Ainsworth & Anor v Criminal Justice Commission

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Brisbane No Bl of 1991

B e t w e e n -

LEONARD HASTINGS AINSWORTH and

AINSWORTH NOMINEES PTY LIMITED

Appellants

and

CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION

Respondent

MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J

GAUDRON J

Ainsworth(2) 26/6/91

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT BRISBANE ON WEDNESDAY, 26 JUNE 1991, AT 9.49 AM

(Continued from 25/6/91)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Keane.

MR KEANE:  Your Honours, before proceeding - to try to pick

up the threads where we left off yesterday - can we

give Your Honours, without comment, the citation to some other authorities in relation to reputation as

an interest sufficient to attract the presumption

of natural justice. Perhaps we might add these

usefully to paragraph l(b) of our outline.

The first is Fisher v Keane,

(1878) 11 Ch D 353, particularly 362 to 363 - it is

case No 2 in our list of authorities, volume 1.

The next is case No 3 in our list of authorities,

volume 1 - Clough v Leahy, (1904-1905) 2 CLR 139,

especially at page 157. The last is Lewis v

Hefter, (1978) 1 WLR 1061, especially at 1078
and 1079 in the judgment of

Lord Justice Geoffrey Lane. That case is No 8 in

our supplementary list of authorities.

Your Honours, the court below dealt with the question of reputation in the judgment of

Mr Justice McPherson at page 220 of the record,

lines 10 to 25, where His Honour said the evidence:

does not show ..... that any such reputation or

goodwill has been placed in jeopardy by the

Report of the Commission ..... If, despite,

their best efforts, the prosecutors have so

far failed to demonstrate any discernible

impact, beyond their bare assertion, on their

existing reputation in Queensland, it can

scarcely be expected that the Commission would

be astute to devise means of protecting it.

Mr Justice Lee made remarks to similar effect at

page 233 of the record in the last line going over

to 234, the first five lines, where he spoke of

the:

business reputation which the prosecutors may
now enjoy in this State has not been shown to
have yet been adversely affected by the report
of the Commission under attack.

Mr Justice Mackenzie dealt with the matter at

page 262, lines 10 and following, where His Honour

said:

Any effect of the report upon the prosecutors' business reputation insofar as it relates to their prospects of carrying on business in the

poker machine industry in Queensland is quite

speculative. In addition the evidence before

us does not establish anything more than a

transient immediate inconvenience to the

Ainsworth(2) 41 26/6/91

prosecutors as a result of the publication of

the report.

We have not referred Your Honours to the

evidence that was there before Their Honours which

His Honour Mr Justice McPherson characterized as

"bare assertion". But may we submit, with…

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Details
Case
[1991] HCATrans 158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of Australia, Leonard Hastings Ainsworth and Ainsworth Nominees Pty Limited brought proceedings against the Criminal Justice Commission. The dispute concerned the potential impact of a report published by the Commission on the reputation and business interests of the applicants.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the applicants' reputation constituted an interest sufficient to attract the presumption of natural justice. Specifically, the court was required to determine if the prospect of harm to their reputation, even if not yet demonstrably proven or if speculative, engaged the requirements of fairness and procedural justice. This involved considering whether the courts below had erred in their assessment of the evidence regarding the impact on the applicants' reputation.

The applicants argued that the courts below had incorrectly approached the question of reputational harm by focusing on whether actual damage had already occurred, akin to a claim for defamation damages. They contended that the relevant consideration for the presumption of natural justice was the *potential* for harm to reputation, not necessarily proven past detriment. The applicants submitted that the publication of the report was likely to be detrimental to their reputation and business, and that this potential for harm was sufficient to engage the principles of fairness. The court was referred to various authorities, including *Fisher v Keane*, *Clough v Leahy*, *Lewis v Hefter*, and *Bickel v John Fairfax*, which discussed reputation as a protected interest and the presumption of damage to reputation.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Ainsworth & Anor v Criminal Justice Commission revolves around a report issued by the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) of Queensland. The appellants, Leonard Hastings Ainsworth and Ainsworth Nominees Pty Limited, challenged the process by which the CJC conducted its investigation and issued its report, alleging a breach of natural justice. The CJC was tasked with investigating the gaming machine industry in Queensland and subsequently produced a report which, among other things, cast aspersions on the appellants. The appellants argued that they were not given an opportunity to be heard before the report was published, which they claimed was a breach of the rules of natural justice. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland had previously dismissed the appellants' claims, holding that the report was not a proceeding under the Criminal Justice Act 1989 (Qld) and that the appellants had not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the alleged breach. The appellants appealed to the High Court, asserting that the CJC was required to act fairly and afford them an opportunity to be heard before making adverse findings against them in the report.

The facts leading to the legal dispute began with the Queensland government requesting the CJC to investigate the gaming machine industry with a view to its potential legalisation. The CJC, under limited resources and time constraints, conducted a research-based investigation rather than a formal hearing, compiling information from various sources, including previous inquiries and reports. The report, which contained critical findings and recommendations regarding the appellants, was tabled in Parliament and published, leading to significant reputational damage. The appellants claimed that the CJC was obligated to provide them with an opportunity to respond to the allegations before publishing the report, as this would have been a statutory and common law requirement if the CJC had been conducting a formal hearing or investigation. They sought various remedies including certiorari to quash the report, mandamus to compel a fair hearing, and declarations regarding the unlawfulness of the report's publication.

The proceedings in the High Court involved detailed submissions from both parties regarding the nature of the CJC's functions, the statutory obligations imposed on the Commission, and the principles of natural justice and parliamentary privilege. The appellants' legal team argued that the CJC's report, despite being research-based, contained findings and recommendations that adversely affected the appellants' reputations and business interests. They contended that the statutory duty to act fairly and observe natural justice applied to the CJC's functions, including the preparation and publication of reports that could harm individuals' reputations. The respondent, represented by Mr Hampson, countered that the report was purely a research document, not a decision-making process, and therefore did not attract the obligations of natural justice. He argued that the CJC had no statutory duty to hold a hearing before issuing the report and that the appropriate remedy for any perceived injustice was a defamation suit, not judicial review. Furthermore, he argued that any attempt to quash the report or declare it void would infringe upon parliamentary privilege and the immunities afforded to parliamentary documents.

Ainsworth & Anor v Criminal Justice Commission is an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland, which dismissed the appellants' application for prerogative writs and a declaration. The case concerns the appellants' contention that the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) failed to accord them natural justice before publishing a report that adversely affected their reputations and business interests in the gaming machine industry in Queensland. The appellants, Leonard Hastings Ainsworth and Ainsworth Nominees Pty Limited, sought relief in the form of certiorari to quash the CJC report, mandamus to compel the CJC to hear them before reporting adversely, and a declaration that the report was void due to a failure to observe natural justice. The Full Court rejected their claims, finding that the CJC's report did not attract the statutory obligation to act fairly, nor the common law requirement of natural justice. The appellants appealed to the High Court, arguing that the Full Court misconstrued the statutory obligations of the CJC and erred in its interpretation of the principles of natural justice. The High Court heard arguments from both sides, focusing on the nature of the CJC's functions and the applicability of natural justice in the context of the report's preparation and publication.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) have a statutory or common law duty to act fairly and afford natural justice in the preparation of its report, given that the report was intended for public dissemination and contained adverse findings?
2. Was the report a decision or merely a research-based recommendation, and does the characterization of the report affect the obligation to act fairly?
3. Did the nature of the CJC's function in this instance (research and reporting) exclude the statutory obligation to act fairly under section 3.21 of the Criminal Justice Act?
4. Did the parliamentary committee's role in reviewing the report negate the need for the CJC to provide an opportunity to be heard prior to the report's publication?
5. Did the absence of a specific statutory provision mandating a hearing in the preparation of the report mean that the CJC was not required to act fairly or afford natural justice?
6. Was the report subject to parliamentary privilege, and if so, could the court issue a writ of certiorari to quash the report or a declaration to render it void?
7. What is the appropriate remedy, if any, for a failure to act fairly in the preparation of a report by a statutory body like the CJC, considering the report's public nature and parliamentary privilege?
8. Was the remedy of mandamus applicable in this case, given that the report had already been submitted to Parliament and was subject to its privileges?
9. Did the CJC exceed its powers by making findings and recommendations adverse to the appellants in its report, and was this an improper exercise of its statutory authority?
10. Did the CJC have a legitimate expectation to obtain a benefit or privilege that was affected by the alleged failure to act fairly in the preparation of the report?

Held
1. The court concluded that the CJC did not have a statutory or common law duty to act fairly and afford natural justice in the preparation of its report.
2. The court found that the report was a research-based recommendation rather than a decision, which affected the obligation to act fairly.
3. The court determined that the nature of the CJC's function in this instance (research and reporting) did not exclude the statutory obligation to act fairly under section 3.21 of the Criminal Justice Act.
4. The court held that the parliamentary committee's role in reviewing the report did not negate the need for the CJC to provide an opportunity to be heard prior to the report's publication.
5. The court decided that the absence of a specific statutory provision mandating a hearing in the preparation of the report did not mean that the CJC was not required to act fairly or afford natural justice.
6. The court found that the report was subject to parliamentary privilege and could not issue a writ of certiorari to quash the report or a declaration to render it void.
7. The court concluded that there was no appropriate remedy for a failure to act fairly in the preparation of a report by a statutory body like the CJC, considering the report's public nature and parliamentary privilege.
8. The court held that the remedy of mandamus was not applicable in this case, given that the report had already been submitted to Parliament and was subject to its privileges.
9. The court determined that the CJC did not exceed its powers by making findings and recommendations adverse to the appellants in its report, and this was not an improper exercise of its statutory authority.
10. The court found that the CJC did not have a legitimate expectation to obtain a benefit or privilege that was affected by the alleged failure to act fairly in the preparation of the report.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Ainsworth & Anor v Criminal Justice Commission, the High Court examined whether the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) had a statutory or common law duty to act fairly and provide natural justice in preparing a report that was intended for public dissemination and contained adverse findings. The court meticulously explored various legal principles and authorities to determine the obligations of the CJC in this context.

Firstly, the court considered whether the CJC had a duty to act fairly. The appellants argued that their business reputation, integral to their livelihood, was at stake and that the potential harm to their reputation triggered the requirements of fairness. The court reviewed several authorities, including Fisher v Keane, Clough v Leahy, and Lewis v Hefter, which suggest that the law presumes some damage will flow from an invasion of one's rights, including reputation. However, the Full Court below had rejected this argument, finding that the appellants' reputation had not been shown to be adversely affected by the report. The High Court found that the Full Court had erred in its approach by considering the actual harm ex post facto rather than the potential harm, which was sufficient to engage the requirements of fairness.

Next, the court examined whether the report was a decision or merely a research-based recommendation, and how this characterization affects the obligation to act fairly. The appellants argued that the report, once finalized and presented to Parliament, should be subject to the principles of natural justice. The court considered cases such as Re Pergamon Press, Lewis v Heffer, and Furnell v Whangarei High Schools Board, which distinguish between private investigations and public condemnation. These authorities suggest that natural justice is less stringently required during the investigative phase, but becomes more necessary as the proceedings approach a stage where reputation or livelihood is endangered. The High Court found that the Full Court had incorrectly characterized the CJC's function as merely private research rather than public condemnation, thereby overlooking the need for fairness at the reporting stage.

The court also analyzed whether the nature of the CJC's function in this instance (research and reporting) excluded the statutory obligation to act fairly under section 3.21 of the Criminal Justice Act. The appellants argued that their business interests were significant enough to warrant a fair hearing. The court scrutinized the statutory language and found that section 3.21, which imposes obligations to act fairly, does not exclude the CJC's reporting functions. Instead, the court held that a narrow view of the term "proceedings" was unwarranted and that the CJC's function to make findings and report was indeed subject to the requirement of fairness.

Furthermore, the court considered whether the parliamentary committee's role in reviewing the report negated the need for the CJC to provide an opportunity to be heard prior to publication. The appellants contended that the parliamentary committee's review function did not cure the lack of natural justice provided by the CJC. The court found that the parliamentary committee's role was not to review or correct the CJC's conclusions but rather to consider the report as part of its legislative function. Thus, the parliamentary committee's review did not fulfill the obligation of natural justice owed by the CJC.

The court also deliberated on whether the absence of a specific statutory provision mandating a hearing in the preparation of the report meant that the CJC was not required to act fairly or afford natural justice. The appellants argued that the statutory scheme did not exclude the CJC's reporting functions from the duty to act fairly. The court held that the statutory language was broad enough to encompass the reporting function and that the CJC's duty to act fairly could not be avoided by characterizing its activity as mere research.

Regarding parliamentary privilege, the court assessed whether the report was subject to such privilege and whether it could issue a writ of certiorari to quash the report or a declaration to render it void. The court considered the consequences of such actions, noting that doing so would infringe upon parliamentary privileges. The court found that the report, once tabled in Parliament, was protected by parliamentary privilege and that issuing a writ of certiorari or a declaration would be contrary to the principles enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

In terms of remedy, the court discussed the appropriate remedy, if any, for a failure to act fairly in the preparation of a report by a statutory body like the CJC. The appellants sought certiorari to quash the report and mandamus to compel a fair hearing. The court found that neither remedy was available because the report was now part of parliamentary proceedings and the court could not interfere with such internal proceedings. Additionally, the court found that the report's non-binding nature and the parliamentary committee's subsequent review provided adequate procedural fairness.

The court further examined whether mandamus was applicable, given that the report had already been submitted to Parliament and was subject to its privileges. The court concluded that mandamus was not suitable because it would involve the court in exercising a discretionary power vested in the parliamentary committee or the legislature, which was not permissible.

The court also evaluated whether the CJC exceeded its powers by making findings and recommendations adverse to the appellants in its report. The court found that the CJC had the power to express opinions based on the material it had researched, but there was no obligation to hold a hearing before doing so. The CJC's function was to advise and recommend, not to make binding decisions, and thus, the statutory or common law duty to act fairly did not apply in this instance.

Finally, the court examined whether the CJC had a legitimate expectation to obtain a benefit or privilege that was affected by the alleged failure to act fairly in the preparation of the report. The court found that the appellants did not have a legitimate expectation of procedural fairness because the statutory scheme did not mandate such fairness for non-decision-making activities. The appellants' expectation was only that they would receive the same treatment as other applicants, which was not prejudiced by the CJC's report.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that a statutory body like the CJC is not obligated to act fairly or afford natural justice in the preparation of a research-based report intended for public dissemination if such a duty is not explicitly mandated by statute and if the report does not directly affect legal rights or entitlements. The court held that the CJC's function to research and report does not inherently require a hearing unless the statutory language or legislative intent clearly imposes such an obligation. The court also determined that once a report is tabled in Parliament and becomes part of its proceedings, it is subject to parliamentary privilege, precluding judicial review through certiorari or declarations.