FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Al Raied v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1357
ABDUL RAHMAN AHMED AL RAIED v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 662 of 2000BRANSON J
SYDNEY
22 SEPTEMBER 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 662 of 2000
BETWEEN:
ABDUL RAHMAN AHMED AL RAIED
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 DECEMBER 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
CORRIGENDUM
In the Reasons for Judgment delivered on 22 September 2000, the name of the applicant on the catchwords page, orders page and first page of the reasons should read: “Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al Raied”.
Associate:
Dated: 4 December 2000
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Al Raied v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1357
EVIDENCE – affidavit filed after conclusion of hearing – whether leave should be granted to allow affidavit to be read – admissibility of evidence of portion of contents of a recording of proceedings before the Refugee Review Tribunal
MIGRATION – refugees – “well-founded fear of persecution” – whether subjective fear a necessary consideration – whether Tribunal failed to comply with the procedure required by s 430 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether particular fact material to decision
PRACTICE – time and place for the presentation of evidence and argument is the hearing – supplementary material may only be filed after close of hearing with leave
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 430, 476
Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 180, cited
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 246, cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845, followedABDULLAH AL RAIED v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 662 of 2000BRANSON J
SYDNEY
22 SEPTEMBER 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 662 of 2000
BETWEEN:
ABDULLAH AL RAIED
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 SEPTEMBER 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.
2.Any appeal from this judgment may be instituted by filing and serving a notice of appeal within 21 days after 3 October 2000.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 662 of 2000
BETWEEN:
ABDULLAH AL RAIED
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE:
22 SEPTEMBER 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The circumstances of this case are unusual, in that it involves an application for review by this Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) in respect of an infant of approximately twelve months of age. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent that the applicant is not entitled to a…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1357
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the Tribunal's decision was supported by the evidence. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the Tribunal had properly assessed the credibility of the applicant's parents' claims and whether the Tribunal had adequately addressed the applicant's own political activities and their potential impact on his safety if he returned to Libya.
The court found that the Tribunal had diligently assessed the evidence and provided detailed reasons for rejecting the applicant's claims. It was satisfied that the Tribunal had not erred in its evaluation of the applicant's parents' credibility or in its conclusions regarding the applicant's own activities. The court emphasised the importance of presenting arguments at the hearing and noted that supplementary written submissions should only be allowed if it did not unduly impact the court's efficiency. In this case, the court found that the Tribunal's written reasons sufficiently met the procedural requirements under the Migration Act.
Ultimately, the Federal Court affirmed the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, holding that the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion and that the decision was supported by the evidence. The court denied the applicant's appeal and noted that any further appeal must be initiated within 21 days of the judgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.
2. Any appeal from this judgment may be instituted by filing and serving a notice of appeal within 21 days after 3 October 2000.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Federal Court of Australia as an appeal against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. Prior to this appeal, Mr Al-Raied had applied to the Tribunal for a review of its decision. The Tribunal upheld its original decision, finding that Mr Al-Raied did not meet the criteria for a protection visa. Mr Al-Raied then sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Court, arguing that the Tribunal failed to comply with procedural requirements under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The case was heard by the Court, which considered the grounds of review raised and the arguments presented by both parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BRANSON J
The circumstances outlined above demonstrate that there is a need to remind practitioners of that which was made clear by Mason J in Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 257-258, namely that the hearing is the time and place for the presentation of arguments. His Honour there said:“I should express my dissatisfaction with the way in which the appellants’ case has thus far been presented. … After argument had concluded in this Court lengthy written submissions dealing with issues not hitherto raised and a further affidavit were filed. … The material was submitted without leave having been given by the Court. The impression, unfortunately abroad, that parties may file supplementary written material after the conclusion of oral argument, without leave having been given beforehand, is quite misconceived. We have to say once again, firmly and clearly, that the hearing is the time and place to present argument, whether it be wholly oral or oral argument supplemented by written submissions.”Neither a party nor counsel is entitled to act on an assumption that merely because counsel has agreed to accept a brief at late notice he or she will be relieved of the obligation to present the party’s case fully at the hearing. While the Court has a discretion in such a case to allow oral argument to be supplemented by written material filed after the conclusion of the hearing, in considering whether the discretion should be exercised it is entitled to take into account, amongst other things, the time that the party has been on notice of the hearing date, the efforts made by or on behalf of the party to secure legal representation in a timely way, whether any reasonable offer of legal assistance was declined by the party and the impact of allowing supplementary written material to be filed after the conclusion of the hearing on the efficient management of the Court’s case load in the interest of all litigants and the public.CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW RAISED AT THE HEARING The respondent did not contend that the applicant is too young to have any fear, let alone a well-founded fear, of being persecuted within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Convention. For this reason I do not propose to give consideration to the difficulties inherent in seeking to apply the Convention definition of a refugee to a young infant. On behalf of the applicant it is contended that the Tribunal failed to comply with the procedure required by s 430 of the Act in that its written statement of reasons does not comply with the requirements of the section. In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845 the majority of the Full Court of this Court (Black CJ, Sundberg, Katz and Hely JJ, Kiefel J dissenting) held that the preparation of the written statement for which s 430(1) of the Act provides is a procedure which the Act requires to be observed. Their Honours held (at para 43) that if there is a failure to prepare a statement at all, s 476(1)(a) of the Act is enlivened. Their Honours also held (at para 43) that if the statement does not comply with s 430(1) because it failed to set out findings on a question of fact which a court holds to be material, then the decision could be set aside under s 476(1)(a) for want of procedural compliance. However, their Honours noted at para 46 that s 430 does not require the Tribunal to give reasons for rejecting, or attaching no weight to, evidence or other material which would tend to undermine any finding if made – subject to the important qualification that if one of the reasons which actually induced the Tribunal to come to its decision was that it decided to reject or place no weight on particular material, then s 430(1)(b) would require disclose of that element of the Tribunal’s actual reasoning process.