Ambrose v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ambrose v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCAFC 88  

File number(s): ACD 51 of 2020
Judgment of: COLLIER, GRIFFITHS AND ABRAHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 28 May 2021
Catchwords: SOCIAL SECURITY – appeal from decision of primary judge to dismiss application for judicial review under Administration Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – appellant’s Newstart allowance suspended for non-compliance with mutual obligation requirements under s 42AF of Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) –legislative scheme of Pt 3, Div 3AA considered – where suspension decision made under s 42AF(1)(a) – where allowance reinstated and appellant repaid allowance without imposition of “reconnection requirement” – appellant sought review of respondent’s conduct in allegedly refusing to conduct internal review of suspension decision – where s 129 internal review decision provided to appellant after judicial review proceedings instigated – judicial review proceedings futile – adequate provision of merits review in Administrative Appeals Tribunal – no denial of procedural fairness – no appealable error established
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5-6, 10(2)(b)(ii)

Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 3(2), 42AA, 42AC, 42AF(1)-(2), 42AI-AJ, 42AL-AM, 126, 129, 135, 142, 179, 234(7)

Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ss 23, 593(1)(e)

Social Security (Administration) (Secretary of the Department of Jobs and Small Business) Delegation (No. 1) 2019 (Cth) Item 2

Cases cited:

Bragg v Secretary, Department of Employment, Education and Training (1995) 59 FCR 31

Dauguet v Centrelink [2015] FCA 395

Hill v Green(1999) 48 NSWLR 161; [1999] NSWCA 477

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

McGowan v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2003) 129 FCR 118; [2003] FCA 482

Rizkallah v Tax Practitioners Board (2020) 169 ALD 295; [2020] FCA 431

Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106

Division: General Division
Registry: Australian Capital Territory
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 92
Date of hearing: 20 May 2021
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Knowles
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

ACD 51 of 2020
BETWEEN:

BRENDON DAVID AMBROSE

Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

COLLIER, GRIFFITHS AND ABRAHAM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MAY 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed. 

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This appeal is from a single judge of the Court who dismissed an application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act).  As is made clear in the amended originating application for judicial review, the applicant below (whom we shall refer to as the appellant) sought judicial review of what he described as the conduct of the first respondent in “refusing to review any decision made by a delegate of the Department of Employment,…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCAFC 88
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an appeal by the appellant, a law student, against the decision of the primary judge to dismiss his application for judicial review under the Administration Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The appellant’s Newstart allowance was suspended for non-compliance with mutual obligation requirements under s 42AF of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth). The dispute centred on the appellant’s allegation that the respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia, refused to conduct an internal review of the suspension decision and that this constituted a denial of procedural fairness.

The court had to decide whether the primary judge correctly found that the appellant’s application for judicial review was futile because the respondent had provided him with an internal review of the suspension decision after the judicial review proceedings were initiated. Additionally, the court needed to determine if there was any procedural unfairness in the respondent’s conduct, and if the appellant had established any appealable error.

The court concluded that the primary judge’s decision was correct. The court found that the suspension decision was made under s 42AF(1)(a) of the Social Security (Administration) Act, and the appellant’s Newstart payments were reinstated without penalty. The internal review affirmed the suspension decision, noting the appellant’s failure to comply with a mutual obligation requirement but found no further penalty was imposed. The court held that the appellant had not identified any further benefit that could be achieved through a merits review, given that his payments had already been restored. The court further found that the appellant had not demonstrated any denial of procedural fairness or appealable error. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is convenient first to outline the background facts, then summarise the primary judge’s reasons for judgment before addressing the grounds of appeal. Summary of background matters The appellant is a law student. He received Newstart payments for several years (Newstart is now known as Jobseeker). Under s 593(1)(e) of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (Social Security Act), an applicant for Newstart could be required to enter into an employment pathway plan (job plan). The purpose of such a plan was to document the obligations of a Newstart recipient. A failure to comply with a job plan requirement (such as failing to attend an appointment or failing to satisfy a job search requirement in the plan) could amount to a “mutual obligation failure” for the purposes of s 42AC of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) (Social Security (Administration) Act). Where a person committed a mutual obligation failure, the “usual rule” under s 42AF was that the Secretary of the Department of Human Services (Department) was obliged to determine that the person’s “participation payment” (as defined in the Dictionary) was not payable during the relevant period (s 42AF(1)(a) of the Social Security (Administration) Act). There was also a “special rule” from which more severe consequences flowed (such as reduction of allowance or cancellation) if the Secretary was also satisfied for the purposes of s 42AF(2) (and via s 42AF(1)(b)) that the person had “persistently committed mutual obligation failures”. The Secretary’s power under s 42AF(1)(a) to suspend Newstart payments was delegated under s 234(7) of the Social Security (Administration) Act to certain persons, including private sector organisations who were known as ESPs (see item 2 of the Schedule to the Social Security (Administration) (Secretary of the Department of Jobs and Small Business) Delegation (No. 1) 2019 (Cth) (Delegation)). It is notable that the Secretary’s power and function under ss 42AF(1)(b) and (2) were not delegated to ESPs. The suspension period affecting the appellant’s Newstart payments was calculated under s 42AL of the Social Security (Administration) Act. That provision provided two ways by which the payment suspension period ended. The first (s 42AL(3)(a)) operated so as to have the payment suspension period end immediately before the day the person whose Newstart payments had been suspended complied with the “reconnection requirement” imposed under s 42AM(1). This avenue only applied where the second avenue did not apply. The second avenue (s 42AL(3)(b)) operated to end the payment suspension period at an earlier time if the Secretary determined that an earlier day was more appropriate. It may be interpolated here that the Secretary’s power to determine that an earlier day was more appropriate was also delegated to ESPs under the Delegation referred to immediately above. Part 4 of the Social Security (Administration) Act provided for internal review of decisions. Under s 126, the Secretary could review a decision of an “officer” under the social security law if the Secretary was satisfied that there was sufficient reason to review the decision. It was made clear in s 126(2) that such a review could be conducted by the Secretary whether or not any person had applied for review of the decision and even if an application had been made to the AAT for review of the decision. The powers of the Secretary in conducting such a review were set out in s 126(3) and included the power to affirm a decision.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, as indicated above, it appears that the appellant was unaware of the internal review prior to 12 November 2019 when he was served a copy of the respondent’s concise statement in the proceeding below. The ARO’s reasons record, however, that she attempted to telephone the appellant on both 21 and 25 November 2019 to discuss the review but she was unable to contact him. Summary of primary reasons for judgment The parties each filed written submissions and agreed to have the matter determined on the papers. As the primary judge noted at [2], however, there was a short oral hearing conducted on 30 September 2020. This was intended to permit the appellant to explain what he sought to achieve by the proceedings, given that the respondent had contended that the proceeding lacked any utility and that relief should be refused on this ground. Her Honour noted at [2], that at the hearing on 30 September 2020, the appellant made “brief oral submissions consistent with his written submissions”. After noting that the appellant had filed three affidavits in the proceedings (two of which were described by the primary judge as being in the nature of submissions only), the primary judge described the background to the proceeding. Her Honour gave brief reasons for dismissing the amended originating application. In the course of summarising some relevant aspects of the statutory regime, the primary judge made specific reference to s 42AF(1)(a) of the Social Security (Administration) Act which, when read in context, strongly suggests that her Honour proceeded on the basis that the decision to suspend the appellant’s Newstart allowance was made under that provision (and not under s 42AF(1)(b) and (2)). At [11], the primary judge found that, on 9 August 2019, the appellant had “sought internal review pursuant to s 129 of the Administration Act” of the suspension decision and that he contacted his ESP on 12 August 2019. Her Honour then added that, as a result, the appellant’s Newstart payments were reinstated on 20 August 2019 and he was repaid in full the amounts withheld from him during the suspension period. Her Honour noted at [12] that, on 26 November 2019, the ARO had affirmed the 8 August 2019 suspension decision. Her Honour said that the ARO had found that the appellant had failed to comply with a mutual obligation requirement by not attending the appointment with MatchWorks and “had not given MatchWorks prior notice that he would not be attending”. Her Honour added that the ARO had noted that the Newstart allowance had been restored and no penalty was imposed. The primary judge said at [16] that the precise nature of the appellant’s legal grievances were “unclear”. Her Honour added that it appeared that the complaint related to “the scheme for merits review established by the Administration Act”. With specific reference to the appellant’s complaint that the review officer did not undertake a merits review of the ESP’s decision and merely confirmed that the Newstart allowance had been restored, the primary judge stated at [17] that the “fundamental difficulty” with this submission is that the appellant had been successful in his internal review application in having the suspension brought to an end and his payments restored without penalty. Accordingly, her Honour added that there was nothing further which the appellant could achieve on a merits review. As will shortly emerge, these findings are the subject of ground 3 of the notice of appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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