ADH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ADH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 53

Appeal from: ADH17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 2968
File number: VID 1563 of 2018
Judge: O’BRYAN J
Date of judgment: 7 February 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming decision of Minister’s delegate refusing grant of protection visa – principles governing application of s 36(2B)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Tribunal failed to adequately address appellant’s claims regarding Boko Haram – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa), 36(2B)(c)

Cases cited:

BBK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 150

BCX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 164 ALD 313

CSO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 260 FCR 134

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 73 ALD 321

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 163 ALD 1

NABE v Minister for Immigration andMulticultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

SZSPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1245

Date of hearing: 7 August 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Appellant: Esser Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Barrington
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1563 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ADH17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O’BRYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 FEBRUARY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J:

Introduction

  1. On 7 December 2018, the appellant filed an application for an extension of time within which to appeal from the judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia pronounced on 24 October 2018, published as ADH17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 2968. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 8 December 2016 refusing to grant the appellant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (Act). 

  2. The application for an extension of time was supported by an affidavit of Kurt William Esser sworn on 30 November 2018 which exhibited a draft notice of appeal. On 7 May 2019, Moshinsky J granted the extension of time and ordered that the draft notice of appeal…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 53
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of Chad, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which affirmed a delegate's refusal to grant him a protection visa. The appellant had previously claimed protection based on fear of persecution due to his alleged political affiliations and involvement with a rebel group in Chad. The AAT rejected his claims and found that any risk from Boko Haram in Chad was a general population risk, not a personal risk to the appellant. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review, and he appealed to the High Court.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the AAT properly applied the complementary protection criterion in section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the exception in section 36(2B)(c). The Court needed to determine if the AAT erred in finding that the risk from Boko Haram was a general population risk rather than a personal risk to the appellant.

The Court found that the AAT properly applied the law. The AAT accepted that Boko Haram operated in Chad and increased its attacks, but concluded that the appellant would not be specifically targeted. The Court noted that for the exception in section 36(2B)(c) to apply, the risk must be one faced by the population generally rather than the individual personally. The AAT found that the appellant would likely return to the capital where Boko Haram was active, but that the risk to him was no different than the general population risk. Therefore, the AAT correctly found that section 36(2B)(c) applied.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs. The Court found no error in the AAT's reasoning or application of the law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons explained below, I dismiss the appeal.Background The appellant is a male citizen of Chad who first entered Australia as an unauthorised air arrival on 1 July 2012. On 6 August 2012, the appellant applied for a protection visa and set out his claims for protection in a written statement dated 27 July 2012. In that statement, the appellant provided the following background information about his life:My name is [the appellant]. I am 33 years old and a citizen of Chad. I was born in North Chad, in Moso Kori and grew up there. My father is deceased. I have a mother and two unmarried sisters aged 29 and 25 years who live in Chad. I have no formal education and have no education apart from Koran studies between the ages of 6-11. As a child, I worked selling water to help support my family. I then worked as a mechanic assistant and then a personal assistant/driver. I am married with 3 daughters aged 6, 4 and 2.5 years. My wife and children are in Saudi Arabia, which is where I lived before coming to Australia. I moved to Saudi Arabia from Chad in September 2004. I married in Saudi Arabia and my daughters were born there. I have no legal rights to reside in Saudi Arabia. I cannot return to Chad because I fear I will be killed or seriously harmed if I do so. The statement set out the basis for the appellant’s principal claim for protection. It is unnecessary to set out the claim in detail. The Tribunal found that the appellant was not a truthful witness and did not believe the principal claim. That finding was not the subject of the application for review in the Federal Circuit Court and is not raised on this appeal. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have some understanding of the appellant’s principal claim in order to understand the context in which a further claim was made before the Tribunal, which is the subject of this appeal. The following is a summary of the principal claim, drawn from the appellant’s statement dated 27 July 2012:(a)The appellant stated that problems for him started in Chad when, in 1998, he was offered a position of employment in the capital city of Chad, N'Djamena, by a man named Haroun Koso Moussa. The appellant worked for Haroun until 2004 as a driver and assistant. Haroun was a merchant who had previously been a military officer under the former president Hasan Hardi. Haroun’s wife was from a powerful political family which included army generals. Haroun and his family were supporters of the opposition party in Chad, known as the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT). MDJT is a Chadian rebel group that tried to oust the Chadian government and current president Idriss Deby.(b)The appellant stated that he undertook various errands for Haroun as part of his role. One of his regular tasks was to drop off goods to a colonel named Edrishay, who used to work for the government but had left and was now supporting the opposition. The appellant claimed that he transported goods such as ammunition, money, bullets, boxes and a land cruiser to the colonel. In August 2003, the appellant claimed that he was asked by Haroun to deliver some wireless devices (similar to “walkie-talkies”) to the colonel. Upon returning to Haroun’s house, the appellant saw that Haroun’s uncle (who was an army general) was there. Haroun’s uncle told the appellant that members of the intelligence services had discovered the equipment he had taken to the colonel and that Haroun was under arrest. The uncle told the appellant to run away as his life was at risk.(c)The appellant claimed that, some time later, intelligence officers came and arrested him. He claimed that he was imprisoned and tortured for a month.(d)The appellant claimed that, while he was in hospital being treated for a gunshot wound to his leg, a relative helped him to escape and took him to Cameroon. The relative then obtained his passport and helped him get a visa to Saudi Arabia.(e)The appellant stated that he does not have the right to live in Saudi Arabia. He stayed in Saudi Arabia unlawfully after arriving in 2004. (f)The appellant claimed that, in 2009, he found out that his name was on a list of wanted persons published by the Chad Embassy. He claimed that he cannot return to Chad because he has a well-founded fear that he will be killed based on his political opinion and association with Haroun. The appellant claimed that that was why he left Saudi Arabia and travelled to Australia.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 11 January 2017, the appellant filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court. The appellant filed an amended application on 16 October 2017. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant’s application on 24 October 2018.The Tribunal's Decision As noted above, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant was a national of Chad who did not have a right to enter or reside in any other country except Chad (at [54]). The Tribunal concluded that Chad is the appellant’s receiving country for the purposes of the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Tribunal found that the appellant was not a witness of truth. It rejected all of the appellant’s principal claims, including that (at [87]):(a)the appellant was employed by a person in Chad who was an active member of the MDJT;(b)he made deliveries to opposition party members;(c)he was arrested, imprisoned, tortured and forced to sign a confession;(d)he escaped from hospital and fled Chad for the reasons claimed;(e)he is or was of adverse interest to the Chadian intelligence agency or government;(f)one of his friends advised him that he was wanted in Chad by staff at the Embassy in Saudi Arabia; and(g)he overheard a conversation in 2010 and 2011 that he was wanted in Chad. The Tribunal found that the appellant was not interested in politics and did not remain in contact with anyone (including colleagues from the MDJT) due to a shared interest in politics (at [88]). It also did not accept that the appellant would be perceived or be imputed as having a political opinion due to his previous employment in Chad, that he had a political opinion or was politically opposed to the Chadian government, or that he would undertake any political activity upon returning to Chad (at [89]). Accordingly, the Tribunal did not accept there was a real chance that the appellant would be harmed or mistreated due to his real or imputed political opinion, including his purported (but not accepted) involvement with MDJT if he returned to Chad (at [90]-[92]). The Tribunal also rejected various other claims made by the appellant:(a)the Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s claim that there were outstanding court sentences against him in Chad (at [95]);(b)the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant would face a real chance of serious harm on the basis of racism or his tribal membership upon his return to Chad (at [97]); and(c)based on country information, the Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s claim that returnees to Chad, including failed asylum seekers from Western countries, were targeted, imprisoned or “disappeared” upon their return to Chad (at [98]-[99]). The Tribunal set out the appellant’s claims concerning Boko Haram made in his statutory declaration dated 29 July 2016 and the submission dated 22 September 2016 (at [31]) and made the following findings:100. During the hearing the Tribunal also spoke to the applicant about his fears of being harmed by Boko Haram. The Tribunal noted the applicant had declared his sister was killed by Boko Haram and on questioning the applicant told the Tribunal Boko Haram is targeting all people and while they do not know the applicant, they are targeting everyone.101. The Tribunal notes the country information indicates Boko Haram does operate in Chad and has stepped up attacks in the capital. Boko Haram killed more than 200 civilians during the year and looted and destroyed properties and public facilities. While the Tribunal has significant concerns about the applicant’s credibility, in light of the country information the Tribunal is prepared to accept the applicant’s sister was killed by Boko Haram. The Tribunal notes the applicant’s oral evidence when questioned if Boko Haram would target the applicant specifically, the applicant told the Tribunal they are targeting everyone.102. While the Tribunal accepts Boko Haram attacks have increased in Chad, on the information before it, the Tribunal does not accept the applicant would be specifically targeted by Boko Haram and the Tribunal does not accept the attacks from Boko Haram are aimed at the applicant specifically or involve systemic and discriminatory conduct as required by s.91R(1)(c).…115. While the Tribunal accepts Boko Haram attacks have increased in Chad, on the information before it, the Tribunal does not accept Boko Haram will specifically target the applicant and the Tribunal considers the risk of harm from Boko Haram is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the applicant personally. Therefore, in accordance with s.36(2B)(c) the risk is taken not to be a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm in Chad.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Second, and in any event, the Tribunal’s reasons disclose an acceptance by the Tribunal that the applicant was likely to return to the capital (at [101]), but the Tribunal found that “Boko Haram attacks have increased in Chad” and did not accept that Boko Haram would specifically target the appellant. On that basis, the Tribunal concluded that the risk of harm from Boko Haram was one faced by the population of the country generally and was not faced by the appellant personally, either by dint of his residency in N’Djamena or for any other reason. In other words, the Tribunal’s findings were founded on an understanding that the appellant would likely return to the capital, but that the relative risk to the appellant in the capital was no different to that experienced by the general population of Chad.Consideration The appeal concerns the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and the meaning and application of s 36(2B)(c). Section 36(2)(aa) provides as follows:(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:…(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm. Section 36(2B) provides as follows:(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non-citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:(a) it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or(b) the non-citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or(c)the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non-citizen personally. Section 36(2B)(c) has been considered in a number of decisions of this Court, including particularly SZSPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1245 (SZSPT), BBK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 150 (BBK15) and BCX16. In SZSPT, Rares J rejected an argument that the complementary protection criterion was satisfied in circumstances where the appellant might face punishment including imprisonment for leaving Sri Lanka illegally in contravention of Sri Lanka’s criminal law. His Honour concluded that the exception in s 36(2B)(c) was engaged because the relevant criminal law applied to the population of Sri Lanka generally. His Honour said (at [11]):In my opinion, the natural and ordinary meaning of the exception in s 36(2B)(c) is that, if the Minister, or decision-maker, was satisfied that the risk was faced by the population of the country generally, as opposed to the individual claiming complementary protection based on his or her individual exposure to that risk, the provisions of s 36(2)(aa) were deemed not to be engaged.