ADZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ADZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 603

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: ADZ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3449
File number: WAD 2 of 2016
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 27 May 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for protection (class XA) visa – application for extension of time to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – extent of delay –whether reasonable explanation for delay in filing appeal – whether respondent may suffer prejudice because of delay – merits of the appeal
Legislation:

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 274.2

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5(1), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 36(2A)(c), 36(2A)(d), 430, 499

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) R 36.05(3)(d)

Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 320A

Cases cited:

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; [1984] FCA 186

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS and Others (2010) 243 CLR 164; [2010] HCA 48

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263

Quan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1239

R v Ping [2006] 2 Qd R 69; [2005] QCA 472

SZQKX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 421

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 64

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 69

SZTEP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1499

Zaburoni v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 492; [2016] HCA 12

Date of hearing: 20 May 2016
Date of last submissions: 26 May 2016
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms E Tattersall
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

WAD 2 of 2016
BETWEEN:

ADZ15

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 MAY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BARKER J:

  1. The applicant, a male citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity, applies for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing his application for judicial review of the decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) refusing to grant a protection (class XA) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). For the reasons which follow, the application should be dismissed.

  2. The applicant arrived in Australia by boat in August 2012 without a visa.  He then applied for a protection visa on 3 May 2013,…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 603
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of ADZ15, the applicant sought an extension of time to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had dismissed his application for a protection (class XA) visa. The applicant argued that there were reasonable grounds for his delay in filing the appeal and that the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection would not suffer prejudice due to the delay. The court had to determine whether the applicant's delay in filing the appeal was reasonable and if the Minister would suffer prejudice because of the delay. Additionally, the court had to assess the merits of the appeal.

The court found that the applicant's delay in lodging an appeal should not count against him, given his limited English proficiency and the need to obtain legal advice after receiving the written reasons for judgment. However, the court had to determine if the proposed grounds of appeal had any prospects of success. The applicant's submissions appeared to raise the same issues that were before the primary judge, which were already considered and dismissed. The court concluded that there were no substantial grounds for the appeal to succeed.

The court dismissed the applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed. The orders were made under Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant now applies for an extension of time to appeal from the Federal Circuit Court’s decision. The circumstances in which he failed to appeal within the required 21 days of the Court’s decision are discussed below, as are the apparent grounds of appeal.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal accepted that, on the evidence before it, the applicant had experienced discrimination on account of his Tamil ethnicity in the form of people looking at him differently. It further accepted that he underwent forced physical fitness training by the LTTE in 2005/2006, and that, in 2007, the LTTE came to his home and may have wanted to recruit him. While the Tribunal also accepted that the applicant’s father died by gunshot, it was not satisfied that he was shot by the Sri Lankan army due to being a suspected LTTE supporter. With regard to the applicant’s claims to have been detained and physically mistreated by the authorities in Kalimottai camp in Mannar in 2008, the Tribunal accepted that the applicant and his family left their homes in the Mullaitivu district, being an area controlled by the LTTE, to avoid being recruited by the group. It further accepted that he was caught, blindfolded and interrogated by the Sri Lankan army when travelling by boat to Mannar, and was subsequently taken to Kalimottai camp where he and his family resided from June 2008 to October 2009. However, the Tribunal found it was not credible that the applicant was accused of being LTTE merely because he underwent fitness training. It also did not accept that he was physically mistreated by the authorities due to contradictions in the applicant’s evidence, country information indicating the camp was a welfare camp where the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was present, and the fact that the applicant was assisted in his repatriation as an internally displaced person. The Tribunal accepted that, after being released from the camp, the applicant was questioned by the authorities while living in Mathakal but had no problems with the authorities during that time. While it also accepted that the applicant may have been questioned by the authorities upon moving to the Mullaitivu district in November 2011, the Tribunal did not accept that he was visited for questioning on a second occasion, during which the applicant alleged he was detained for a day and a half, beaten and had a gun held to his head. In light of these factual findings, the Tribunal then considered whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a reason under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (Convention reason). In doing so it noted that, in accordance with Ministerial Direction No. 56, it had taken into account relevant country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The Tribunal considered that, on the basis of the evidence before it, namely the applicant being unemployed between 2008 and 2012, the applicant’s economic circumstances were a motivating factor in his decision to leave Sri Lanka.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant, by supplementary written submissions filed 26 May 2016, does not address the Full Court’s decision in SZTAL FC, but instead reiterates in substance the arguments raised before the primary judge and in his written submissions of 20 May 2016: I am the Applicant in this case, and which to make the following submissions on the Respondent's supplementary submissions of 24th May 2016:1.I firmly state that the Tribunal and the Primary Judge were aware of the Prevention of Terrorism Act but played it down as this would have strengthened my case. The whole basis of my complaint and fleeing from Sri Lanka was because I was harassed by the armed forces acting under this Act.2.The fact that my father was killed by the Sri Lankan army was because it was perceived by them that he had connections with the LTTE. The army has been let loose on the Sri Lankan Tamils to suppress their aspirations and in this process they killed a number of Tamils under the cover of the PTA. For the Tribunal to submit that this was a killing for other reasons is far from fair and points to a bias in examining my claims for a protection visa.3.In Sri Lanka if a person is detained by the armed forces he is invariably harassed and persecuted. This has been well documented by international human right organisations and by the UNHCR. I too was harassed when detained.4.The documents I submitted related to the period that the Tribunal held the inquiry into my claims for a Protection Visa. If the tribunal examined my case in a fair and just manner, in accordance with the laws of natural justice, the country situation in the context of my situation would have been different. I am certain that if this was done I would not have been denied a Protection Visa under the Refugee Convention and the Migration Act no 58 of Australia. Therefore, my appeal is that the documents must b accepted on the basis of relevance.CONSIDERATION As noted above, this is a case in which it appears the primary judge delivered his judgment and reasons for dismissing the application for judicial review orally, and provided the written reasons later. In such circumstances, while it is strictly correct to say, as the Minister does, that there is no impediment to an aggrieved party lodging an appeal within the 21 day period provided by the Rules following the oral delivery of judgment and reasons, it is nonetheless understandable why a self‑represented party whose first language is not English, and who was assisted by an interpreter at the hearing, such as the applicant, might have taken time, following receipt of the written reasons for judgment, to obtain advice about those reasons and to have been late in filing his appeal papers. I am satisfied that the simple fact of delay in lodging an appeal should not count against the applicant in this case. The question of substance is whether there are any proposed grounds of appeal that have any prospects of success. Taken collectively, the two sets of written submissions filed by the applicant appear to raise the same issues that were before the primary judge.