FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ADH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 53
Appeal from: ADH17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 2968 File number: VID 1563 of 2018 Judge: O’BRYAN J Date of judgment: 7 February 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming decision of Minister’s delegate refusing grant of protection visa – principles governing application of s 36(2B)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Tribunal failed to adequately address appellant’s claims regarding Boko Haram – appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa), 36(2B)(c)
Cases cited: BBK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 150
BCX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 164 ALD 313
CSO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 260 FCR 134
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 73 ALD 321
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 163 ALD 1
NABE v Minister for Immigration andMulticultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZSPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1245
Date of hearing: 7 August 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Appellant: Esser Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Barrington Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
VID 1563 of 2018 BETWEEN: ADH17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O’BRYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 FEBRUARY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’BRYAN J:
Introduction
On 7 December 2018, the appellant filed an application for an extension of time within which to appeal from the judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia pronounced on 24 October 2018, published as ADH17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 2968. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 8 December 2016 refusing to grant the appellant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (Act).
The application for an extension of time was supported by an affidavit of Kurt William Esser sworn on 30 November 2018 which exhibited a draft notice of appeal. On 7 May 2019, Moshinsky J granted the extension of time and ordered that the draft notice of appeal…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read ADH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2020] FCA 53
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether the AAT properly applied the complementary protection criterion in section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the exception in section 36(2B)(c). The Court needed to determine if the AAT erred in finding that the risk from Boko Haram was a general population risk rather than a personal risk to the appellant.
The Court found that the AAT properly applied the law. The AAT accepted that Boko Haram operated in Chad and increased its attacks, but concluded that the appellant would not be specifically targeted. The Court noted that for the exception in section 36(2B)(c) to apply, the risk must be one faced by the population generally rather than the individual personally. The AAT found that the appellant would likely return to the capital where Boko Haram was active, but that the risk to him was no different than the general population risk. Therefore, the AAT correctly found that section 36(2B)(c) applied.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs. The Court found no error in the AAT's reasoning or application of the law.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Second, and in any event, the Tribunal’s reasons disclose an acceptance by the Tribunal that the applicant was likely to return to the capital (at [101]), but the Tribunal found that “Boko Haram attacks have increased in Chad” and did not accept that Boko Haram would specifically target the appellant. On that basis, the Tribunal concluded that the risk of harm from Boko Haram was one faced by the population of the country generally and was not faced by the appellant personally, either by dint of his residency in N’Djamena or for any other reason. In other words, the Tribunal’s findings were founded on an understanding that the appellant would likely return to the capital, but that the relative risk to the appellant in the capital was no different to that experienced by the general population of Chad.Consideration The appeal concerns the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and the meaning and application of s 36(2B)(c). Section 36(2)(aa) provides as follows:(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:…(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm. Section 36(2B) provides as follows:(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non-citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:(a) it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or(b) the non-citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or(c)the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non-citizen personally. Section 36(2B)(c) has been considered in a number of decisions of this Court, including particularly SZSPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1245 (SZSPT), BBK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 150 (BBK15) and BCX16. In SZSPT, Rares J rejected an argument that the complementary protection criterion was satisfied in circumstances where the appellant might face punishment including imprisonment for leaving Sri Lanka illegally in contravention of Sri Lanka’s criminal law. His Honour concluded that the exception in s 36(2B)(c) was engaged because the relevant criminal law applied to the population of Sri Lanka generally. His Honour said (at [11]):In my opinion, the natural and ordinary meaning of the exception in s 36(2B)(c) is that, if the Minister, or decision-maker, was satisfied that the risk was faced by the population of the country generally, as opposed to the individual claiming complementary protection based on his or her individual exposure to that risk, the provisions of s 36(2)(aa) were deemed not to be engaged.