FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AKS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 791
Appeal from: AKS16 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 142 File number: NSD 195 of 2019 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 7 May 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for Constitutional writ relief under Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal committed jurisdictional error – whether Tribunal failed to consider a clearly articulated and distinct claim raised in evidence at Tribunal hearing – whether Tribunal failed to base decision on most recent and up-to-date material Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 91R Cases cited: AKS16 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 142
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 1
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173
Date of hearing: 7 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 36 Counsel for the Appellants: Ms T Baw Solicitor for the Appellants: Sarom Solicitors Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Kay Hoyle Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 195 of 2019 BETWEEN: AKS16
First Appellant
AKU16
Second Appellant
AKV16 (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 MAY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 29 January 2019 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, orders that:
(a)the decision of the second respondent made on 28 January 2016 be set aside;
(b)the application for review be remitted to the second respondent for hearing and determination according to law; and
(c)the first respondent pay the applicants’ costs.
3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court that dismissed the appellants’ application for Constitutional writ relief against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 28 January 2016 to affirm the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant them protection visas: AKS16 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 142. The issue now agitated on appeal is in a narrow compass and is confined to whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in failing to carry out its statutory task of review by misconstruing, or not considering, one or more of the appellants’ claims.
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 791
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicant argued that the AAT did not consider all the photographs and circumstances in which they were taken, particularly the role of the husband as a bodyguard. The Minister contended that the AAT had indeed considered the material and found that it did not give rise to a risk of serious harm. The court found that the trial judge had erred by evaluating the merits of the claim rather than ascertaining whether the AAT carried out its function of review in accordance with law. The trial judge failed to identify whether the AAT had considered all relevant material and whether it had made its decision based on the most current information available.
In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for determination in accordance with law. The Minister was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and the proceeding below. The decision highlights the importance of ensuring that the AAT considers all relevant material and bases its decision on the most recent and accurate information available.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 29 January 2019 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, orders that:
(a) the decision of the second respondent made on 28 January 2016 be set aside;
(b) the application for review be remitted to the second respondent for hearing and determination according to law; and
(c) the first respondent pay the applicants’ costs.
3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
He argued that merely because the Tribunal did not refer to the role of the bodyguard in par 150 that did not mean that the Tribunal had not considered all the photographs and the circumstances in which they were taken. Rather, the Minister said the conclusion that should be drawn was that the Tribunal had found that those circumstances did not give rise to the husband having a sufficiently high profile to be considered as being at risk of serious or significant harm. Next, the Minister argued that, in any event, the Tribunal had found in par 150, based on the April 2015 DFAT report, the nature of the risk in Fiji for persons with a high profile was only a risk “of monitoring and harassment by the military and harassment through the court system”. The Minister submitted that this finding explained the Tribunal’s alternative finding in the last two sentences of par 150, being namely that monitoring and surveillance, of itself, would not come within the meaning of “serious harm” for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b) and, accordingly, the claim could not be made out.Consideration In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 346 [69] McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ pointed out that:…a court which is asked to review the decision is able to identify the Tribunal’s reasons and the findings it made in reaching that conclusion. The provision entitles a court to infer that any matter not mentioned in the s 430 statement was not considered by the Tribunal to be material [Repatriation Commission v O’Brien (1985) 155 CLR 422 at 446, per Brennan J; Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 at 348-349, per Deane J; at 353, per Fisher J; cf Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250 at 262-263 [28]-[29]]. This may reveal some basis for judicial review by the Federal Court under Pt 8 of the Act, or by this Court in proceedings brought under s 75(v) of the Constitution. For example, it may reveal that the Tribunal made some error of law of the kind mentioned in s 476(1)(e) of the Act, such as incorrectly applying the law to the facts found by the Tribunal. It may reveal jurisdictional error [Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179]. The Tribunal’s identification of what it considered to be the material questions of fact may demonstrate that it took into account some irrelevant consideration or did not take into account some relevant consideration [Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24]. (emphasis added) In Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 44-45, Mason J, with whom Gibbs CJ and Dawson J agreed, held that, ordinarily, unless the subject matter, scope and purpose or express provisions of an Act provided otherwise, a decision-maker must base his or her decision on the most recent and accurate information that is to hand. His Honour said at 45:It would be a strange result indeed to hold that the Minister is entitled to ignore material of which he has actual or constructive knowledge and which may have a direct bearing on the justice of making the land grant, and to proceed instead on the basis of material that may be incomplete, inaccurate or misleading. In one sense this conclusion may be seen as an application of the general principle that an administrative decision-maker is required to make his decision on the basis of material available to him at the time the decision is made. But that principle is itself a reflection of the fact that there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of nearly every statute conferring power to make an administrative decision an implication that the decision is to be made on the basis of the most current material available to the decision-maker. (emphasis added)