Aistrope v South Australian Housing Trust

Link copied
Case Copied 81 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

AISTROPE & ANOR v SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HOUSING TRUST

[2018] SASC 33

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Kelly

20 March 2018

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - ESSENTIALS OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE - DAMAGE

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - DISCHARGE, BREACH AND DEFENCES TO ACTION FOR BREACH

DAMAGES - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - MITIGATION OF DAMAGES - PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO MITIGATE

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS

The plaintiffs purchased a residential property from the defendant in 1996. A contract for sale and purchase was signed on 22 October 1996. The plaintiffs allege that some years after purchase they discovered defects in the property. The plaintiffs allege that statutory duties contained in the Builders Licensing Act 1986 (SA) were incorporated into the contract for sale. The plaintiffs claim damages for breach of contract and negligence arising from the alleged defects. The plaintiffs claim that if they are out of time in bringing their action by virtue of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) then the Court ought to exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time. The defendants deny the claims for breach of contract and negligence. In the alternative, the defendant claims that the plaintiffs have been contributorily negligent and failed to mitigate their losses.

Held:

1.       Claim dismissed.

2. The statutory warranties contained in the Builders Licensing Act 1986 (SA) were not incorporated into the contract for sale.

3. The plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and negligence are out of time pursuant to the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA). An extension of time pursuant to s 48 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) is refused. However, on the assumption that a duty of care was owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs either in contract or in tort, the defendant did not breach its duty of care.

4.       The plaintiffs have failed to prove that any of the alleged defects in the property have been caused by the defendant.

5.       The plaintiffs have been contributorily negligent and failed to mitigate their losses.

Builders Licensing Act 1986 (SA) s 4, s 27, s 34; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 35, s 36, s 48; Building Act 1971 (SA); Building Work Contractors Act 1995 (SA) s 32; Building Regulations 1973 (SA) reg 3, reg 4, reg 5, reg 6, reg 16; Building Code of Australia 1990 (Cth); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA); Development Act 1993 (SA) s 73; Land and Business (Sale and Conveyancing) Act 1994 (SA) s 5, s 7; South Australian Housing Trust Act 1995 (SA) s 7; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Wrongs Act 1936 (SA); Development Regulations 1993 (SA) reg 106; Law Reform (IPP Recommendations) Act 2004 (SA); Encroachments Act 1944 (SA), referred to.
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; Forlyle Pty…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Aistrope v South Australian Housing Trust and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] SASC 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Aistrope v South Australian Housing Trust was before the court to determine whether the plaintiffs could establish a negligence claim against the defendant for damage to their property and whether the statutory warranties were incorporated into the contract. The plaintiffs, who purchased property from the defendant, alleged that the property suffered damage from a fire in 1995 and subsequent repairs were inadequate. They sought damages and specific performance of the statutory warranties. The defendant denied liability, arguing that the statutory warranties were not incorporated into the contract and that any claim was time-barred.

The court was required to determine whether the statutory warranties were part of the contract and, if so, whether they were breached. It also needed to assess if the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred and whether any duty of care was owed by the defendant. Furthermore, the court had to decide if the plaintiffs' conduct had contributed to the damage and if they had mitigated their losses. The court also needed to consider whether an extension of time should be granted under the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA).

The court found that the statutory warranties were not incorporated into the contract and that the plaintiffs had not proven any loss or damage caused by the defendant. The court held that most, if not all, of the damage complained of was due to the plaintiffs' own conduct since purchasing the property. The impasse between the parties had prevented necessary repairs to the roof of the adjacent property for 14 years. The court concluded that the unreasonable conduct of the plaintiffs, particularly the first plaintiff, had contributed to the unsatisfactory state of the property. The court dismissed all claims made by the plaintiffs.

The court ordered that the plaintiffs take no further action to enforce the statutory warranties and that the defendant take no action to enforce the contract. The court also directed that the plaintiffs pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

My detailed reasons follow.BackgroundThe construction and purchase of 13B In 1994 the defendant engaged a builder, Rolf Juergen Werner Franck (“RJ Franck”), to construct the Properties following a tender process. On or around 22 August 1995 a fire caused damage to 13B. There are scant records of the fire and the extent of the damage that it caused. It is not disputed however that the defendant engaged Solid State Constructions Pty Ltd to undertake repairs to rectify the fire damage. The first plaintiff moved into 13B in February 1996 as a tenant of the defendant. She had been living there for around five months when she decided she wished to purchase the property. After some negotiations the defendant agreed to sell 13B to the plaintiffs. The Contract was signed on 22 October 1996,[1] and settled on 18 December 1996. Whilst the negotiations appear to have been conducted mainly by the first plaintiff, both plaintiffs are listed on the Contract as purchasers and on the Memorandum of Transfer as transferees. The plaintiffs were married prior to settlement on 14 November 1996.[1] P13. After settlement was completed, the plaintiffs made a number of improvements to 13B, including erecting a carport and pergola, building a swimming pool in the backyard, paving the backyard with bricks, installing a new kitchen, roller shutters, carpet and tiles inside the house, and improving the garden. In the course of these improvements, the plaintiffs replaced the rectangular downpipes on their property with round downpipes. The plaintiffs then lived at 13B for some seven years without issue. 13A has been owned by the defendant since its construction and was tenanted up until around 2011.The plaintiffs become aware of alleged defects The plaintiffs say they became aware of the extent of the damage to their property, and that of 13A, in early 2004. The defendant had engaged a contractor to investigate the guttering of 13A. During the course of the contractor’s investigations, the contractor fell through the roof. The contractor came to the door of 13B and expressed a view to them that the Properties had been damaged by a fire. That same day the first plaintiff contacted the defendant with regards to the fire damage. In evidence, the first plaintiff said that during this telephone conversation an employee of the defendant denied having any record of the fire. The plaintiffs obtained incident reports from the South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service.[2] The reports are not overly comprehensive. They disclose that there was a fire at 13B on 22 August 1995 in the main bedroom and in the roof. On arrival the South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service detected there was smoke in the lounge, rear bedroom and roof void well. The fire crew extinguished the fire. The smoke and heat damage was recorded as effecting the whole unit. [2] P5 and P6. Documents tendered during the trial show the defendant entered into a contract with Solid State Constructions Pty Ltd at some time between November 1995 and January 1996 to repair the fire damage. Solid State Constructions Pty Ltd was deregistered as a company on 16 May 2004.[3] [3] P129.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KELLY J
The defendant denies that the statutory warranties were incorporated into the Contract and denies owing the plaintiffs a duty of care, relying on the principle of caveat emptor. In the event that the statutory warranties were incorporated into the Contract, the defendant says that under the provisions of s 27(5) and s 27(6) of the Builders Licensing Act, the action was out of time in either 1999 or 2000/2001 (five years after the initial construction and the fire repairs were conducted respectively). The defendant argues that an extension of time should not be granted by the Court exercising its discretion pursuant to s 48 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) (“Limitation of Actions Act”). Summary of my conclusions I have reached the conclusion that none of the plaintiffs’ claims can succeed. Indeed, after my review of the evidence I am satisfied that most, if not all, of the damage about which the plaintiffs complain has been caused or contributed to by their own conduct since purchasing 13B in 1996. I am not satisfied that the plaintiffs have proven that any loss or damage suffered by them has been caused or contributed to by any act or omission for which the defendant is responsible. The impasse between the plaintiffs and the defendant, which I set out in detail in my reasons, has prevented the defendant from carrying out necessary repairs to the roof of 13A for a period now of some 14 years. The explanation for the state of affairs which has brought the matter to this Court for determination in my view lies more in the state of mind of the first plaintiff than in the state of the property. Indeed, the only explanation for what I find to have been the unreasonable, irrational and intransigent conduct of the plaintiffs over many years lies in the evidence given by Dr Michael Clarke, a psychiatrist and witness whose evidence for reasons I later discuss, I unreservedly accept. The impasse between the parties has resulted effectively in public housing being tied up and unable to be rented since 2011. This unacceptable state of affairs cannot be permitted to continue. My detailed reasons follow.BackgroundThe construction and purchase of 13B In 1994 the defendant engaged a builder, Rolf Juergen Werner Franck (“RJ Franck”), to construct the Properties following a tender process. On or around 22 August 1995 a fire caused damage to 13B. There are scant records of the fire and the extent of the damage that it caused. It is not disputed however that the defendant engaged Solid State Constructions Pty Ltd to undertake repairs to rectify the fire damage. The first plaintiff moved into 13B in February 1996 as a tenant of the defendant. She had been living there for around five months when she decided she wished to purchase the property. After some negotiations the defendant agreed to sell 13B to the plaintiffs. The Contract was signed on 22 October 1996,[1] and settled on 18 December 1996. Whilst the negotiations appear to have been conducted mainly by the first plaintiff, both plaintiffs are listed on the Contract as purchasers and on the Memorandum of Transfer as transferees. The plaintiffs were married prior to settlement on 14 November 1996.[1] P13.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KELLY J

The court considered whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs under the statutory warranties incorporated into the contract. The defendant argued that the principle of caveat emptor applied, denying any duty of care. The court found that the statutory warranties were incorporated into the contract, establishing a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs. This finding was crucial as it set the stage for the court's examination of the plaintiffs' claims under these warranties.

The court then assessed whether the plaintiffs' action was out of time under s 27(5) and s 27(6) of the Builders Licensing Act. The statutory warranties provided a five-year period from the date of initial construction or the date of completion of repairs for the plaintiffs to bring any claims. The plaintiffs' action was filed well beyond these periods, raising the issue of timeliness. The court found that the statutory warranties applied to the contract, and the plaintiffs' action was indeed out of time under the provisions of the Act. This determination was pivotal as it initially seemed to bar the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims.

In light of the out-of-time claims, the court exercised its discretion to extend the time limits under s 48 of the Limitation of Actions Act. The plaintiffs argued that exceptional circumstances warranted an extension, while the defendant opposed any extension. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were not so exceptional as to warrant extending the statutory time limits. The court's refusal to extend the time limits was based on the plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate compelling reasons for the delay in bringing their action.

The court examined to what extent the damages suffered by the plaintiffs were caused or contributed to by their own conduct since purchasing 13B in 1996. The plaintiffs had undertaken significant renovations and improvements to the property, including replacing downpipes, building a carport, and installing a new kitchen. The court found that most, if not all, of the damage complained of by the plaintiffs was due to their own conduct in making these improvements. This finding was critical as it suggested that any damage resulting from these improvements could not be attributed to the defendant.

Finally, the court assessed whether the plaintiffs could prove that any loss or damage suffered was caused or contributed to by any act or omission for which the defendant is responsible. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that any of the damage they experienced was due to the defendant's actions or omissions. The court's finding that the plaintiffs' damages were largely self-inflicted meant that the plaintiffs could not establish a causal link between the defendant's conduct and their damages.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that statutory warranties incorporated into a contract establish a duty of care, but such claims must be brought within the statutory time limits. If the statutory time limits are not met, the court may not exercise its discretion to extend the time limits unless exceptional circumstances are shown. Additionally, where damages are largely due to the plaintiff's own conduct, the plaintiff cannot hold the defendant responsible for those damages. The court distinguished the current case from prior authority by emphasizing the importance of statutory time limits and the plaintiffs' contributory conduct in mitigating their damages.