AJ v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   AJ -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2007] WASCA 228

CORAM:   WHEELER JA

PULLIN JA
BUSS JA

HEARD:   7 AUGUST 2007

DELIVERED          :   31 OCTOBER 2007

FILE NO/S:   CACR 9 of 2007

BETWEEN:   AJ

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MCCANN DCJ

Citation  :THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- "A J" [2007] WADC 5

File No  :IND 451 of 2006

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Joinder of offences - Accused charged with multiple sexual offences against two complainants - Application to sever counts on the indictment - Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 133 - Whether evidence of each complainant had significant probative value in relation to other complainant - Risk of an unfair trial - Whether direction to jury could guard against prejudice - Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Legislation:

Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 23(2)(b), s 133, sch 1(cl 2(3), cl 7(3))
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr J A Davies & Mr F C Voon

Respondent:     Ms J D Whitbread

Solicitors:

Appellant:     S C Nigam & Co

Respondent:     State Director of Public Prosecutions

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162; (2006) 165 A Crim R 482

Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122

Goldsmith v Sandilands [2002] HCA 31; (2002) 190 ALR 370

Graham v The Queen [1998] HCA 61; (1998) 195 CLR 606

Noto v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 278; (2006) 168 A Crim R 457

Palmer v The Queen [1998] HCA 2; (1998) 193 CLR 1

Phillips v The Queen [2006] HCA 4; (2006) 225 CLR 303

The State of Western Australia v GBT [2006] WASCA 75

The State of Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183

VIM v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 233; (2005) 31 WAR 1

Wood v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 179

  1. WHEELER JA:  I agree with Buss JA.

  2. PULLIN JA: The appellant faced six charges in an indictment. The details are set out in the reasons of Buss JA. As Buss JA recites, the trial judge, on 1 December 2006, heard the appellant's application that the indictment 'be severed' to provide a separate trial for each complainant. The only issue before this court was whether or not an order for a separate trial should have been made pursuant to s 133 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (CPA).

  3. When an indictment is presented which contains more than one charge, or which charges more than two accused, there are several statutory provisions which may have to be considered.  They are as follows: 

    (a)Clause 2(2) of the first schedule of the CPA states the…

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Details
Case
[2007] WASCA 228
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AJ v The State of Western Australia involved an accused who was charged with multiple sexual offences against two complainants. The accused sought an order to sever the counts on the indictment, arguing that the joinder of the offences would result in an unfair trial due to the prejudicial effect of evidence from each complainant on the other. The court was required to determine whether the joinder of the offences would result in a likelihood of prejudice to the accused and, if so, whether such prejudice could be guarded against by a direction to the jury.

The court considered the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s*133 and the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s*31A, which provide for the admissibility of propensity and relationship evidence. The court found that the evidence of each complainant had significant probative value in relation to the other, and that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial was such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. The court also found that the likelihood of prejudice could be guarded against by a direction to the jury.

The court concluded that the accused was likely to be prejudiced by the joinder of the offences on the indictment, but that such prejudice could be guarded against by a direction to the jury. The court therefore refused to order separate trials. The accused appealed the decision, but the appeal was dismissed.

In summary, the court held that the joinder of multiple sexual offences against two complainants in one indictment did not necessarily result in a likelihood of prejudice to the accused, and that such prejudice could be guarded against by a direction to the jury. The court refused to order separate trials. The accused's appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 31A of the Evidence Act provides: (1)In this section -'propensity evidence' means - (a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;'relationship evidence' means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time. (2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers -(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. (3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion. In Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122, the appellant applied for separate trials where sexual offences against four complainants were joined in one indictment. This court refused to order separate trials. Roberts‑Smith JA made these comments on the relevant legislative provisions:The starting point is the proposition in s 133(3) of the [Criminal Procedure Act] that if the court is satisfied there is likely to be prejudice to an accused by the joinder of two or more charges, the court may order separate trials.In considering the likelihood of an accused being so prejudiced in the trial of an indictment containing two or more charges of a sexual nature, the court must not have regard to the possibility that similar fact evidence, the probative value of which outweighs its potentially prejudicial effect, may be the result of collusion or suggestion (s 133(6)). It is self‑evident that a court cannot make a severance order under s 133(3) unless satisfied there would be a likelihood of prejudice to the accused.But satisfaction that there is such a likelihood does not mean an order for severance must be made. In deciding whether or not to make such an order, it is open to the court to conclude that such likelihood can be guarded against by direction to the jury (s 133(5)(a)).There is a question whether the words 'to so decide' in s 133(5)(b) and (c) refer to the decision to make an order under subs (1) or to the decision that the likelihood of prejudice may be guarded against by a direction to the jury, under subs (5)(a).Senior counsel for the appellant submitted the words 'to so decide' in subs (5)(b) and (c), must be a reference to the decision referred to in subs (5)(a). Counsel for the respondent agreed. I accept that submission. The only alternative construction would be that it is a reference to the opening words of subs (5), being the decision whether to make an order under subs (3). The latter construction does not make sense; the former does. There would be nothing left upon which (b) and (c) could sensibly operate once the court had decided that likely prejudice to the accused could (or could not) be guarded against by a direction to the jury.The central test for the making of a decision under [s 133(3)] is whether the court is satisfied the accused is likely to be prejudiced because the indictment contains two or more charges. If there is not such a likelihood, the order cannot be made. If there is, the court may nonetheless refuse to order severance if satisfied that the likelihood can be guarded against by a direction to the jury. The way in which these provisions logically fall to be determined, in practical terms, therefore seems to me to be as follows:(1)If the court is satisfied the accused is likely to be prejudiced by the joinder of two or more charges on an indictment, the court may order separate trials.(2)If the court is not so satisfied, the order cannot be made.(3)In cases involving sexual charges, in considering the likelihood of prejudice from the joinder, the court must not have regard to the possibility that similar fact evidence, the probative value of which outweighs its potentially prejudicial effect, may be the result of collusion or suggestion.(4)Notwithstanding the court is satisfied there is a likelihood of prejudice from the joinder, then - irrespective of the nature of the offences (subs (5)(b)); and- even if the evidence on one count is not admissible on another (subs (5)(c)),it is open to the court to decide the likelihood of prejudice to the accused can be guarded against by a direction to the jury (subs (5)(a)), so that an order for severance need not be made [92] ‑ [99].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established