Akbar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Akbar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 746  

File number(s): SYG 2293 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
Date of judgment: 19 August 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION LAW – Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Subclass 500 (Student) visa – Whether genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student – application dismissed  
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 359

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2 cl 500.212

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 256 FCR 593

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 650

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] 147 FCR 51

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3

Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2012) 207 FCR 277

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 34
Date of hearing: 12 August 2024
Place: Parramatta
Solicitor for the Applicant: Appearing in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Sangha, Mills Oakley

ORDERS

SYG 2293 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

RAMIZ AKBAR

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE D HUMPHREYS

DATE OF ORDER:

19 AUGUST 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed

2.The Applicant pays the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5400.00.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE D HUMPHREYS:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant is a male citizen of Indonesia. He arrived in Australia on 15 September 2012 as the holder of a Student (Subclass 572) visa.

  2. The applicant subsequently applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Subclass 500 (Student) visa (“the visa”) on 26 May 2017 to study a Diploma and Advanced Diploma of Marketing and Communication at George Brown College.

  3. On 9 August 2017, a delegate of the then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“delegate”) refused to grant the visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”) on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the requirements of cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Regulations”)…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 746
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Akbar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involves the applicant, Akbar, who sought judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) regarding his application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Subclass 500 (Student) visa. Akbar contended that the AAT erred in its assessment of his intention to genuinely stay in Australia temporarily as a student, among other complaints. The central issue before the court was whether the AAT’s decision to dismiss Akbar's visa application was lawful, focusing on whether the AAT correctly applied the relevant legal principles and had adequate reasons for its conclusions.

The court examined the AAT’s application of Direction No.69, which outlines factors for assessing genuine temporary entry, and the statutory provisions under the Migration Act. The AAT had detailed the various factors it considered, including Akbar’s personal ties, immigration history, and the value of his course to his future. The Tribunal concluded that Akbar did not convincingly demonstrate a genuine intention to stay in Australia temporarily, citing his personal ties to Indonesia, the lack of strong ties to Australia, and concerns that his course was a means to extend his stay in the country. The Tribunal also highlighted the applicant’s economic circumstances and his plan to work as a marketing consultant, which it deemed insufficiently thought through.

In reviewing the AAT's decision, the court noted that it was not the role of the judiciary to re-evaluate the merits of the case or to engage in what amounted to merits review. Instead, the court’s function was to ensure the AAT’s decision was lawful and that it properly considered all relevant factors. The court found that the AAT had indeed considered the relevant factors and had provided a reasoned decision that adhered to the legal framework. Therefore, the court dismissed Akbar's application for judicial review, upholding the AAT’s decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court. For the reasons set out below, the application must be dismissed. THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal considered that the issue for resolution was whether the applicant was a genuine temporary applicant for entry and stay as a student. The Tribunal set out in full cl 500.212 of the Regulations:The applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:(a)the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having regard to:(i) the applicant’s circumstances; and(ii) the applicant’s immigration history; and(iii)if the applicant is a minor—the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and(iv) any other relevant matter; and(b)the applicant intends to comply with any conditions subject to which the visa is granted, having regard to:(i)the applicant’s record of compliance with any condition of a visa previously held by the applicant (if any); and(ii)the applicant’s stated intention to comply with any conditions to which the visa may be subject; and(c) of any other relevant matter. Under the heading “Does the applicant intend genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily?”, the Tribunal confirmed that it must have regard to Direction No.69 which specifies a number of factors the Tribunal is to have regard to, being:•the applicant’s circumstances in their home country, potential circumstances in Australia, and the value of the course to the applicant’s future;•the applicant’s immigration history, including previous applications for an Australian visa or for visas to other countries, and previous travel to Australia or other countries;•if the applicant is a minor, the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and•any other relevant information provided by the applicant, or information otherwise available to the decision maker, including information that may be either beneficial or unfavourable to the applicant. At [10] to [11], the Tribunal set out the documents that the applicant had provided and the documents the Tribunal had regard to, and from [12] to [37] set out the statements, evidence, and claims of the applicant. Under the heading “Findings in relation to factors contained in Direction No.69”, the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that the applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia. The Tribunal noted that certain aspects of the applicant’s circumstances supported his claim to be a genuine temporary entrant, but that the Tribunal had concerns as a whole. The Tribunal, in considering Direction No.69, made the following findings:(a)The applicant continues to have personal ties in Indonesia which would serve as an incentive to return, that he maintains contact with his family through phone applications and relatively regular visits, and that his economic circumstances may present as an incentive to return, including his mother’s business and the land which he and his brothers own, and the land owned by his mother.(b)The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant does not have strong personal ties with Australia and, noting the applicant had some friends, did not consider them a strong incentive to remain in Australia.(c)The applicant has a good level of knowledge of living in Australia.(d)There was no evidence of any military service or civil or political incidents which would act as an incentive for the applicant to remain in Australia. There was no evidence that the applicant had entered into a relationship, and that there was insufficient evidence regarding the applicant’s circumstances in Indonesia relative to others. As such, the Tribunal made no adverse findings in regard to these factors. (e)There were no adverse findings in relation to cl 9(a) of Direction No.69.(f)When considering the value of the course to the applicant’s future, the Tribunal had concerns. At [44] to [49], the Tribunal set out the applicant’s generic and sometimes varying reasons for why he was studying his chosen course of Marketing and Communications. These reasons were stated by the applicant in his Genuine Temporary Entrant statement (“GTE statement”), his response to the Tribunal’s invitation under s 359(2) of the Act, and his claims and oral statements at the hearing before the Tribunal.(g)In light of the applicant’s previous statements, the Tribunal viewed the applicant’s plan to work as a Marketing Consultant as being put forward for the purposes of the hearing. The Tribunal had concerns that this plan had not been thought through sufficiently and was still in the ideas stage. The Tribunal also noted that, on the applicant’s evidence, the weekly wages earned by the applicant in Australia were roughly equivalent to what he hopes to earn from consultancy work in Indonesia; even when expenses are factored in. The Tribunal had some concerns in respect of the applicant’s economic circumstances, which present as an incentive not to return to his home country, and with respect to the renumeration the applicant could expect to receive in his home country compared to Australia. As such, the Tribunal was concerned that the applicant was enrolled in his then current studies to extend his stay in Australia, raising concerns that the visa may have been used to maintain ongoing residence and to circumvent the intentions of the migration program. (h)The applicant has held two Student visas, and he has no other outstanding visa applications. (i)Considering the applicant’s work as an Uber driver (on the applicant’s own evidence of earning $600 to $700 per week), the Tribunal noted that this was significantly higher than the salary earned in previous years and the Tribunal questioned whether the additional hours worked were required for paying daily expenses and educational costs as claimed, or whether the self-regulating hours provided the applicant with an additional economic incentive to extend his stay in Australia. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted the applicant’s Bridging visa, dated 26 May 2017 contained in the Department’s file, and noted that it contained Condition 8105 (work limitation). The Tribunal found that the applicant, based on his own evidence, did not comply with Condition 8105 of his visa and that the circumstances were not beyond his control.(j)While having some concerns, the Tribunal did not make any adverse findings when considering the amount of time the applicant has spent in Australia, and the relatively short and inexpensive courses he has completed. (k)There were no adverse findings in respect to clauses 14(a)(i) and (ii) or 14(b)(ii) or (iv) of the Direction No.69.(l)There are no other relevant matters in addition to those otherwise considered.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground three alleges that the Tribunal “made an erroneous reasoning” by failing to consider that the applicant had been “quite consistent” in his motivations. The first respondent submits that the applicant seeks an invitation for the Court to engage in impermissible merits review; (see: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259). As such both grounds two and three must fail.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF REVIEW In Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [17], the task of a court conducting judicial review was described in this manner:… An application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality the decision by reference to the complaints made about it. In ApplicantWAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 256 FCR 593 at [46], the following was said:The Tribunal is not a Court. It is an administrative body operating in an environment which requires an expeditious determination of a high volume of applications. Its reasons are not to be scrutinised ‘with an eye keenly attuned to error’. Nor is it necessarily required to provide reasons of the kind that might be expected from a court of law. Ground 1 is a complaint that the Tribunal breached s 359 of the Act. That section reads as follows:Tribunal may seek information(1) In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review.(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Tribunal may invite, either orally (including by telephone) or in writing, a person to give information.(3) If a written invitation under subsection (2) is given to a person other than the Secretary, the invitation must be given:(a) except where paragraph (b) applies--by one of the methods specified in section 379A; or(b) if the invitation is given to a person in immigration detention--by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.(4) If an invitation is given to the Secretary, the invitation must be given by one of the methods specified in section 379B. The complaint by the applicant is that the Tribunal failed to take account of his statement that he wished to run a marketing consultancy business. A fair reading of the Tribunal decision record clearly indicates that the Tribunal did take into account the plan the applicant put forward at the hearing to run a marketing consultancy, whereas the material in the response related to “a business”. The applicant’s evidence was clearly set out at [44] – [49] of the decision record. The Court is satisfied based on a reading of the entirety of that evidence, the Tribunal was entitled to draw the conclusion that the applicant only stated that the plan to run a business as a marketing consultant was put forward for the first time at the hearing before the Tribunal. Up until that point of time, the idea of running a business had been entirely generic and vague. The Court notes that at [25], the Tribunal noted that the applicant stated his initial intention was a business similar to that of his parents, which was as an accountant.