SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
ABL NOMINEES PTY LTD & ANOR v MCROBERT; MCROBERT v ABL NOMINEES PTY LTD & ANOR
[2014] SASC 49
Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Nicholson
11 April 2014
PROCEDURE - COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY - COURTS - CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF DIFFERENT COURTS - TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER CROSS-VESTING LEGISLATION - WHERE APPROPRIATE AND IN INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
The defendant to loan recovery proceedings sought an order for the transfer of those proceedings to the Supreme Court of Western Australia pursuant to s5(2) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (SA).
Whether it is in the interests of justice for the proceedings to be heard and determined by the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
Held (dismissing the application): it is not in the interests of justice for the proceedings to be heard in Western Australia as opposed to South Australia.
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (SA) s5, referred to.
Cini v Pets Paradise Franchising (SA) Pty Ltd & Ors (2008) 102 SASR 177; Garra Water Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ourback Yard Nursery & Garra [2010] SASC 326; Kranenberg v AFT Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd [2012] SASC 98; Clarke & Ors v ABL Nominees Pty Ltd & Anor [2014] SASC 15; BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400, considered.
ABL NOMINEES PTY LTD & ANOR v MCROBERT; MCROBERT v ABL NOMINEES PTY LTD & ANOR
[2014] SASC 49CIVIL
NICHOLSON J.
Introduction
Shaun McRobert (“the applicant”) is the defendant to loan recovery proceedings originally instituted in the District Court and recently transferred into this Court. He has brought an application for an order that the loan recovery proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court of Western Australia, pursuant to s5(2) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (SA) (“the Act”). The first and second plaintiffs in the loan recovery proceedings are ABL Nominees Pty Ltd (“ABL”) and Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd (“BABL”). They are the respondents to Mr McRobert’s cross-vesting application.
The applicant invested in the Great Southern Beef Cattle Project which was one of a number of managed investment schemes within the Great Southern Plantation Project. The Great Southern Beef Cattle Project involved leasing droves of cattle on stations across Australia. Apart from any direct commercial benefits hoped for, the investment was seen as offering investors certain tax advantages. The scheme failed, causing investment losses for the various participants including the applicant.
The applicant entered into a loan agreement with ABL in March 2007 pursuant to which ABL provided finance to enable the applicant to participate in the Great Southern Beef Cattle Project. ABL’s rights under the loan agreement were later assigned to BABL and subsequently assigned back to ABL. ABL is the party who claims an entitlement to recover the loan. BABL is also a party, in essence, to ensure that any difficulties that might arise with respect to the assignments might be resolved as part of this litigation.
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- Case
- [2014] SASC 49
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the applicant had established that it was in the interests of justice to transfer the proceedings to another jurisdiction, and whether the applicant had discharged the evidential burden to demonstrate the basis for such a transfer. The court also considered the principle that a plaintiff generally has the right to choose its forum, and the factors that might influence a decision to transfer proceedings under the cross-vesting legislation.
The court held that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it was in the interests of justice to transfer the proceedings. The judge noted that the respondents had chosen South Australia for proper reasons related to administrative convenience and costs, and that the applicant had not presented compelling reasons to suggest that the proceedings should be moved to Western Australia. The court further emphasised that the applicant had an evidential burden to establish the basis for a transfer, and that the limited evidence provided did not support the application.
As a result, the application to transfer the proceedings was dismissed. The court concluded that the interests of justice were best served by allowing the proceedings to remain in South Australia, given the factors presented by the parties and the lack of compelling evidence to support a transfer.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NICHOLSON J
The respondents, both in their written submissions and through counsel, raised a number of matters in support of their opposition to the application. I do not need to set these out in any detail. I have drawn on these submissions, to some extent, in the discussion to this point. Consideration and resolution of the application Ultimately, this litigation as presently constituted and the evidence relied on by the applicant in support of his application for transfer, do not give rise to any considerations that, alone or in combination, plainly dictate that one forum should be preferable to the other. I start with the proposition that, subject to the obligation under s5 of the Act to order otherwise where it is in the interests of justice,[5] a plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to choose its forum. I am satisfied that the respondents in this case have chosen South Australia for proper reasons to do with administrative convenience and costs. The question arises as to whether the applicant has pointed to anything to suggest that it is in the interests of justice that the proceedings be transferred to and determined by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. [5] See the fifth dot point taken from the judgment of Bleby J in Cini v Pets Paradise quoted earlier. On my review of the parties’ affidavit evidence and their submissions it seems to me that they have locked horns not on the question of what is in the interests of justice, but on a comparison of the respective disparities in inconvenience and expense for the parties depending on the choice of forum. Whilst this is a consideration relevant to the interests of justice question, I have no information, by affidavit or otherwise, as to the likely extent to which one party might be put to more inconvenience and expense than the other. In Garra Water Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ourback Yard Nursery Pty Ltd & Garra[6] White J observed as follows:The sixth principle summarised by Bleby J in Cini v Pets Paradise Franchising (SA) Pty Ltd is that it is inappropriate to speak of an applicant for an order for transfer having a burden of persuasion analogous to onus of proof. Different views on this topic have been expressed in the Supreme Court of New South Wales: compare Bankinvest Letters A-G v Seabrook & Others and James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Barry. However, in BHP Billiton v Schultz Gummow J, with whom Hayne J agreed, considered that:Section 5(7) indicates that it is inapt to speak of the applicant for an order for transfer as bearing a burden of persuasion analogous to an onus of proof. However, it would be inaccurate to describe the decision upon a transfer application as administrative, by some analogy to the orders made with no lis inter partes in the administration of assets or of trust by courts of equity.The approach outlined by Gummow J has been adopted in this Court by Bleby J, as noted above, and subsequently by Gray J. I consider it appropriate to take the same view. However, I do not understand this to mean that an applicant for an order does not carry an evidential onus and, in particular, to establish the basis upon which a court may make an assessment of where the interests of justice lie. That is a matter of some significance on the present application bearing in mind both its timing and the limited evidence adduced by the defendants to support it.[6] [2010] SASC 326 at [12] (citations omitted).