AJY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AJY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 327

Appeal from: AJY17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1057
File number: NSD 653 of 2019
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 13 March 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from an order dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – primary judge held it was open to the Authority to conclude that the appellant was not a person who would be imputed by the Sri Lankan authorities to have the political opinions of a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – grounds of appeal ambiguous – no objection to court on appeal examining the reasoning of the primary judge for appealable error – primary judge proceeded on an incomplete summary of the appellant’s claims – decision of Authority affected by legal unreasonableness – Authority’s errors material to the outcome – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36, 65, 474, Pt 7AA

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516; 69 AAR 210

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 151

Date of hearing: 19 August 2019
Date of last submissions: 26 August 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 59
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice
Table of Corrections
18 March 2020 Order 7 has been amended to read “ vary the order in paragraphs 5 or 6”

ORDERS

NSD 653 of 2019
BETWEEN:

AJY17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The orders of the primary judge made on 16 April 2019 in SYG 280/2017 are set aside.

3.A writ of certiorari issue, quashing the decision of the second respondent made on 13 January 2017.

4.The second respondent (differently constituted) is to review the decision of the first respondent in accordance with the law.

5.The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 327
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

AJY17 brought an appeal against the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerning the dismissal of an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority. The appellant, a Sri Lankan national, sought to challenge the Authority's decision that he did not face a risk of persecution in Sri Lanka due to imputed political opinions associated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The appeal was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, which was tasked with determining whether the primary judge's decision contained any appealable errors.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge correctly interpreted the grounds for judicial review and whether the Authority's decision was affected by legal unreasonableness. The appellant argued that the primary judge had misinterpreted the grounds of appeal and failed to consider certain critical evidence regarding threats made by the Sri Lankan authorities. The court needed to decide if the Authority's decision was based on a proper understanding of the appellant's claims and whether the decision-making process was legally sound.

The Federal Court found that the primary judge had generously interpreted the grounds for judicial review but had based her decision on an incomplete summary of the appellant's claims. The court noted that the Authority's decision was affected by legal unreasonableness as it did not fully consider the appellant's claims regarding threats made by the authorities. The court emphasised that the Authority's power to review the delegate's decision was subject to the condition that it be exercised reasonably, in line with the common law principle that statutory decision-making authority must be exercised according to law and reason. Consequently, the court held that the Authority's decision contained jurisdictional error due to the incomplete consideration of the appellant's claims.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge's orders, quashed the Authority's decision, and ordered the Authority to review the matter in accordance with the law. The Minister was directed to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, while the parties were to bear their own costs of the original proceedings. The parties were given liberty to apply to vary the order regarding costs, to be exercised by a specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge made on 16 April 2019 in SYG 280/2017 are set aside.

3. A writ of certiorari issue, quashing the decision of the second respondent made on 13 January 2017.

4. The second respondent (differently constituted) is to review the decision of the first respondent in accordance with the law.

5. The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

6. The parties are to bear their own costs of the proceedings SYG 280/2017.

7. The parties have liberty to apply to vary the order in paragraphs 5 or 6, such liberty to be exercised on or before 20 March 2020.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge (properly) interpreted the grounds for judicial review at first instance generously toward the appellant. The essence of the judgment at first instance was that there was no jurisdictional error affecting the Tribunal’s factual finding that the Sri Lankan authorities did not currently impute to the appellant the political opinions of an LTTE member or sympathiser. Her Honour concluded that the Tribunal’s findings on that topic were open to it, even though the grounds for judicial review had not expressly articulated a challenge to that finding in language articulating a recognisable ground for judicial review. There is no objection to this Court examining that conclusion for appealable error.CONSIDERATION The legal effect of her Honour’s conclusion was that the Authority’s underlying factual finding was not affected by legal unreasonableness in the sense explained by the Full Court of this Court in ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109 and the cases cited therein. From that conclusion, the primary judge reasoned that the Tribunal had not committed jurisdictional error in applying the country information to the facts particular to the appellant, as the Authority had lawfully found them to be. The primary judge proceeded on the basis that the appellant’s claims were as summarised in written submissions upon which the Minister had relied. That summary was incomplete in two respects that were critical to the outcome of the Authority’s review. The summary did not include any reference to the circumstance that the “warning” that had been issued to the appellant after his detention and torture in 2006 was in the nature of a threat that he could be shot at any time. Nor did the summary refer to the words the appellant claimed had been said by the authorities at the time of his release, namely that he was “known” to be “an original LTTE member”. It is significant that those words were claimed to have been said by the authorities themselves. A proper analysis of whether the Authority committed jurisdictional error depended upon an accurate understanding of the claims the Authority had considered and rejected and its reasons for doing so. The Authority correctly identified that the appellant had claimed that upon his release in 2006 he was told by officers of the STF that “they knew he was an original LTTE member and they could shoot him at any time”. In the circumstances I have described, it is appropriate for this Court to consider for itself whether the Authority’s finding about the appellant’s profile was affected by jurisdictional error, having regard to the appellant’s claims as he had articulated them, and not as they were summarised by the Minister’s lawyer at first instance.Principles The Authority’s power to review the delegate’s decision was subject to the implied condition that the power be exercised reasonably. As Gageler J said in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (at [90]):Implication of reasonableness as a condition of the exercise of a discretionary power conferred by statute is no different from implication of reasonableness as a condition of an opinion or state of satisfaction required by statute as a prerequisite to an exercise of a statutory power or performance of statutory duty. Each is a manifestation of the general and deeply rooted common law principle of construction that such decision-making authority as is conferred by statute must be exercised according to law and to reason within limits set by the subject matter, scope and purposes of the statute.(original emphasis, footnotes omitted)