Al-Rahal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Al-Rahal v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1005

MIGRATION – protection visa – Iraqi citizen- prior residence and family in Syria – Tribunal finding no obligation on Australia not to refoul - whether Tribunal decision unauthorised – whether Tribunal decision involved incorrect interpretation of applicable law – whether Tribunal decision involved incorrect application of law to the facts – whether no evidence for Tribunal decision.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 476

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Al Sallal (1999) 167 ALR 175, cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (1997) 80 FCR 543, followed
Rajendran v Minister for Immigration & Muticultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 526, cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Kabail (1999) 93 FCR 498, cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Gnanapiragasam (Federal Court, Weinberg J, 25 September 1998, unreported), cited
Barzidehv Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1996) 69 FCR 417, cited

AYDAR AL-RAHAL V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W 12 OF 2000

R D NICHOLSON J

28 JULY 2000
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W12 of 2000

BETWEEN:

HAYDAR AL-RAHAL
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

R D NICHOLSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 JULY 2000

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for review be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W12 of 2000

BETWEEN:

HAYDAR AL-RAHAL
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

R D NICHOLSON J

DATE:

28 JULY 2000

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") given on 25 January 2000. The decision of the Tribunal was to affirm a decision of a delegate of the respondent to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa. At the time of the Tribunal decision, the applicant was a 27 year old male citizen from Iraq. He arrived in Australia on 13 August 1999 and was subsequently taken into immigration custody at the Port Hedland Immigration Detention Centre. He lodged his application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ("the Department") on 21 September 1999.

  2. The original application to this Court was filed by the applicant in a standard form often used by detainees of the Detention Centre.  A notice of motion filed shortly before the hearing sought an order that an amended application dated 22 May 2000 stand as the applicant's application in these proceedings and that the time for the filing and service of the notice of motion be abridged. The respondent did not contest the motion, which was granted.

    Applicant's history

  3. The applicant's case…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1005
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Al-Rahal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, an Iraqi national, sought review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which determined that he was not a refugee and that he could be lawfully removed to Syria. The RRT's decision was based on the applicant's potential for effective protection in Syria, as per Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The applicant argued that the RRT failed to properly apply the law and made errors in its assessment of the evidence, particularly concerning his rights and protections in Syria.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the RRT correctly interpreted and applied the applicable law in determining that the applicant could be lawfully refouled to Syria, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the RRT's decision. Specifically, the court examined whether the RRT erred in its interpretation of Article 33 of the Convention, which prohibits refoulement, and whether there was a lack of evidence to support the RRT's finding that the applicant would receive effective protection in Syria.

The court found that the RRT was not obliged to make specific findings on all the matters raised by the applicant but was required to consider whether effective protection was available in Syria. The court held that the RRT did not misinterpret the applicable law and correctly prioritised the consideration of Article 33 before Article 1E of the Convention. The court further determined that the RRT's decision was supported by evidence, including recent country information reports and other material, indicating that the applicant would likely be admitted to Syria and could remain there indefinitely unless involved in criminal activities. The court found no basis to conclude that the RRT's decision was unauthorised, based on an incorrect interpretation or application of the law, or unsupported by evidence.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for review, finding that the RRT's decision was lawful and properly made. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for review be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

In my view the Tribunal was not necessarily obliged to make positive findings on the list of matters adumbrated in the applicant's contentions. Rather it was required to consider whether as a matter of practical reality and fact effective protection was available in the third country. That may or may not encompass findings on some or all of the matters so adumbrated, depending upon the evidence in the case. The Tribunal did not incorrectly interpret the applicable law.Whether incorrect application of the law to the facts The third ground of review is based on the second limb of s 476(1)(e), and is that the Tribunal was in error of law because it incorrectly applied the law to the facts. In particularisation of this ground it is pleaded that the Tribunal failed to apply Article 1E of the Convention to the facts as found. I have already found that, as a matter of law, the Tribunal was required to address Article 33 first. Only in the event that the Tribunal found that Article prevented refoulement would it have then been necessary for the Tribunal to turn to Article 1E. In her reply, Counsel for the applicant, appearing pro bono, accepted this was the correct position. The further particularisation of the ground claims it was not open to the Tribunal to exclude the applicant from protection in Australia in the light of the following:(i)The applicant has not been granted refugee or permanent residence status in Syria.(ii)The applicant is not entitled to and has not secured permanent residency and citizenship in Syria.(iii)The applicant does not have a travel document that entitles him to re-enter Syria.(iv)The applicant does not have a secured right to enter or re-enter or reside in Syria.(v)The applicant does not have the same rights and obligations a Syrian national and the disabilities he suffers as an Iraqi in Syria are not negligible.(vi)Syria is not a signatory to the Convention or any regional legal instrument relating to the status of refugees and does not have a defined asylum policy.(vii)Iraqis in Syria obtain refugee status through the UNHCR in Damascus and are resettled in other countries.(viii)The degree of protection expected of a contracting state cannot confidently be anticipated from Syria.(ix)The real chance that the applicant would suffer persecution in Syria and/or be refouled by Syria to Iraq. Most of these items repeat the items raised in connection with the second ground of appeal. None of them were findings which the Tribunal was obliged to make. The real nub of the ground is whether on the findings which the Tribunal made it wrongly concluded that there was effective protection. The essence of the argument is that even if Syria were to grant the applicant re-entry, his position in Syria as an "illegal" Iraqi is at best tolerated and provides no right to reside permanently or a right to obtain eventual citizenship. Furthermore, there is no obligation on Syria to treat him as a refugee and to prevent his return to Iraq. The ground of appeal in this particularisation invites the Court to (impermissibly) re-engage in assessment of the evidence before the Tribunal. The ground is really pressed in the context of the fourth ground. I therefore turn to that ground.Whether no evidence

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The ground of appeal in this particularisation invites the Court to (impermissibly) re-engage in assessment of the evidence before the Tribunal. The ground is really pressed in the context of the fourth ground. I therefore turn to that ground.Whether no evidence This ground contends that there was no evidence to justify the making of the decision that the applicant was excluded from protection in Australia and consequentially could be safely refouled to Syria: s 476(1)(g). That ground must be understood in the context of s 476(4) which provides: “(4) The ground specified in paragraph (1)(g) is not to be taken to have been made out unless:(a)the person who made the decision was required by law to reach that decision only if a particular matter was established, and there was no evidence or other material (including facts of which the person was entitled to take notice) from which the person could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established; or (b)the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist.” On the assumption that the matters referred to in Article 33(1) are particular matters referred to in s 476(4)(a), it was necessary for the Tribunal to have before it evidence from which it could be reasonably satisfied the matters were established. In my view, this was the case. The most recent country information report provided to the Tribunal stated that Iraqis would be free to enter Syria provided they were sponsored either by a relative or friend residing in Syria, or by one of the Iraqi opposition parties operating in Syria. This was evidence to support the Tribunal's finding that the applicant would be likely to be admitted under both categories. There was also evidence before the Tribunal that once in Syria, Iraqis may remain in the country indefinitely unless involved in criminal offences (which may lead to incarceration rather than deportation). This evidence did not involve any confusion of Iraqis with other Arabs, as contended for the applicant. Rather it was based on evidence that Iraqis so admitted were in that respect like other Arabs. There was also evidence that it was most unlikely that any rapprochement between Syria and Iraq would result in Iraqi refugees and dissidents in Syria being forced to return to Iraq. No case can be made that either limb of s 476(4) can be satisfied so that the ground based on s 476(1)(g) is not made out. Therefore neither grounds 3 or 4 are made out.Conclusion It follows also that ground 1 is not made out. Consequently, the application for review fails. The application should be dismissed with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the case of the applicant, the starting point is Article 33 of the Convention, set out above. A refugee must not be refouled to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened. However, in the situation where an applicant has come to Australia via a third country and that country can offer the applicant effective protection, there will not be any prohibition on Australia from refouling the applicant to that third country. Australia’s obligations can be satisfied by refoulement to a third country, notwithstanding that such country is not a party to the Convention: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Al Sallal (1999) 167 ALR 175.Whether decision unauthorised The first ground of review is that the decision not to grant a protection visa to the applicant was not authorised by the Act or the Migration Regulations:s 476(1)(c) of the Act. This ground was particularised in terms of error of law set out in the remaining three grounds. Should one of those be made out, it is contended for the applicant that the Tribunal's decision was unauthorised.Whether incorrect interpretation of the applicable law The second ground of review is that in deciding the applicant was excluded from protection in Australia, the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted the applicable law: s 476(1)(e) of the Act. The ground is particularised in two respects. The first is that the Tribunal's misinterpretation arose because it failed to recognise that Australia may only return the applicant to Syria if the applicant has secured rights and entitlements there which extend to permanent residence, to eventually becoming a citizen of Syria and to effective protection. The latter is said to include the right for the applicant to reside, enter and re-enter Syria. The second particularisation is that the Tribunal should have considered the application of Article 1E of the Convention; that is, whether in Syria the applicant would have the same rights and be under the same obligations as a Syrian national excepting rights of a political kind and disabilities so slight as to be negligible. The issues raised by the ground are therefore whether Article 33 imports some standard which the Tribunal failed to apply.Contentions for the applicant The contentions for the applicant commence by accepting that the question raised by Article 33 is whether, as a matter of practical reality and fact, an applicant is likely to be given effective protection by being permitted to enter and live in a third country where the applicant "will not be under any risk of being refouled to his original country": Al-Sallal at 185. It is submitted that the Tribunal was therefore required to find whether the applicant would experience genuine protection in Syria. It is accepted for the applicant that the following are relevant considerations for the Tribunal in considering whether Article 33 prohibits the refoulement of an applicant for refugee status:(a)the individual circumstances of the refugee: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (1997) 80 FCR 543 at 563; (b)whether the third country is a party to the Convention: Al-Sallal at 185;(c)whether the third country has granted refugee status: Thiyagarajah at 562;(d)whether the applicant has secured rights and entitlements in the third country short of refugee status: Rajendran v Minister for Immigration & Muticultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 526;(e)whether the nature of the refugee's contact with the third country provides the opportunity to obtain refugee status in that country and gives rise to effective protection from refoulement: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Kabail (1999) 93 FCR 498.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established