AAY16 v Minister for Immigration
[2019] FCCA 2593
•13 September 2019
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AAY16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 2593 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection (Class XA) visa – whether the Tribunal failed to address the proper question – whether the Tribunal failed to consider claims – whether the Tribunal failed to apply or consider the Tribunal’s guidelines – whether the Tribunal acted unreasonably or irrationally – no jurisdictional error found – Application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958, ss.36(2), 499 Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2 |
| Cases cited: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] FCAFC 146 SZUZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 498 |
| Applicant: | AAY16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File number | MLG 21 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Blake |
| Hearing date: | 5 September 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 5 September 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 13 September 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Sorensen |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Visatec Legal |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Hosking |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz Lawyers |
ORDERS
Pursuant to section 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958, the time for the Applicant to file an application in respect of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 30 November 2015 be extended to 6 January 2016.
The Application filed on 6 January 2016 and amended on 9 May 2017 be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $7,467.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 21 of 2016
| AAY16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
And
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) on 30 November 2015. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the Applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (‘visa’).
For the reasons set out below, I have decided to dismiss the application for review of the Tribunal’s decision.
Background
The Applicant claims to be a stateless Faili Kurd born in Iran. The Applicant arrived in Australia on 2 June 2012. He applied for the visa on 11 December 2012. The Applicant provided a statement of claims with his application and attended an interview with a delegate of the Minister on 15 November 2013.
The Applicant advanced a number of claims in support of his application for the visa. Among other things, he claimed that in 2011, he was stopped by the Basij on his way to work. The Basij suspected that the Applicant was an Afghan and took him to a police station. His family were later able to secure his release. The Applicant also claimed that he escaped arrest on three occasions by running away. He also claimed that he is unable to obtain any documents permitting him to work and study, he cannot open a cheque account or obtain a drivers licence, and he cannot buy a home or a car. The Applicant claimed that he would face harm on account of his Kurdish race, imputed political opinions and membership of a particular social group consisting of Faili Kurds and stateless persons.
On 31 March 2014, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa.
The Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 2 April 2014.
On 30 November 2015, the Applicant attended a hearing at the Tribunal with the assistance of an interpreter. Later that day, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the Applicant the visa.
The Applicant applied to this Court on 6 January 2016. He sought a review of the Tribunal’s decision. He also sought to extend the time in which to file the application in this Court.
On 9 May 2017, the Applicant filed an amended Application (‘Application’) and written submissions. On 30 May 2017, the Minister filed written submissions.
When the matter came on for hearing before me, the Applicant sought leave to file the Application out of time. This was not opposed by the Minister. Accordingly the matter proceeded to final hearing on the substantive application before the Court.
At the hearing, both parties were represented and relied on the written submissions filed with the Court.
The Application for Review
Ground 1
Ground 1 in the Application is as follows:
‘The Tribunal failed to address the question which the Tribunal was actually required to address; i.e. whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution and instead addressing the question of alleged credibility of his account of the status and history of his father and stepmother's relationship.’
The argument of the Applicant in respect of this ground is set out at paragraph [10] of his written submission. It is as follows:
‘The Applicant contends the AAT failed to address [the] correct question of whether he had [a] well-founded fear of persecution and instead addressed the question of alleged credibility of his account of his father and step-mother's relationship. Given [the] lack of evidence as to the Applicant's Father's status in Iran ( See Paragraph 21 of AAT's Decision) and his Step-Mother's apparent citizenship of Iran, matters addressed in Paragraph 26, regarding status of his half-siblings:
• Are not [an] adequate basis for rejecting the Applicant's claims based on allegations of lack of access to work, education and other services and related harassment, as matters addressed by the AAT reveal nothing about how the Applicant's half-siblings might comparatively have been treated in this regard by virtue of their status as citizens, or their mother's
• Did in fact form the basis for rejecting the Applicant's claims of lack of access to work, education and other services and related harassment.’
The Applicant’s argument concerning the Tribunal’s treatment of the ‘account of his father and stepmother’s relationship’ is a feature that runs through grounds 1, 2 and 4 of the Application. In an attempt to properly understand the submission that was being put, I asked the Applicant’s Counsel whether what was being submitted was at least, in part, that the Tribunal over emphasised the account of the relationship between the Applicant’s father and his stepmother when considering the application for the visa. The Applicant’s Counsel agreed with that characterisation.
The first aspect of this ground of review is that the Tribunal failed to address the question that it was required to address. That is, whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution, or whether there are substantial grounds for believing the Applicant is at real risk of, or will suffer significant harm, having regard to the criteria set out in section 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (‘Act’).
To address this criticism of the Tribunal, it is necessary to consider at some length the Tribunal’s reasons and the way it went about the task before it. A review of the Tribunal’s reasons discloses the following:
a)At paragraphs [5] to [18], the Tribunal set out the relevant law and regulations that it was required to apply in assessing the criteria required under section 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (‘Regulations’).
b)At paragraphs [19] to [25], the Tribunal set out the Applicant’s claims for protection. Notably, paragraph [25] of the Tribunal’s reasons identified the Applicant’s claims as follows:
‘It was submitted that the applicant would face harm on account of his Kurdish race, imputed political opinions (opposition to the Iranian government, support for separatist movements) and membership of particular social groups consisting of Faili Kurds and stateless persons.’
c)From paragraphs [26] to [33], the Tribunal considered at some length the Applicant’s claim that he was a stateless Faili Kurd. The Tribunal’s conclusions in relation to these claims are set out in paragraphs [31] to [33]. At paragraph [31], the Tribunal finds that ‘Iran is his country of nationality for the purposes of the Convention and his receiving country for the purposes of s.5(1) and s. 36(2)(aa) of the Act’. At paragraph [32] the Tribunal does not ‘accept that the applicant is a member of particular social groups consisting of “stateless persons” or “stateless Faili Kurds”’, and finds that ‘he does not face a real chance of persecution’. In paragraph [33], the Tribunal finds that ‘there are not substantial grounds for believing… that there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm’ on being removed from Australia to Iran.
d)From paragraphs [34] to [36], the Tribunal considered the Applicant’s claim for protection on the basis that he would be a failed asylum seeker. In respect of this claim, the Tribunal gives greater weight to the ‘authoritative information from DFAT’ in concluding at paragraph [35] that the Applicant ‘does not face a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future on account of his membership of a particular group of “failed asylum seekers”’. Further, at paragraph [36] the Tribunal finds ‘that there are not substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iran that there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm on this basis’.
e)At paragraphs [37] to [39], the Tribunal considered the Applicant’s claims that he faced a risk of persecution on account of his Kurdish race, his imputed political opinions or his membership of a particular social group being Faili Kurds. Again, having considered the country information from DFAT and giving it greater weight, the Tribunal concludes at paragraph [38] that the Applicant ‘does not face a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future on account of his Kurdish race, imputed political opinions (opposition to the Iranian government or support for separatist movements) or membership of a particular social group consisting of Faili Kurds’. The Tribunal also concludes at paragraph [39] that there are ‘are not substantial grounds for believing… there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm on these bases’ if the Applicant were removed from Australia and returned to Iran.
f)At paragraphs [40] to [41], the Tribunal cumulatively considered all of the Applicant’s circumstances in considering whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution, or whether there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm. In respect of this cumulative assessment, at paragraph [40] the Tribunal found that the Applicant ‘does not face a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future for any reason (Convention or non-Convention related). His fear of persecution is not well-founded’. Further, at paragraph [41] the Tribunal found that ‘there are not substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iran that there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm’.
g)Finally at paragraphs [42] to [45], the Tribunal recorded its specific conclusions as to whether the Applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention, and also whether the Applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. In each case, the Tribunal concluded that the Applicant did not satisfy the criterion in section 36(2) of the Act. The relevant paragraphs being paragraphs [42] to [43] from the Tribunal’s reasons are below:
‘42. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).
43. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).’
When the paragraphs above from the Tribunal’s reasons are considered, they disclose the following. First, the Applicant’s claims were clearly set out and recognised by the Tribunal. Second, each of those claims was comprehensively dealt with. The Tribunal carefully went through each claim, assessed the evidence before it, and made findings on the basis of that evidence. In my view, it is apparent that the Tribunal did address itself to the relevant questions that it was required to consider. It was not diverted from its primary task.
The above is not the end of the matter however, because built into this ground of review is the suggestion that the Tribunal was somehow diverted from its primary task by focusing on, or overemphasising, in its reasons, the Applicant’s account of the relationship between the Applicant’s father and the Applicant’s stepmother.
This aspect of the Applicant’s complaint derives from paragraph [26] of the Tribunal’s reasons. Paragraph [26] of the Tribunal’s reasons is as follows:
‘I have considered carefully the applicant's claims; however I do not consider him to be a credible witness. I do so for the following reasons:
• In his oral evidence at the hearing and in his protection visa application, the applicant stated that his half-brother (born 1995) and half-sister (born 2003) are Iranian citizens. However, country information before the Tribunal shows that a child born to an Iranian father acquires citizenship at birth and that a constitutional amendment passed in September 2006 provides that children who are the result of marriage between foreign men and Iran women, who are born in Iran or are born in Iran within one year from the date of the ratification of this law, will be able to apply for Iranian citizenship when they reach the full age of 18. The applicant's half-sister is under the age of 18 years and the applicant's half-brother was under the age of 18 years when the applicant applied for the protection visa. The applicant commented that he did not have citizenship but the fact that both his half-siblings are and were Iranian citizens strongly indicates that they acquired their citizenship through the applicant's father and that the applicant has Iranian citizenship too.
• At his interview with the delegate, the applicant stated that his father and step-mother were married and that his father's name appeared on his step-mother's shenasnameh. Country information before the Tribunal is that unregistered Faili Kurds can enter into religious marriages but they would not be able to record the marriage officially and that the shenasnameh records marriages. The applicant was given the opportunity to comment or respond to the information under s.424AA of the Act and he commented that he did not have any documentation and suffered a lot because of it. I have considered his response, however his evidence at the interview in conjunction with the country information, strongly indicates that his father is not undocumented and that therefore the applicant is not as well. Whilst the applicant has said that it was his opinion that his step-mother had contacts in the government, given my concerns about his overall credibility I have given this claim little weight.
• The applicant gave substantially inconsistent information on important matters. For example, he told the delegate that his father and step-mother were married and that his father's name appeared on his step-mother's shenasnameh. However, at the Tribunal hearing, he stated that he did not know if they were married and that he did not know if his father was listed on the shenasnameh. The applicant commented that both his step-mother and half-siblings have citizenship, but I do not consider this satisfactorily or at all explains the applicant's significantly inconsistent evidence and I consider this substantially detracts from his credibility.
• The applicant told the Tribunal that he did not know if the persons who arrested him were Basij but some were casual and some were military. When I put to him that he had stated in his statutory declaration that they were Basij, he stated that some of them were Basij. I consider the applicant's evidence on the identity of those who he claims arrested him to be substantially inconsistent, noting that he changed his evidence at the hearing from stating that he did not know if they were Basij to stating that some of them were. At the hearing, the applicant claimed that on 2-3 occasions, he was forced to run away from the authorities and on 2-3 occasions he had to leave his trolley behind. However, in his statutory declaration he stated that he had escaped on three occasions and that on one occasion he left his cart behind. Asked to comment on this inconsistency at the hearing, he stated that it was 2-3 times; however I consider this does not address the inconsistency in his evidence and I find that his inconsistent evidence further detracts from his credibility.’ (citations omitted)
In my view, this aspect of the Applicant’s grounds of review (being the alleged focus on the relationship between the Applicant’s father and stepmother) cannot be made out (be it under this ground of review, or grounds two and four of the grounds of review). I have come to this view for the following reasons.
First, a review of paragraph [26] of the Tribunal’s reasons discloses that the discussion of the relationship and its consequences occurs in a context where the Tribunal is assessing the credibility of the Applicant. The reference to the relationship between the father and the stepmother occurs in that context.
Second, in terms of its findings in relation to the Applicant’s credibility, the reference to the relationship between the father and the stepmother is only one reason why the Tribunal finds the Applicant not to be a credible witness. For example, one of the stated reasons given by the Tribunal as to why the Applicant was not credible was that the evidence he gave to the Tribunal was inconsistent, on important matters, with evidence that he had given during the course of the visa application. Another reason for rejecting the Applicant’s claims and making an adverse finding as to his credibility was that the country information before the Tribunal was inconsistent with the Applicant’s claims. These were important matters of significance going directly to an assessment of the Applicant’s credibility. It is not correct to minimise the importance of these matters in respect of assessments of the Applicant’s credibility.
Third, to the extent this ground takes issue with the weight accorded to particular pieces of evidence assessed by the Tribunal, the ground should not be entertained. The Minister submitted, and I accept, that the question of how much weight is to be placed on particular evidence is a matter for the Tribunal. The Court interfering with that would give rise to what is, in effect, an impermissible merits review. I do not propose to go down that path.
Finally, the discussion at paragraph [26] of the Tribunal’s reasons dealt with the credibility of the Applicant, and ultimately to the conclusion that the Applicant was not a stateless Faili Kurd. Once the Tribunal reached that conclusion, many of the Applicant’s other claims (including claims that he had been stopped by the Basij, that he could not obtain Iranian citizenship, that he was unable to obtain medical services, and that he was unable to work or study, etc.) fell away. Any complaint about a failure by the Tribunal to entertain aspects of particular claims needs to be seen in that context.
For all of the reasons set out above, I dismiss ground one of the grounds of review.
Ground 2
Ground 2 in the Application is as follows:
‘The Tribunal failed to consider the Applicant's claims in support of his application for a Protection Visa, by instead focusing only on the detail of his account of the status and history of his father and step-mother's relationship.’
The argument of the Applicant in respect of this ground is summarised at paragraph [14] of his written submissions and is as follows:
‘In addressing only the detail of the Applicant's account of the status and history of his father and step-mother's relationship, the AAT also failed to consider his claims in support of his application for a Protection Visa. As noted above in Paragraph 10 of these Submissions; matters addressed by the AAT in Paragraph 26 of its Decision, regarding status of his half-siblings did not adequately address claims based on allegations of lack of access to work, education and other services and related harassment ( rejected in Paragraphs 26-33 and 37-41 of the AAT's Decision, consequent on its reasoning in Paragraph 26 ), as matters the AAT addressed reveal nothing of how the Applicant's half-siblings might comparatively have been treated by virtue of status as citizens, or their mother's.’
It is not clear from either the written or oral submissions received which particular claims the Applicant asserts were not considered. The Minister submitted that the Applicant had failed to identify any claim and that this ground of review ought to be dismissed on that basis. There is force in that submission.
A generous view of the Applicant’s argument is that it is submitted that the Tribunal failed to adequately address claims based on allegations of lack of access to work, education and other services and related harassment. If that is what is being asserted, then it fails to pay sufficient regard to the following:
a)As already noted, the Applicant’s claims relating to his lack of access to work, services, etc were based on him being a stateless Faili Kurd. The Tribunal did not accept that claim and found that both the Applicant and his father were Iranian citizens. Once that position was reached, as previously noted, many of the Applicant’s other claims around lack of access to work or services simply fell away.
b)Insofar as there is an alleged failure to address any related harassment that the Applicant may have been subjected to, paragraph [37] of the Tribunal’s reasons examined those issues in some detail. Paragraph [37] provides as follows:
‘I accept that the applicant is a Faili Kurd and have taken into account the country information referred to by the applicant's agents. However, in making my findings I have given greater weight to information from DFAT as it is authoritative and more recent and they have been specifically charged with the provision of such advice to government decision-makers. As put to the applicant at the hearing, DFAT have reported that following discussions with a range of credible non-government sources they were not aware of any cases where Faili Kurds who are also Iranian citizens have faced adverse attention specifically because of their ethnicity. They have also said that Faili Kurds in Iran who are also Iranian citizens can access services on the same basis as other Iranian citizens and that they appear to face little to no discrimination in access to services on the basis of their ethnicity or religion. They also stated that Faili Kurds who are Iranian citizens have access to employment on the same basis as other Iranian citizens. They further stated that though it could not be ruled out in individual cases, societal discrimination against Kurds is not widespread and their contacts had not reported instances of Faili Kurds being targeted for extortion or being subject to harassment, detention or physical assault. I have not accepted any of the applicant's claims to have been in the past mistreated or discriminated against and the applicant has not made any claims to have been involved in any political activities which might draw him to the adverse attention of the authorities.’ (citation omitted)
The above paragraph from the Tribunal, in my view, indicates that claims of related harassment made by the Applicant were dealt with.
In summary, when regard is had to the approach of the Tribunal outlined in the paragraphs set out above, it cannot be said, in my view, that the Tribunal failed to consider the Applicant’s claims in support of his application for a protection visa.
Finally, I note that this ground of review bears some resemblance to the first ground of review. To the extent that it does, and there is an overlap, I rely on my reasons in respect of the first ground of review in relation to my assessment of the second ground of review.
For the reasons given above, I dismiss ground two of the grounds of review.
Ground 3
Ground 3 in the Application is as follows:
‘The Tribunal failed to properly apply or consider the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility (referred to in Paragraph 27 of its Decision), in that it focused only on the detail of the Applicant's account of the status and history of his father and step-mother's relationship, rather than the overall consistency and coherence of his claims in support of his application for a Protection Visa (See Paragraphs 28, 30 and 33 of the Guidelines at: AA T/media/ AA T/Files/MRD%20documents/Legislation%20Policies%20Guidelincs/Guidelincs-onAssessment-of-Credibility.pdf).’
The Applicant’s argument in relation to these grounds is set out in paragraphs [19] to [20] of his written submissions. It is as follows:
‘19. It is submitted that the AAT failed to properly apply or consider the Tribunal's Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility, contrary to its assertion in Paragraph 27 of its Decision. These Guidelines require the Tribunal to focus on the overall consistency and coherence of his claims in support of his application for a Protection Visa ( See Paragraphs 28, 30 and 33 of the Guidelines at: The AAT's obligation to properly consider and apply these Guidelines arose from principles discussed above in Paragraphs 15-8 of these Submissions. As outlined above in Paragraphs 10 and 14 of these Submissions, the AA T failed to do so; by not focusing on overall consistency and coherence of the Applicant's claims supporting his application for a Protection Visa, instead focusing on detail of his account of status and history of his father and step-mother's relationship.’
The Tribunal has produced a document entitled ‘Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility’ (‘Guidelines’), which the Applicant’s Counsel provided in his bundle of authorities. Paragraph [28] of that document provides that ‘When forming a view on the credibility of claims, the Tribunal should consider the overall consistency and coherence of an applicant’s account’. The essence of the complaint made by the Applicant is that the Tribunal has not focused on the overall consistency of the Applicant’s account, has acted contrary to paragraph [28] of the Guidelines, and has therefore committed jurisdictional error.
I am satisfied that the complaint made by the Applicant does not give rise to any jurisdictional error committed by the Tribunal. I have reached this view for the following reasons:
a)The Tribunal stated expressly that it had taken the Guidelines into account in reaching its conclusions. Paragraph [27] of the Tribunal’s reasons records this. I have reproduced it below for ease of reference:
‘In making my findings, I have taken into account the Tribunal's Guidelines on the Assessment of Credibility (including the effects of anxiety and trauma on applicants and the passage of time). However, these do not overcome the highly significant concerns I have about the applicant' (sic) credibility set out above.’
b)As can be seen from the above, having expressly stated that it had taken the Guidelines into account, the Tribunal nevertheless reached a conclusion that what is provided for in the Guidelines did not overcome the ‘highly significant concerns [the Tribunal] [had] about the applicant’(sic) credibility’.
c)Even if it could be said, in the face of the express statement at paragraph [27], that the Tribunal had not considered, or not appropriately applied, the Guidelines, that does not give rise to an error as to jurisdiction. That is because the Guidelines are just that- guidelines of the Tribunal. There is nothing to suggest that the Guidelines are designed to bind the Tribunal: SZUZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 498 at [22]. Further, the Guidelines are not directions of the Minister issued pursuant to section 499 of the Act. Failure to apply the Guidelines therefore does not amount to jurisdictional error.
For the above reasons, I dismiss ground three of the grounds of review.
Ground 4
Ground 4 in the Application is as follows:
‘The Tribunal unreasonably and irrationally drew an ultimate conclusion as to whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution without assessing all of his individual claims in support of this contention, but merely on the basis of an assessment of whether the detail of the Applicant's account of the status and history of his father and step-mother's relationship was consistent.’
As can be seen, this ground asserts that the Tribunal’s conclusions were unreasonable or irrational. The Applicant must meet a high bar in order to demonstrate irrationality or illogicality. The standard that the Applicant must reach is set out in the judgement of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] FCAFC 146 (‘CQG15’) at [59] to [61]. I do not set out those extracts in full but have had regard to them in this matter.
The Applicant’s argument in respect of this ground was summarised in paragraph [23] of his written submissions. This paragraph refers in turn to paragraphs [10] and [14] of the Applicant’s written submissions, which have been set out earlier in these reasons.
I am not satisfied that the Applicant has met the threshold required by the Full Court in CQG15. The Applicant is taking issue with conclusions to be drawn from the evidence in respect of which reasonable minds might differ. The High Court has stated firmly that evidence of illogicality or irrationality or unreasonableness cannot arise simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.
There is then the allegation built into this ground of review, that not all of the Applicant’s individual claims were assessed. For reasons I have previously articulated in this decision, I am satisfied that all of the Applicant’s claims were assessed.
Finally, there is a repetition of the allegation that the Tribunal did not assess all claims and instead focussed on the Applicant’s account of the relationship between his father and stepmother. I have dealt with this aspect earlier and rely on my previous findings.
For the reasons set out above, I dismiss the fourth ground of review.
In light of my findings above, the Application must be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Blake
Associate:
Date: 13 September 2019
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