Aguwa v Wesley Community Services Ltd

CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER
CITATION:	Aguwa v Wesley Community Services Ltd [2023] NSWPIC 648
APPLICANT:	Izuchi Aguwa
RESPONDENT:	Wesley Community Services Limited
MEMBER:	Gaius Whiffin
DATE OF DECISION:	1 December 2023
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Claim for psychological injuries; claim for weekly benefits compensation; issue arisen regarding the correctness of the respondent’s calculation of the applicant’s pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE); consideration of applicant’s statement, employment and earnings documentation, medical reports and other treatment records, other factual material, as well as claim correspondence; consideration of whether the pay increase which the applicant received in July 2022 allowed the application of clause 8C of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2016 (the Regulation) to the calculation of her PIAWE, because it both amounted to a change of an ongoing nature to the applicant’s employment arrangement, as well as a financially material change to the earnings of the applicant; Cain v Tamworth Aboriginal Medical, Firth v HammondCare, Bhatia v Cameron Logistics Pty Limited, Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority, Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Limited v Commissioner of Territory Revenue, and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May considered; Held – clause 8C of the Regulation applies so as to adjust the applicant’s ‘relevant earning period’ for the purpose of calculating her PIAWE; the adjusted earning period will be between her pay increase in July 2022 and the date when she ceased working on 4 March 2023; the applicant’s PIAWE will therefore be calculated at $1,799.67; awards in favour of the applicant pursuant to sections 36 and 37 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 for the period from 4 March 2023 to date and on a continuing basis; the respondent will be given credit for all weekly compensation payments made already during this period.
DETERMINATIONS MADE:	The Commission determines: 1. Clause 8C of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2016 applies so as to adjust the applicant’s ‘relevant earning period’ for the purpose of calculating her pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE). The adjusted earning period will be between her pay increase in July 2022 and the date when she ceased working on 4 March 2023. 2. As a result, the applicant’s PIAWE is calculated at $1,799.67. The Commission orders: 1. There will be an award in favour of the applicant in the amount of $1,709.69 per week pursuant to s 36(2) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act), in relation to the period between 4 March 2023 and 2 June 2023. 2. There will be an award in favour of the applicant in the amount of $1,439.74 per week pursuant to s 37(3) of the 1987 Act, in relation to the period from 3 June 2023 to date and on a continuing basis. 3. Credit is to be given to the respondent in relation to all payments previously made to the applicant since 4 March 2023 pursuant to ss 36 and 37 of the 1987 Act. 4. The parties are given liberty to apply to the Commission prior to 15 December 2023 should either of them require any further or amended orders, consistent with the Commission’s determination.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

BACKGROUND

Izuchi Aguwa (the applicant) is 37-years-old and commenced employment as a support worker on 7 March 2022 with Wesley Community Services Limited (the respondent).
The applicant alleges that she sustained a psychological injury (agreed between the parties to have a deemed date of 4 March 2023) due to events which occurred during the course of her employment with the respondent. She alleges that she has been incapacitated for employment since that date, which was the last date when she worked for the respondent.
The respondent has accepted liability for the applicant’s psychological injury, and it continues to make weekly compensation payments to her as well as continuing to pay her expenses in accordance with s 60 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act).
The dispute which has arisen between the applicant and the respondent relates to the calculation of the applicant’s pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE) used by the respondent to calculate the weekly compensation payments that it has made to her since
4 March 2023. Specifically, the applicant argues that the respondent’s calculation fails to take into account the effect of cl 8C of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2016 (the Regulation), following the pay increase that she received in July 2022.
The applicant (by email on 3 July 2023) requested that the respondent review its calculation in this regard, but on 17 July 2023, the respondent issued a notice under s 287A(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) refusing to change its calculation.
By an Application for Expedited Assessment (AEA) filed in the Personal Injury Commission (Commission), the applicant claims weekly compensation payments from 4 March 2023 to date and on a continuing basis, with her PIAWE in this regard being calculated in accordance with cl 8C of the Regulation.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The parties agree that the sole issue in dispute is as follows:
(a) does the pay increase which the applicant received in July 2022 allow the application of cl 8C of the Regulation to the calculation of her PIAWE, because it both amounts to a change of an ongoing nature to the applicant’s employment arrangement, as well as a financially material change to the earnings of the applicant.

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COMMISSION

I am satisfied that the parties to the dispute understand the nature of the application and the legal implications of any assertion made in the information supplied. I have used my best endeavours in attempting to bring the parties to the dispute to a settlement acceptable to all of them. I am satisfied that the parties have had sufficient opportunity to explore settlement and that they have been unable to reach an agreed resolution of the dispute.
The dispute was initially listed before the Commission for an expedited assessment preliminary conference on 31 August 2023. However, following the conference, Division Head Capel issued a direction on 1 September 2023 that due to statutory interpretation being required in order to resolve the dispute, the dispute would be dealt with as a “Form 2” dispute, and transferred in order to be determined by a Member of the Commission.
The dispute was then listed for conciliation/arbitration before myself on 1 November 2023. On that occasion, Mr Josh Beran of counsel appeared for the applicant, instructed by
Ms Dawson. The applicant was also present. Ms Sarah Warren of counsel appeared for the respondent, instructed by Ms McCaffrey. Ms Brown from the respondent’s insurer was also present.
During conciliation, the issue to be determined (see paragraph 7 above) was agreed upon between the parties. The respondent also confirmed that it did not dispute that the applicant was injured on 4 March 2023 and that she had possessed no current work capacity since that date. She was entitled to weekly compensation payments at the maximum amount payable, according to her PIAWE, since 4 March 2023 pursuant to ss 36 and 37 of the 1987 Act.
The respondent confirmed its argument that cl 8C of the Regulation was not applicable to the calculation of the applicant’s PIAWE. The PIAWE should as a result be calculated over the 52 week period prior to 4 March 2023, in accordance with cl 2(2) to Schedule 3 of the 1987 Act. The respondent in this regard calculated the applicant’s PIAWE to be $1,742.40, a mathematical calculation agreed to by Mr Beran on behalf the applicant.
The applicant confirmed her argument that, following her pay increase in July 2022, cl 8C of the Regulation applied to reduce the earning period used in the calculation of her PIAWE to the 32 week period prior to 4 March 2023. The applicant in this regard calculated her PIAWE to be $1,799.67, a mathematical calculation agreed to by Ms Warren on behalf of the respondent.

EVIDENCE

Documentary evidence

The following documents were in evidence before the Commission and considered in making this determination:
(a)    the AEA and attached documents;
(b)    the respondent’s Reply (Reply) and attached documents;
(c)    the respondent’s Application to Admit Late Documents (respondent’s first AALD) dated 25 August 2023 and attached documents;

(d) the respondent’s Application to Admit Late Documents (respondent’s second AALD) dated 5 September 2023 and attached documents, and

(e) the applicant’s Application to Admit Late Documents (applicant’s AALD) dated
1 November 2023 and attached documents - the documents attached to this application were provided to me at the conciliation/arbitration on
1 November 2023 and not objected to by the respondent – I therefore ordered that they be formally lodged with the Commission as part of an Application to Admit Late Documents, which the applicant attended to.

Oral evidence

There was no oral evidence given by the applicant or any other witness at the arbitration hearing.

Consideration of the evidence

Considering the discrete nature of the issue requiring determination by the Commission, a detailed analysis of all the evidence is not required. I have considered all the evidence, and will refer only to those aspects of it that are relevant to the issue requiring determination and that I am directed to during the parties’ submissions.
The AEA contains the applicant’s signed (on 4 March 2022) acceptance of an employment offer (by letter dated 2 March 2022) from the respondent, at pages 143-149. The letter outlines the terms of her employment with the respondent, as accepted by her. I have no difficulty in accepting that the document outlines the contractual terms applicable to her employment with the respondent, and agreed to by both her and the respondent. Relevantly, the document specifically states (under the heading entitled ‘Wage and conditions of employment’):
“The terms and conditions of employment will be in accordance with the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Industry (SCHADS) Award 2010…Your wages will be paid (fortnightly) directly into your bank account or building society account (electronic funds transfer). You will be classified under the SCHADS Award as a Social and community services employee, Level 3, Pay Point 4, at a rate of $34.89 per hour…The position is subject to termination by either party as per award conditions.”
The AEA also contains (between pages 10 and 39) various payslips of the applicant’s, produced by the respondent. Of relevance is the fact that up to and including her
13 July 2022 payslip, she was paid at an hourly rate of $34.89526, whereas from and including her 27 July 2022 payslip, she was paid at an hourly rate of $36.5.
The AEA further contains:
(a) a statement from the applicant signed on 21 July 2023 (at page 1) in which she confirms that she “had an hourly rate increase to 36.50 on 11 July 2022” organised “through my Union”, and that the “hourly rate increase was ongoing’, and
(b) an Australian Services Union publication dated 15 June 2022 (at page 54) advising that:
“In a huge union win, today we have secured an Award Wage increase of 4.6% in the Fair Work Commission's Annual Wage Review…This 4.6% increase applies to all workers on the SCHADS Award from 1 July 2022. Award-free employees on the minimum wage will receive a 5.2% increase.”
The Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Industry Award 2010 (the SCHADS Award) is then found from page 47 of the applicant’s AALD. The document relied upon specifically advises that it incorporates all amendments up to and including 1 July 2022. It refers to the current hourly wage rate applicable to a Level 3, Pay Point 4 worker as $36.50. This hourly wage rate is also confirmed in a 18 November 2022 Fair Work Ombudsman Pay Guide publication (at page 16 of the applicant’s AALD) referencing the pay rates applicable under the SCHADS Award from the first full pay period on or after 1 July 2022.
In contrast, the hourly wage rate applicable to a Level 3, Pay Point.4 worker under the SCHADS Award is confirmed at $34.90 in a 18 November 2022 Fair Work Ombudsman Pay Guide publication (at page 3 of the applicant’s AALD) referencing the pay rates applicable under the SCHADS Award from the first full pay period on or after 1 July 2021.

Applicant’s submissions

The applicant’s submissions have been recorded and form part of the Commission’s record. I do not intend to repeat them in detail.
To summarise, the applicant submits:
(a)    her employment contract with the respondent is in accordance with the SCHADS Award and this is evidenced;
(b)    the SCHADS Award forms part of her employment contract;
(c)    the change in her hourly rate of pay from July 2022 is evidenced, and
(d)    her employment contract forms part of her ‘employment arrangement’.
The applicant asks that her dispute be determined “in accordance with the way these matters have been determined by the Commission in the past”, and she refers to the decisions of Member Wright in Cain v Tamworth Aboriginal Medical Service [2021] NSWPIC 193 (Cain), Member Isaksen in Firth v HammondCare [2022] NSWPIC 630 (Firth), and Member McDonald in Bhatia v Cameron Logistics Pty Limited [2023] NSWPIC 540 (Bhatia). The applicant notes that the pay increase which she received in July 2022 was a 4.6% pay increase ($34.89526 per hour to $36.5 per hour), which should be considered to be a ‘financially material change’, especially when considering:
(a)    the pay increase in Cain was from $24 per hour to $26 per hour, and considered a ‘financially material change’;
(b)    the pay increase in Firth was from $21.11 per hour to $22.85 per hour, and considered a ‘financially material change’, and
(c)    the pay increase in Bhatia was a 2.5% pay increase, and considered a ‘financially material change’.

Respondent’s submissions

The respondent’s submissions have been recorded and form part of the Commission’s record. I do not intend to repeat them in detail.
The respondent correctly identifies that there is a two-step process involved in my determination as to whether cl 8C of the Regulation applies to the calculation of the applicant’s PIAWE.
In relation to the first step that there needs to be a change of an ongoing nature to the applicant’s ‘employment arrangement’, the respondent submits that all that changed in July 2022 was the applicant’s hourly rate of pay. There was no change in the nature of her employment, the duties that she was required to perform, or the number of hours per week that she worked. The change in her hourly rate of pay was a function of arrangements already in place in her employment contract, subsequent to changes to the SCHADS Award following union action. The respondent therefore submits that there was in fact no change to the applicant’s employment contract in July 2022 when her hourly rate of pay increased.
In relation to the second step that there needs to be a ‘financially material change’ to the applicant’s earnings, the respondent submits that the change in the applicant’s hourly rate of pay in July 2022 was not material. The term ‘material’ needs to be given its ordinary grammatical meaning, and the respondent refers to its definition in the Macquarie Dictionary as “of substantial import or much consequence”, as well as its definition in the Oxford Dictionary as “significant and important”.
The respondent also submits that I am not bound to follow the decisions in Cain, Firth, and Bhatia, and that the facts in those cases were different to the facts in the applicant’s.

Applicant’s submissions in reply

These submissions were recorded and form part of the Commission’s record. I do not intend to repeat them in detail.
The applicant conceded that the determination as to whether the pay increase in July 2022 was ‘material’ is a discretionary matter for myself. She did however submit that:
(a) “a $50-$60 pay rise per week is significant for a lot of workers especially in the current age”, and
(b) the pay increase “is of weight enough to make a difference to a worker”.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

Does the pay increase which the applicant received in July 2022 allow the application of cl 8C of the Regulation to the calculation of her PIAWE, because it both amounts to a change of an ongoing nature to the applicant’s employment arrangement, as well as a financially material change to the earnings of the applicant

The calculation of the applicant’s PIAWE is required in order to determine her entitlements to weekly compensation payments, in accordance with ss 36 and 37 of the 1987 Act.
Clause 2 to Schedule 3 of the 1987 Act reads as follows:
“(1) ‘Pre-injury average weekly earnings’, in relation to an injured worker, means the weekly average of the gross pre-injury earnings received by the worker for work in any employment in which the worker was engaged at the time of the injury.
(2) Except as provided by this clause (or by regulations made under this clause), in calculating the ‘pre-injury earnings’ received by a worker in employment for the purposes of subclause (1), no regard is to be had to earnings in the employment paid or payable to the worker for work performed before or after the period of 52 weeks ending immediately before the date of the injury (‘the relevant earning period’).
(3) The regulations may provide for the adjustment of the relevant earning period for a worker in employment (including, for example, by extending or reducing the period) -
(a) to take into account any period of unpaid leave or other change in earnings circumstances in the employment, or
(b) to align the relevant earning period with any regular interval at which the worker is entitled to receive payment of earnings for work performed in the employment.
(4) If the amount of a worker's pre-injury average weekly earnings is less than any minimum amount prescribed by the regulations as applicable to the worker, the amount of the worker's pre-injury average weekly earnings is taken to be that minimum amount. Different minimum amounts may be prescribed for different classes of workers, including part-time and full-time workers.”
Clause 8C of the Regulation is one of a number of clauses in the Regulation aimed at dealing with how to determine the ‘relevant earning period’ for the purpose of PIAWE calculations, in relation to injuries occurring on or after 21 October 2019.
Clause 8C of the Regulation reads as follows:
“(1) The relevant earning period for a worker is to be adjusted in accordance with this clause if, during the unadjusted earning period, there was a change of an ongoing nature to the employment arrangement resulting in a financially material change to the earnings of the worker (for example, a change from full-time to part-time work).
(2) The relevant earning period is to be adjusted by excluding from the period any period before the change to the earnings of the worker occurred.”
I agree with the respondent (see paragraph 26 above) that I need to undertake a two-step process in order to determine whether cl 8C of the Regulation applies to the calculation of the applicant’s PIAWE. For the clause to apply, the applicant’s pay increase in July 2022 will need to be a change of an ongoing nature to her employment arrangement with the respondent, and will also need to result in a financially material change to her earnings.
There is no evidence before me that the pay increase was not an ongoing pay increase. It had been negotiated by the Australian Services Union (see paragraph 19(b) above) and the pay rates in the SCHADS Award had changed (see paragraphs 20-21 above). The applicant’s employment contract with the respondent specifically refers (see paragraph 17 above) to the terms and conditions of her employment being in accordance with the SCHADS Award, which in my opinion provides the applicant with certainty that her pay rate will increase on an ongoing basis when the pay rates in the SCHADS Award change, until the next date when those pay rates in the SCHADS Award change.

The respondent argues (see paragraph 27 above) that the pay increase was not a change to the applicant’s ‘employment arrangement’, as it was simply a function of the SCHADS Award being amended. There was no need for any further written contract (as the applicant’s initial written contract of employment already outlined the situation that the contract was subject to the SCHADS Award, which would necessarily include in the contract amendments made to the award from time to time). Further, the applicant’s position description, hours of work, and other contractual obligations did not change at the time of the pay increase.
I reject the respondent’s submission as I consider that ‘employment arrangement’ (while not specifically defined in the Regulation) should be interpreted broadly. In my opinion, the applicant’s ‘employment arrangement’ included not only her written contract of employment, but also any awards or industrial agreements applicable to her, as well as the nature of her employment relationship with the respondent and other aspects of her employment which had been agreed to by both her and the respondent. My opinion in this regard is entirely consistent with the reasoning adopted in Cain, Firth, and Bhatia.
I therefore intend to find that her July 2022 pay increase was a change to her ‘employment arrangement’ with the respondent.
In Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28, the majority in the High Court discussed statutory construction, and said [at 69]:
“The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined ‘by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole’. In Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos, Dixon CJ pointed out that ‘the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed’. Thus, the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed.”
The starting point with statutory construction is to consider the ordinary and grammatical sense of the statutory words being interpreted, having regard to their text, context, and legislative purpose – see Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Limited v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41 and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] HCA 19.
Applying these principles of statutory construction, I have considered the following as relevant in my determination that a pay increase is a change in an ‘employment arrangement’:
(a) I do not see the example (‘a change from full-time to part-time work’) given in cl 8C of the Regulation to be in any way limiting the circumstances in which a change can be found to be a change in an ‘employment arrangement’ - this example is expressed specifically to be just an example, and I agree with the following passage of Member Wright’s in Cain [at 21] (which was also quoted with approval in both Firth and Bhatia):
“In my view, the example listed in regulation 8C (“a change from full-time to part-time work”) does not place a limit on the content of the “employment arrangement”. The term “employment arrangement” in regulation 8C is not expressed to be limited by the example given. Even if this were so, a change from full-time to part-time work could also be characterised as a change in the employment contract, with the result that other changes to the employment contract would also be included in a change in the employment arrangements. In this case, a change to the hourly rate of pay, as evidenced by the payslips attached to the ARD and the Reply, and as specified in the Employment Agreement referred to below, also forms a change to the employment contract and hence the employment arrangements”;
(b) the wording of cl 8C of the Regulation in itself contemplates pay rate changes as changes in an ‘employment arrangement’, as it specifically requires the ‘employment arrangement’ change to result in a change in the worker’s earnings [my emphasis];
(c)    it is trite to say that the payment of a wage or renumeration is an essential condition of a contract of employment - consideration is a requirement of an employment contract, and in the applicant’s situation, the consideration that she received for her services to the respondent was to be paid a level of wages, calculated in accordance with the SCHADS Award – I find that the manner in which her contract of employment was written (see paragraph 17 above) incorporates into that contract a provision to the effect that her wages are to be calculated from time to time in accordance with the SCHADS Award - when the pay rates in that award are updated, the level of her wages (an essential condition of her contract) is also updated – because of the manner in which the applicant’s employment contract is written, I find that changes to the SCHADS Award automatically become changes to the employment contract – just because no further clauses or terms need to be added to the written contract do not in my opinion equate (as the respondent submitted at paragraph 27 above) to there being no change in the essential conditions of the contract (which require consideration) following pay rate increases pursuant to the SCHADS Award;
(d)    contextually, I believe that is highly relevant to consider the wording in cl 2(3) to Schedule 3 of the 1987 Act, which is the provision that allows for the making of regulations to adjust the ‘relevant earning period’ when calculating an applicant’s PIAWE - the clause specifically allows regulations to be made “to take into account any period of unpaid leave or other change in earnings circumstances in the employment [my emphasis] - the regulation making power specifically contemplates earnings changes (pay increases) as being a reason for the adjustment of the ‘relevant earning period’, and
(e)    the broad meaning that I have attributed to ‘employment arrangement’ (see paragraph 39 above) is in my opinion consistent with other sections in the 1987 Act, which include awards, industrial agreements, or other arrangements, with contracts of employment in clarifying worker’s entitlements – in this regard:
(i)section 49(1) - “Compensation is payable under this Division to a worker in respect of any period of incapacity for work even though the worker has received or is entitled to receive in respect of the period any payment, allowance or benefit for holidays, annual holidays or long service leave under any Act (Commonwealth or State), award or industrial agreement under any such Act or contract of employment [my emphasis]”;
(ii)section 50(1) – “Compensation is payable to a worker in respect of a period of incapacity for work even though the worker has received or is entitled to receive in respect of that period any wages for sick leave under any Act (Commonwealth or State), award or industrial agreement under any such Act or contract of employment [my emphasis]”, and
(iii)section 87A(2) – “The regulations may prescribe any of the following as additional or alternative compensation - (a) payments to workers or their dependants in respect of injuries or deaths under any specified or class of contract of employment, industrial agreement, award or other arrangement [my emphasis]”.
I now need to determine whether the applicant’s pay increase in July 2022 resulted in a financially material change to her earnings.
Whilst I acknowledge (see paragraph 28 above) the respondent’s submission and dictionary assistance regarding the term ‘material’, I am conscious that cl 8C of the Regulation qualifies that term with the term ‘financially’.
The regulation does not define ‘financially material change’, but the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words would seem to me to suggest that the change needs to be of such significance or importance that it is reasonably likely to impact upon a person’s financial position or condition.
It is common ground that the applicant’s pay increase in July 2022 was a 4.6% increase, which according to my calculations (and based on a 38 hour working week) resulted in a gross increase of $60.98 in her weekly wage.
The applicant argues (see paragraph 31 above) this increase to be a financially material change, and the respondent submits that the increase is not sufficient to be a financially material change.
While the pay increase was only 4.6% and while the National Minimum Wage increase in June 2022 was 5.2%, in terms of determining whether a 4.6% pay increase amounted to a financially material change, I consider that it is highly relevant to note that in the 10 years prior to June 2022, the National Minimum Wage had never increased by as much as 4.6%, and had regularly increased by as little as 2.5%.
I am also willing to take notice of the significant increases in the Australian costs of living from 2022, which in my opinion make pay increases of more importance than they perhaps otherwise would be. I accept that (as submitted by the applicant at paragraph 31(b) above) her pay increase was enough to make a difference to any worker, which would include herself.
Certainly, the Australian Services Union (see paragraph 19(b) above) considered the 4.6% pay increase to be a “huge win”.
Finally, I note that (as outlined by the applicant at paragraph 24 above) her pay increase was greater than the pay increases which were accepted as constituting financially material changes in Firth and Bhatia, and only slightly less than the pay increase which was accepted as constituting a financially material change in Cain. Although I accept that I am not bound by those decisions, I consider them to be well reasoned decisions, which I have no difficulty in following. I intend to follow judicial comity in this regard.
Taking all these matters into account, I am persuaded by the applicant’s submissions. I consider that the applicant’s pay increase of 4.6% was of such significance or importance that it was reasonably likely to impact upon her financial position or condition.

SUMMARY

I therefore find that cl 8C of the Regulation applies so as to adjust the applicant’s ‘relevant earning period’ for the purpose of calculating her PIAWE. The adjusted earning period will be between her pay increase in July 2022 and the date when she ceased working on
4 March 2023.
As agreed mathematically between the parties (see paragraph 13 above), considering my above finding, the applicant’s PIAWE will be calculated at $1,799.67.
I intend to, using this PIAWE calculation, make awards in favour of the applicant pursuant to ss 36 and 37 of the 1987 Act for the period from 4 March 2023 to date and on a continuing basis. The respondent will naturally be given credit for all weekly compensation payments made already during this period.
The parties will also be given liberty to approach the Commission should they require any further or amended orders, consistent with my determination.
There will be an award in favour of the applicant in the amount of $1,709.69 per week pursuant to s 36(2) of the 1987 Act, in relation to the period between 4 March 2023 and
2 June 2023.
There will be an award in favour of the applicant in the amount of $1,439.74 per week pursuant to s 37(3) of the 1987 Act, in relation to the period from 3 June 2023 to date and on a continuing basis.

[2023] NSWPIC 648

1 December 2023