Aex17 v Minister for Immigration

[2020] FCCA 3117

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AEX17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2020] FCCA 3117

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection visa –  whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional by failing to take into account all relevant circumstances when considering the applicant’s claimed conversion to Christianity – whether the applicant’s conversion to Christianity was for the sole purpose of strengthening their refugee claim – whether the Tribunal’s decision was inconsistent, illogical or un-reasonable – whether jurisdictional error is made out – no jurisdictional error arises – the application is dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss. 36, 91R.

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 7.01.

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510.

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593.
ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174.
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26.
Medich v Bentley-Smythe Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 494.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 ; 297 ALR 225.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJXO and Anor [2009] 238 CLR 642.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16.
SZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 566.

Applicant: AEX17

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 114 of 2017

Judgment of: Judge Humphreys

Hearing date: 10 November 2020

Date of Last Submission: 10 November 2020

Delivered at: Parramatta

Delivered on: 19 November 2020

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr Hodges of Hodges Legal

Solicitors for the Respondents: Mr Downie of Minter Ellison Lawyers

ORDERS

1. The name of the first respondent be changed to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.

2. The application is dismissed.

3. The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $5600.00.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 114 of 2017

AEX17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The applicant is a citizen of Iran. In July 2012, the applicant departed Iran legally on a passport issued in his own name. The applicant travelled via the United Arab Emirates to Indonesia. After the applicant arrived in Indonesia, he boarded a boat for Australia.

2. On 1 July 2013, the applicant applied for a protection (Class XA) visa. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration (“the delegate”) refused to grant the visa on 9 January 2015. The applicant sought merits review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). In a decision dated 20 December 2016, the Tribunal set aside the decision to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa and substituted a decision to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XD) visa.

3. The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s Decision

1. The Tribunal’s decision runs to some 32 pages. In these circumstances, it is not appropriate to undertake a detailed summary of the decision for the purposes of this judgement. The following should suffice:

   ·    The applicant is a citizen of Iran. The applicant left Iran in 2013 on his own valid passport. The applicant arrived in Australia as an unauthorised boat arrival. In his initial visa application he claimed he was perceived as being anti-Islam.

   ·    In his initial application, the applicant made false claims of being of adverse interest to Iranian authorities because he tried to help two young women at risk of being harmed by Sepah officers.

   ·    The applicant also presented a false Court summons document in the hope it would assist him secure a visa.

   ·    The Tribunal rejected claims that the applicant’s wife and sons had been discriminated against as a result of the applicant’s conviction 25 years earlier for deserting the army.

   ·    The Tribunal considered, at great length, the applicant’s claims that he had converted to Christianity whilst in Australia, but ultimately rejected the claim. The Tribunal did so on the basis of the applicant’s overall credibility, notwithstanding evidence provided by supporters that he was a genuine Christian.

2. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for either refugee protection under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), or complimentary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

Grounds for Judicial Review

1. Amended grounds of judicial review were filed in an Amended Application filed with the Court on 16 July 2018. In an Outline of Submissions filed on 2 Nov 2020, the applicant now seeks leave to further amend the grounds of review to the following:

   Ground One:

   The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error when considering the applicant’s claimed conversion to Christianity.

   Particulars:

   i. The tribunal found it was not satisfied that the applicant engage in the conduct otherwise than for the sole purpose of strengthening his refugee claim. In so doing the Tribunal purported to invoke the provisions of s91R(3) of the Act. [CB290, par 77, also at CB295 par 97].

   ii. In the consideration of the applicant’s conversion, the Tribunal did not take into account all relevant circumstances.

   iii. In the consideration of the applicant’s conversion, the Tribunal did not take into account other possible motives for the applicant engaging in the conduct.

   iv. In consideration of s91R(3) the Tribunal did not take into account (in respect of which the Tribunal made a finding in favour of the applicant) which occurred before the applicant left Iran. That is the applicant’s conflict with a Mullah and perceived anti-Islam profile.

   v.  In consideration of s91R(3) the Tribunal did not take into account the conduct of third parties which were integral to the events preceding the applicants “conversion”. That is, the applicant was approached by a Jehovah’s Witness and invited to attend functions.

   vi. In consideration of s91R(3) the Tribunal unfairly focused on and defined the applicant’s conversion as having occurred in the period of May 2015 to February 2016 when the applicant was baptised.

   vii.    In consideration of s91R(3) the Tribunal did not adequately engage with the case and submissions as to the timing of the applicants conversion and the application for protection.

   Ground Two:

   The Tribunal’s decision to disregard the applicant’s conduct pursuant to s91R(3) is inconsistent, illogical and un-reasonable.

   Particulars:

   i.   The Tribunal found [CB295 par 97] that the applicant would have been aware at the relevant times (those being from when he started attending “various churches”, May 2013) that some Iranian asylum seekers seek protection on the basis of having converted to Christianity in Australia.

   ii. The applicant lodged his application for the protection visa on 1 July 2013, 2 months after having acquired the knowledge.

   iii. When the applicant spoke to the delegate in January 2015 then two years after acquiring the knowledge, the applicant spoke of living with a group of Christians in Sydney and that he had considered converting his faith but he wasn’t ready to consider this.

   iv. The illogicality is that the sole reason for the conversion culminating with the baptism in February 2016 was knowledge that the Tribunal found the applicant possessed from May 2013. Yet that same knowledge did not persuade the applicant to mention the conversion in his visa application or to the delegate. If the applicant’s sole purpose in converting was to support his claim for a protection visa he would have converted as soon as possible after he acquired his knowledge.

   Ground Three:

   The Tribunal did not adequately engage with the case/submissions presented to it by the applicant and his representative.

   Particulars:

   i.   At [CB 200] the applicant’s submission to the Tribunal draws attention to the conduct of the applicant prior to attendance at the Jesus Family Centre and asks that it be considered.

   ii. The Tribunal did consider the submission that the applicant would have been baptised sooner if he was motivated solely by the desire to promote his protection visa application [CB295 par 96] . However, in so doing, the Tribunal did not give any reasons, did not engage with the substance of the submission and did no more than reject it.

   iii. The applicant repeats the particulars set out for ground 2 above.

The Applicant’s Submissions

1. In relation to the issue of leave to amend, the legal representative for the applicant notes that under r 7.01(1) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).the Court ‘may allow or direct a party to amended a document (other than an affidavit) in the way and on the conditions the Court… thinks fit.’.

2. Reliance is placed on the principles identified by Stone J in Medich v Bentley-Smythe Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 494 at [8] where the following was said:

   The general principle is that leave to amend should be granted unless the proposed amendment is obviously futile or would cause substantial prejudice or injustice which could not be compensated for. These considerations require the Court to take account of the nature of the proposed amendment, whether it is made in good faith, the stage in the proceedings at which leave is sought, the nature of the prejudice that may be caused and the means by which such prejudice might be redressed. The question of delay is relevant to these considerations however it is not the purpose of the Court to punish a party for delay in seeking an amendment.

3. It was submitted on behalf the applicant that the matter was transferred from the docket of Judge Barnes to my docket and that notice of the hearing date was given to the parties on 15 October 2020, less than a calendar month beforehand. Although the case is pleaded differently in the proposed amended application, the focus of the attack of the Tribunal’s decision still concerns the findings on the issue of conversion. Thus, any prejudice to the first and second respondents is limited.

4. In relation to ground one, the applicant submits that all relevant information must be considered when dealing with s 91R(3) of the Act. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40 and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJXO and Anor [2009] 238 CLR 642 at [53], Crennan and Keifel JJ stated “evidence about the person’s conduct, and their motive for it, may have particular relevance to the subjective question”. Further at [60] of the same judgement the following was said: “it follows that where it is accepted that a person had more than one reason for engaging in the conduct, they will satisfy the requirements of the proviso”.

5. It is submitted that the Tribunal was required to deal with the applicant’s historical conflict with the Mullah, the fact that the applicant’s initial church attendance at Jehovah’s Witness was at the invitation of third party and the applicant derived comfort and support from the conduct in question (attending churches, making friends and related activities.)

6. In relation to ground two, it is submitted that legal reasonableness, or in absence of legal unreasonableness, is an essential element in the lawfulness of decision-making: (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [19]). It follows that findings or reasoning along the way to reach a conclusion by a decision-maker that are illogical or irrational may established jurisdictional error: (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16).

7. It is submitted that it is illogical that the applicant would, in 2016, engage in conduct solely for the purpose of advancing his protection visa claim in circumstances where he was aware, from May 2013, of the possible assistance to his claim of conversion to Christianity, where the applicant lodged a claim, not referring to the conduct, and waited three years before completing activities leading to his religious conversion. This is in circumstances where the applicant had numerous opportunities to complete the activities earlier.

8. In relation to ground three, it was submitted that the Tribunal’s duty to review involves making a finding on “substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts’: (see Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26 at [24]).

9. In this case, the Tribunal noted that it had received an argument that the applicant would have been baptised sooner if the sole purpose was to strengthen his claim. This claim was thus clearly expressed to the Tribunal. It was submitted that the Tribunal must have “proper, genuine and realistic” consideration to the merits of the applicant’s case: see Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 457). At paragraph 96 of its decision, it is submitted by the applicant that the Tribunal simply dismiss the applicant’s submission without engaging with it. It is submitted by the applicant that more was needed from the Tribunal. The applicant submits that the Tribunal did not properly consider or engage with the applicant’s claim in relation to the timing of the relevant conduct.

The First Respondent’s Submissions

1. The Minister submits that the burden lies with the applicant of satisfying the Tribunal that the applicant has engaged in the conversion activities in Australia otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee: see 91R(3)(b) of the Act and SZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 566 at [28].

2. As the Tribunal was not so satisfied, it was consequently obliged to disregard the conduct engaged in by the applicant in Australia. The contention that the Tribunal failed to take into account the claimed historical conflict with a Mullah does not articulate how or when the matter was raised by the applicant with the Tribunal as being relevant to the task of applying subsection 91R(3) of the Act. Further, the Tribunal specifically rejected the factual premise of the claims regarding the applicant’s defiance of the military Mullah and Iranian Sepah, and his claim to fear harm for reasons of his religion and any political opinion imputed to him for reasons of religion at a factual level (see [74], [113]).

3. Properly understood, this allegation merely disagrees with the findings made by the Tribunal and is an attempt to recast the applicant’s claims in a manner not advanced to the Tribunal.

4. Contrary to the applicant’s contention, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision does not expose that it unfairly focused on the applicant’s conversion as having occurred in the period from May 2015 to February 2016 when he was baptised. The applicant’s own evidence to the Tribunal was that he had converted to Christianity in May 2015, and it had been at that point of time that he began regularly attending the Jesus Family Church at Parramatta: (see [75]).The Tribunal accepted that prior to this, the applicant may have occasionally attended church but did not accept that he attended on a regular basis: (see [77]).

5. In reaching the state of satisfaction required on whether the applicant had engaged in the conversion activities in Australia, otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee, the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that the applicant had been first drawn to churches in Australia because he was genuinely interested in Christianity, nor was the Tribunal satisfied that he had, by then “become a genuine Christian”. The Minister submits that these findings were reasonably open to the Tribunal for the reasons it gave and are not without a logical and probative basis:

6. In relation to ground two, the applicant contends that it was illogical for the Tribunal to find that the applicant had engaged in the claimed conversion conduct solely for the purposes of advancing his protection claim, in circumstances where he had numerous opportunities to complete the activities earlier.

7. Firstly, the task of the Court is to ask whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make findings it did make on the material before it: (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship vSZMDS (2010) HCA 16 at [133]). In making the findings it did, the Tribunal had a multiplicity of concerns about the applicant’s credibility which could not be overcome: (see [97]). In coming to the conclusions it did, the Tribunal relied upon the fact that the applicant had not attended church on a regular basis until 2015, and he had not put forward his claim to have converted to Christianity until after the applicant’s initial application for protection had been rejected by a delegate on credibility grounds. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s occasional attendance at churches between 2013 and 2015 was motivated by desire to learn about an activity that could strengthen his application for a protection visa. Contrary to the applicant’s contention, these concerns were not limited to the “sole reason” of knowledge of the fact that other Iranian asylum seekers had sought protection on the basis of their conversion to Christianity from May 2013.

8. It is submitted by the first respondent that while the proposed ground two plainly disagrees with the Tribunal’s findings, this cannot, without more, establish jurisdictional error. The first respondent submits that the applicant has failed to demonstrate ‘extreme illogicality’ in the Tribunal’s decision, measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one about which reasonable minds might come to different conclusions: see ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174 at [47].

9. In relation to ground three, the applicant contends that the Tribunal did not adequately engage with the case or the submissions presented to it. In particular, the applicant refers to his claimed conduct prior to attending the Jesus Family Church in Parramatta as well as his submission that he would have been baptised sooner, if he was motivated solely by the desire to promote his protection visa application, which the applicant says was rejected without any reasons or, in the alternative, without due consideration.

10. It is submitted that care ought to be taken with the formula ‘proper, genuine and realistic consideration’ which has been found to be no more than an expression of emphatic disagreement with the findings of the Tribunal and insufficient to constitute requisite error: (see Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510). Further, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claimed prior conduct on the basis of the ‘serious concerns’ that it had about his credibility and was of the view that the applicant’s occasional attendance at churches between 2013 and 2015 was motivated by the desire to learn about an activity that could strengthen his application for a protection visa. These were not objectively minor matters.

11. In respect of the claim that the applicant would have been baptised sooner if his conversion activities were not genuine, the Tribunal considered this possibility, however, it was not satisfied that the applicant was first drawn to churches in Australia because he was genuinely interested in Christianity. The Tribunal was not satisfied, if his sole purpose in Christianity was to strengthen his claim for protection, he would have been baptised earlier: (see [96]).

Consideration

1. The first issue relates to leave to amend the grounds of the application. The Court notes that the grounds, whilst different in particulars, are substantially the same in that they attack the decision of the Tribunal in relation to its treatment of the conversion of the applicant to Christianity. Noting that the first and second respondents were put on notice of the proposed amendments and that they have had an opportunity to consider them, the view of the Court is that leave should be granted for the grounds to be amended to those outlined above. In so doing, the Court notes the considerable time lag between the filing of the grounds in 2018 and today. This matter arises under Migration law, one of the most litigated areas in the Court’s General Federal Law jurisdiction. As a result, there are continual changes to the common law in relation to the area. The Court needs to be mindful of this in allowing leave to amend, subject to the first respondent having sufficient time to respond to any new matters raised and are not prejudiced as a result. Accordingly, leave is granted pursuant to r 7.01 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) to rely upon the amended grounds of judicial review filed 2 November 2020.

1. As noted by the first respondent, the Tribunal set aside the decision of the delegate to refuse the applicant a Protection (class XA) visa and substituted a decision to refuse him a Protection (class XD) visa. While the applicant takes no issue with this aspect of the decision, the Court is satisfied that this was appropriate due to the timing involved in the consideration of his visa application.

2. In relation to the decision of the Tribunal, the Court notes initially that the decision amounts to 32 pages and contains a very detailed examination of the claims of the applicant, his evidence to the Tribunal, his post hearing submissions and then a very detailed assessment of the material it was required to consider in assessing the applicant’s claims. Whilst not in itself determinative of the issue, the detailed manner in which the Tribunal lists and then discusses the applicant’s evidence and claims mitigates against the claim in ground three that the Tribunal failed to adequately engage with the case or the evidence submitted to it.

3. Ground one alleges the Tribunal failed to properly consider the applicant’s claim conversion to Christianity. In particular, it suggested at particular (iv) the Tribunal did not take into account conduct which occurred before the applicant left Iran. That is the applicant’s conflict with the Mullah and perceived anti-Islam profile.

4. The Court notes that the Tribunal accepted that the applicant left Iran on a valid passport in his own name and that the applicant was dismissed from the army after a conflict with the Mullah [74]. The Tribunal rejected, however, that the applicant was on a blacklist in Iran.

5. The Tribunal noted that it was not until 2015 that the applicant regularly attended church and that his conversion to Christianity took a significant step when he was baptised in 2015, following the rejection of his initial application for a protection visa by the Department. Given the Tribunal’s various findings as to its concerns as to the lack of credibility of the applicant, including his admission of making false claims, the Court is satisfied that the Tribunal was properly entitled to view the applicant’s other claims with a degree of significant suspicion. The Court accepts the first respondent’s submission that the applicant bore the burden of proof that his conversion was not for the sole purpose of enhancing his protection claim. The Court is satisfied that the conclusions of the Tribunal that he may have attended churches prior to 2015 in order to obtain knowledge about Christian activities in an effort to strengthen his refugee claim is a finding, based on the entirety of the evidence, that was open to the Tribunal. The Court is satisfied that the dispute with the Mullah was not a matter that formed a reasonable basis for the Tribunal to find that the applicant was anti-Islam prior to him leaving Iran. The Court is satisfied that the Tribunal did give detailed and proper consideration to all the applicant’s claims and was entitled to discount other possible motives for the applicant engaging in the conduct. Indeed, at paragraph 79 of its decision, the Tribunal acknowledged that a person may fear religious persecution in their country of origin, but might also have economic motivations to remain in Australia. The Tribunal concluded that this did not mean their fear of persecution on religious grounds was not genuine. This indicates quite a detailed consideration of the relevant timeline and possible motivations for the applicant. To the extent that the applicant takes issue with the conclusions, this invites the Tribunal to engage in impermissible merits review. Accordingly, Ground one reveals no jurisdictional error.

6. As acknowledged by the legal representative of the applicant, Grounds two and three are interrelated. As outlined by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593 at 604, Tribunal reasons should not be scrutinised ‘with an eye keenly attuned to error’: (see [46]) and that ‘it may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matters because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality’ (see [47]).

7. Ground two alleges that the decision to disregard the applicant’s conduct in terms of his Christian activities pursuant to s 91R(3) of the Act is inconsistent, illogical and unreasonable. The test for unreasonableness is “stringent” and only arises in rare cases. Unreasonableness is not a means for challenging a decision on the basis that the Court disagrees with the consideration of matters or the evaluative judgements made by the decision-maker: (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225 at [30], [113]). The Tribunal had already found, at paragraph 70 of its decision, that the applicant was not afraid of anyone at the time he left Iran en route to Indonesia, nor was he of adverse interest to Iranian authorities. The Tribunal further found at paragraph 71 of its decision that the applicant had obtained and submitted a fraudulent document to enhance his protection claims. The Tribunal found, on the evidence, that the applicant had been dismissed from the army after he had a conflict with a Mullah, but that he was not on a black list in Iran. At paragraph 79 of its decision, the Tribunal considered the applicant’s evidence about his conversion to Christianity. At paragraph 80 of its decision, The Tribunal cautioned itself as to deeply personal nature of faith and the understanding that there is no set way in which a person might talk about their faith. The Tribunal discussed that the applicant’s involvement with Christian activities had been relatively limited, so it would be unreasonable to expect him to display a detailed knowledge of Christian teachings. Overall, the Tribunal found his evidence about his newfound faith to be vague and limited to generalities.

8. The Tribunal, at paragraph 83 of its decision, found the applicant was disingenuous, evasive and not credible in response to questions about whether he was aware, when he was attending church in Australia, that some Iranians sought protection on that basis. The Tribunal did not accept that it was credible that at the time he first began frequenting Australian churches in Sydney, the applicant had not thought about or was unaware of this issue. The Tribunal found that it detracted from his credibility as a witness. After considering evidence from witnesses, at paragraph 95 of its decision, the Tribunal ultimately concluded that it was not satisfied that the applicant’s involvement with the Jesus Family Church and his baptism was otherwise than for the sole purpose of strengthening his claim to be a refugee.

9. The Court does not consider the conclusions of the Tribunal are inconsistent, illogical or unreasonable. The Tribunal considered the entirety of the evidence, including the applicant’s own evidence, those of his supporters and the relevant timeline of his involvement with the Christian church. The Tribunal carefully weighed the material against its concerns with the credibility of the applicant. The Court does not consider that the conclusions are so illogical or irrational as to meet the very stringent requirements for jurisdictional error. Accordingly, ground two reveals no jurisdictional error.

10. Ground three alleges that the Tribunal did not adequately engage with the case/submissions presented to it by the applicant and his legal representative. As indicated above, the Tribunal decision, with respect, is one of the most detailed and considered this Court has seen. The Tribunal sets out the applicant’s evidence, its consideration of the evidence, a detailed discussion and then conclusions from paragraph 75 to 100 of its decision.

11. The above consideration was in circumstances where the Tribunal had already detailed that the applicant had admitted to providing false evidence in relation to his claims concerning the evidence as to a fear of harm because of the claimed incident in the taxi which was abandoned, and admitting that a Court summons he had provided to the Department was fraudulent (see [42-43]). This caused the Tribunal to have significant concerns about the overall credibility of the applicant and his claims to have converted to Christianity in Australia. The Tribunal noted in particular at paragraphs 60 through to 63 of its decision, supporting letters from a number of people, including Senior Pastor David Boyd, and their opinions as to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity. The Tribunal gave these supporting letters considerable weight.

12. At paragraph 77 of its decision, the Tribunal found that it did not accept the applicant had any genuine interest or connection to Christianity at the time he left Iran in 2012. The Court considers the claim that particular (ii) of ground three that, while the Tribunal did consider the submission that the applicant would have been baptised sooner if he was motivated solely by his desire to strengthen his protection visa application, it did not give any reasons and did not engage with the substance of the submission and did no more than reject it.

13. The Court is satisfied that the Tribunal did properly engage with the claim, but made findings of greater generality that it did not, on the basis of the applicant’s overall evidence and, in particular, adverse credibility findings that were open to it and rejected his claim. It is significant to note that the applicant’s baptism did not take place until after his claim had been rejected at the Departmental level. The Court is satisfied that all of these matters were considered by the Tribunal, particularly at paragraphs 96-97 and there was a logical and probative basis for the Tribunal to reject the claims made by the applicant in relation to his conversion and find in the matter which it did.

14. Accordingly, ground three reveals no jurisdictional error.

Conclusion

1. The application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Humphreys

Associate:

Date: 19 November 2020.