Al Raied v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Al Raied v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1357

ABDUL RAHMAN AHMED AL RAIED v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 662 of 2000

BRANSON J
SYDNEY
22 SEPTEMBER 2000

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 662 of 2000

BETWEEN:

ABDUL RAHMAN AHMED AL RAIED
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 DECEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

CORRIGENDUM

In the Reasons for Judgment delivered on 22 September 2000, the name of the applicant on the catchwords page, orders page and first page of the reasons should read: “Abdul Rahman Ahmed Al Raied”.

Associate:

Dated:   4 December 2000

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Al Raied v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1357

EVIDENCE – affidavit filed after conclusion of hearing – whether leave should be granted to allow affidavit to be read – admissibility of evidence of portion of contents of a recording of proceedings before the Refugee Review Tribunal

MIGRATION – refugees – “well-founded fear of persecution” – whether subjective fear a necessary consideration – whether Tribunal failed to comply with the procedure required by s 430 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether particular fact material to decision

PRACTICE – time and place for the presentation of evidence and argument is the hearing – supplementary material may only be filed after close of hearing with leave

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 430, 476

Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 164 CLR 180, cited
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 246, cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845, followed

ABDULLAH AL RAIED v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 662 of 2000

BRANSON J
SYDNEY
22 SEPTEMBER 2000

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 662 of 2000

BETWEEN:

ABDULLAH AL RAIED
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 SEPTEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.

2.Any appeal from this judgment may be instituted by filing and serving a notice of appeal within 21 days after 3 October 2000.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 662 of 2000

BETWEEN:

ABDULLAH AL RAIED
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

22 SEPTEMBER 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The circumstances of this case are unusual, in that it involves an application for review by this Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) in respect of an infant of approximately twelve months of age.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent that the applicant is not entitled to a…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1357
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Al Raied v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant, a Libyan national, sought to avoid deportation from Australia by claiming refugee status, citing potential persecution if returned to Libya due to his parents' political affiliations. The Tribunal had rejected the applicant's claims, finding that he was not stateless and that there was insufficient evidence to support the assertion that he or his parents would face persecution in Libya.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the Tribunal's decision was supported by the evidence. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the Tribunal had properly assessed the credibility of the applicant's parents' claims and whether the Tribunal had adequately addressed the applicant's own political activities and their potential impact on his safety if he returned to Libya.

The court found that the Tribunal had diligently assessed the evidence and provided detailed reasons for rejecting the applicant's claims. It was satisfied that the Tribunal had not erred in its evaluation of the applicant's parents' credibility or in its conclusions regarding the applicant's own activities. The court emphasised the importance of presenting arguments at the hearing and noted that supplementary written submissions should only be allowed if it did not unduly impact the court's efficiency. In this case, the court found that the Tribunal's written reasons sufficiently met the procedural requirements under the Migration Act.

Ultimately, the Federal Court affirmed the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, holding that the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion and that the decision was supported by the evidence. The court denied the applicant's appeal and noted that any further appeal must be initiated within 21 days of the judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be affirmed.

2. Any appeal from this judgment may be instituted by filing and serving a notice of appeal within 21 days after 3 October 2000.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Al Raied v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs revolves around the application of a Libyan national, Mr Al-Raied, for a review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal had rejected Mr Al-Raied's application for a protection visa, finding that he was not a refugee as defined under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Tribunal did not accept that Mr Al-Raied was stateless and concluded that he was eligible for Libyan citizenship by virtue of his parents being Libyan citizens. The Tribunal examined the claims made by Mr Al-Raied and his parents regarding the risk of persecution if they were to return to Libya. It found that Mr Al-Raied's father had some limited involvement with the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, but this was not significant enough to warrant a fear of persecution upon return to Libya. The Tribunal also dismissed the claims made by Mr Al-Raied's parents regarding their potential persecution in Libya, concluding that they left Libya for reasons unrelated to persecution.

The matter came before the Federal Court of Australia as an appeal against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. Prior to this appeal, Mr Al-Raied had applied to the Tribunal for a review of its decision. The Tribunal upheld its original decision, finding that Mr Al-Raied did not meet the criteria for a protection visa. Mr Al-Raied then sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Court, arguing that the Tribunal failed to comply with procedural requirements under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The case was heard by the Court, which considered the grounds of review raised and the arguments presented by both parties.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J
Like the member who constituted the Tribunal in this matter, I deprecate the artificiality of the document and the apparent attempt made by those responsible for it to exploit the emotive potential of the situation of the applicant. I assume, however, as it bears what appear to be the signatures of the applicant’s parents, that it refers to all bases upon which it is said that there is a real chance that the applicant will suffer persecution if he travels to Libya with his family.DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL As is mentioned above, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant is stateless. It found on the bases of a research document from the Research Directorate, Immigration & Refugee Board Documentation Centre of Canada and Libyan Nationality Law that, as the child of Libyan citizens, the applicant would automatically be eligible for Libyan citizenship. No basis for challenging this finding has been identified. The Tribunal noted that there was nothing to suggest that the applicant, or rather persons on his behalf, fear that he will be persecuted for reasons of his race, religion or political belief. The Tribunal turned to consider whether there was a well-founded basis for any fear that the applicant faces persecution in Libya for reason of his membership of a particular social group, namely his family. This involved the Tribunal in giving consideration to the claims of the applicant’s parents that they each face persecution should they return to Libya. The Tribunal gave detailed reasons for rejecting the veracity of the stories of the applicant’s parents. The Tribunal found that “there is a lack of credibility in their claims of being wanted people in Libya”. As to the claim of the applicant’s father that he was a member of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), a group opposed to the regime of Colonel Gaddafi, the Tribunal made the following findings:“On the basis of all the evidence before me, I accept that Mr Al-Raied has had some contact with people linked to the NFSL and that he might have watched, read, and in a limited way passed on to others dissident material propagated by the NFSL, but I am not satisfied that he had a role of any significance in the organisation. I find that his lack of close involvement with the organisation is reflected in his evidence to UNHCR that he did not belong to any party. I find it implausible that he was frightened to tell UNHCR the ‘truth’ given public knowledge of UNHCR’s reputation. I acknowledge that Mr Al-Raied might have been a person of slight interest to the Libyan authorities if they had known that he had been involved in any NFSL activity, but I am not satisfied that the authorities have such knowledge.” The Tribunal concluded in this regard:“In all, I am not satisfied that Mr Al-Raied did not leave Libya normally, and for reasons unconnected with a well-founded fear of persecution.” The Tribunal was not satisfied that Mr Al-Raied has a political profile in Libya. It rejected the evidence of the applicant’s mother that she would be regarded with suspicion by the Libyan authorities as two of her brothers-in-law had been deported from that country. It was not satisfied that the deported men were relatives of hers. The overall conclusion of the Tribunal concerning any risk to the applicant because of the activities of his parents, including their attempt to obtain asylum in this country, was as follows:“… I am not satisfied that the applicant’s father is a wanted person in Libya. Neither am I satisfied that his mother is a wanted person. I consider that they left Libya freely for reasons unconnected with a fear of persecution.I do not consider that Libyan authorities would persecute Mr Al-Raeid for the NFSL-linked activities that I accept he did engage in prior to 1993, as I find on his own evidence that they did not know about these activities. I am not satisfied that Mr Al-Raeid would volunteer the information unless he felt that it was safe or of benefit to him to do so. Given the lack-lustre nature of his engagement with the NFSL to date, I am not satisfied that he would begin an activist role with the NFSL on his return to Libya in a way that would cause him to be persecuted under the Convention.I am not satisfied that Mr Al-Raeid’s activities since leaving Libya in 1993 would have caused Libyan officials to regard him with concern for a Convention reason given his lack of real political activity. If the Al-Raeids were to attempt to seek publicity over their return to Libya they might gain attention in Libya. However, since I am not satisfied that they have an adverse political profile in Libya, I consider that the authorities there would simply regard them as opportunists seeking to gain an immigration advantage in foreign countries. There is no independent evidence before me that suggests that such people are persecuted in Libya.I consider that Mr Al-Raeid’s difficulties in the various countries he has visited are due to his having engaged in unlawful activities or to his not having renewed lapsed visas. I am not satisfied that he is known as a Libyan activist in these countries. I am not satisfied that engaging in petty criminal activities abroad or flouting foreign visa regulations would give the Al-Raeids an adverse political profile in Libya.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J

The circumstances outlined above demonstrate that there is a need to remind practitioners of that which was made clear by Mason J in Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 257-258, namely that the hearing is the time and place for the presentation of arguments. His Honour there said:“I should express my dissatisfaction with the way in which the appellants’ case has thus far been presented. … After argument had concluded in this Court lengthy written submissions dealing with issues not hitherto raised and a further affidavit were filed. … The material was submitted without leave having been given by the Court. The impression, unfortunately abroad, that parties may file supplementary written material after the conclusion of oral argument, without leave having been given beforehand, is quite misconceived. We have to say once again, firmly and clearly, that the hearing is the time and place to present argument, whether it be wholly oral or oral argument supplemented by written submissions.”Neither a party nor counsel is entitled to act on an assumption that merely because counsel has agreed to accept a brief at late notice he or she will be relieved of the obligation to present the party’s case fully at the hearing. While the Court has a discretion in such a case to allow oral argument to be supplemented by written material filed after the conclusion of the hearing, in considering whether the discretion should be exercised it is entitled to take into account, amongst other things, the time that the party has been on notice of the hearing date, the efforts made by or on behalf of the party to secure legal representation in a timely way, whether any reasonable offer of legal assistance was declined by the party and the impact of allowing supplementary written material to be filed after the conclusion of the hearing on the efficient management of the Court’s case load in the interest of all litigants and the public.CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW RAISED AT THE HEARING The respondent did not contend that the applicant is too young to have any fear, let alone a well-founded fear, of being persecuted within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Convention. For this reason I do not propose to give consideration to the difficulties inherent in seeking to apply the Convention definition of a refugee to a young infant. On behalf of the applicant it is contended that the Tribunal failed to comply with the procedure required by s 430 of the Act in that its written statement of reasons does not comply with the requirements of the section. In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845 the majority of the Full Court of this Court (Black CJ, Sundberg, Katz and Hely JJ, Kiefel J dissenting) held that the preparation of the written statement for which s 430(1) of the Act provides is a procedure which the Act requires to be observed. Their Honours held (at para 43) that if there is a failure to prepare a statement at all, s 476(1)(a) of the Act is enlivened. Their Honours also held (at para 43) that if the statement does not comply with s 430(1) because it failed to set out findings on a question of fact which a court holds to be material, then the decision could be set aside under s 476(1)(a) for want of procedural compliance. However, their Honours noted at para 46 that s 430 does not require the Tribunal to give reasons for rejecting, or attaching no weight to, evidence or other material which would tend to undermine any finding if made – subject to the important qualification that if one of the reasons which actually induced the Tribunal to come to its decision was that it decided to reject or place no weight on particular material, then s 430(1)(b) would require disclose of that element of the Tribunal’s actual reasoning process.