The court found that the primary judge correctly interpreted the economic evidence, noting that absorption rates for CBD office accommodation were increasing. This interpretation supported the notion that developers would consider purchasing new sites as a viable investment at the base date, countering the argument that the market was declining.

Lastly, the court examined whether the primary judge erred in law by not considering that comparable sales after the base date could be relevant, provided there was evidence that economic circumstances and land values had not changed between the base date and the date of the subsequent sale. The court noted that the primary judge acknowledged the existence of authority supporting the use of post-base date sales but imposed a condition that economic circumstances and land values must remain unchanged. The court found that this approach was legally sound, as it ensured the relevance and reliability of the comparable sales used in the valuation process.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that while temporal differences in sales can affect comparability, they are not the sole determinant. Economic conditions and market differences must also be considered, and appropriate adjustments should be made to account for these factors. The court emphasized the importance of a consistent and legally sound approach in evaluating the relevance and comparability of sales in real property valuation.