FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AKY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 232
Appeal from: AKY15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2798 File number(s): SAD 369 of 2015 Judge(s): MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 10 March 2016 Cases cited: AZAEY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 193
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 254 CLR 610
Date of hearing: 3 March 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 24 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondents: Mr K Tredrea Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore ORDERS
SAD 369 of 2015 BETWEEN: AKY15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 MARCH 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
This is an appeal from orders made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) on 23 September 2015 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 17 March 2015: AKY15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2798 (AKY15). The Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa.
BACKGROUND
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 19 July 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 4 December 2012 he lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa (the Visa).
In his visa application the appellant claimed to fear persecution on the basis of his political opinion and his membership of a particular social group, failed asylum seekers. In his statutory declaration, annexed to his visa application, the appellant claimed that:
(1)he provided assistance to his friend, Mr Fonseka, who was running as a candidate for the United Nations Party (UNP) in the July 2011 election;
(2)while out posting posters, people working for the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) would paste their posters over those of the UNP. This caused conflict and the SLFP supporters threatened the appellant and his co-workers;
(3)the UNP lost the election after which SLFP supporters came to his house looking for him. The appellant said that by that time he was hiding;
(4)three days after the election the appellant was working at his job at the hospital car park when three or four men who were SLFP supporters grabbed him. He escaped and ran away;
(5)about a week later, the SLFP supporters came to the appellant’s house at night. The appellant left the…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 232
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine whether the Tribunal's findings were correct and whether the appeal was based on any jurisdictional error. The court considered whether the Tribunal had made any appealable error in its decision and whether the appeal was seeking to review the merits of the Tribunal's decision. The court found that the Tribunal had considered all the matters raised before it and rejected some of those matters as fabrications and found that the others rose no higher than receipt by the appellant of an idle threat. The court also considered the Minister's submissions regarding the Tribunal's findings concerning the appellant's claims arising from his membership of a particular social group: failed asylum seekers who had departed Sri Lanka illegally.
The court found that the Tribunal had undertaken the requisite qualitative assessment in determining whether a risk of loss of liberty constitutes serious harm, as required by the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN. The court also found that the Tribunal's findings were based on an assessment of the credit of the appellant, which is within the domain of the Tribunal alone. The court concluded that there was no error in the Tribunal's approach to its consideration of the complementary protection provisions in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs. The court found that the appeal was seeking to review the merits of the Tribunal's decision, which is not the role of the court on appeal. The court also found that the Tribunal's findings were open to it upon the materials then available and that there was no error in the Tribunal's approach to its consideration of the complementary protection provisions in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant has not filed any written submissions in support of his appeal. At the hearing when invited to make submissions the appellant informed the Court that he was unable to go back to Sri Lanka and that he was looking for a better decision. The Minister has filed written submissions.CONSIDERATION The grounds of appeal raised by the appellant in his notice of appeal seek to cavil with the findings of the Tribunal and, as such, seek impermissible merits review. On that basis, the appeal cannot succeed. The role of this Court on appeal is to consider whether there is any appealable error in the decision of the primary judge. No such error is identified in the notice of appeal nor is any such error discernible from the judgment of the primary judge who considered the appellant’s grounds and found that they did not reveal any jurisdictional error in the decision of the Tribunal. The primary judge found that the Tribunal had considered all of the matters raised before it and rejected some of those matters as fabrications and found that the others rose no higher than receipt by the appellant of an idle threat. As a Full Court of this Court stated in AZAEY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 193 at [38]:The claims as made by the Applicant were considered but largely rejected by the Tribunal. The claims were variously rejected by the Tribunal upon the basis that they were (for example) implausible or inconsistent with other information available to the Tribunal….Each of the findings as made by the Tribunal was a finding open to it upon the materials then available. And, to the extent that those findings were based upon an assessment of the credit of the Applicant, those findings were findings “par excellence” within the domain of the Tribunal alone: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1 at [67], (2000) 168 ALR 407 at 423 per McHugh J. Neither the Federal Circuit Court (nor this Court on appeal) has any general role to review the findings of fact made by the Tribunal. That is what occurred here. There is no error in the approach of the primary judge. Although not raised in the notice of appeal, the Minister made submissions in relation to the Tribunal’s findings concerning the appellant’s claims arising from his membership of a particular social group: failed asylum seekers who had departed Sri Lanka illegally. Firstly, the Minister submitted that, as required by Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610 (WZAPN), the Tribunal did undertake the requisite qualitative assessment in determing whether a risk of loss of liberty constitutes serious harm. Having considered the Tribunal’s decision, I accept that is so: see [202] to [209] of the Tribunal decision. Secondly, the Minister submits that, regardless of the High Court’s decision in WZAPN, the appellant in this case failed on this ground because the Tribunal found that the laws in Sri Lanka in relation to illegal departures are laws of general application. Thus the feared harm is not visited on the appellant for reason of any Convention based ground. I accept that submission. The facts in this case are different to those which were considered in WZAPN: see AZAEK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1415 at [26]-[27]. There is no error in the Tribunal’s approach to its consideration of the complementary protection provisions in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.CONCLUSION