Alz16 v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 2631
•31 October 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ALZ16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 2631 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review – protection visa – relocation – no matters of principle – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.473CA, 473CB, 473DC, 473DD, 473GB(3) |
| Cases cited: SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26 NBKS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 156 FCR 205 |
| Applicant: | ALZ16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | MLG 428 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Riethmuller |
| Hearing date: | 12 April 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 2 May 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 31 October 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Maloney |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Asylum Seeker Resource Centre |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr L. Brown |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | DLA Piper |
ORDERS
The application be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $7,206.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 428 of 2016
| ALZ16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant seeks orders quashing a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the IAA”) made on 23 December 2015, affirming a decision of a delegate for the first respondent to refuse to grant the applicant a temporary protection (subclass 785) visa.
The applicant is a citizen of Iraq who came to Australia by boat from Indonesia, arriving on Christmas Island on 16 September 2012. In May 2015, the applicant was invited to apply for a protection visa and did so in June that year. In October the delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant’s protection visa, and as a result the matter was automatically referred to the IAA pursuant to section 473CA of the Migration Act 1958. The IAA requested further information from the applicant, which the applicant provided. On 23 December 2015 the IAA affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse the protection visa application.
The applicant claimed protection on the basis that as a stateless Kuwaiti Bedoon, this exposed him to discrimination and caused him to leave school early, and that his family were forced to convert from being Sunni Muslims to Shia Muslims when they moved from Kuwait.
The applicant says that his house (though now vacant) continued to be a target for Shia militias, that his family has been interrogated and his father imprisoned for periods by Shia militia, that his two brothers who trained with the Iraqi security forces and served in the Iraqi police were forced to resign because of their Bedoon heritage and that therefore he is at risk of being targeted as an associate of the ISF or Iraqi security personnel. Finally, as a result of storing belongings for two men at his shop, the applicant may have inadvertently assisted two men organising attacks on Shia Muslims and the militia, when searching the shop, located US dollars and are now seeking to apprehend him. The applicant is also concerned that the people whose belongings he was storing may believe that he has been informing upon them.
The decision-maker in the IAA received the material from the secretary under s.473CB of the Act.
The decision-maker requested information from the applicant, explaining:
5. On 6 November 2015, I requested the applicant provide further information in relation to his claims by 1 December 2015. On 9 December 2015, the applicant’s representative submitted a response in writing.
6. The information I requested was in relation to the following:
· A description of the encounters the applicant had had with Shia militia groups.
· Reasons for leaving Nasiriya and his actions subsequent to his departure from Nasiriya.
· Why he waited until April 2012 to depart Iraq considering he had obtained a passport prior to this time.
· Description of the targeting he claimed to have faced by both Shia and Sunni militia groups.
· When and why his family were forced to convert from Sunni to Shia.
· The applicant’s parents current residential address.
7. I requested this information as the delegate did not consider the issues above, nor did the delegate provide the applicant with the opportunity to present these claims during the primary protection visa process. The information is relevant to the applicant’s claims.
However, the decision-maker formed the view that:
8. I have considered the applicant’s response to the request. The response received from the applicant contained information which had previously been provided to the IAA and is contained within the applicant’s protection visa application, as such, is not new information. I am therefore not prevented by s.437DD from having regard to this information.
The applicant’s claims relating to the two men who left belongings at the shop were dealt with by the IAA at [12]-[19] of the decision, finding that whilst approached by members of the Shia militia, the applicant was not of interest to them or other Shia militia groups operating in Iraq. The IAA member noted at paragraph 15:
15. In my request for further information sent to the applicant on 6 November 2015, the applicant was asked to provide information in relation to these encounters. He was asked to provide information about when he was approached, what the men said, what his response was and how he knew they were part of a Shia militia group. The applicant did not respond to these questions.
The IAA also considered the allegations relating to conversion from Sunni to Shia Islam and whilst accepting that his family had converted from being Sunni to Shia, concluded that the applicant “does not pray and is not and has never been active in practicing any religion”: see [25].
The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claim that he was at risk as a stateless Kuwaiti Bedoon and concluded that as his family had obtained Iraqi citizenship at the time that he was born, he was born an Iraqi citizen: see [27]. The applicant claimed that he was unable to complete school because of his heritage and was rejected because he has other siblings who did complete school: see [28]. The Tribunal rejected the claims that his brothers were sacked from the Iraqi police or ISF, noting his evidence at the visa protection interview that they had quit.
The IAA also considered the data breach that occurred in 2014, which may have included the applicant’s details, but rejected this as a ground for the visa, saying:
30. The delegate’s decision states that the applicant was in held detention on 31 January 2014 and consequently had his details exposed on the Department of Immigration website as a protection visa applicant. The applicant has not made any claims of harm as a result of the website disclosure, however I accept that his name may have been included as part of that disclosure.
Grounds for review
The applicant’s further amended application filed 14 March 2017 contains six grounds for review.
Ground 1
The first ground for judicial review was framed in the following terms.
1. The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority is affected by jurisdictional error in that the Authority constructively failed to review the decision of the delegate.
Particulars
a. the Authority accepted that there have been attacks against current and former members of the ISF, that the applicant’s brother was a former member of the ISF, and that individuals associated with, or perceived to be supporting, the ISF are likely to be in need of international refugee protection.
b. The applicant fell within this category.
c. The Authority found that the applicant’s brothers had not been harmed in the part, and purported to rely on this finding as disposing of the applicant’s claims as they fell within the findings set out in paragraph (a) above.
d. This was a constructive failure to “review” tin that the Authority’s findings set out in paragraph (c) above does not amount to a review of this claim – the fact that the applicant’s brothers have not been harmed in the past does not conclude the question whether the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm by reason of being perceived to be associated with former members of the ISF, being a category of person who the Authority accepted was likely to be in need of international refugee protection.
The IAA accepted that the applicant’s brothers were former Iraqi police and had trained with the ISF. The IAA also accepted that individuals associated with or perceived to support Iraqi authorities or the ISF may be at risk of harm along with their family members. The IAA discussed the applicant’s brother’s involvement with the Iraqi police and ISF at [46]-[52] concluding:
52. I acknowledge country information above which indicates those who are perceived to be supporting the ISF may be at risk of harm, I am not satisfied the applicant’s brothers have a profile which would attract an adverse profile with any militia group. The applicant has provided no evidence of his brother’s role, position or association with the ISF or Iraqi police force. I also note that his brothers are no longer working for the Iraqi police, and that they continue to reside in Iraq. The applicant has not detailed that they have faced any harm as a result of their association to the ISK and/or previous employment as police officers. I am therefore not satisfied the applicant’s brothers are of interest to any militia groups and therefore am not satisfied the applicant will face a real chance of any serious harm amounting to persecution as a result of his relationship with his brothers.
The applicant argues that these conclusions with respect to his brothers do not deal with the risk that he faces as a result of his familial connection with his brothers. The applicant therefore argues that these findings do not dispose of his claim to be at risk.
In simple terms, if the applicant’s brothers were not of any interest to militia groups, and therefore not at risk, it is difficult to see how the applicant, through his association with his brothers, could face a real chance of any serious harm.
In these circumstances, the IAA’s reasoning appears logical, and open to it. I am not persuaded that this amounts to a ground of judicial review.
Grounds 2 and 4
Grounds 2 and 4 of the application are conveniently dealt with together as ground 4 is an alternative to ground 2. Those grounds provide:
2. The decision of the Authority was made in breach of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Particulars
a. The Authority requested new information from the applicant regarding his parents’ current residential address and interactions with Shia militia.
b. The applicant did not provide this new information, and the Authority relied on the applicant’s failure to provide this information to make an adverse inference against him.
c. It was not lawful for the Authority to rely on this new information, and therefore not lawful for the Authority to make the adverse inference, because there were no “exceptional circumstances” to justify consideration of the new information (jurisdictional fact theory).
d. Alternatively to paragraph (c), it was not lawful for the Authority to rely on this new information, and there not lawful for the Authority to make the adverse inference, because the Authority did not lawfully form a state of satisfaction that there existed “exceptional circumstances” to justify consideration of the new information (Authority’s opinion theory).
i. The Authority gives no reason for determining what exceptional circumstance(s) existed to justify consideration of the new information, and no intelligible reason is apparent from the record before the Authority.
ii. In the premise, the decision to consider the new information was legally reasonable.
…
4. Further or in the alternative to ground 2 above, the Authority impermissibly considered matters which were neither considered by the Delegate nor constituted ‘new information’.
Section 473DC allows the IAA to “get” documents or information that were not before the Minister, but which the Authority considers may be relevant. The section relevantly provides:
(1) Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information ( new information ) that:
(a) were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and
(b) the Authority considers may be relevant.
Section 473DD provides a limitation upon the consideration by the authority of any “new information”:
(1) For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:
(a) the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and
(b) the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:
(i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or
(ii) is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant's claims.
The information provided by the applicant in response to the request under s.473DC did not constitute new information as referred to in s.473DD. (Whilst s.473DC(1) does refer to new information, it must be interpreted as providing for an opportunity to gather “new information”, but not force the IAA to accept information that is not “new information” if given in response to s.473DC request as to do so would render the restriction in s.473DD pointless).
In this case it is not disputed that the material forwarded to the IAA was not “new information”, therefore not information to which the IAA had to have regard. However, the IAA drew an inference from the failure to respond to certain questions, which the IAA relied upon (in part) in reaching its conclusions. It is appropriate to set out the relevant findings of the IAA:
15. In my request for further information sent to the applicant on 6 November 2015, the applicant was asked to provide information in relation to these encounters. He was asked to provide information about when he was approached, what the men said, what his response was and how he knew they were part of a Shia militia group. The applicant did not respond to these questions.
16. In the absence of any response to the questions put to the applicant in writing, I am not satisfied that these men associated to the Shia militia have any adverse interest in the applicant. I find that if the Shia militia were genuinely interested in the applicant they would have not waited until after the applicant departed Iraq to search his shop and home but would have done so on their previous visits to his shop. I do not find the applicant’s response to the question put to him at the protection visa interview about why they waited so long to search his shop and home to be plausible, as there is no evidence that any further information came to light to change the view of the Shia militia. While I am willing to accept that as part of routine surveillance of the area, the Shia militia visited his shop and questioned the applicant, I am satisfied this was just general questioning and not targeted to the applicant specifically nor specifically about Sajeed and Hussein.
…
18. The applicant has further claimed that since his departure from Iraq, and subsequent to his shop and family home being searched by the Shia mililtia, the applicant’s parents have been moving from town to towm to avoid harm. The applicant also claimed that his parents have been interrogated and his father imprisoned. I am not satisfied that any of this has occurred. The applicant only raised these claimed in his oral testimony during this primary protection visa interview and while I acknowledge the protection visa process is foreign to him, his young age, the fact that he is illiterate and that he arrived in Australia as an unaccompanied minor, I do not accept that such a significant event would have been omitted from at least his statement of claims attached to his protection visa application which was completed with the assistance of a registered migration agent. In the protection visa application form the applicant has listed his parents address as ‘Nasria, Iraq’. In my request for further information put to the applicant in writing on 6 November 2015, he was asked to state his parent’s current residential address. The applicant did not respond to this question. As a result of the lack of evidence the applicant has provided in relation to his parent’s displacement, in addition to my concerns above, I am not satisfied that the Shia militia have any adverse interest in the applicant’s parents and find they have not searched their home, led them to flee, or imprisoned the applicant’s father.
The applicant argues that IAA relied upon the applicant’s silence to draw an adverse inference and this constituted “information” that was new information that the IAA was not able to take it into account unless first making the relevant findings under s.473DD with respect to the applicant’s silence. In this regard the applicant draws an analogy with the decision in NBKS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 156 FCR 205. In that decision Allsop J (as he then was) and Weinberg J agreeing, considered information from a reporting doctor that was used by the Tribunal in determining whether the applicant would, upon return to Iran, react in a threatening or retaliatory manner if placed in a confrontational situation with the authorities.
This potentially led to a risk that he would be considered to have views against the regime and imputed with such an opinion. The Tribunal relied upon the fact that the doctor had not discussed the likely reaction of the applicant in a confrontation in his report. It appears fair that the doctor who wrote the report “was not asked any direct question about the appellant’s likely behaviour if he returned to Iran”: see NBKS at [64]. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s behaviour may deteriorate on his return to Iran, and revert to some degree of physical violence. The Tribunal member accepted Dr Nair’s evidence in this regard, but went on to note that Dr Nair did not state that the appellant might react in such a way as to express views against the regime in his report. The Tribunal member in that case said:
As to his future conduct and imputed political opinion, it has been argued that Mr [name provided] may retaliate during a confrontation with Iranian authorities such that he may be imputed with an anti-regime opinion, and that during questioning on return he would be likely to become agitated to such a degree that he may seem threatening to the authorities. Although there is no recent evidence before the Tribunal that Mr [name provided] is still physically violent. I accept that his behaviour may deteriorate on return to Iran, as is observed by Dr Nair (23 November 2004). As to whether he might be imputed with a political opinion as a result, it was further argued that, if he were in a confrontational situation, he would be likely to “express his views against the regime …” However Dr Nair’s report of 23 November 2004 does not state that he might react in this way, and in light of my other findings about his past political activity, I cannot be satisfied that he might.
I accept that Mr [name provided] may be questioned on or soon after his arrival. However, as I am satisfied that he was not perceived by the authorities to be involved in anti-government political activities before he left Iran, and am also satisfied that he has not been involved in such activities since then, I consider the chance remote that he may be subjected to serious harm in Iran because of political opinion imputed to him.
Allsop J (as his Honour then was) concluded:
73. The primary judge took the view that there was no information because, in effect, the absence of any comment by Dr Nair was a product of the fact that Dr Nair had not been asked to comment. In argument before us, the Minister relied on what Finn and Stone JJ said in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471 at [24] to the effect that a gap or lack of evidence was not “information”.
74. In my respectful view, both his Honour’s approach and the Minister’s submissions do not deal with how the Tribunal dealt with the issue. As part of its reasons for not being satisfied that the appellant might react in a confrontational way upon his return to Iran, the Tribunal cited the fact that Dr Nair’s report did not state that he might. This was not in answer to a proposition that Dr Nair’s report did say that. Rather, it was a statement that the form of Dr Nair’s report and its failure to say that the appellant would behave in this way was of assistance in concluding that he would not. That is, the absence of such a statement in Dr Nair’s report was taken by the Tribunal as supportive of the conclusion that he would not behave in that way, implicitly a relevant proposition as to how the appellant would behave upon return to Iran was being extracted from the form of Dr Nair’s report. As I said in SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214 at [221]-[225], care needs to be exercised in applying [24(iii)] of VAF 206 ALR 471. Here, the absence of something in Dr Nair’s report was not merely taken as a gap, but was implicitly probative of Dr Nair’s view that there was no such danger. If the form of Dr Nair’s report (including what it did not say) did not have this significance for the Tribunal there would have been no point in mentioning it.
75 In my view, the information which should have been the subject of a letter in compliance with s 424A was that Dr Nair had reported and did not state that the appellant might react in a way to express his views against the regime. The letter should have pointed out why this was relevant to the review — that it tended against the proposition that he might so behave.
In the following year in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26 the High Court said:
18. Thirdly and conversely, if the reason why the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review was the Tribunal's disbelief of the appellants' evidence arising from inconsistencies therein, it is difficult to see how such disbelief could be characterised as constituting “information” within the meaning of par (a) of
s 424A(1).Again, if the Tribunal affirmed the decision because even the best view of the appellants' evidence failed to disclose a Convention nexus, it is hard to see how such a failure can constitute “information”. Finn and Stone JJ correctly observed in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs that the word “information”
[FN: [2004] FCAFC 123; (2004) 206 ALR 471 at 476-477, citing Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 at [54]; Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1196; (2001) 113 FCR 396 at 428; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1679 at [25]; WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 266; (2002) 124 FCR 276 at 282-284].
“does not encompass the tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations ... nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc”.
If the contrary were true, s 424A would in effect oblige the Tribunal to give advance written notice not merely of its reasons but of each step in its prospective reasoning process. However broadly “information” be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence. The appellants were thus correct to concede that the relevant "information" was not to be found in inconsistencies or disbelief, as opposed to the text of the statutory declaration itself.
Ultimately the distinction rests upon a careful reading of the Tribunal’s reasons and the approach that the Tribunal took. In substance, in NBKS the Tribunal took the view that the absence of comment by the expert witness in that case allowed the inference to be drawn that any comment would have been contrary to the applicant’s case and therefore that inference was information that should have been put to the applicant. In this case the IAA effectively concluded that on the state of the evidence before the IAA it was unable to be satisfied as to the applicant’s claims and noted that no further evidence had been given. In its simplest form no further evidence had been given (as is outlined by the IAA in its decision noting that there was no response to these questions) and therefore the IAA determined the matter on the existing evidence, which was not sufficient for the applicant.
At its best, the failure to provide that evidence was conduct of the applicant and the nature of the evidence that he gave, not fresh information or “new information” within in the meaning of s.473CD. In this regard I am not persuaded that this is new information within the meaning of the relevant sections. I therefore find that the applicant has not made out this ground.
Ground 3
The applicant framed ground 3 as follows:
3. The Authority constructively failed to consider the applicant’s claims that he would face persecution by reason of being an involuntary returnee from the West, and instead, purported to consider with a claim that the applicant would face persecution by reason of being a voluntary returnee from the West.
Whilst the applicant did not expressly make a claim on the basis of being a returnee from the west, the Tribunal nonetheless considered it: see [55]. The Tribunal specifically noted:
56. DFAT, in its 2015 report, have stated that there is considerable evidence showing a number of Iraqis returning home, sometimes only months after securing residency in Australia, to reunite with families, to set up business or take up or resume positions in the government or public sector. DFAT has seen no evidence to suggest that voluntary returnees from the West are not assimilated back into their communities [FN: “DFAT Country Report Iraq”, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 13 February 2015, CISEC96CF1160].
57. DFAT have further stated that the Iraqi government now provides a range of incentives to encourage Iraqis who have not been able to gain asylum overseas to return to Iraq voluntarily. These include reinstatement of employment, access to education opportunities and financial incentives [FN: “DFAT Country Report Iraq”, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 13 February 2015, CISEC96CF1160].
The applicant seeks to distinguish this reasoning on the basis that he would not be voluntarily returning from the west but involuntary leaving Australia having failed in attempts to obtain protection visa. The gravamen of the issue is that the applicant would be returning from a western country and in this regard the Tribunal has properly dealt with the issues. I accept the Minister’s submission that both the voluntary and involuntary returnees arguments are subsumed by the IAA’a findings: see generally Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [47]. There is nothing in the material to point to any unique claim predicated on being an involuntary returnee, which would raise this issue in any event, nor anything to indicate that the applicant would be required to disclose that he was an involuntary returnee rather than a voluntary returnee to Iraq. I therefore refuse this ground.
Ground 5
The applicant framed ground 5 as:
5. The Authority failed to disclose the existence of a certificate under s 473GGB, or particulars of the information the subject of that certificate.
It is argued that there was an obligation on the IAA to disclose the certificate. This is not been accepted in two cases decided in this Court: BVM16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3183 (per Judge Jarrett at [26]) and BBS16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 4 (per Judge Driver at [77]). .
It is appropriate that I apply the law as set out by Judges Jarrett and Driver in the two proceeding decisions until such time as the Full Court deals with the issue.
Counsel for the applicant noted the difficulty of arguing against these decisions in this case, but reserved his rights should there be an appeal.
The process to be adopted by the IAA is set out in s.473GB, in particular subsection (3) which provides:
(3) If the Immigration Assessment Authority is given a document or information and is notified that this section applies in relation to it, the Authority:
(a) may, for the purpose of the exercise of its powers in relation to a fast track reviewable decision in respect of a referred applicant, have regard to any matter contained in the document, or to the information; and
(b) may, if the Authority thinks it appropriate to do so having regard to any advice given by the Secretary under subsection (2), disclose any matter contained in the document, or the information, to the referred applicant.
In these circumstances is difficult to conclude that there was any obligation on the IAA to disclose the certificate.
Whether or not the certificate was a valid certificate for the purpose of the delegate’s proceedings does not appear to make any difference to the IAA process, given that the contents of the material are provided to the IAA under s. 473GB.
In the circumstances I am not persuaded that this ground is made out.
Ground 6
The last ground of review is framed as follows:
6. The Authority did not apply the correct legal test in determining whether the Applicant faced a real chance of harm as a consequence of the website disclosure.
The Tribunal’s reasons in this regard are as follows:
53. While I accept the applicant was affected by the DIBP website disclosure, there is no evidence before me to indicate that this would result in a real chance of persecution as a result of this upon return to Iraq.
54. The applicant has not claimed harm from the Iraqi authorities nor any non-state agents in any regard and I find that any suggestion of harm raised as a result of the website disclosure would be purely speculative and not well-founded.
The applicant argues that the appropriate approach is that discussed by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor v SZSSJ (2016) 333 ALR 653. In that case the High Court noted that as the true extent of access to personal information of each applicant must in practical terms have been unknowable following the data breach, it is sensible to proceed on the assumption that all the personal information was accessible and then considered the risk.
There is no claim of risk of harm from the Iraqi authorities in this case, rather Shia militias who are arguably “non-state agents.” Significantly in this case, the IAA has not accepted that the applicant is of any interest to Shia militia groups: see [19]. Therefore this is a case, where on the findings of fact by the Tribunal neither the Iraqi authorities nor non-state agents are pursuing the applicant. This is a case where his concerns relate to his family association with his brothers who may be seen to have supported the Iraqi regime. Nor was he being pursued by the Shia militias as a result of his association with the men who left belongings at the shop: see [13].
In these circumstances the IAA appear to me to adequately dispose of the issue.
I am not persuaded that any of the grounds have been made and therefore I dismiss the application with costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Riethmuller
Associate:
Date: 31 October 2017
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