FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AJX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2016] FCA 109
Appeal from: AJX15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1839 File number: NSD 1430 of 2015 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 10 February 2016 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
guideline PAM3 Protection Visas – Complementary Protection Guidelines
Cases cited: AJX15 v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1839
Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1988) 195 CLR 516
R v Secretary for the Home Department; Ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087
Date of hearing: 10 February 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 19 Counsel for the Appellant: C Parkin Solicitor for the Appellant: Westside Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: R Francois Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz ORDERS
NSD 1430 of 2015 BETWEEN: AJX15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 FEBRUARY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)
RARES J:
This is an application for an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court given on 3 July 2015: AJX15 v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1839. The application for an extension of time was filed on 17 November 2015, over four months from the original decision.
Background
The applicant had been represented throughout the process of the Minister’s delegate’s assessment of his application for a protection visa and on his application for review of the delegate’s decision not to grant that visa, determined by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 19 March 2015. However, he was not represented in the proceedings below, but is now represented by counsel.
The applicant’s counsel accepts that the trial judge made no error in determining the application for review of the Tribunal’s decision that had been asserted in the Court below. The fate of this application depends squarely upon a point that counsel has identified subsequently and it forms the basis of the proposed notice of appeal, namely, that the Tribunal failed properly to consider and apply guideline PAM3 Protection Visas – Complementary Protection Guidelines, promulgated by the then Minister on 21 June 2013 in Ministerial Direction No 56, made under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Direction required the Tribunal, relevantly, when exercising its powers under ss 414 and 415 of the Act “to take account of the following guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration”.
The circumstances in which the extension of time…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 109
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether it should exercise its discretion to extend time to allow the applicant to file an appeal. The court applied the test established in Jackamarra v Krakouer, which requires the court to consider whether the case is strong on the merits and whether it ought to be heard in fairness to the parties. The court considered the weakness of the proposed ground of appeal, the applicant's failure to raise the point earlier, and the applicant's delay in seeking legal advice before filing the present application. The court concluded that the application for an extension of time should be dismissed with costs.
The court held that the proposed sole ground of appeal had no real prospect of success. The court found that the Tribunal's reasons demonstrated an active intellectual engagement with the requirements of the PAM3 guidelines. The court also noted that the applicant had failed to explain why he delayed between late August 2015, when he learned that the Minister had refused his request for consideration under s 417, and early November 2015 when he first consulted his solicitor. The court held that the applicant's choice to take a different avenue than directly appealing from the trial judge's decision, and the significant delay in seeking legal advice, were factors that weighed against granting an extension of time.
The court ordered that the application for an extension of time be dismissed and that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs. The applicant was also ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court. The court noted that entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant argued that the Tribunal’s reasons did not exhibit an active intellectual engagement with the requirements of the PAM3 guidelines, relying on the decision of Lindgren, Rares and Foster JJ in Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1 at 7 [48]. The applicant accepted that he would need leave to raise the sole ground of his intended appeal because it had not been addressed to the trial judge. But, he argued that the Court ought grant that leave because, if the ground had merit, the lack of the applicant’s representation below was a sufficient explanation for allowing it to be advanced, having regard to the fact that it was a pure point of law not requiring further facts to be considered.Consideration The test for granting an extension of time was explained by Brennan CJ and McHugh J in Jackamarra v Krakouer (1988) 195 CLR 516 at 519-520 at [3]-[4], with the agreement of Kirby J at 540 [66(4)]. They applied what Lord Denning MR had said in R v Secretary for the Home Department; Ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087 at 1091, namely:We often like to know the outline of the case. If it appears to be a case which is strong on the merits and which out to be heard, in fairness to the parties, we may think it proper that the case should be allowed to proceed and we extend the time accordingly. If it appears to be a flimsy case and weak on the merits, we may not extend the time. We never go into much detail on the merits, but we do like to know something about the case before deciding whether or not to extend the time. Brennan CJ and McHugh J pointed out that Lord Denning MR had been considering an application for an extension of time to lodge an appeal and they said that that class of case involved a respondent who had a vested right to retain the judgment the subject of the proposed appeal. They observed that: “To grant the application for an extension of time is to put at risk a vested right of the respondent”. Their Honours said this was in contradistinction to a situation where an appeal was already on foot and there was an application for an extension of time to take a step within such a proceeding, when a more liberal approach may be applied. In my opinion, having regard to the Tribunal’s reasons, the proposed sole ground of appeal in the circumstances of this case, has no real prospect of success. Moreover, the applicant has failed to explain why he delayed between late August 2015, when he learned that the Minister had refused his request for consideration under s 417, and early November 2015 when he first consulted his solicitor. I accept the applicant’s evidence that he was not aware of a time limit within which he had to file an appeal before he consulted his solicitor. However, he chose to take a different avenue than directly appealing from the trial judge’s decision. When that avenue, namely, of seeking Ministerial intervention had failed, he then took a significantly long period of time, for which he has given no explanation in which to seek legal advice before he commenced this application.