| WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION | ||
| DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR | ||
| CITATION: | Adriaansen v Dungog & District Retirement Living Limited [2016] NSWWCCPD 36 | |
| APPELLANT: | Margit Susanne Adriaansen | |
| RESPONDENT: | Dungog & District Retirement Living Limited | |
| INSURER: | QBE Workers Compensation (NSW) Limited | |
| FILE NUMBER: | A1-2462/15 | |
| ARBITRATOR: | Ms J Peacock | |
| DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: | 30 March 2016 | |
| DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: | 15 July 2016 | |
| SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: | Section 329 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; application of Target Australia Pty Ltd v Mansour [2006] NSWWCCPD 286; 6 DDCR 440 and Milosavljevic v Medina Property Services Pty Ltd [2008] NSWWCCPD 56; duty to give adequate reasons | |
| PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: | Acting President Michael Snell | |
| HEARING: | On the papers | |
| REPRESENTATION: | Appellant: | Philip Watson Pty Ltd |
| Respondent: | Gillis Delaney Lawyers | |
| ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL: | The Arbitrator’s decision dated 30 March 2016 is confirmed. | |
INTRODUCTION
This appeal involves issues going to the exercise by an Arbitrator of the discretion, pursuant to s 329 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act), to refer a matter for further assessment by an Approved Medical Specialist. It also raises issues going to whether the order the subject of the appeal is ‘interlocutory’, and if so, whether it is appropriate that leave to appeal be granted pursuant to s 352(3A) of the 1998 Act.
BACKGROUND
Margit Susanne Adriaansen (the appellant) was employed by Dungog & District Retirement Living Limited (the respondent) from February 2005 as an assistant in nursing.
On 10 September 2011 the appellant suffered injury to her shoulders when rolling a resident in bed, at the Lara Aged Care Unit, which was operated by the respondent. She underwent surgery to the right shoulder (arthroscopic acromioplasty and excision of the distal clavicle) by Dr Kemp on 3 April 2012. She had injections into the right shoulder and physiotherapy. There were periods off work, and periods on restricted duties. She eventually started a Diploma in Counselling, and commenced a business, Holistic and Healing Centre, performing home visits to people.
The appellant was assessed, at the request of her solicitor, by Dr Higgs, who reported initially on 28 April 2014. Dr Higgs concluded at that time that the appellant had not reached maximum medical improvement. Dr Higgs re-examined the appellant and reported on 1 December 2014. He assessed her as suffering 11 per cent whole person impairment (in respect of the right upper extremity) and 7 per cent whole person impairment (in respect of the left upper extremity), which combined to yield 17 per cent whole person impairment.
A claim for lump sum compensation pursuant to s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act), consistent with Dr Higgs’s assessment, was made by the appellant’s solicitor under cover of a letter dated 23 December 2014. The respondent’s insurer (the insurer), relying on a report of Dr Walsh dated 23 February 2015, advised the appellant’s solicitor by letter dated 17 March 2015 that the permanent impairment…
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- Case
- [2016] NSWWCCPD 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included the interpretation and application of Section 329 of the 1998 Act concerning the referral of matters for further medical assessment or reconsideration, and the nature of interlocutory decisions under Section 352(3A) of the same Act. The court was also required to determine whether the matter at hand constituted a final order capable of being appealed, in light of the precedent set by Licul v Corney and the established principle that interlocutory decisions do not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.
The court examined the statutory framework and relevant case law to conclude that the matter referred for reconsideration had not resulted in a final determination of the dispute. It was noted that a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) does not equate to a determination of a dispute by the Commission, as disputes are determined by the Commission itself. The court found that the issue of a Certificate of Determination, consistent with the MAC, would finally determine the rights of the parties. Applying the principles from Licul, the court determined that the interlocutory decision in question was not a final order disposing of the action between the parties and settling their substantive rights.
The final orders confirmed the Arbitrator’s decision dated 30 March 2016, affirming that the interlocutory decision was not appealable as it did not constitute a final determination of the dispute.
Orders
Orders of the court
The Arbitrator’s decision dated 30 March 2016 is confirmed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 329 of the 1998 Act provides:“329 Referral of matter for further medical assessment or reconsideration(1) A matter referred for assessment under this Part may be referred again on one or more further occasions for assessment in accordance with this Part, but only by:(a)the Registrar as an alternative to an appeal against the assessment as provided by section 327, or(b)a court or the Commission.(1A) A matter referred for assessment under this Part may be referred again on one or more further occasions by the Registrar to the approved medical specialist for reconsideration.(2) A certificate as to a matter referred again for further assessment or reconsideration prevails over any previous certificate as to the matter to the extent of any inconsistency.” Section 352(3A) of the 1998 Act provides:“(3A) There is no appeal under this section against an interlocutory decision except with the leave of the Commission. The Commission is not to grant leave unless of the opinion that determining the appeal is necessary or desirable for the proper and effective determination of the dispute.” In Licul v Corney [1976] HCA 6; 50 ALJR 439 (Licul) Gibbs J at [11] said:“The distinction between final and interlocutory judgments is not always easy to draw and there has been disagreement as to the test by which the question whether a judgment is final or interlocutory is to be determined. One view – which was preferred by the Court of Appeal in Salter Rex and Co. v. Ghosh – is that the test depends on the nature of the application made to the Court. The other view which, since Hall v. Nominal Defendant, should, I think, be regarded as established in Australia, depends on the nature of the order made; the test is: Does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties?” (footnotes omitted) The above passage has been frequently applied in the Commission (see for example P & O Ports Limited v Hawkins [2007] NSWWCCPD 87; 6 DDCR 12 (Hawkins)). Section 326(1) of the 1998 Act provides that a MAC is “conclusively presumed to be correct” in respect of the matters described in the sub-section. This includes “the degree of permanent impairment of the worker as a result of an injury”. However, the Commission is not constituted by an AMS or a MAP: s 368 of the 1998 Act. It follows that a MAC “does not equate to a determination of a dispute by the Commission”: Jopa Pty Ltd t/as Tricia’s Clip-n-Snip v Edenden [2004] NSWWCCPD 50 at [27], Milosavljevic at [49]. Disputes are determined by the Commission: s 293 of the 1998 Act. The dispute between the parties going to the appellant’s entitlement to permanent impairment compensation has not, at this point, been decided. The respondent’s submission is correct; it is the issue of a Certificate of Determination, consistent with the MAC, which will finally determine the rights of the parties. The issue in Licul went to orders for substituted service, and the extension of time for service, of originating process. Gibbs J concluded that the orders in respect of which the appellants sought to appeal were not final orders. In the same case, Barwick CJ (Stephen and Jacobs JJ agreeing) at [20] said: “I am clearly of opinion that the order of the Supreme Court was not a final order disposing of the action between the parties and settling their substantive rights. Their actions remain on foot and are capable of being pursued if a judge of the County Court is minded upon an application duly made to extend the time for service of the original summonses.”