ABG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ABG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 369

Appeal from: ABG16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2146
File number: NSD 1709 of 2017
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 19 March 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal ignored corroborating evidence in a newspaper article – whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider the appellant’s claim that he was a member of a social group of people who had witnessed corruption – whether the decision of the Tribunal was affected by procedural fairness in the form of apprehended bias – whether the primary judge erred by failing to give adequate reasons, giving rise to procedural unfairness or a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction – Held:  appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa)
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 593

COZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 46

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP [2010] FCAFC 50; 184 FCR 485

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16; 309 ALR 67

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323

Re Alley; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation (1985) 64 ALR 6

SZKLO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 735; 247 ALR 582

Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44; 167 CLR 568

Date of hearing: 19 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms GA Costello
Solicitor for the Applicant: Camatta Lempens Pty Ltd Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr GJ Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1709 of 2017
BETWEEN:

ABG16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 MARCH 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant’s interlocutory application filed 16 February 2018 is granted and the appellant has leave to rely on the transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing.

2.Leave is granted to the appellant to rely on grounds 1, 2 and 4 of his amended notice of appeal.

3.Leave to rely on ground 3 of his amended notice of appeal is refused.

4.The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

  1. This appeal is from the judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given and made on 6 September 2017, which dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review to that Court, with costs.

  2. By its…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 369
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, ABG16, appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The appeal concerned the Tribunal's assessment of ABG16's application for a visa, with particular focus on whether the Tribunal properly considered certain evidence and claims made by the appellant.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal erred in failing to find that it ignored corroborating evidence in a newspaper article, whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider the appellant’s claim that he was a member of a social group of people who had witnessed corruption, and whether the decision of the Tribunal was affected by procedural fairness in the form of apprehended bias. Additionally, the court considered whether the primary judge erred by failing to give adequate reasons, which would give rise to procedural unfairness or a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.

The court held that the appeal should be dismissed. Regarding the evidence, the court admitted the transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing on a final basis. The court found that the Tribunal had not made a jurisdictional error by not referring to the newspaper article as it was not material to the issue of the appellant's credibility. The primary judge’s reasons were deemed adequate, and the court did not find any procedural unfairness or constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The court granted leave for the appellant to rely on grounds 1, 2, and 4 of his amended notice of appeal but refused leave to rely on ground 3. The interlocutory application to admit the transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing was also granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant’s interlocutory application filed 16 February 2018 is granted and the appellant has leave to rely on the transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing.

2. Leave is granted to the appellant to rely on grounds 1, 2 and 4 of his amended notice of appeal.

3. Leave to rely on ground 3 of his amended notice of appeal is refused.

4. The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In support, primarily, of ground 3, the appellant, by interlocutory application filed on 16 February 2018, sought to rely on the transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing which was not adduced in the hearing before the primary judge. It was submitted that the appellant was largely self-represented below, was unaware of the bias argument available to him below, or that such an argument would require evidence by way of transcript of the Tribunal hearing.The evidence I admitted provisionally the affidavit of Emily Rutherford affirmed 15 February 2018, exhibiting the transcript of the Tribunal hearing, which was not adduced in the proceeding below. I admit it on a final basis as counsel for the appellant relied on it in support of ground 1, in respect of which the appellant did not need leave to appeal. I note that counsel for the appellant said that a sound recording of the Tribunal hearing was also available but I note that I have not listened to it.The parties’ submissions In relation to the appellant’s proposed amended notice of appeal, the first respondent, the Minister, submitted that, as conceded by the appellant, he required leave to advance grounds not raised in the Federal Circuit Court in which he contended that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error. The appellant submitted that ground 1 was in substance the subject of ground 1 of the application before the Federal Circuit Court. The appellant submitted that although grounds 2 and 3 were not argued below, leave to argue those grounds should be granted because it was expedient in the interests of justice to do so. The appellant was largely unrepresented below. The points had merit, it was submitted, and there was no real prejudice to the respondents in permitting the arguments to be agitated. Ground 4 arose logically for the first time on appeal.Ground 1 The appellant submitted that the Tribunal ignored corroborating evidence in a newspaper article and thereby failed to perform its statutory function by not properly considering an integer of the appellant’s claim that he and his father were BNP members. The appellant referred to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP [2010] FCAFC 50; 184 FCR 485 at [36] and [38] for the proposition that although it was open to the Tribunal to assess the credit of a visa applicant and then, in light of that assessment, consider what weight should be given to a corroborative witness statement, that did not mean that any evidence of corroboration could be rejected: it would depend on the nature, content and quality of the corroborative evidence and the Tribunal would fall into jurisdictional error if, after making an adverse credibility finding, it simply refused to consider the corroborative evidence. The appellant referred also to Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16; 309 ALR 67 at [34] in relation to a Tribunal not referring to a particular matter or particular evidence. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal ignored the newspaper article and it was not referred to anywhere in the Tribunal’s reasons. The Tribunal’s methodology was to detail the evidence the Tribunal reviewed specifically, mostly using bold underlining to refer to each piece of documentary evidence. The Tribunal’s reasons at [27]-[46] rehearsed what happened at the hearing but omitted the appellant’s submissions about the newspaper article.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ground 4 is not made out.Conclusion and orders Although leave may be unnecessary in relation to ground 1 since in substance it was the ground raised before the primary judge, the appellant should have leave to rely on grounds 1, 2 and 4 of his amended notice of appeal. As I have said, ground 2 is of sufficient substance that it is in the interests of justice to grant leave, there being no prejudice claimed by the Minister if leave were granted. Ground 4 was not available before the primary judge as it concerns a claimed error by the primary judge to give adequate reasons for his decision. As I have said at [47] above, leave is refused to rely on ground 3. The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that it should also be taken into account that the reasons for judgment of the primary judge were given ex tempore. The primary judge’s reasons, whilst brief, were adequate. They explained the basis of the primary judge’s reasoning in rejecting the appellant’s contention that the Tribunal failed to take into account the newspaper article. The reasoning was that, first, the Tribunal had expressly made reference to the post-hearing submission attaching the article and, secondly, that it was not apparent how the newspaper article could in any way have overcome the adverse credibility findings, or verify the authenticity of the BNP certificates. The findings were open to the primary judge. They did not overlook or fail to address or indicate any misapprehension in respect of any argument that was advanced to the Court by the appellant. The reference by the primary judge to the Tribunal setting out the appellant’s “claims and evidence” without detailing those claims was not demonstrative of a failure by the primary judge to exercise the Court’s jurisdiction. The primary judge did not overlook or omit to mention the appellant’s social group claim and the Tribunal’s lack of consideration of the claim. The circumstances were that no argument was put to the primary judge by the appellant that the Tribunal had failed to consider a claim advanced by him.ConsiderationGround 1 The newspaper article was put forward to the Tribunal as confirming the identity of the person whose name appeared on each of the BNP certificates by showing that the name on each of the certificates was the name of the person referred to in the newspaper article as having been arrested and of being president of the Dupchanchia BNP. In my opinion, it was not necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction for the Tribunal to refer to the newspaper article in reaching its conclusion, at [51], that the certificates were not genuine. The newspaper article was insufficiently material. It could do no more than show that the name on each of the certificates coincided with the name in the newspaper article of the person who had been arrested, some two and a half years later, as president of a unit of the BNP. The identity of Mr Hamid was not significant and neither was the balance of the newspaper article referring to his arrest and to the allegations against him. It had too slight a bearing on the issue of the Tribunal’s findings that the appellant was not a credible witness. I would not infer that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the newspaper article and thereby made a jurisdictional error. In circumstances where the Tribunal, at [29], referred to other documents provided with the post-hearing submission of 12 November 2015, I would infer that the Tribunal did not regard the newspaper article as material. I do not accept the submission at [15] above, put on behalf of the appellant, that anything is to be derived from the format of the Tribunal’s reasons. There was no uniform practice of underlining or putting in bold font documents that had been taken into account, as shown by [29] of the Tribunal’s reasons which referred to the post-hearing submission.