AKS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AKS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 791

Appeal from: AKS16 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 142
File number: NSD 195 of 2019
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 7 May 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for Constitutional writ relief under Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal committed jurisdictional error – whether Tribunal failed to consider a clearly articulated and distinct claim raised in evidence at Tribunal hearing – whether Tribunal failed to base decision on most recent and up-to-date material
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 91R
Cases cited:

AKS16 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 142

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 1

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173

Date of hearing: 7 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Appellants: Ms T Baw
Solicitor for the Appellants: Sarom Solicitors
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Kay Hoyle
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 195 of 2019
BETWEEN:

AKS16

First Appellant

AKU16

Second Appellant

AKV16 (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 29 January 2019 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, orders that:

(a)the decision of the second respondent made on 28 January 2016 be set aside;

(b)the application for review be remitted to the second respondent for hearing and determination according to law; and

(c)the first respondent pay the applicants’ costs.

3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court that dismissed the appellants’ application for Constitutional writ relief against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 28 January 2016 to affirm the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant them protection visas:  AKS16 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 142. The issue now agitated on appeal is in a narrow compass and is confined to whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in failing to carry out its statutory task of review by misconstruing, or not considering, one or more of the appellants’ claims.

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 791
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AKS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, AKS16, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The primary issue before the court was whether the AAT had committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider a distinct claim raised in evidence at the Tribunal hearing. Additionally, the court examined whether the AAT failed to base its decision on the most recent and up-to-date material available.

The applicant argued that the AAT did not consider all the photographs and circumstances in which they were taken, particularly the role of the husband as a bodyguard. The Minister contended that the AAT had indeed considered the material and found that it did not give rise to a risk of serious harm. The court found that the trial judge had erred by evaluating the merits of the claim rather than ascertaining whether the AAT carried out its function of review in accordance with law. The trial judge failed to identify whether the AAT had considered all relevant material and whether it had made its decision based on the most current information available.

In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for determination in accordance with law. The Minister was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and the proceeding below. The decision highlights the importance of ensuring that the AAT considers all relevant material and bases its decision on the most recent and accurate information available.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 29 January 2019 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, orders that:

(a) the decision of the second respondent made on 28 January 2016 be set aside;

(b) the application for review be remitted to the second respondent for hearing and determination according to law; and

(c) the first respondent pay the applicants’ costs.

3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The trial judge found that the articles concerning the Prime Minister’s statement did not apply to a person in the husband’s position because he was not a person involved in encouraging sedition or violence. In my view, her Honour’s reasoning in that respect, to the extent that this argument was on all fours with what she was asked to consider, erred. Her reasoning was an evaluation of the merits of the claim, as opposed to a consideration of what the Tribunal actually did as expressed in its reasons. The trial judge erred by failing to ascertain whether the Tribunal carried out its function of review in accordance with law. Conclusion For these reasons, the appeal must be allowed and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for determination in accordance with law. The Minister must pay the costs of the appeal and the proceeding below.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

He argued that merely because the Tribunal did not refer to the role of the bodyguard in par 150 that did not mean that the Tribunal had not considered all the photographs and the circumstances in which they were taken. Rather, the Minister said the conclusion that should be drawn was that the Tribunal had found that those circumstances did not give rise to the husband having a sufficiently high profile to be considered as being at risk of serious or significant harm. Next, the Minister argued that, in any event, the Tribunal had found in par 150, based on the April 2015 DFAT report, the nature of the risk in Fiji for persons with a high profile was only a risk “of monitoring and harassment by the military and harassment through the court system”. The Minister submitted that this finding explained the Tribunal’s alternative finding in the last two sentences of par 150, being namely that monitoring and surveillance, of itself, would not come within the meaning of “serious harm” for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b) and, accordingly, the claim could not be made out.Consideration In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 346 [69] McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ pointed out that:…a court which is asked to review the decision is able to identify the Tribunal’s reasons and the findings it made in reaching that conclusion. The provision entitles a court to infer that any matter not mentioned in the s 430 statement was not considered by the Tribunal to be material [Repatriation Commission v O’Brien (1985) 155 CLR 422 at 446, per Brennan J; Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 at 348-349, per Deane J; at 353, per Fisher J; cf Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250 at 262-263 [28]-[29]]. This may reveal some basis for judicial review by the Federal Court under Pt 8 of the Act, or by this Court in proceedings brought under s 75(v) of the Constitution. For example, it may reveal that the Tribunal made some error of law of the kind mentioned in s 476(1)(e) of the Act, such as incorrectly applying the law to the facts found by the Tribunal. It may reveal jurisdictional error [Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179]. The Tribunal’s identification of what it considered to be the material questions of fact may demonstrate that it took into account some irrelevant consideration or did not take into account some relevant consideration [Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24]. (emphasis added) In Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 44-45, Mason J, with whom Gibbs CJ and Dawson J agreed, held that, ordinarily, unless the subject matter, scope and purpose or express provisions of an Act provided otherwise, a decision-maker must base his or her decision on the most recent and accurate information that is to hand. His Honour said at 45:It would be a strange result indeed to hold that the Minister is entitled to ignore material of which he has actual or constructive knowledge and which may have a direct bearing on the justice of making the land grant, and to proceed instead on the basis of material that may be incomplete, inaccurate or misleading. In one sense this conclusion may be seen as an application of the general principle that an administrative decision-maker is required to make his decision on the basis of material available to him at the time the decision is made. But that principle is itself a reflection of the fact that there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of nearly every statute conferring power to make an administrative decision an implication that the decision is to be made on the basis of the most current material available to the decision-maker. (emphasis added)