Aerison Pty Ltd v Innovent Engineering Group Pty Ltd
[2025] WASC 252 (S)
•27 AUGUST 2025
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: AERISON PTY LTD -v- INNOVENT ENGINEERING GROUP PTY LTD [2025] WASC 252 (S)
CORAM: SEAWARD J
HEARD: ON THE PAPERS
DELIVERED : 27 AUGUST 2025
FILE NO/S: CIV 2125 of 2024
BETWEEN: AERISON PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
INNOVENT ENGINEERING GROUP PTY LTD
First Defendant
MICHAEL TIMOTHY O'CALLAGHAN
Second Defendant
DARREN JUSTIN LEHMANN
Third Defendant
BRIAN HOOKER
Fourth Defendant
LEE FORD
Fifth Defendant
SANDI LOUISE FRANICH
Sixth Defendant
MELISSA ROGERS
Seventh Defendant
CHRISTOPHER PEARSON
Eighth Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Costs - Special costs order - Whether matter of 'usual difficulty, complexity or importance' - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Legal Profession (Supreme and District Courts) (Contentious Business) Determination 2024
Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA)
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)
Result:
Plaintiff's application for special costs order dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | No appearance |
| First Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Second Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Third Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Fourth Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Fifth Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Sixth Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Seventh Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Eighth Defendant | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Steedman Stagg Lawyers |
| First Defendant | : | Bennett |
| Second Defendant | : | Bennett |
| Third Defendant | : | Bennett |
| Fourth Defendant | : | Bennett |
| Fifth Defendant | : | Bennett |
| Sixth Defendant | : | Bennett |
| Seventh Defendant | : | Bennett |
| Eighth Defendant | : | Bennett |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Aerison Pty Ltd v Innovent Engineering Group Pty Ltd [2025] WASC 252
BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd v Pt Bayan Resources Tbk [No 5] [2023] WASC 116
Bolt v Bolt [2023] WASC 162 (S)
Electricity Generation and Retail Corporation Trading as Synergy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] WASC 469 (S)
Heartlink Ltd v Jones (as Liquidator of HL Diagnostics Pty Ltd) [2007] WASC 254 (S)
INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd v AIG Australia Ltd [No 3] [2023] WASC 332 (S)
Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] WASCA 76 (S)
SEAWARD J:
Introduction
On 27 June 2025, I delivered my reasons for decision in relation to Aerison's application for leave to issue a subpoena prior to the filing of a defence (Primary Reasons).[1] Aerison was successful in their application.
[1] Aerison Pty Ltd v Innovent Engineering Group Pty Ltd [2025] WASC 252 (Primary Reasons).
In my orders made on 27 June 2025, I ordered (relevantly) that the defendants pay Aerison's costs of the hearing and the cost of Aerison's submissions in reply dated 16 April 2025, and that the remaining costs of the application be in the cause. Counsel for Aerison submitted that his client wished to consider whether to make an application for special costs orders, and accordingly I also made programming orders to facilitate such an application.
By application letter dated 7 July 2025, Aerison applies for an order pursuant to s 141(3) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA) (Uniform Law) that the costs payable to the Aerison be assessed, unless otherwise agreed, without regard to the limits as to hourly rate or time specified in the Legal Profession (Supreme and District Courts) (Contentious Business) Costs Determination 2024.
The application is supported by the affidavit of Isabella Sophie Jackson affirmed on 7 July 2025 (Jackson Affidavit).
These reasons should be read with the Primary Reasons.
For the following reasons, I will not grant the application for orders under s 141(3) of the Uniform Law.
Legal Principles
The Supreme Court has a broad discretion to award costs pursuant to s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA). That discretion must be exercised judicially.
Order 66 r 51(1) provides that in a particular action or matter the court may make an order under s 141(3) of the Uniform Law. Section 141 relevantly provides:
(1) The following are regulated by an applicable costs determination —
(a) the taxation of bills of law practices;
(b) any other aspect of the costs charged by law practices.
…
(3) Despite subsection (1), if a court or judicial officer is of the opinion that the amount of costs allowable in respect of a matter under a costs determination is inadequate because of the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter, the court or officer may do any or all of the following —
(a) order the payment of costs above those fixed by the determination;
(b) fix higher limits of costs than those fixed in the determination;
(c) remove limits on costs fixed in the determination;
(d) make any order or give any direction for the purposes of enabling costs above those in the determination to be ordered or assessed.
(4) Subsection (1) does not limit the power of a court, a judicial officer or a taxing officer of a court to determine in any particular case before that court, judicial officer or taxing officer the amount of costs allowed.
When considering such an application, it is important to identify the matter in question. In this case, it is the application for leave to issue a subpoena prior to the filing of a defence.
The scale which applies to the work carried out by the practitioners engaged on this matter is the Legal Profession (Supreme and District Courts) (Contentious Business) Determination 2024 (2024 Determination). The items which Aerison submits are inadequate and for which the limits should be lifted are items 10(a) and 10(c) of the 2024 Determination, which are extracted below:
The legal principles concerning when a special costs order may be made under s 141(3) of the Uniform Law are not in dispute and have been detailed in numerous authorities of this court (including those addressing the equivalent provision under earlier legislation). In particular, see Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 2],[2] and the helpful summaries by Vandongen J (as his Honour then was) in Bolt v Bolt[3] and Lundberg J in INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd v AIG Australia Ltd [No 3].[4]
[2] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] WASCA 76 (S).
[3] Bolt v Bolt [2023] WASC 162 (S) [8] - [19].
[4] INPEX Operations Australia Pty Ltd v AIG Australia Ltd [No 3] [2023] WASC 332 (S) [36].
It is not necessary to repeat the legal principles in detail. Rather, it is sufficient to observe that the two key issues to be determined are as follows:
1.Is the maximum amount allowable under the applicable costs determination inadequate, in the sense there is a fairly arguable case that, on a taxation of costs, costs may properly be allowed in an amount greater than the maximum amount?; and
2.Does the inadequacy of the costs allowable under the costs determination arise because of the 'unusual difficulty, complexity, or importance of the matter'?
The word 'unusual' in s 141(3) of the Uniform Law qualifies only the 'difficulty' of the matter, and not its 'complexity' or 'importance'. The word 'unusual' in this context means unusual, having regard to what one might describe as the usual run of civil cases determined in the court. Assessing whether a matter is unusually difficult essentially involves the making of a value judgment by the court.[5]
[5] Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] WASCA 76 (S) [15].
In terms of complexity, there are limited authorities addressing the precise meaning of the term. However, the references to complexity in the authorities are consistent with complexity arising from either the legal or factual issues raised in the matter.[6]
[6] See for example Heartlink Ltd v Jones (as Liquidator of HL Diagnostics Pty Ltd) [2007] WASC 254 (S) [24].
In BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd v Pt Bayan Resources Tbk [No 5], Archer J (as her Honour then was) considered the meaning of the word 'importance' in the context of special costs applications as follows:[7]
[7] BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd v Pt Bayan Resources Tbk [No 5] [2023] WASC 116 [75] ‑ [80] (citations omitted).
75Cases in which importance has been found include cases which involve the risk of significant professional damage, test cases, or cases which involve enormous sums of money.
76Heartlink Ltd v Jones as Liquidator of HL Diagnostics Pty Ltd (in liq) was a case in the first category, involving serious allegations against liquidators. In Heartlink, Martin CJ said that:
'By reference to "importance" in this context, the legislature is allowing the court to have regard to the question of whether the work done was appropriate to the significance of the issue that arose in the litigation. Significance can arise either because of the significance of the issues to the parties or because of the significance of the issues to other prospective parties or to the public or to the community generally. In this case, the issues raised were of considerable significance to the liquidators in the practice of their profession, and in respect of whom serious allegations were made.'
77This passage was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Sino Iron [No 2].
78In Blatchford v Laine, Vaughan J commented on the passage as follows:
'His Honour's formulation involves a qualitative evaluation as to the significance of the matter. It requires an assessment of the weight, seriousness and gravity of the issues and controversy before the court. Often the question of importance will be answered as a matter of impression informed by experience. Outside of those relatively rare cases involving matters of public importance - where "importance" may well be obvious - the importance of the matter may be evident in the amount of the claim or the nature of the allegations that are being litigated.'
79It is plain from these authorities, and the context of s 141 and the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act as a whole, that a matter will not be 'important' in the required sense simply because a party considers it to be so. If it were otherwise, the test of importance would probably be satisfied in every litigated dispute.
80Further, I consider that a matter will not be 'important' in the required sense simply because the amount of money involved is large. It would depend on the circumstances.
In Electricity Generation and Retail Corporation trading as Synergy v Woodside Energy Ltd,[8] Martin CJ observed the role of the judicial officer in considering a special cost application (under the previous legislation) is as follows:
[O]nce an order is made for the taxation of costs, it is not appropriate for the court to usurp the function of the taxing officer. Rather, under s 280(2) of the Act, the function of the court is limited to setting the parameters within which the taxing officer will tax the relevant bill, providing any specific directions which will assist the taxing officer to assess the quantum of the costs to be allowed on taxation. Because the quantum of costs to be allowed is to be determined by taxation, the powers conferred upon the court by s 280(2) of the Act are to be exercised as matters of impression rather than science, taking into account the greater expertise of taxing officers in fixing the amount of costs properly and reasonably allowed.
[8] Electricity Generation and Retail Corporation Trading as Synergy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] WASC 469 (S) [4].
Further, it is not in dispute that the disposition of a special costs application is addressed as a matter of impression, rather than matters of detailed evaluation, precision or science.
Evidence
The Jackson Affidavit attaches a draft bill of costs prepared for the work carried out by Aerison's solicitors falling within the scope of the costs order made on 27 June 2025. The draft bill contains an explanation and description of the work undertaken. It is not necessary to set out the detail of that work here, and it is sufficient to record that the amount of costs incurred is as follows:
Item
Amount
10(a) - proceedings in chambers
$55,055.00
10(c) - consent orders
$2,301.20
Total
$57,356.20
The consent orders which are claimed under item 10(c) of the 2024 Determination are the consent orders dated 2 May 2025 regarding a particular document referred to in affidavit evidence filed by the defendants. The Jackson Affidavit details the conferral which occurred between the solicitors for the parties between 15 April 2025 and 22 May 2025, including in relation to the confidentiality of this document and preparation of the consent orders.
The Jackson Affidavit also attaches copies of the various costs agreements entered into by Aerison and by their instructing solicitors with two counsel (redacted due to legal professional privilege).
Preliminary Issue - scope of costs orders
The defendants submit that two aspects of the costs sought by Aerison are outside the scope of the costs order in two respects.
First, that part of the draft bill of costs that includes costs relating to the preparation of the supplementary affidavit of Dylan Wadia, filed 16 April 2025. The defendants submit that the costs of preparation of this affidavit, like all affidavits, falls outside of the costs awarded to Aerison.
I accept the defendants' submission in this regard. The wording of order 5 of my orders made on 27 June 2025 is:
The defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of the hearing on 30 May 2025 and the cost of the plaintiff's submissions in reply dated 16 April 2025. The reaming costs of the application are in the cause.
The wording of order 5 does not include the costs of the preparation of any affidavit evidence, or in particular the supplementary affidavit of Mr Wadia. It would, however, encompass any preparation done by counsel for the hearing, which would include an amount associated with reviewing the supplementary affidavit and including information concerning that which goes into the reply submissions and getting up for the hearing.
This is consistent with my oral reasons delivered on 27 June 2025.
Secondly, that part of the draft bill of costs that includes costs relating to the minute of consent orders dated 5 May 2025. The defendants rely on order 4 of the minute of consent orders, and the orders made by the court on 5 May 2025, which provides that:
The costs of and incidental to this memorandum be in the cause.
I accept the defendants' submission in this regard. Item 10(c) of the 2024 Determination is concerned with consent orders. The only consent orders relied upon in relation to this application are the consent orders dated 5 May 2025, and order 4 expressly provides that the costs of and incidental to that minute are in the cause. In these circumstances, Aerison is not entitled to seek their costs of or incidental to the minute, and the consent orders fall outside the scope of the subsequent costs orders made on 27 June 2025.
Accordingly, when considering Aerison's application, it is necessary to consider that application in the context of excluding the costs sought in relation to these above two matters.
Issue 1 - is it fairly arguable that, on a taxation of costs, costs may properly be allowed in an amount greater than the maximum amount?
Submissions
The amount of costs incurred by Aerison are detailed in the draft bill of costs is $57,356.20. However, it is necessary to deduct from that the amount claimed for the minute of consent orders ($2,301.20) and the amount claimed in relation to the preparation of the supplementary affidavit. Ultimately, it is not necessary to identify the precise amount claimed for the supplementary affidavit for the purposes of these reasons.
Aerison submits that the costs were incurred as a consequence of the defendants opposing the application and leading evidence in opposition, which necessitate the following work:[9]
(a)reviewing the defendants' submissions in opposition to the application, filed 7 April 2025 (15 pages) and the affidavit of Mr Michael Timothy O'Callaghan, filed 7 April 2025 (39 pages);
(b)issuing an O 26 r 8(2) RSC request for production of the documents referred to in Mr O'Callaghan's affidavit;
(c)work in relation to Mr O'Callaghan's affidavit, including conferral with the defendants' solicitors regarding the imposition of a confidentiality regime pertaining to the 'OEM Contract';
(d)conferring with the defendants' solicitors regarding matters arising from production of the unredacted copy of the OEM Contract, resulting in the filing of the supplementary affidavit sworn by Mr O'Callaghan, filed on 27 May 2025 (21 pages);
(e)reviewing Mr O'Callaghan's supplementary affidavit;
(f)preparation of Aerison's submissions in reply, filed 16 April 2025 (10 pages); and
(g)preparing for and attending the hearing on 30 May 2025.
[9] Work falling outside of the orders has been excluded from the summary.
The draft bill of costs provides further explanation of the various tasks undertaken.
Aerison submits that in light of this work, there is a fairly arguable case that a taxing officer may properly tax Aerison's draft bill of costs at an amount that is greater than the limits imposed by the 2024 Determination.
The defendants submit that on the basis of Aerison's submissions, it appears that Aerison is submitting that the relevant scale items are inadequate both as to the hourly rates for practitioners and the maximum amounts allowed for each item.
The defendants submit that there is no evidence as to why the maximum hourly rates for counsel and solicitors are inadequate, and that they are not. The mere fact that costs agreements were signed whereby the higher hourly rates were agreed to, is not sufficient.
The defendants further submit that as a matter of impression, the court could not be satisfied that the maximum allowance in item 10(a) of 30 hours (being two days' preparation and a one day hearing) was inadequate for preparing nine pages of responsive submissions and attending a three hour chambers hearing.
Disposition
In considering the first question, it is not sufficient for a party to simply show it has incurred costs greater than those allowable under the relevant determination. It is necessary to have regard to the costs incurred in the context of the matter before the court.
When regard is had to all the circumstances, I do not consider it is fairly arguable that, on a taxation costs, an amount may be allowed which exceeds the maximum amount allowed under item 10(a) of the 2024 Determination.
I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons.
First, the scope of the costs order made in Aerison's favour was narrow and limited to the costs of preparing the reply submissions and the costs of the hearing on 30 May 2025. Accordingly, the scope of the costs order does not cover the full range of matters that fall within the scope of item 10(a) of the 2024 Determination.
Secondly, the legal issues raised by the application were confined. Aerison was required to demonstrate that it had a legitimate forensic purpose for the issue of the subpoena, and that there were exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of leave. The relevant underlying causes of action include a claim for breach of contract and a claim in equity for a breach of confidence.
Thirdly, the parties' submissions were not lengthy and were concerned with a limited number of paragraphs of the statement of claim. The reply submissions were nine pages, and responded to the submissions that were 13 pages. Whilst the parties referred to a number of cases, the principles drawn from those cases were not contentious.
Fourthly, whilst the affidavit material filed by Aerison was lengthy, the costs of preparing the affidavits is not included in the scope of the costs order. Even allowing for time for Aerison's counsel to review the affidavit material as part of getting up for the hearing and preparing the reply submissions, the facts as revealed by the affidavit material are not complicated. The affidavit material was directed towards demonstrating a legitimate forensic purpose for the subpoena existed by demonstrating through the use of IT records and witness accounts, that certain of the defendants had electronic access to various documents, and those documents were then located on the third parties' computer server and systems.
Fifthly, the oral hearing only took three hours and four minutes, and the scale allows for a hearing of up to one day. Whilst I accept that the length of a hearing may be shortened in circumstances where there are written submissions addressing all relevant issues, the length of the hearing was nonetheless well short of the maximum allowed under the relevant item.
In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that it is fairly arguable that, on a taxation of costs, costs may be allowed in an amount that exceeds the maximum amount allowed under item 10(a) of the 2024 Determination.
Issue 2 - complexity, or importance of the matter?
Notwithstanding my above conclusion that it is not fairly arguable that, on a taxation, costs may be allowed in an amount that exceeds the maximum amount allowed, I have gone on to consider whether, if I am wrong in this respect, the inadequacy in the maximum amount arises due to the complexity and importance of the application.
Aerison submits that the inadequacy of the scale arises due to the unusual difficulty, the complexity and the importance of the matter.
Submissions
Aerison accepts that on its face, an application for leave to issue a subpoena is not usually difficult compared to the usual run of civil cases before the court. However, Aerison submits that in this case the reliance required to be placed by Aerison on the extensive IT evidence to support its application made it unusually difficult compared to other such applications.
Aerison submits that the complexity of the application is demonstrated by the extent of the affidavit evidence and submissions filed by the parties and the extensive and detailed affidavit evidence relied on by Aerison.
Aerison submits that the application was important to the parties because:
(a)the application affected Aerison's ability to plead its case to the extent required by the defendants, thereby progressing the matter and potentially avoiding further interlocutory disputes and the consumption of the court's resources;
(b)the progression of the proceeding is important to Aerison due to:
(i)the alleged taking and misuse of its property by competitors, including its estimating tools, which are a valuable resource of Aerison; and
(ii)the impact of the defendants' alleged conduct on Aerison's relationship with its clients and its business generally, while the defendants continue to allegedly benefit from their conduct; and
(c)the contention of the defendants (which is denied) that the proceeding impugns their reputations.
Finally, Aerison submits that the unusual difficulty, complexity and importance of the application is further evidenced by the fact that the submissions were drafted, and the parties represented at the hearing, by well qualified and experienced counsel, including senior counsel and senior junior counsel for the defendants.
The defendants submit that even if the scale items were inadequate, the court could not be satisfied of a nexus between the costs incurred and the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter.
The defendants submit that when considering the difficulty of the matter, the proper comparator is not other applications for leave to issue a subpoena, but rather other matters falling within the scope of item 10(a), being other proceedings in chambers other than those by way of an originating process. Further, that there is nothing unusually difficult about this application when compared to the range of other proceedings in chambers falling within item 10(a) of the 2024 Determination.
In terms of complexity, the defendants submit that the preparation of the IT evidence relied upon by Aerison does not fall within the scope of the costs orders, and in any event no explanation has been provided as to how the evidence affected the costs of preparing the responsive submissions. Further, the defendants submit that the evidence is of a kind commonly deployed in confidential information cases.
In terms of importance, the defendants submit that the matter is not important and there was no suggestion that Aerison would have been unable to adequately progress its case if the application was refused.
Finally, the defendants submit that the fact that both parties were well resourced for the application does not, of itself, allow the court to infer anything about the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the matter.
Disposition
I am not satisfied that even if the amount allowed under item 10(a) of the 2024 Determination was inadequate, that this inadequacy was due to the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the application.
Turning first to the question of the unusual difficulty or complexity of the matter, I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons.
First, the matter being considered here is the application for leave to issue a subpoena prior to the filing of the defence. This does not raise any legal issues of any unusual difficulty or complexity. Aerison's underlying cause of action included a claim for breach of contract and a claim in equity for a breach of confidence. These underlying causes of action did not raise any legal issues of unusual difficulty or complexity in the context of the application for leave to issue the subpoena.
Secondly, whilst the affidavit evidence filed by Aerison in support of its application was extensive, for the reasons outlined above, I do not consider the affidavit evidence was factually complex. Further, the affidavit evidence filed in reply by the defendants is not lengthy or complex.
Thirdly, the submissions filed by the parties were not lengthy. The reply submissions were nine pages in length, and they responded to submissions that were 13 pages in length. Aerison's main submissions were 10 pages in length. Whilst the parties referred to a number of cases, the principles drawn from those cases were not contentious.
Fourthly, the oral hearing went for three hours and four minutes. Even making an allowance for the length of the hearing being reduced by the filing of written submissions, the hearing was not long.
In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that any inadequacy is due to the unusual difficulty or complexity of the application for leave to issue the subpoena.
Turning to the question of the importance of the matter, every application before the court will be of importance to the parties involved. That, of itself, is not sufficient. Further, it is not sufficient that the underlying cause of action is important to the parties. Rather, attention must be directed to the importance of the application itself. When this is done, I am not satisfied that any inadequacy is due to the importance of the application for leave to issue the subpoena.
The application was for leave to issue a subpoena seeking documents that would enable Aerison to further particularise paragraphs of its statement of claim so as to:
(a) identify precisely what is said to be the information which has the necessary quality of confidentiality;
(b) specify the grounds upon which it is alleged that the respective defendants 'stole' Aerison's confidential information; and
(c) to specify the actual or threatened misuse of the confidential information.
Whilst some of the information necessary to further particularise the statement of claim was solely within the defendants' knowledge, Aerison accepted that it could draft some of those particulars with the information it had, but that the particulars would be incomplete. Aerison submitted that it would be consistent with case management principles to grant leave to issue the subpoena as it may avoid a foreshadowed application to strike out the statement of claim and would enable full particulars to be provided by Aerison in one amendment which would avoid subsequent expenses and delays.
Whilst there was nothing inappropriate in Aerison making the application and proceeding in this manner, it was not Aerison's only forensic choice. Aerison could have proceeded to particularise the relevant paragraphs of the statement of claim as best it could with the information it had, and stated that further particulars would be provided after discovery. Whilst a strike out application had been foreshadowed, none has been made. Accordingly, this was not a situation where Aerison was responding to a strike out application or was faced with a springing order or some other situation where there was a real risk that if the application was not granted then its entire case would be dismissed. Rather, this was an interlocutory application made by Aerison at an early stage of the proceedings.
In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that any inadequacy is due to the importance of the application for leave to issue the subpoena.
Other matters
My conclusions in relation to both issue 1 and issue 2 are not altered by the fact that both parties engaged senior and experienced counsel for the purposes of the application.
Parties are entitled to brief counsel of their choice. The fact that a senior counsel and two senior junior counsel appeared does not either of itself, or when considered in light of the other matters I have referred to, result in it being fairly arguable that on a taxation costs may be allowed in an amount that exceeds the maximum amount allowed under item 10(a) of the 2024 Determination. It also does not result in any inadequacy in the 2024 Determination being caused by the unusual difficulty, complexity or importance of the application.
Conclusion
For the reasons I have given, I am not satisfied that the limit contained in item 10(a) of the 2024 Determination should be removed pursuant to s 141(3) of the Uniform Act, and therefore Aerison's application is dismissed.
My preliminary view is that in these circumstances, Aerison should pay the defendants' costs of this application on a party‑party basis to be taxed if not agreed. However, I will hear further from the parties in relation to the appropriate orders to give effect to my decision, including as to costs.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
MA
Associate to the Hon Justice Seaward
27 AUGUST 2025
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