AJX15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AJX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 109

Appeal from: AJX15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1839
File number: NSD 1430 of 2015
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 10 February 2016
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

guideline PAM3 Protection Visas – Complementary Protection Guidelines  

Cases cited:

AJX15 v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1839

Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1

Jackamarra v Krakouer (1988) 195 CLR 516

R v Secretary for the Home Department;  Ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087

Date of hearing: 10 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 19
Counsel for the Appellant: C Parkin
Solicitor for the Appellant: Westside Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 1430 of 2015
BETWEEN:

AJX15

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an application for an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court given on 3 July 2015:  AJX15 v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1839. The application for an extension of time was filed on 17 November 2015, over four months from the original decision.

    Background

  2. The applicant had been represented throughout the process of the Minister’s delegate’s assessment of his application for a protection visa and on his application for review of the delegate’s decision not to grant that visa, determined by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 19 March 2015.  However, he was not represented in the proceedings below, but is now represented by counsel.

  3. The applicant’s counsel accepts that the trial judge made no error in determining the application for review of the Tribunal’s decision that had been asserted in the Court below.  The fate of this application depends squarely upon a point that counsel has identified subsequently and it forms the basis of the proposed notice of appeal, namely, that the Tribunal failed properly to consider and apply guideline PAM3 Protection Visas – Complementary Protection Guidelines, promulgated by the then Minister on 21 June 2013 in Ministerial Direction No 56, made under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Direction required the Tribunal, relevantly, when exercising its powers under ss 414 and 415 of the Act “to take account of the following guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration”.

    The circumstances in which the extension of time…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 109
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity, sought an extension of time to appeal from the Federal Circuit Court's decision of 3 July 2015, which dismissed his application for a protection visa. The application for an extension of time was made over four months after the original decision. The applicant had been represented by a solicitor migration agent in the original proceedings but was unrepresented at the time of the application for an extension of time. The applicant now relies on counsel and argues that the Refugee Review Tribunal did not properly consider and apply the PAM3 Protection Visas – Complementary Protection Guidelines when determining his application. The applicant argues that this is a pure point of law that does not require further facts to be considered and that the Court should grant leave for the appeal to proceed.

The court was required to determine whether it should exercise its discretion to extend time to allow the applicant to file an appeal. The court applied the test established in Jackamarra v Krakouer, which requires the court to consider whether the case is strong on the merits and whether it ought to be heard in fairness to the parties. The court considered the weakness of the proposed ground of appeal, the applicant's failure to raise the point earlier, and the applicant's delay in seeking legal advice before filing the present application. The court concluded that the application for an extension of time should be dismissed with costs.

The court held that the proposed sole ground of appeal had no real prospect of success. The court found that the Tribunal's reasons demonstrated an active intellectual engagement with the requirements of the PAM3 guidelines. The court also noted that the applicant had failed to explain why he delayed between late August 2015, when he learned that the Minister had refused his request for consideration under s 417, and early November 2015 when he first consulted his solicitor. The court held that the applicant's choice to take a different avenue than directly appealing from the trial judge's decision, and the significant delay in seeking legal advice, were factors that weighed against granting an extension of time.

The court ordered that the application for an extension of time be dismissed and that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs. The applicant was also ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court. The court noted that entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court given on 3 July 2015: AJX15 v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1839. The application for an extension of time was filed on 17 November 2015, over four months from the original decision.Background The applicant had been represented throughout the process of the Minister’s delegate’s assessment of his application for a protection visa and on his application for review of the delegate’s decision not to grant that visa, determined by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 19 March 2015. However, he was not represented in the proceedings below, but is now represented by counsel. The applicant’s counsel accepts that the trial judge made no error in determining the application for review of the Tribunal’s decision that had been asserted in the Court below. The fate of this application depends squarely upon a point that counsel has identified subsequently and it forms the basis of the proposed notice of appeal, namely, that the Tribunal failed properly to consider and apply guideline PAM3 Protection Visas – Complementary Protection Guidelines, promulgated by the then Minister on 21 June 2013 in Ministerial Direction No 56, made under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Direction required the Tribunal, relevantly, when exercising its powers under ss 414 and 415 of the Act “to take account of the following guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration”.The circumstances in which the extension of time is sought The applicant gave evidence and was cross-examined. In cross-examination he said that he did not read, write or speak English, and that, although he was aware of his right to appeal to this Court from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, he had been told by a friend that he could also choose to apply essentially, under s 417, to the Minister to grant him a more favourable outcome than the Tribunal. Accordingly, the applicant wrote to the Minister on 20 July 2015 with the assistance of an interpreter, who prepared the English version of his application. On 26 August 2015, the applicant received a letter from the Department telling him that his request to the Minister had been declined. On 6 November 2015, the applicant made an appointment with his new solicitor. That led to the obtaining of counsel’s advice and the preparation and filing of the present application and the applicant’s affidavit of 12 November 2015.The proceedings in the Tribunal The applicant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity. He applied for a protection visa on 27 November 2012. The delegate refused his application on 26 February 2014. He appeared and gave evidence before the Tribunal on 2 March 2015 with the assistance of his solicitor migration agent. The solicitor migration agent made very detailed written submissions to the Tribunal covering a wide range of matters. However, in the over 50 pages of those submissions dated 25 February 2015 it is not apparent that attention was given to the PAM3 guidelines. Nonetheless, one of the matters that the submissions addressed was the possibility that, on his return to Sri Lanka, the applicant might be subjected to persecution or significant harm, attracting Australia’s complementary protection obligations for the purposes of ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) because of that country’s policy of charging and detaining persons who left there illegally.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In all the circumstances, having regard to the weakness of the proposed ground, the failure of the applicant to raise the point earlier, albeit understandable because he was not represented, and his delay, I am not persuaded that this is an appropriate case in which to exercise the Court’s discretion to extend time to allow the appeal to be filed.Conclusion In my opinion, the application for an extension of time must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant argued that the Tribunal’s reasons did not exhibit an active intellectual engagement with the requirements of the PAM3 guidelines, relying on the decision of Lindgren, Rares and Foster JJ in Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1 at 7 [48]. The applicant accepted that he would need leave to raise the sole ground of his intended appeal because it had not been addressed to the trial judge. But, he argued that the Court ought grant that leave because, if the ground had merit, the lack of the applicant’s representation below was a sufficient explanation for allowing it to be advanced, having regard to the fact that it was a pure point of law not requiring further facts to be considered.Consideration The test for granting an extension of time was explained by Brennan CJ and McHugh J in Jackamarra v Krakouer (1988) 195 CLR 516 at 519-520 at [3]-[4], with the agreement of Kirby J at 540 [66(4)]. They applied what Lord Denning MR had said in R v Secretary for the Home Department; Ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087 at 1091, namely:We often like to know the outline of the case. If it appears to be a case which is strong on the merits and which out to be heard, in fairness to the parties, we may think it proper that the case should be allowed to proceed and we extend the time accordingly. If it appears to be a flimsy case and weak on the merits, we may not extend the time. We never go into much detail on the merits, but we do like to know something about the case before deciding whether or not to extend the time. Brennan CJ and McHugh J pointed out that Lord Denning MR had been considering an application for an extension of time to lodge an appeal and they said that that class of case involved a respondent who had a vested right to retain the judgment the subject of the proposed appeal. They observed that: “To grant the application for an extension of time is to put at risk a vested right of the respondent”. Their Honours said this was in contradistinction to a situation where an appeal was already on foot and there was an application for an extension of time to take a step within such a proceeding, when a more liberal approach may be applied. In my opinion, having regard to the Tribunal’s reasons, the proposed sole ground of appeal in the circumstances of this case, has no real prospect of success. Moreover, the applicant has failed to explain why he delayed between late August 2015, when he learned that the Minister had refused his request for consideration under s 417, and early November 2015 when he first consulted his solicitor. I accept the applicant’s evidence that he was not aware of a time limit within which he had to file an appeal before he consulted his solicitor. However, he chose to take a different avenue than directly appealing from the trial judge’s decision. When that avenue, namely, of seeking Ministerial intervention had failed, he then took a significantly long period of time, for which he has given no explanation in which to seek legal advice before he commenced this application.