FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AFU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1877
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal from: AFU17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3411 File number: VID 1281 of 2017 Judge: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 28 November 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – protection visa – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 424, 424A, 425 Cases cited: ABV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 184
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Date of hearing: 13 August 2018 Date of last submissions: 27 August 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 39 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Applicant: WLW Migration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms NJ Campbell Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 1281 of 2017 BETWEEN: AFU17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MOSHINSKY J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 NOVEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant have leave to rely on the amended draft notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Navid Koushke Baghi filed 7 August 2018 and to rely on the submissions dated 7 August 2018.
2.The application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application (including the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 7 August 2018), to be fixed by way of a lump sum.
4.Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
5.In the absence of any agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of these orders, within 21 days the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
6.Within a further 14 days, the applicant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
7.In the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MOSHINSKY J:
Introduction
The…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1877
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in the case were whether the applicant had established that she had a genuine fear of persecution if returned to Vietnam and whether the Tribunal had erred in failing to provide her with notice of an issue regarding the nature of her political activities in Australia. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had not properly assessed her claims and had failed to consider the distinction between "anti-regime activity" and "critical views" in the context of her political involvement in Australia.
The court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the applicant's claims and had appropriately assessed the evidence in relation to her political activities. The distinction between "anti-regime activity" and "critical views" did not rise to the level of a specific issue in the review but rather formed part of the basis upon which the Tribunal evaluated the applicant's claims. Consequently, the court held that the applicant's contention was not sufficiently arguable to warrant a grant of leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant have leave to rely on the amended draft notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Navid Koushke Baghi filed 7 August 2018 and to rely on the submissions dated 7 August 2018.
2. The application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application (including the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 7 August 2018), to be fixed by way of a lump sum.
4. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
5. In the absence of any agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of these orders, within 21 days the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
6. Within a further 14 days, the applicant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
7. In the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant relies on the affidavit of the applicant dated 3 August 2018 (which goes to the fact that the applicant was self-represented in the Federal Circuit Court and reasons why the new grounds were not raised earlier) and certain material annexed to the affidavit of Navid Koushke Baghi filed 7 August 2018 and a separate affidavit filed 26 July 2018. The Minister does not object to the reliance on the new material. The applicant also relies on an affidavit of Timothy Nguyen dated 13 August 2018.Consideration In determining whether leave to appeal should be granted the relevant considerations are: whether, in all the circumstances, the decision at first instance is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration by the Court; and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. I will consider the question whether leave to appeal should be granted by reference to the proposed new grounds of appeal. By proposed ground 1, the applicant seeks to contend that there was a failure to comply with s 425(1) of the Migration Act, because the applicant was not aware of an issue arising in relation to the decision under review and so was deprived of the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to that issue: see SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 (SZBEL) at [36]-[40]. The applicant contends that the “issue” was the question whether the applicant’s political activities in Australia constituted ‘anti-regime activity’ or were merely the expression of ‘critical views’. The applicant contends that this was a critical issue in the review, but the applicant was not given notice of the issue. Section 425(1) of the Migration Act provides that the Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal “to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. In SZBEL, the High Court stated at [36] that, unless the Tribunal tells the applicant something different, the applicant would be entitled to assume that the reasons given by the delegate for refusing to grant the application would identify the issues that arise in relation to that decision. In the present case, the applicant had not raised a claim based on political activity in Australia in her application for a protection visa or in the process before the delegate. The claim on this basis was raised in the applicant’s statutory declaration, filed for the purposes of the review by the Tribunal. There is no question that whether the applicant had established her claims based on political activity in Australia thus became an issue in the review. The question is whether the issue is to be stated at this level of generality or, as the applicant contends, more narrowly. In my view, the applicant’s contention is not sufficiently arguable in the circumstances of this case to warrant a grant of leave to appeal. The Tribunal in the course of responding to the claims based on political activity in Australia referred to country information that drew a distinction between ‘anti-regime activity’ and ‘critical views’: see the Tribunal decision at [45]. It appears that the Tribunal had before it Refugee Review Tribunal Research Response VNM31954 (2 July 2007) (the RRT Note), which referred in turn to CA Thayer, “Comments for the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal” (18 March 2005) (the Thayer Report). There is generally no requirement that the Tribunal give notice to an applicant that it may have regard to country information: see s 424A(3)(a) of the Migration Act. In this case, the distinction drawn in the country information did not rise to the level of an issue in the review. Rather, the country information simply formed part of the basis upon which the Tribunal assessed whether there was a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm as a result of the applicant’s participation in political activity in Australia.