AFU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AFU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1877

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal from: AFU17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3411
File number: VID 1281 of 2017
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 28 November 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – protection visa – application dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 424, 424A, 425
Cases cited:

ABV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 184

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 13 August 2018
Date of last submissions: 27 August 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Applicant: WLW Migration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms NJ Campbell
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1281 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AFU17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOSHINSKY J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant have leave to rely on the amended draft notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Navid Koushke Baghi filed 7 August 2018 and to rely on the submissions dated 7 August 2018.

2.The application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application (including the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 7 August 2018), to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

4.Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

5.In the absence of any agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of these orders, within 21 days the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

6.Within a further 14 days, the applicant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

7.In the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MOSHINSKY J:

Introduction

  1. The…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1877
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AFU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a Vietnamese national, sought leave to appeal from the Federal Circuit Court's dismissal of her application for a protection visa. The applicant arrived in Australia on a student visa in 2008 and had applied for a skilled visa in 2012, which was subsequently refused. On 14 February 2014, she applied for a protection visa, claiming that she would face harm in Vietnam due to her conversion to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and her political activities in Australia. The delegate of the Minister refused the application, and the applicant appealed to the Migration Review Tribunal, which affirmed the delegate's decision.

The central legal issues in the case were whether the applicant had established that she had a genuine fear of persecution if returned to Vietnam and whether the Tribunal had erred in failing to provide her with notice of an issue regarding the nature of her political activities in Australia. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had not properly assessed her claims and had failed to consider the distinction between "anti-regime activity" and "critical views" in the context of her political involvement in Australia.

The court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the applicant's claims and had appropriately assessed the evidence in relation to her political activities. The distinction between "anti-regime activity" and "critical views" did not rise to the level of a specific issue in the review but rather formed part of the basis upon which the Tribunal evaluated the applicant's claims. Consequently, the court held that the applicant's contention was not sufficiently arguable to warrant a grant of leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant have leave to rely on the amended draft notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Navid Koushke Baghi filed 7 August 2018 and to rely on the submissions dated 7 August 2018.

2. The application for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application (including the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 7 August 2018), to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

4. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

5. In the absence of any agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of these orders, within 21 days the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

6. Within a further 14 days, the applicant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

7. In the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant seeks leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court. For the reasons that follow, the application is to be dismissed.Background facts The following statement of the background facts is based on the statement of decision and reasons of the Tribunal (Tribunal decision) and the reasons for judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (the Reasons). Although the Court Book from the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court was not before this Court at the hearing of the application, as discussed at the hearing a copy of the Court Book was subsequently obtained and regard has been had to the documents in the Court Book. The applicant is a woman from Vietnam. She arrived in Australia in January 2008 on a student visa. Her student visa ended in January 2013. During the period from 2008 to 2013, the applicant travelled overseas on three occasions. In November 2012, the applicant applied for a skilled visa. This was refused by a delegate of the Minister in April 2013. In January 2014, the Migration Review Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse the applicant a skilled visa. On 14 February 2014, the applicant applied for a protection visa. She claimed to fear harm if returned to Vietnam because she had converted to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. On 1 May 2015, a delegate of the Minister refused the application for a protection visa. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The applicant was represented by a migration agent. The applicant relied on a statutory declaration dated 8 November 2016 in support of her claims. The applicant raised a new claim based on her political activities in Australia – this claim had not been made in her application for a protection visa and was not raised in the process before the delegate. On 16 November 2016, the applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence. On 22 December 2016, the Tribunal decided to affirm the decision to refuse the applicant a protection visa. At [20]-[23] of its decision, the Tribunal summarised the applicant’s claims. The Tribunal outlined the applicant’s claims and made certain findings of fact at [25]-[32]. The Tribunal found, at [29], that the applicant’s conversion to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints was for the sole purpose of furthering her refugee claims. Nevertheless, the Tribunal accepted that, if she were to return to Vietnam, the applicant would continue to practice her faith. The Tribunal stated, at [30], that the applicant claimed to have been involved in various political movements in Australia, beginning in 2012 with Bloc 8406. The Tribunal noted that the applicant’s protection visa application did not include a mention of any involvement with Bloc 8406. The Tribunal stated that it did not accept that the applicant had been politically involved since 2011, but accepted that she had been involved since 2015. The Tribunal accepted, at [31], that the applicant had contributed to Bloc 8406 by participating in protests where she waved the South Vietnamese flag, by organising a petition, and by contributing to the running of a musical performance raising awareness of the case of a human rights activist. The Tribunal accepted, at [32], that the applicant had been a member and was (at the time of the Tribunal’s decision) an office holder of Prisoners of Conscience Fund (POCF), a group that supported families of prisoners who stood for human rights in Vietnam, and that the applicant had been involved since some time after February 2014.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The following statement of the background facts is based on the statement of decision and reasons of the Tribunal (Tribunal decision) and the reasons for judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (the Reasons). Although the Court Book from the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court was not before this Court at the hearing of the application, as discussed at the hearing a copy of the Court Book was subsequently obtained and regard has been had to the documents in the Court Book. The applicant is a woman from Vietnam. She arrived in Australia in January 2008 on a student visa. Her student visa ended in January 2013. During the period from 2008 to 2013, the applicant travelled overseas on three occasions. In November 2012, the applicant applied for a skilled visa. This was refused by a delegate of the Minister in April 2013. In January 2014, the Migration Review Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse the applicant a skilled visa. On 14 February 2014, the applicant applied for a protection visa. She claimed to fear harm if returned to Vietnam because she had converted to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. On 1 May 2015, a delegate of the Minister refused the application for a protection visa. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The applicant was represented by a migration agent. The applicant relied on a statutory declaration dated 8 November 2016 in support of her claims. The applicant raised a new claim based on her political activities in Australia – this claim had not been made in her application for a protection visa and was not raised in the process before the delegate. On 16 November 2016, the applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence. On 22 December 2016, the Tribunal decided to affirm the decision to refuse the applicant a protection visa. At [20]-[23] of its decision, the Tribunal summarised the applicant’s claims. The Tribunal outlined the applicant’s claims and made certain findings of fact at [25]-[32]. The Tribunal found, at [29], that the applicant’s conversion to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints was for the sole purpose of furthering her refugee claims. Nevertheless, the Tribunal accepted that, if she were to return to Vietnam, the applicant would continue to practice her faith. The Tribunal stated, at [30], that the applicant claimed to have been involved in various political movements in Australia, beginning in 2012 with Bloc 8406. The Tribunal noted that the applicant’s protection visa application did not include a mention of any involvement with Bloc 8406. The Tribunal stated that it did not accept that the applicant had been politically involved since 2011, but accepted that she had been involved since 2015. The Tribunal accepted, at [31], that the applicant had contributed to Bloc 8406 by participating in protests where she waved the South Vietnamese flag, by organising a petition, and by contributing to the running of a musical performance raising awareness of the case of a human rights activist. The Tribunal accepted, at [32], that the applicant had been a member and was (at the time of the Tribunal’s decision) an office holder of Prisoners of Conscience Fund (POCF), a group that supported families of prisoners who stood for human rights in Vietnam, and that the applicant had been involved since some time after February 2014.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant relies on the affidavit of the applicant dated 3 August 2018 (which goes to the fact that the applicant was self-represented in the Federal Circuit Court and reasons why the new grounds were not raised earlier) and certain material annexed to the affidavit of Navid Koushke Baghi filed 7 August 2018 and a separate affidavit filed 26 July 2018. The Minister does not object to the reliance on the new material. The applicant also relies on an affidavit of Timothy Nguyen dated 13 August 2018.Consideration In determining whether leave to appeal should be granted the relevant considerations are: whether, in all the circumstances, the decision at first instance is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration by the Court; and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. I will consider the question whether leave to appeal should be granted by reference to the proposed new grounds of appeal. By proposed ground 1, the applicant seeks to contend that there was a failure to comply with s 425(1) of the Migration Act, because the applicant was not aware of an issue arising in relation to the decision under review and so was deprived of the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to that issue: see SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 (SZBEL) at [36]-[40]. The applicant contends that the “issue” was the question whether the applicant’s political activities in Australia constituted ‘anti-regime activity’ or were merely the expression of ‘critical views’. The applicant contends that this was a critical issue in the review, but the applicant was not given notice of the issue. Section 425(1) of the Migration Act provides that the Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal “to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. In SZBEL, the High Court stated at [36] that, unless the Tribunal tells the applicant something different, the applicant would be entitled to assume that the reasons given by the delegate for refusing to grant the application would identify the issues that arise in relation to that decision. In the present case, the applicant had not raised a claim based on political activity in Australia in her application for a protection visa or in the process before the delegate. The claim on this basis was raised in the applicant’s statutory declaration, filed for the purposes of the review by the Tribunal. There is no question that whether the applicant had established her claims based on political activity in Australia thus became an issue in the review. The question is whether the issue is to be stated at this level of generality or, as the applicant contends, more narrowly. In my view, the applicant’s contention is not sufficiently arguable in the circumstances of this case to warrant a grant of leave to appeal. The Tribunal in the course of responding to the claims based on political activity in Australia referred to country information that drew a distinction between ‘anti-regime activity’ and ‘critical views’: see the Tribunal decision at [45]. It appears that the Tribunal had before it Refugee Review Tribunal Research Response VNM31954 (2 July 2007) (the RRT Note), which referred in turn to CA Thayer, “Comments for the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal” (18 March 2005) (the Thayer Report). There is generally no requirement that the Tribunal give notice to an applicant that it may have regard to country information: see s 424A(3)(a) of the Migration Act. In this case, the distinction drawn in the country information did not rise to the level of an issue in the review. Rather, the country information simply formed part of the basis upon which the Tribunal assessed whether there was a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm as a result of the applicant’s participation in political activity in Australia.