Adams v The Queen - [2008] HCATrans 12

[2008] HCATrans 012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M121 of 2007

B e t w e e n -
STEVEN ADAMS
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 1 FEBRUARY 2008, AT 10.03 AM

MR L.C. CARTER: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.B. BOYCE, for the appellant. (instructed by Leanne Warren & Associates)

MS W.J. ABRAHAM, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.R. DAVIS, for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth))

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Carter.

MR CARTER: Your Honour, it is our submission that the federal legislature in adopting a penalty regime for certain drug offences that is linked to quantities has not sought to deny sentencing courts the ability to take judicial notice of or to receive evidence of the harms caused by prohibited drugs. Our contention is that the court below in applying the reasoning in R v Pidoto and O’Dea, the earlier decision of the court below relating to the relevant State legislation, has fallen into error.

Ultimately, the appellant should be resentenced on the basis that the narcotic he was found in possession of on 9 January 2004, MDMA, or ecstasy, is less harmful to users and to society than heroin. The sentencing judge proceeded to the contrary equating ecstasy with heroin. Your Honours will have seen the relevant remarks extracted in the reasons of his Honour Justice Vincent in the court below at page 93 of the appeal book, paragraph 15. The court below held that this approach in light of the decision in Pidoto was “unassailable”, and I refer to page 93 of the appeal book at paragraph 16.

Justice Vincent, however, in his reasons, the other members of the court agreed, did accept that the correctness of his Honour’s view was “debatable” - appeal book 95, paragraph 21 - and it appears at least potentially erroneous, and I refer to appeal book 95 at paragraph 21. As a result of the court below holding that Pidoto reasoning applied mutatis mutandis to the Customs Act, or the Act for short, the appellant’s complaint of error has yet to be properly determined.

Now, as your Honours are aware the reasoning in Pidoto and in the court below hinges on the approach to the governing statutory provisions. May I shortly identify them. The relevant provisions of the Customs Act at the time of this offence have been provided in a folder for the Court where we acknowledge the assistance of the Commonwealth I should say. The relevant offence provision 233B(1)(c) is contained behind tab 1. The relevant penalty provision is contained behind tab 3 and that being section 235(2)(a) and (c) of the Act providing that in the case of an offence committed…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Adams v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Adams v The Queen [2008] HCATrans 12
Case: [2008] HCATrans 12
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Adams appealed his conviction for murder in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The central issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant, specifically statements made by him to police and a search of his property. The High Court of Australia was required to determine whether the evidence was obtained in contravention of the appellant's rights and, if so, whether it should have been excluded from the trial.

The High Court considered the application of the common law exclusionary rule and the provisions of the *Criminal Code* (Qld) regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained improperly or in contravention of a person's rights. Specifically, the Court had to assess whether the police conduct in obtaining the statements and conducting the search was unlawful or improper, and if so, whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. The Court also examined the scope of the discretion to exclude evidence in such circumstances.

The Court reasoned that the common law exclusionary rule, which allows for the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence, is a significant safeguard against abuses of power by law enforcement. It applied a balancing exercise, weighing the seriousness of the impropriety against the importance of the evidence to the prosecution's case. The Court ultimately found that the evidence in question had been obtained in circumstances that warranted its exclusion, as the prejudicial effect of admitting it outweighed its probative value, particularly in light of the impropriety of its acquisition. The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

Orders