FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Akbar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 746
File number(s): SYG 2293 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS Date of judgment: 19 August 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION LAW – Administrative Appeals Tribunal - Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Subclass 500 (Student) visa – Whether genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 359
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2 cl 500.212
Cases cited: Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352
Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey [2014] FCA 650
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] 147 FCR 51
Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3
Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2012) 207 FCR 277
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 34 Date of hearing: 12 August 2024 Place: Parramatta Solicitor for the Applicant: Appearing in person Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Sangha, Mills Oakley ORDERS
SYG 2293 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: RAMIZ AKBAR
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
19 AUGUST 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed
2.The Applicant pays the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5400.00.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant is a male citizen of Indonesia. He arrived in Australia on 15 September 2012 as the holder of a Student (Subclass 572) visa.
The applicant subsequently applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Subclass 500 (Student) visa (“the visa”) on 26 May 2017 to study a Diploma and Advanced Diploma of Marketing and Communication at George Brown College.
On 9 August 2017, a delegate of the then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“delegate”) refused to grant the visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”) on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the requirements of cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Regulations”)…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 746
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the AAT’s application of Direction No.69, which outlines factors for assessing genuine temporary entry, and the statutory provisions under the Migration Act. The AAT had detailed the various factors it considered, including Akbar’s personal ties, immigration history, and the value of his course to his future. The Tribunal concluded that Akbar did not convincingly demonstrate a genuine intention to stay in Australia temporarily, citing his personal ties to Indonesia, the lack of strong ties to Australia, and concerns that his course was a means to extend his stay in the country. The Tribunal also highlighted the applicant’s economic circumstances and his plan to work as a marketing consultant, which it deemed insufficiently thought through.
In reviewing the AAT's decision, the court noted that it was not the role of the judiciary to re-evaluate the merits of the case or to engage in what amounted to merits review. Instead, the court’s function was to ensure the AAT’s decision was lawful and that it properly considered all relevant factors. The court found that the AAT had indeed considered the relevant factors and had provided a reasoned decision that adhered to the legal framework. Therefore, the court dismissed Akbar's application for judicial review, upholding the AAT’s decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ground three alleges that the Tribunal “made an erroneous reasoning” by failing to consider that the applicant had been “quite consistent” in his motivations. The first respondent submits that the applicant seeks an invitation for the Court to engage in impermissible merits review; (see: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259). As such both grounds two and three must fail.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF REVIEW In Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [17], the task of a court conducting judicial review was described in this manner:… An application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality the decision by reference to the complaints made about it. In ApplicantWAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 256 FCR 593 at [46], the following was said:The Tribunal is not a Court. It is an administrative body operating in an environment which requires an expeditious determination of a high volume of applications. Its reasons are not to be scrutinised ‘with an eye keenly attuned to error’. Nor is it necessarily required to provide reasons of the kind that might be expected from a court of law. Ground 1 is a complaint that the Tribunal breached s 359 of the Act. That section reads as follows:Tribunal may seek information(1) In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review.(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Tribunal may invite, either orally (including by telephone) or in writing, a person to give information.(3) If a written invitation under subsection (2) is given to a person other than the Secretary, the invitation must be given:(a) except where paragraph (b) applies--by one of the methods specified in section 379A; or(b) if the invitation is given to a person in immigration detention--by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.(4) If an invitation is given to the Secretary, the invitation must be given by one of the methods specified in section 379B. The complaint by the applicant is that the Tribunal failed to take account of his statement that he wished to run a marketing consultancy business. A fair reading of the Tribunal decision record clearly indicates that the Tribunal did take into account the plan the applicant put forward at the hearing to run a marketing consultancy, whereas the material in the response related to “a business”. The applicant’s evidence was clearly set out at [44] – [49] of the decision record. The Court is satisfied based on a reading of the entirety of that evidence, the Tribunal was entitled to draw the conclusion that the applicant only stated that the plan to run a business as a marketing consultant was put forward for the first time at the hearing before the Tribunal. Up until that point of time, the idea of running a business had been entirely generic and vague. The Court notes that at [25], the Tribunal noted that the applicant stated his initial intention was a business similar to that of his parents, which was as an accountant.