[2009] HCATrans 296
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P13 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
AMACA PTY LTD (ACN 000 035 512)
Appellant
and
TERESA ELLIS AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PAUL STEVEN COTTON (DEC)
First Respondent
THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
MILLENNIUM INORGANIC CHEMICALS LTD (ACN 008 683 627)
Third Respondent
Office of the Registry
Perth No P14 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Appellant
and
TERESA ELLIS AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PAUL STEVEN COTTON (DEC)
First Respondent
AMACA PTY LTD (ACN 000 035 512)
Second Respondent
MILLENNIUM INORGANIC CHEMICALS LTD (ACN 008 683 627)
Third Respondent
Office of the Registry
Perth No P12 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
MILLENNIUM INORGANIC CHEMICALS LTD (ACN 008 683 627)
Appellant
and
TERESA ELLIS AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PAUL STEVEN COTTON (DEC)
First Respondent
THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
AMACA PTY LTD (ACN 000 035 512)
Third Respondent
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 2009, AT 10.16 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR G.M. WATSON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR J.C. SHELLER for Amaca Pty Ltd in each of the three appeals. (instructed by Minter Ellison Lawyers)
MR M.L. ABBOTT, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR S.J. DOYLE, for the State of South Australia in each of the three appeals. (instructed by State Solicitor for Western Australia)
MR D.F. JACKSON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR N.J. OWENS, for the appellant, Millennium, in the appeal which is P12 of 2009 and for the third respondent in each of the other two matters. (instructed by Lavan Legal)
MR B.W. WALKER, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.R.C. GORDON, for the first respondent in each of the appeals. (instructed by Slater & Gordon)
FRENCH CJ: Mr Walker, before we hear from Mr Watson, just to have a sense of the parameters within which this debate is to be conducted, we look to 63 and 90, I think, in your submissions in P12 and ask whether it is your case that the asbestos exposure – it is put on the basis that the asbestos exposure materially contributed to Mr Cotton’s disease and it is within that framework we are operating?
MR WALKER: Yes.
FRENCH CJ: Yes, all right.
GUMMOW J: At paragraphs 63 and 90 of your written submissions, is that right?
MR WALKER: Yes. I hope 63 makes it clear that is an attempt to frame a question that we say is the relevant issue – was the relevant issue. It follows that my answer to…
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- Case
- [2009] HCATrans 296
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the plaintiffs' claims for damages for dust diseases were maintainable in the absence of proof of a specific date of injury, as required by the relevant limitation legislation. Specifically, the court had to consider the application of the "date of injury" rule in the context of progressive diseases like asbestosis, where the damage accrues over time and the precise moment of injury is difficult to ascertain. This raised questions about when a cause of action accrues for the purposes of limitation periods in dust disease claims.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that for a dust disease claim to be maintainable, the plaintiff must prove that the cause of action accrued within the relevant limitation period. The court affirmed the principle that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers damage. However, in the context of progressive diseases, the court clarified that the cause of action accrues at the time when the plaintiff first suffers damage, even if that damage is not yet manifest or diagnosed. The court reasoned that the limitation period begins to run from the earliest point at which the plaintiff has a recognisable injury, regardless of whether the full extent of the disease is known. This approach aimed to balance the rights of plaintiffs to seek compensation for their injuries with the need for defendants to have certainty regarding potential claims.
The High Court allowed the appeals, finding that the Supreme Court of New South Wales had erred in its application of the limitation provisions. The court remitted the matters to the Supreme Court for further determination in accordance with the principles laid down in the judgment.
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