Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services; Boiling Pty Limited v Roads and Maritime Services (No 3)

[2017] NSWLEC 183

Land and Environment Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services; Boiling Pty Limited v Roads and Maritime Services (No 3) [2017] NSWLEC 183
Hearing dates:	5 December 2017
Date of orders:	20 December 2017
Decision date:	20 December 2017
Jurisdiction:	Class 3
Before:	Sheahan J Maston AC
Decision:	The subpoena issued to David Lunney on 10 November 2017 is set aside
Catchwords:	SUBPOENA: Application to set aside – principles to apply
Legislation Cited:	Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
Cases Cited:	A v Z (2007) 212 FLR 255 Agricultural Equity Investments Pty Ltd v Westlime Pty Ltd [2013] NSWLEC 122 Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 394; [1983] 2 WLR 494 Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 Attorney-General for NSW v Chidgey [2008] NSWCCA 65; 182 A Crim R 536 Azar Building and Construction Services Pty Ltd v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation [2010] NSWLEC 110 Ballard v Multiplex Limited [2010] NSWSC 1038 Cosco Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1997] FCA 1504; (1997) 37 ATR 432 Fried v National Bank Australia Ltd (“Fried”) [2000] FCA 911 ICAP Australia Pty Ltd v BGC Partners (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 307 ICAP Australia Pty Ltd v Moebes [2009] NSWSC 306 R v Saleam [1999] NSWCCA 86 Thomas & Ors v SMP (International) & Ors (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 870 Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Limited (No 2) (1989) 21 FCR 306; 88 ALR 90 Wingecarribee Shire Council v O'Shanassy (No 2) [2014] NSWLEC 32 Young v King (No 3) [2012] NSWLEC 42
Texts Cited:	Ritchie’s Uniform Civil Procedure NSW Practice
Category:	Procedural and other rulings
Parties:	Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd (Applicant) Boiling Pty Ltd (Applicant) Roads and Maritime Services (Respondent)
Representation:	Counsel: Mr M Seymour, barrister (Applicants) Mr N Eastman, barrister (Respondent)   Solicitors: Dibbs Barker (Applicants) Henry Davis York (Respondents)
File Number(s):	2016/155678 2016/155930

Judgment

Introduction

1. The respondent has made an oral application for the Court to set aside a subpoena issued by the applicants to David Lunney, an expert valuation witness retained by the respondent.

2. Mr Lunney is a frequent witness in compensation proceedings heard in Class 3 of this Court’s jurisdiction.

3. He himself makes no application in respect of the subject subpoena, but the respondent’s interest in the case is clearly “sufficient” to underpin its application (Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Rule 33.4).

4. In the substantive proceedings, the applicants make detailed claims in terms of market value, special value, and disturbance, but the respondent’s Points of Defence are not yet in final form.

The Witness Lunney

5. Amongst Mr Lunney’s evidence (Court Book (“CB”) tabs 60 to 62, and 68 to 70, and Tender Bundle tabs 49 to 52), with which material the Court is yet to deal, is a curriculum vitae in the following terms:

DAVID VICTOR LUNNEY

POSITION:   Director

QUALIFICATIONS:   Associate of the Australian Property Institute (AAPI)

Certified Practising Valuer

Bachelor of Commerce (Land Economy)

Associate Professional Certificate in Expert Evidence for the Land and Environment Court of NSW (University of Sydney/Australian Property Institute)

EXPERIENCE:

David has extensive experience in the property industry having gained registration as a practising Real Estate Valuer in 1997.

In 1996 David commenced his career in the property industry in Real Estate Agency practice gaining experience in the negotiation and sale of real estate interests.

From 1997 to 1998 David was employed by R.E.A. Valuations at Parramatta and Chatswood and was responsible for the carrying out of property valuations on a daily basis throughout Metropolitan Sydney.

In 1998 David joined K.D. Wood Valuations at Penrith and was responsible for the provision of valuation advice to a wide range of public and private clientele including numerous local and State Government Authorities, lending institutions and many property development companies which were active in the Sydney market. In 2002 David became a director of K.D. Wood Valuations and was responsible, with his two fellow directors, for the training and supervision or ten valuation staff.

In January 2006 David established Lunney Watt & Associates Pty Ltd in partnership with Adrian Watt.

David has broad ranging experience across the property industry, and in recent years has developed a specialty in the provision of expert evidence and regularly appears as an Expert Witness before a number of Courts and tribunals.

David provides advice to a range of public and private clientele for litigation purposes including:

•   NSW Roads & Maritime Services

•   NSW Department of Planning and Environment

•   Transport For New: South Wales

•   NSW Land & Property Information (Valuer General's Department)

•   NSW Land & Property Information (Crown Lands Division)

•   NSW Crown Solicitors Office

•   NSW Health

•   NSW Department of Education and Training

•   Energy Australia

•   Hunter Water Corporation

•   Rail Corporation NSW

•   Australian Rail Track Corporation

•   Numerous Local Councils

•   Woolworths Limited, and

•   Numerous property investment & development companies

Over the past 10 years David has been involved in over 120 litigation matters relating to the valuation of land, acting on behalf of both government agencies and private litigants.

6. There being no “expertise” objection to Mr Lunney’s evidence, the Court presumes that the applicants’ objective in seeking further documents from him is to mount an attack on his credit.

7. Mr Lunney’s contribution to the joint valuers’ report in (CB 69) appears to be the key evidence in response to which the subpoena’d documents would be used. The paragraph to which the competing submissions on the subpoena most frequently referred was 2.2, which says:

Lunney/Dyson. Whilst neither Mr Lunney nor Mr Dyson [(the applicant’s valuer)] specialise (sic) in the valuation of landfill properties, they both have considerable experience in undertaking valuations pursuant to the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (Just Terms Act). On the basis of their general experience and enquiries which they have made in the course of undertaking their respective valuations of the Subject Property, they understand that in circumstances such as the present matter, wherein a potential business activity which may be conducted on the Subject Property would, by its very nature, be inextricably linked to the land (i.e. landfilling), the calculation of the market value of land would be undertaken by a hypothetical vendor and purchaser in the marketplace on the basis of Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis.

8. Mr Seymour (for the applicants) also emphasised par 2.13, which says:

Mr Lunney is of the opinion that taking into account cash flows expected to be derived from a new business to be established on the land after it has been filled, capped and suitably remediated, would only reasonably be adopted by a prospective purchaser of the land at the date of compulsory acquisition if the land (after filling, capping and remediation) had some unique attribute which meant that the proposed new business could only be conducted from that land. This approach is consistent with the approach agreed to be taken to the valuation of the land which is to be used for waste recycling and landfilling for the first 8 years after the date of compulsory acquisition. He does not consider that an intending purchaser would have no regard at all to possible uses beyond year 8. He considers that the most likely approach which would be taken to determine the terminal land value would be a conventional, real estate based approach, rather than a business based approach.

9. The Court notes that the joint report also says (at 2.3 to 2.5, and 2.12):

2.3.   Mr Lunney and Mr Dyson agree that a significant component of the “value” of the Subject Property would be calculated from cash flows which may be generally categorised as “business related” cash flows rather than “land related” cash flows. Mr Lunney and Mr Dyson agree that, as real estate valuers, we would need the assistance of and would need to rely heavily upon the expertise of business valuers and forensic accountants such as Dr Ferrier and Mr Samuel for the purpose of assessing the market value of the Subject Property. The inputs which Mr Lunney and Mr Dyson have provided into the agreed joint valuation model are:

(a)   The basis of determining the market value of the Subject Property,

(b)   The rental value which could be generated by the use of part of the Subject Property for alternative purposes during the first eight years (which is referred to in this Joint Report as the “Surplus Land”),

(c)   The real discount rate which should be applied for the purpose of calculating the present value of the terminal land value,

(d)   The assessment of the terminal land value,

(e)Estimating future statutory land holding costs.

2.4.   Samuel: Mr Samuel’s opinion is that a willing but not anxious buyer of the Subject Property would adopt a DCF approach when assessing the price to be paid for it and, to the extent that it can be used for the conduct of a landfilling/waste recycling business, would undertake a DCF analysis of the cash flows reasonably expected to be generated from the Subject Property, including the cash flows reasonably expected to be generated from the conduct of that business. In Mr Samuel’s opinion, all assets which generate income can be valued using a DCF methodology.

2.5.   Ferrier: Does not have sufficient expertise or experience to determine the valuation method which would be adopted by a prospective purchaser of the land, and has accepted Mr Lunney’s advice in that regard. On that basis, Dr Ferrier has provided assistance to Mr Lunney in order to inform Mr Lunney’s opinion as to land value.

...

2.12   The Experts noted that the Applicant contends that 5.7 hectares of the land should be valued on the basis of the present value of business-related cash flows which include expected cash flows from the establishment of a waste transfer business on that portion of the land after it is filled, capped and suitably remediated (which is agreed by the waste management experts to be 8 years after the date of compulsory acquisition).

The Subpoena

10. The subpoena issued to Mr Lunney seeks the production of the following:

1.   Documents being records of offers to retain you, or records of your retainer for, prospective purchasers or lenders or vendors of commercial or industrial properties within the Sydney metropolitan region when expected sale prices were likely to exceed $10 million, excluding any retainer or offer for retainer for properties to be compulsorily acquired, between January 2012 and the present;

2.   Copies of any document of advice provided to prospective purchasers or lenders or vendors of property in the Sydney metropolitan region about the value of land derived from the expected potential business activities to be carried out on that land after sale, excluding any advice concerning land proposed for compulsory acquisition, between January 2012 and the present.

3.   Copies of any document of advice provided by you to vendors or purchasers of land involving the value of landfill sites excluding any advice concerning land proposed for compulsory acquisition in New South Wales between January 2007 and the present.

4.   Copies of any document of advice provided to intending purchasers, lender or vendors of landfill, quarry or mine sites in New South Wales, excluding any advice involving land proposed for compulsory acquisition, involving the calculation of the value that land by projecting businesses cash flows generated as a result of ownership of that land between January 2007 and the present;

5.   Copies of any document of advice provided by you to a vendor or an impending purchaser or land within the Sydney metropolitan region, other than for such land proposed for compulsory acquisition, that you were instructed was known to be contaminated between January 2012 and the present;

6.   [Not pressed]

For the purposes of this subpoena, "Documents" includes all letters, emails, file notes, memorandums, maps, photographs, plans, specifications or other communication in written or electronic form.

11. The specific exclusion, from the documentation nominated in the subpoena, of his compulsory acquisition experience, is to be noted.

The Principles and Authorities

12. On 5 December 2017, the Court heard argument on the respondent’s oral set-aside application, which was not supported with any evidence.

13. The principles applied by this and other courts when dealing with such applications regarding subpoenas and Notices to Produce are well-established and have been frequently stated, explained, and applied. (See also Ritchie, at pp8002 – 8003.) They are not in contest in the present case.

14. For my part, I adhere to what I said and did in Young v King (No 3) [2012] NSWLEC 42, in which I extensively reviewed the authorities (see especially pars [41], [50], -- [51], [55] – [97], and [104]). I sought (e.g. in [90]) to contrast “impermissible ‘trawling’ and permissible ‘line fishing’”, when deciding if a subpoena is oppressive.

15. My detailed analysis need not be repeated here, but it has been endorsed and applied in many cases since 2012. (See, for example, Agricultural Equity Investments Pty Ltd v Westlime Pty Ltd [2013] NSWLEC 122, and Wingecarribee Shire Council v O'Shanassy (No 2) [2014] NSWLEC 32.)

16. It will suffice to quote again here Craig J’s statement in Azar Building and Construction Services Pty Ltd v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation (“Azar”) [2010] NSWLEC 110 (at [20], which I quoted, with approval, in Young v King, at [64]):

... Without intending to be exhaustive, it is apparent that a subpoena or notice to produce will be liable to be set aside where the party seeking production of documents cannot establish:

(i)   that it is “on the cards” that the documents will materially assist on an identified issue: Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 414; R v Saleam [1999] NSWCCA 86 at [11]; Attorney-General for NSW v Chidgey [2008] NSWCCA 65; 182 A Crim R 536 at [58] – [69];

(ii)   that the material sought could reasonably be expected to throw light on some of the issues in the principal proceedings: Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Limited (No 2) (1989) 21 FCR 306; 88 ALR 90 at 103; Cosco Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1997] FCA 1504; (1997) 37 ATR 432;

(iii)   that there is a reasonable basis for supposing that the material called for will likely add to the relevant evidence in the case: A v Z (2007) 212 FLR 255 at [4];

(iv)   that it is likely the documents will materially assist on an identified issue or there is a reasonable basis beyond speculation that it is likely the document will do so: Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade (No 2) [1983] 2 AC 394; [1983] 2 WLR 494; ICAP Australia Pty Ltd v Moebes [2009] NSWSC 306; ICAP Australia Pty Ltd v BGC Partners (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 307.

17. Nicolas J, at first instance, in ICAP Australia Pty Ltd v Moebes [2009] NSWSC 306, expressed caution about using non-legal terms such as “on the cards” or “throw light on” in applying the “legitimate forensic purpose” test. He stated the test (at [30]) as:

... It must be shown that it is likely the documentation will materially assist on an identified issue, or there is a reasonable basis beyond speculation that it is likely the documentation will.

18. Mr Seymour adopted that test (Tp482, LL15-18):

The test only ever is, is it likely that the documentation will materially assist on an identified issue or there is a reasonable basis beyond speculation that it is likely that the documentation will?

19. The Court of Appeal found no error in Nicholas J’s reasoning or conclusion: ICAP Australia Pty Ltd v BGC Partners (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 307.

20. Three cases predating Young v King (No 3) propounded the principles, but my attention was not particularly drawn to them during argument in Young v King. However, they were drawn to my attention by Mr Eastman in arguing, for the respondent, the present application:

1. Fried v National Bank Australia Ltd (“Fried”) [2000] FCA 911;

2. Thomas & Ors v SMP (International) & Ors (No 2) (“Thomas”) [2010] NSWSC 870; and

3. Ballard v Multiplex Limited (“Ballard”) [2010] NSWSC 1038.

21. In Fried (to which Brereton J referred in a decision I quoted in Young v King, at [88]), the respondent Bank sought documents to attack the credit of an important witness, a purpose Weinberg J accepted “may be legitimate” (at [24]), but His Honour added (at [29] and [30]):

... The Court must be alert to ensure that any subpoena which is issued has a legitimate forensic purpose. That purpose must be identifiable, and likely to facilitate the conduct of the proceeding, not merely to oppress a party or witness.

... It is not a legitimate use of a subpoena to have the specified documents produced in a speculative attempt to identify whether the documents might, ultimately, be of some evidential value. ...

22. In Thomas, the plaintiffs caused a subpoena to be issued to the NSW Crime Commission seeking the production of the transcript of an interview with the fourth defendant, a Mr Willett. The subject matter of the fourth defendant’s examination was his knowledge of, or involvement in, possible money laundering activities by a Mr Barkl.

23. Pembroke J said, in Thomas (at [19], omitting references to cases examined by me here, or in Young v King):

... a number of relatively recent judicial statements about the extent to which the credit basis can justify a subpoena. They reveal a difference in emphasis reflecting the varied factual circumstances in which the issue can arise, as well as the discretionary nature of the considerations to which a judge will have a reference on such an application. ... There is, I think, a common thread in each of these decisions which I will endeavour to explain:

(a) As a general principle, the production of documents intended to be used solely to impeach the credit of a witness may be a legitimate forensic purpose: ... It is not therefore an objection, by itself, that the subpoena seeks documents relating only to credit: ... On the other hand, in order to support the subpoena, it is not sufficient, by itself, merely to say that the documents relate to the credit of a witness;

(b) In all cases, there must be some actual identifiable basis – reasonably precise and tolerably clear – that indicates what the legitimate forensic purpose really is. The forensic purpose requires realistic consideration of the potential strategic and evidentiary use of the documents in the context of the legal and factual issues that are required to be determined;

(c) If the subpoena is legitimate, two features of its intended forensic purpose will usually demonstrate its legitimacy. First, the particular credit issue will be capable of reasonable articulation, making due allowance for the necessity for some generalisation depending on the stage that the hearing has reached. Second, the probable connection between the documents sought to be produced and that credit issue, will be apparent;

(d) A credit issue of doubtful plausibility is unlikely to be sufficient to justify the subpoena. The same result will follow if the supposed connection between the credit issue and the documents sought, is strained, opaque or speculative;

(e) The court will exercise particular caution when a subpoena is sought to be justified solely on the credit basis: ... The judge must be satisfied about the utility of the production of the documents, and the fairness to the witness, having regard to the potential for abuse and the need to control and confine cross examination within manageable limits;

(f) A subpoena that does little more than speculatively trawl for documents that may possibly be used to impugn a witness’s credit has never been justifiable. ...

24. His Honour continued (at [21] – [24]):

21   In this case, there is, in fact, no sound evidentiary basis for me to infer that the transcript of Mr Willett’s evidence to the Commission contains any statements by him that might be capable of being deployed to impeach his credit. The propensity of the transcript to achieve that result is utterly speculative. The mere fact that the subject matter is Mr Barkl’s alleged money laundering activities does not advance the analysis beyond guesswork and innuendo.

22   It is undoubted that the credit of [the fourth defendant] in this case is likely to be relevant to the findings of primary fact that I must make concerning conversations in which he participated and representations which he made. Most of these conversations and representations relate to the financial position of SMP, its prospects and [the fourth defendant’s] role in connection with it. But no fact in issue turns on anything done by [B], or [the fourth defendant’s] possible facilitation of money laundering by him.

23   Other than at the highest level of speculative generality, there is no obvious legitimate forensic purpose to be served by the production of the transcript. No actual identifiable basis has been explained, let alone with reasonable precision and tolerable clarity, that could support any reasonable likelihood that the transcript might be successfully deployed. There is no plausible basis for assuming that any statements attributed to [the fourth defendant] in the transcript might assist me in the resolution of any fact in issue – to which [the fourth defendant’s] credit might be relevant.

24   For those reasons, I will order that the subpoena dated 26 June 2010 to the New South Wales Crime Commission be set aside.

25. Smart AJ quoted and considered Fried and Thomas in Ballard, a case in which ASIC was asked to produce a range of documents said to be “relevant to the credibility of Mr Widdup”. The “legitimate forensic purpose” was said to be that it was “on the cards” that the documents would “bear on Mr Widdup’s credit adversely” (see [6] and [7]).

26. Smart AJ said (at [23] – [24]):

23   ASIC stressed that the documents sought are wholly unconnected with the issues in these proceedings. That was the situation in Fried and Thomas. ASIC submitted that there was no suggestion that the documents sought might be relevant to an issue of fact likely to arise for decision.

24   ASIC submitted that the bare assertion of relevance to credit, as set out by the first and second defendants, falls well short of establishing a probable connection between the documents sought to be produced and the credit issue.

27. His Honour went on to deal with the contentions in that case, and continued (at [31] – [37]):

31   The first and second defendants wish to mount a substantial challenge to the credit of Mr Widdup about financial, construction and business dealings. The Court is going to be asked not to accept his evidence on the matters briefly summarised. They contend that the ASIC announcement indicates that he has conducted himself poorly and that his management of two of the companies mentioned has been unsatisfactory. Two of the companies failed owing substantial amounts to the ATO and in respect of them he failed to provide reports about the companies’ affairs to the liquidator, an offence of strict liability. Thereby he hampered the liquidator.

32   It is not necessary for the first and second defendants to go as far as being able to point to convictions or materials which point to convictions being obtained or likely to be obtained of an offence of dishonesty, such as perjury. It would suffice if it were on the cards that the materials pointed to untruthfulness on the part of Mr Widdup, or some other form of dishonesty.

33   The first and second defendants, having correctly identified the credit of Mr Widdup as important, contended that it was on the cards that documents will exist from the ASIC investigation which will bear upon that credit. They pointed to the transcript of any hearing conducted by the Commission in relation to Mr Widdup’s disqualification from managing corporations announced on 18 April 2008. I was asked to infer that there would be written reasons. I do not so infer. As an important administrative body I would expect ASIC to have reasons but not necessarily to have reduced them to writing. I would expect any written reasons to be prepared subsequently if there was an application for administrative review to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

34   I proceed on the basis that what emerged from the ASIC investigation which warranted adverse comments were the two matters mentioned in ASIC’s announcement of about 18 April 2008, namely, two of the companies failed owing substantial amounts to the ATO and failure to lodge reports about the affairs of two companies with the liquidator. Counsel for ASIC warned me against reading too much into ASIC’s announcement.

35   That leaves one further matter, sought by subpoena, namely the orders for disqualification made in respect of Mr Widdup. I would not separate the orders made for disqualification from the reasons stated in ASIC’s announcement for the disqualification from managing corporations for 18 months.

36   While the two matters as to each of the two companies of non-payment of substantial amounts to the ATO and the failure to provide reports about the companies’ affairs to the liquidators are substantial, I have not been persuaded that they are likely to bear upon the issues of whether Mr Widdup’s evidence as to the statements allegedly made to him by Mr McDiven is correct and his version of the conversations he allegedly held with Mr Hicks is correct.

37   I have not dealt with any confidentiality regime. ASIC sought a ruling on the question whether the subpoena should be permitted to stand. It regarded the maintenance of confidentiality as important.

28. His Honour (at [38]) set aside the subpoena.

Consideration of the competing submissions

29. Mr Eastman, for the respondent, says that the Lunney subpoena is “trawl fishing” (Tp468, L6) for material which would be used to “have Mr Lunney’s opinions diminished and Mr Dyson’s opinions enhanced ... because of a credit issue” (Tp469, LL13-15). Their opinions generate inputs for the “DCF spreadsheet” (Tp470, LL14-15), but the parties differ on whether there is to be one spreadsheet (for 8 years) or two (another for the period beyond 8 years) – (Tp471, LL8-23 and Tp488, LL13-36 cf Tp483, LL30-9).

30. Mr Eastman submits that no “probable connection” has been demonstrated between the documents sought and the issue of Mr Lunney’s credit (Tp480, LL5-6), and that the “material sought shouldn’t be in the evidence” (Tp480, LL40-1).

31. Mr Seymour bears the onus, and he says that the material sought will assist the applicants to “understand Mr Lunney’s history, background and [actual] experience, the basis upon which he offers expert advice to the Court” (Tp484, LL8-12), notably in terms of what Mr Seymour calls (citing paragraph 2.4 of the joint report) his “inextricably linked” test (Tp485, LL4-39), and/or his “self-imposed tests for picking methodology” (Tp486, LL32-33).

32. He said (Tp486, LL35-40):

So would it materially assist my client to know what is it in Mr Lunney's background, study or experience that has led him to be proffering these sort of tests? One way to do that is to look at what he does in the market, to look at what he does when he's not just an expert in the proceedings but to look at what he does.

33. He later said (Tp487, LL11-15):

So we say it would materially assist my client to understand instances of when Mr Lunney is involved, if he is, in commercial transactions where the price is likely to exceed $10 million to understand how often he is retained to do that, or how often he has been retained to do that.

34. Mr Seymour (Tp486, L42 – p487, L42) then made specific submissions about each of the five categories of documentation sought in the subpoena.

35. Mr Eastman responded to Mr Seymour in these terms (Tp489, LL7-22):

If the test he is propounding is would it materially assist his client that is an irrelevant and inapplicable test under the authorities. I'll contend that it is meant in the way that the authorities meant it about being on the cards and so on.

The best I can do is to return to some of the select words that Justice Pembroke used in the Thomas case about my analogies pushing together the issue and the documents in the subpoena to show that they fit within those words, like his Honour had said in paragraph 21(b), that the identified basis is reasonably precise and tolerably clear and that - and this is important - the forensic purpose requires realistic consideration of the potential strategic and evidentiary use of the documents in the context of the legal and factual issues.

Conclusion

36. On the basis of the principles stated in the authorities to which I have referred – especially in the terms they were stated and applied by Craig J in Azar, Pembroke J in Thomas, and Smart AJ in Ballard – I prefer the submissions of Mr Eastman to those of Mr Seymour, and the subpoena directed to Mr Lunney cannot be allowed to stand.

37. Mr Lunney comes before the Court as an expert, whose focus must fall on the value the Court should attribute to the acquired land, and it is worth remembering that he and the applicant’s expert, Mr Dyson, agree upon the use of Discounted Cash Flow.

38. What else Mr Lunney may do in broader professional life, and/or regarding other land, is not the Court’s concern in this present judicial valuation task.

39. The documents sought in the subpoena are not relevant.

Decision

40. The subpoena directed to Mr David Lunney on 10 November 2017 is set aside.

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Decision last updated: 11 February 2019