AKR15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AKR15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ORS [2015] FCCA 1734
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Protection visa – publication of personal information – International Treaties Obligations Assessment (“ITOA”) – whether the ITOA was a “migration decision” within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 – whether the Federal Circuit Court has jurisdiction in respect of the ITOA decision – Department was engaged in conduct that was preparatory of either a decision to remove the bar to a further visa application or to remove the applicant from Australia – jurisdiction of the Court raised – whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness or the ITOA decision was affected by bias – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Constitution, ss.61, 75(v)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.16
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 5AA, 5E, 13, 14, 48B, 65, 189, 197C, 198, 198AD, 336E, 417, 474, 476, 501
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.5.35AA
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88
Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70
Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board v Churchill [1998] VSC 51
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319
Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2012) 246 CLR 636
R v Cook; Ex parte Twigg (1980) 147 CLR 15
Saeed v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252
Snedden v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2014) 315 ALR 352
SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2012) 200 FCR 207

SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143
SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (No.2) [2015] FCCA 1148
SZTZI v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1271
SZWCH v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (No.3) [2015] FCCA 1128
SZWCP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 802

Applicant: AKR15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Third Respondent: KENT CRAWFORD, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
File Number: SYG 979 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Smith
Hearing date: 10 June 2015
Date of Last Submission: 10 June 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 1 July 2015

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr S. Lloyd SC and Ms J. Davidson
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 979 of 2015

AKR15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent

KENT CRAWFORD, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 1734
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Judge Smith of the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, AKR15, sought to challenge a decision concerning their immigration status, specifically relating to the process of determining Australia's non-refoulement obligations under international treaties. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the court possessed jurisdiction to hear the application, which in turn depended on whether a "migration decision" as defined by the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) (the Act) had been made or was in prospect.

The legal issues before the court were whether the applicant had identified a "migration decision" that would enliven the court's jurisdiction, and more specifically, whether a particular communication, referred to as the ITOA, constituted "conduct preparatory to the making of a decision under the Act" and was made "under the Act." The court was required to interpret the definitions of "migration decision," "privative clause decision," and "purported privative clause decision" within the Act, particularly sections 5 and 474, and Regulation 5.35AA.

The court reasoned that a "migration decision" encompasses not only final decisions but also conduct preparatory to a decision, provided that conduct is made "under the Act." The applicant's reliance on the ITOA process was central to establishing the necessary connection to the Act for the court to exercise jurisdiction. The court noted that the applicant's situation bore similarities to that in *SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection* [2014] FCAFC 143, where the Full Court found jurisdiction based on a letter concerning a similar process. The primary judge in *SZSSJ* had dismissed the application, finding no identified migration decision, but this was overturned on appeal. The applicant in the present case was essentially seeking to prevent removal pending a lawful determination of their non-refoulement obligations, and thus needed to demonstrate a jurisdictional basis through the ITOA process.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of AKR15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor revolves around the jurisdictional basis for a court to review a decision made under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant, AKR15, is in detention and seeks to prevent their removal from Australia pending the determination of their non-refoulement obligations under various international treaties. AKR15 argues that the Internal Transfer of Offenders Agreement (ITOA) process provides the necessary connection to the Migration Act, which is essential for the Court to have jurisdiction over the matter. The applicant relies on the conduct preparatory to a decision, as outlined in section 474(3) of the Act, to establish the required connection. The applicant's case is supported by the decision of the Full Court in SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143, where a similar question was considered and the Full Court allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court dismissing an application for want of jurisdiction. The primary judge in the current case found that the applicant had not identified a migration decision that would enliven the Court's jurisdiction, but rather had only speculated or inferred potential decisions.

The facts of the case date back to the period when the applicant was in detention and their personal information was inadvertently disclosed by the Department in February 2014. On 12 March 2014, the applicant received a letter outlining the ITOA process. This letter was relevantly identical to the one received by the applicant in the SZSSJ case, which the Full Court found to be an integral part of the jurisdictional connection between the applicant's situation and the Migration Act. The applicant argues that the ITOA process, which involves the transfer of offenders between countries, is a decision under the Act and forms the basis for the Court's jurisdiction. The applicant contends that the ITOA process is not merely a preparatory step but an integral part of the decision-making process under the Act, thus providing the necessary connection to the Act that is essential for the Court to have jurisdiction over the matter.

The matter of AKR15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor came before the court as an appeal against the determination of an earlier interlocutory application. The applicant sought to prevent their removal pending a lawful determination of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under international treaties. The application was initially dismissed for want of jurisdiction by the primary judge, who found that the applicant had not identified a migration decision which would enliven the Court’s jurisdiction. The Full Court of the Federal Court had previously addressed a similar question in the case of SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143, where it allowed an appeal from a decision of this Court dismissing an application for want of jurisdiction. The applicant in the present case, like the applicant in SZSSJ, received a letter concerning the Internal Referral of Operational Arrangements (IROA) process, which the applicant relied upon to provide the necessary connection to the Act to establish jurisdiction. The primary judge found that the applicant had not identified a migration decision that could be characterised as a migration decision. The court must now determine whether the ITOA process can be considered conduct preparatory to a decision under the Act, and whether it is made "under the Act".

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 5E of the Act provides:5E Meaning of purported privative clause decision(1)In this Act, purported privative clause decision means a decision purportedly made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in purported exercise of a discretion or not), that would be a privative clause decision if there were not:(a) a failure to exercise jurisdiction; or(b) an excess of jurisdiction;in the making of the decision.(2)In this section, decision includes anything listed in subsection 474(3). In short, a migration decision is, for present purposes a decision, including conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, that is, or purports to be made under the Act. One of the issues, then, is whether the ITOA was:a)conduct preparatory to the making of a decision under the Act; andb)made “under the Act”. The first of those questions requires consideration of the possible future decision and the connection, if any, between it and the ITOA. With that issue in mind, it is necessary to have regard to the provisions that the applicant says provide the necessary connection between the ITOA and the Act. The first question in the application is whether the Court has jurisdiction to determine the matter. As the statutory provisions set out above reveal, that question comes down to whether or not there is a relevant “decision under the Act”. That decision need not already have been made and can be conduct preparatory of a decision: see Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319; SZQDZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2012) 200 FCR 207. The application is essentially aimed at preventing the removal of the applicant pending a lawful determination of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under a number of international treaties. Thus, as I have mentioned, the applicant must rely on the ITOA process to provide the connection to the Act that is essential to the jurisdiction of the Court. A similar question was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143. In that case the Full Court allowed an appeal from a decision of this Court dismissing an application for want of jurisdiction. Like the applicant here, the applicant in that case was in detention on 31 January 2014 and was amongst those whose personal information was inadvertently disclosed by the Department in February 2014. Just as in this matter, the applicant there received a letter dated 12 March 2014, the terms of which are set out in the judgment of the Full Court at [6]. It was relevantly identical to the letter received by the applicant in these proceedings. That applicant also received a letter concerning the ITOA process. The learned primary judge found that the applicant had not identified a migration decision which enlivened the Court’s jurisdiction but had only “referred to decisions which he speculated, inferred or suggested had been made but pointed to no actual decision, or future decision which was in prospect, which could be characterised as a migration decision”: SZSSJ at [25].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The term “migration decision” is defined in s.5 of the Act as follows:migration decision means:(a)a privative clause decision; or(b)a purported privative clause decision; or(c)a non‑privative clause decision.…non‑privative clause decision has the meaning given by subsection 474(6).…privative clause decision has the meaning given by subsection 474(2).…purported privative clause decision has the meaning given by section 5E. Section 474 of the Act relevantly provides:474 Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision: (a)is final and conclusive; and (b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and (c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. (2) In this section:“privative clause decision” means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).(3)A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following:(a)granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination;(b)granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa);(c)granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument;(d)imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction;(e)making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration, demand or requirement;(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article;(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing;(h)conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation;(i)a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act;(j) a failure or refusal to make a decision.(4)For the purposes of subsection (2), a decision under a provision, or under a regulation or other instrument made under a provision, set out in the following table is not a privative clause decision: Regulation 5.35AA of the Migration Regulations 1994 (“Regulations”) provides:5.35AA Decisions that are not privative clause decisionsFor subsection 474(5) of the Act, a decision, or a decision included in a class of decisions, made under a provision of the Act set out in the following table is not a privative clause decision. Section 5E of the Act provides:5E Meaning of purported privative clause decision(1)In this Act, purported privative clause decision means a decision purportedly made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in purported exercise of a discretion or not), that would be a privative clause decision if there were not:(a) a failure to exercise jurisdiction; or(b) an excess of jurisdiction;in the making of the decision.(2)In this section, decision includes anything listed in subsection 474(3).