AAJ15 v Minister for Immigration

[2015] FCCA 1281

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AAJ15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 1281

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal – Protection (class XA) visa – whether the Tribunal failed to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation: 

Migration Act 1958, ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 411, 414, 420, 476

Applicant: AAJ15

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 435 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Street

Hearing date: 12 May 2015

Date of Last Submission: 12 May 2015

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 12 May 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P. Reynolds

Solicitors for the Applicant: Fragomen

Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D. Hume

Solicitors for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

1. The amended application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $7500.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA

AT SYDNEY

SYG 435 of 2015

AAJ15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 in respect of a decision made on 27 February 2015 in affirming the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a protection visa.  The applicant was found to be a citizen of Pakistan and his claims were assessed on that basis.  

2. It is material in this case that the applicant lived in a particular location from 2003 until 2012, when he then came to Australia.  The Tribunal carefully identified the applicant’s claims and evidence and conducted a hearing on 8 October 2014, at which the Tribunal carefully put to the applicant concerns in relation to the applicant’s alleged claims and the dispositive issues..  The Tribunal received further material after the hearing, which it identified and relevantly took into account some material advanced suggesting some psychological difficulty by the applicant. The Tribunal noted that the applicant did not have any difficulty responding to the Tribunal’s questions and he was able to address the issues which were raised with him in the course of the hearing in a way which demonstrated that he understood the issues.

3. The Tribunal carefully summarised the applicant’s claims and issues that were put to the applicant making patent that his alleged claims were in issue and the essential integers of his claims were each the subject of matters raised by the Tribunal with the applicant as identified in paras.11-20.  To the extent that the Tribunal referred in para.20 and para.43, to the proposition that it was impossible for the applicant to live in a particular location, that expression was used because that was the claim that was advanced by the applicant.  There is no substance in the assertion that the Tribunal applyied an inappropriate test by referring to the applicant’s claim, where the applicant identified the proposition it was impossible to live in a particular location

4. Moreover, it is clear that the Tribunal carefully took into account the evidence and country information advanced on behalf of the applicant and the submissions of the applicant, including the submission on 1 August 2014, and, relevantly, found:

   33. [The applicant] said that the [project] had been going on for a year and a half and the people who had been employed with him had been doing this for a year and a half.  However, as I put to him, the information to which I referred came from the website of [Organisation 4].  [The applicant] said that this [project] had been carried out throughout the whole of Pakistan so when it had finished in one area they had sent the team to another area.  However, as I put to him, he was working for [Organisation 4] and they were only responsible for carrying out the [project] in [certain] districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.   [The applicant] agreed.  I find on the basis of the information available to me that [the applicant] was employed by [Organisation 4] from [October] 2010 until [January] 2011 because that was the period of the [project] which he was hired to carry out.  I do not accept that he was forced to quit this job because he is a Shia Muslim or because he was receiving threatening telephone calls as he has claimed.

   34. As I put to [the applicant], by his account the militants who questioned him in the [Town 5] area in December 2010 identified him as a Shia Muslim.  They were also aware that he had a GPS device to assist him in his work.  As I put to him, I consider that this makes it difficult to accept that they telephoned him after he returned to Peshawar saying that he was an infidel or an unbeliever and also referring to the fact that he had had a GPS device with him in the [Town 5] area and accusing him of spying.  As I put to [the applicant], if the militants had wanted to do anything to him I consider that they would have done so rather than allowing him to go.  [The applicant] said that the militants had allowed him to go because his boss had told them that if they killed him his boss would wind up the programme and no one would get anything from the programme.  However, as I put to him, if the militants had accepted this then it is difficult to understand why they would then have been threatening him after he had gone back to Peshawar.

   35. [The applicant] repeated that they had been after him because they had viewed him as an infidel or an unbeliever but by his account they had known this when they questioned him in [Town 5].  I do not accept that [the applicant] is telling the truth about his encounter with militants or the Taliban in the [Town 5] area.  I do not accept that he was questioned about his religion nor that he was accused of spying in the area because he had a GPS device to assist him in his work.  I do not accept that [the applicant] received threatening telephone calls after he returned to Peshawar saying that he was an infidel or an unbeliever or referring to the fact that he had had a GPS device with him and accusing him of spying.  For the reasons given above I do not accept that [the applicant] was forced to quit his job with [Organisation 4] because he was receiving threatening telephone calls or because he is a Shia Muslim.

   36. [The applicant] has said that apart from this period of 90 days working for [Organisation 4] he was unemployed and supported by his mother and [siblings] before he left Pakistan in June 2012.  He has said that that in February 2011 he was offered a job by a [Business 2] but that he declined the job because they wanted him to work in areas in Peshawar which he did not consider safe.  [The applicant] is well-qualified - he has completed both a Bachelor degree and [a postgraduate degree] - and he has work experience, having completed an internship with a [Business 2] as part of his [postgraduate degree] course in 2008.  I do not accept on the evidence before me that, if he returns to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, there is a real chance that the only employment he will be able to obtain will require him to work in areas where he may be in danger because of his religion as a Shia Muslim.

   37. As I put to [the applicant] in the course of the hearing before me, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has advised that Shias are not at any economic disadvantage relative to other groups in Pakistan.  It has said that respected human rights groups in Pakistan have told it that they are not aware of any discrimination against Shias in government jobs, the police, the military or in the private sector.   I do not accept on the basis of this advice that there is a real chance that [the applicant] will be discriminated against in relation to employment on the basis of his religion as a Shia Muslim in such a way or to such an extent as to amount to persecution for the purposes of the Refugees Convention if he returns to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

   38. [The applicant] asked how many [Business 2 workers] and doctors had been killed but, while I accept that, as [the applicant] himself said, and as referred to in one of media reports included in the compilation produced by his representatives, prominent members of the Shia community have been targeted in various cities of Pakistan including, for example, a [Business 2] manager in Peshawar and a doctor in Lahore, I do not accept on the evidence before me that there is a real chance that [the applicant] will be targeted in this way if he returns to Pakistan.  He is not on the evidence before me a prominent or respected member of the Shia community at present nor do I accept that there is a real chance that he will achieve such prominence within the reasonably foreseeable future.  I have rejected above [the applicant’s] claims about the problems he encountered when working for [Organisation 4] and I consider that there is only a remote chance that he will be placed in a situation where he may be identified as Shia from the [City 1] area and be targeted and harmed or killed as a result (as he claims he luckily escaped in 2005 or 2006).  I do not accept that there is a real chance that [the applicant] will be persecuted because he will be able to be identified from his identity card as a Shia from [City 1] if he returns to Pakistan now or in the reasonable foreseeable future.

   …

   42. In his statutory declaration made on 1 July 2014 [the applicant] said that he maintained that he would suffer serious harm due to his membership of [Tribe 7].  He said that [Tribe 7] was targeted by the Taliban who were supported by the government.  As referred to above, [the applicant] did not raise this claim at the hearing before me.  He said that his father had altered his name to omit the reference to [Tribe 7] because of the problems suffered by the Shia Muslims in Pakistan.  He said that their survival was at stake.  I do not accept on the evidence before me that there is a real chance that [the applicant] will be persecuted for reasons of his membership of [Tribe 7] if he returns to his home in Peshawar now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

   43. As I indicated to [the applicant], I accept that there have been terrorist attacks in Peshawar.  As I put to him, these have tended to be attacks on government targets and the police.  I accept that Shia targets have also been attacked and that Shia leaders and clerics had been killed.  As I put to [the applicant], however, the information available to me does not support his claims that it is impossible to live in Peshawar as a Shia or specifically as a Shia from [City 1].  As I put to him, indeed, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has advised that Shia Muslims fleeing generalised violence in other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have relocated to Peshawar.  I note that one of the items included in the compilation provided by [the applicant’s] representatives after the hearing cites the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan as having said that more than 90 per cent of the sectarian terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2013 occurred in Quetta, Karachi, [District 6], [City 1], Islamabad and Rawalpindi.  In other words, the risk of attack in Peshawar is significantly less than in these other places in Pakistan.

   44. [The applicant] said that he had lived there and he knew the exact situation there.  He said that anyone could be killed at any time as his father had been killed but as referred to above his father was killed in fighting in [City 1] in [2007] rather than in one of these sectarian terrorist attacks which I accept occur in Peshawar.  I accept, for example, that 15 people were killed and more than two dozen were injured in a suicide bomb attack on an imambargah (Shia mosque) and seminary in Peshawar on 21 June 2013 as referred to in the compilation provided by [the applicant’s] representatives and in their submission.  [The applicant] said that the terrorists just wanted to minimise the number of Shias or to kill Shias and he said that the risk that he had taken in coming to Australia by boat was evidence that there was no life for him in Pakistan.  He said that for him it had been a ‘do or die’ situation.  He said that he had not had any other choice.  He said as referred to above that just because nothing had happened to his family after his father’s death this did not mean that they were living peacefully or that they were not in danger and he said that his [siblings] were taking risks going to their jobs every day in order to survive.

   45. I remain of the view that it is relevant to the assessment of the risk to [the applicant] that he and his family lived in Peshawar from 2003 until 2012.  Despite his claims with regard to the situation for Shia Muslims in that city he completed his education there.  He was able to complete a Bachelor degree and [a postgraduate degree] and he completed an internship in a [Business 2].  At the hearing before me he said that in Pakistan he had gone to a Shia mosque every Friday for Friday prayers and that he had been an active participant in Muharram although he had not been a member of any Shia organisation.  His mother [and siblings] continue to live in Peshawar where one of his [siblings] works as an [occupation] with [a] company while the other works in [Business 2].

   46. For the reasons given above I do not accept that [the applicant] or other members of his family have been targeted because of their relationship with his father.  [The applicant] and his representatives have referred to the fact that prominent members of the Shia community like [Business 2 workers] and doctors have been targeted in various cities of Pakistan but for the reasons given above I do not accept that his situation is comparable to that of these prominent or respected member of the Shia community.  I do not accept that there is a real chance that he will targeted to be kidnapped or abducted or killed because he belongs to a known family (as a result of his relationship with his father) or because he is a Shia Muslim if he returns to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

   47. I accept that, as a Shia Muslim who attends the mosque every Friday and who participates actively in Muharram, there is some level of risk to [the applicant] in the context of sectarian terrorist attacks like that on the imambargah and seminary in Peshawar on 21 June 2013 referred to above. However I consider that the chance of [the applicant] being harmed in this context is remote given the evidence regarding the prevalence of such attacks in Peshawar. Having regard to the independent evidence referred to above I find that there are fewer sectarian terrorist attacks in Peshawar than in many other places in Pakistan and that Shias from other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa like [City 1] have relocated to Peshawar for their safety. While, as I have said, I accept that sectarian terrorist attacks continue to occur in Peshawar, I do not accept on the evidence before me that there is a real chance that [the applicant] will be killed or otherwise persecuted for reasons of his religion as a Shia Muslim if he goes back to his home in Peshawar. I accept that there is some level of risk to [the applicant] in the context of the sort of terrorist attacks directed at government targets and the police which I accept continue to occur in Peshawar but I do not accept that one or more of the five Convention reasons is the essential and significant reason for the persecution to which [the applicant] may be exposed in this context as required by paragraph 91R(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958. I consider that the risk to him in this context is the same as that to any other citizen of Pakistan.

   48. I note for the sake of completeness that I consider that this case is clearly distinguishable on its facts from that dealt with by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45.  In that case the High Court held that it was necessary for the Tribunal to consider the impact on the applicant of remaining in Kabul and not driving trucks on the roads he usually frequented in the course of his business.  The discussion at the hearing in the present case focused on Peshawar because I consider that to be [the applicant’s] home.  I have referred to the fact that on the evidence before me there are some places in Pakistan, for example Quetta, Karachi, [District 6], [City 1], Islamabad and Rawalpindi, where there have been more sectarian terrorist attacks than in Peshawar.  Equally, however, there are other places in Pakistan where, as I have found to be the case with Peshawar, the risk is lower.  I do not accept that, if [the applicant] returns to Pakistan, there is a real chance that he will have to remain confined to Peshawar or that he will not be able to travel outside that city.  For the reasons give above I do not accept on the evidence before me that he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the five Convention reasons if he returns to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

5. In those circumstances, the Tribunal turned to the issue of complementary protection and relevantly made adverse findings as follows:

   49. Having regard to my findings of fact above, I do not accept that [the applicant] is telling the truth about his encounter with militants or the Taliban in the [Town 5] area.  I do not accept that he was questioned about his religion nor that he was accused of spying in the area because he had a GPS device to assist him in his work.  I do not accept that he received threatening telephone calls after he returned to Peshawar saying that he was an infidel or an unbeliever or referring to the fact that he had had a GPS device with him and accusing him of spying.  Having regard to my findings of fact above, I do not accept that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm as a result of his having worked briefly for an NGO, [Organisation 4].  Having regard to my findings of fact above I do not accept that he was forced to quit this job because he was receiving threatening telephone calls or because he is a Shia Muslim as he has claimed.

   50. Having regard to my findings of fact above, I do not accept that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer ‘significant harm’ as defined in subsection 36(2A) of the Migration Act as a result of discrimination in employment on the basis of his religion. I do not accept on the evidence before me that, if he returns to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, there is a real risk that the only employment he will be able to obtain will require him to work in areas where he may be in danger because of his religion as a Shia Muslim. I do not accept on the evidence before me that there is a real risk that he will have to remain confined to Peshawar or that he will not be able to travel outside that city nor do I accept that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm because he will be able to be identified from his identity card as a Shia from [City 1].

   51. Having regard to my findings of fact above, I do not accept that [the applicant’s] father was killed because of his involvement in peace keeping initiatives or because of his hatred for the militants as is suggested in the letter from the [Official 3] which he produced along with his original application.  Having regard to my findings of fact above, I do not accept that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm as a result of his relationship with his father or his belonging to a known family.

   52. In his statutory declaration made on 1 July 2014 [the applicant] said that he maintained that he would suffer serious harm due to his membership of [Tribe 7].  He said that [Tribe 7] was targeted by the Taliban who were supported by the government.  As referred to above, [the applicant] did not raise this claim at the hearing before me.  He said that his father had altered his name to omit the reference to the [Tribe 7] tribe because of the problems suffered by the Shia Muslims in Pakistan.  He said that their survival was at stake.  I do not accept on the evidence before me that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm as a result of his membership of the [Tribe 7].

   53. [The applicant] and his representatives have referred to the fact that prominent members of the Shia community like [Business 2 workers] and doctors have been targeted in various cities of Pakistan but having regard to my findings of fact above I do not accept that his situation is comparable to that of these prominent or respected members of the Shia community.  I do not accept that there is a real chance that he will targeted to be kidnapped or abducted or killed because he belongs to a known family (as a result of his relationship with his father) or because he is a Shia Muslim if he returns to Pakistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

   54. Having regard to my findings of fact above, I accept that there have been sectarian terrorist attacks in Peshawar but I consider that Peshawar is safer than other places in Pakistan and that Shia Muslims fleeing generalised violence in other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have relocated to Peshawar. I do not accept on the evidence before me that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm for reasons of his religion as a Shia Muslim if he returns to his home in Peshawar. As indicated in paragraph 43 above, the terrorist attacks in Peshawar have tended to be attacks on government targets and the police. I accept that there is a risk to innocent bystanders in the context of such attacks but for the reasons given above I do not accept that there are particular factors which will increase the risk of [the applicant] being harmed in these sorts of terrorist attacks. I consider that this is a risk faced by the population of Pakistan generally and not by [the applicant] personally and that it is therefore excluded under paragraph 36(2B)(c) of the Migration Act.

   55. Subject to that exclusion I do not accept that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will be arbitrarily deprived of his life, that the death penalty will be carried out on him, that he will be subjected to torture, that he will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment or that he will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment as defined. Accordingly I do not accept that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed from Australia to Pakistan, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm as defined in subsection 36(2A) of the Migration Act.

1. It was in those circumstances that the Tribunal concluded that the applicant was not a person with respect to whom Australia had a protection obligations and that the applicant did not satisfy the criterion under ss.36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa).

2. The amended application identifies four grounds of alleged error.  The first ground alleges jurisdictional error by failing to deal with the claim before it or misconstruing or failing to apply the correct law.  The submission in relation to ground 1 in substance sought to dissect into a tripartite analysis the clear finding of fact by the Tribunal in para.42 as follows:

   42. … I do not accept on the evidence before me that there is a real chance that [the applicant] will be persecuted for reasons of his membership of [Tribe 7] if he returns to his home in Peshawar now or in the reasonably foreseeable future

3. The alleged dissection of the finding was in order to advance an argument that there were underlying questions that had not been properly considered by the Tribunal.  The Tribunal’s reasons are to be read as a whole and not with a fine eye to error.  It is crystal clear that the Tribunal made an adverse finding of fact, as identified above, in relation to the applicant’s membership of the [Tribe 7] and the claim that he advanced in that regard.  I will regard ground 1 as an impermissible challenge to that finding of fact. 

4. This is not a case where the Tribunal failed to address the essential integer of the claim raised in respect of the applicant’s fears concerning his membership of the [Tribe 7].  There is no substance in the criticism advanced that the Tribunal incorrectly understood the claim that was raised in the reference to the Tribunal saying that the applicant did not raise this claim at the hearing before me. 

5. Moreover, it is clear that the claim that has been earlier raised by the applicant was specifically addressed and the finding made at paragraph 52 with reasons in support of that finding.  That finding cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification and was open on the material before the Tribunal. There is no substance in ground 1 and if fails to identify a jurisdictional error.

6. Ground 2 alleges jurisdictional error with respect to the Tribunal asking itself the wrong question.  That ground is focused on the erroneous characterisation that the Tribunal, by identifying the applicant’s claim, was applying some test of impossibility.  It is crystal clear the Tribunal was referring to the claim advanced by the applicant in using the word “impossible.”  There is no substance in relation to the second ground. 

7. To the extent that it was suggested that there was some want of consideration by the Tribunal of the ability of the applicant to live in a particular area, that is again an impermissible challenge to the finding of fact. Moreover, it is crystal clear, given the location at which the applicant had lived for nine years prior to coming to Australia, that the Tribunal, relevantly, had taken into account the reasonableness for the applicant to return to his home in that area. This is consistent with a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole.  This was not a relocation case and there is no substance in relation to ground 2.  I do not accept that the change of name gives rise to any issue of alleged relevant change of behaviour of a kind that supports any alleged fear of persecution or that there was any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal arising from the change of name.

8. The third ground of the application alleged jurisdictional error by failing to consider relevant considerations or failing to carry out its statutory task.  There was no substance in relation to the third ground and it is an impermissible challenge to the findings of fact. The applicant asserts that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the country information whereas it is clear from what was put by the Tribunal to the applicant that the Tribunal was well alive to and had regard to the country information advanced by the applicant and put to the applicant concerns of the Tribunal in relation to that matter.

9. An argument was sought to be developed that the finding made by the delegate in relation to returning to a particular location was a matter in respect of which the Tribunal failed to have regard.  That is an impermissible challenge to the findings of fact made by the Tribunal in para.42.  This is not a case where it was the position that the Tribunal was raising a new issue that had not been dealt with. It is clear that the claim advanced by the applicant was addressed by the Tribunal and, in particular, in the questions by the Tribunal to the applicant, paras.15, 16 and 20, raised the same essential claim and same dispositive issue as to whether there was any risk of the applicant suffering serious harm, in the circumstances, by reason of being a member of a particular tribe if returned to that location.

10. It was not necessary for the Tribunal to set out the whole of the country information or to set out findings of the delegate. It is clear that the Tribunal conducted a genuine review and complied with its statutory duty under ss.411, 414 and, complied with its duty under s.420. The third ground again is, in substance, an inadmissible challenge to the findings of fact made by the Tribunal. Relevantly, in this regard it was a matter for the Tribunal to take into account, its credit findings in respect of the applicant’s evidence. Those credit findings were open on the material before the Tribunal and, accordingly, ground 3 is not made out.

11. In relation to ground 4, this asserts the Tribunal engaged in a jurisdictional error by failing to comply with s.425.  Effectively, this ground advances a proposition that the Tribunal was bound to identify to the applicant that it might depart from what was said by the delegate in respect of the existence of any risk of the applicant suffering serious harm because of certain matters upon being returned to a particular location.  For the reasons I have identified above, this is not a case where the Tribunal was required to identify some issue other than those that had been raised before the delegate and there is no substance in the contention that the Tribunal in this case had to notify the applicant that it might depart from what the delegate had said in respect of any risk to the applicant suffering serious harm. Those issues were squarely raised by the Tribunal with the applicant.

12. Nor is there any substance in the assertion that the Tribunal might depart from the delegate’s conclusions regarding country information as being a matter which gave rise a requirement to notify the applicant.  It is clear from what was put by the Tribunal to the applicant that the applicant was on clear notice of the adverse country information that the Tribunal may take into account.  Relevantly, the Tribunal said in para.20:

    20. I indicated to [the applicant] that I accepted that there had been terrorist attacks in Peshawar.  I put to him that these had tended to be attacks on government targets and the police.  I indicated to him that I accepted that Shia targets had also been attacked and that Shia leaders and clerics had been killed.  I put to [the applicant], however, that the information available to me did not support his claims that it was impossible to live in Peshawar as a Shia or specifically as a Shia from [City 1].  I put to him, indeed, that the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had advised that Shia Muslims fleeing generalised violence in other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had relocated to Peshawar.  I put to [the applicant] that it was difficult for me to accept on the evidence before me that there was a real chance that he would be persecuted for a Convention reason or that there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm if he went back to his home in Peshawar.  [The applicant] said that he had lived there and he knew the exact situation there.  He said that anyone could be killed at any time as his father had been killed.  He repeated that he accepted that his father had not been targeted.  He said that they just wanted to minimise the number of Shias or to kill Shias.

13. It is clear from the other material referred to in the earlier part of para.20 that the Tribunal took into account the other country information.  There is no substance in relation to ground 4.  The amended application fails to disclose any jurisdictional error.  The application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighteen (18) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Street

Associate: 

Date:  18 May 2015