AAI Limited t/as Suncorp Insurance v Birch

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

AAI Limited t/as Suncorp Insurance v Birch [2017] QCA 232

PARTIES:

AAI LIMITED trading as SUNCORP INSURANCE

ACN 005 297 807v
TONI-LEE BIRCH
(applicant)

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 3794 of 2017
DC No 157 of 2016

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Townsville – [2017] QDC 66 (Durward SC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

13 October 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

23 August 2017

JUDGES:

Holmes CJ and Gotterson JA and Flanagan J

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to appeal granted.

2.   Appeal dismissed.

3.   Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – EXTENSION OF TIME IN PERSONAL INJURIES MATTERS – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS OF DECISIVE CHARACTER – WHAT ARE MATERIAL FACTS – where the respondent suffered nervous shock injury as a result of involvement in a motor vehicle accident – where the respondent brought a claim against the appellant as the insurer of the vehicle at fault – where the claim was filed after the expiry of the limitation period allowed under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (“the Act”) – where the respondent filed an application to extend the limitation period – where the period of limitation may be extended under the Act if a material fact arises of a decisive character relating to the right of action which was not previously within the applicant’s means of knowledge – where the learned primary judge found the fact that the respondent had become medically unfit to continue employment due to an aggravation of her previous psychiatric injury to be a “material fact of a decisive character” within the meaning of the Act – where the learned primary judge further found this material fact to have not been within the respondent’s means of knowledge prior to the year preceding the commencement of the claim – whether the learned primary judge erred in applying ss 30 and 32 of the Act – whether the learned primary judge failed to identify a material fact within the meaning of the Act

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – EXTENSION OF TIME IN PERSONAL INJURIES MATTERS – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS OF DECISIVE CHARACTER – KNOWLEDGE – REASONABLE STEPS TAKEN TO ASCERTAIN FACTS – where the respondent resigned from her employment as an audiometrist more than three years after a motor vehicle accident causing post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) – where the respondent gave evidence that she resigned due to increased travel requirements and conflicts with her manager – where the respondent indicated in her resignation letter that she had secured alternative employment in the same industry – where the respondent later stated that this was inaccurate – where the applicant contends that a further motor vehicle incident occurring after the respondent’s resignation, but before she had ceased work, was the actual cause of respondent’s…

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Details
Case
[2017] QCA 232
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of AAI Limited trading as Suncorp Insurance (appellant) versus Birch (respondent), the court was called upon to determine whether the trial judge was correct in extending the limitation period for the respondent to bring her claim. The respondent suffered a nervous shock injury in a motor vehicle accident and sought damages from the appellant, who was the insurer of the vehicle at fault. The respondent filed her claim outside the statutory limitation period set out in the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). However, she applied for an extension of this limitation period, arguing that a material fact of a decisive character, which was not within her knowledge prior to the limitation period, arose. The learned primary judge found that the respondent's medical unfitness to continue employment due to an aggravation of her psychiatric injury was such a material fact, and thus granted the extension.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in applying sections 30 and 32 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) and whether the primary judge correctly identified a material fact within the meaning of the Act. The court examined the evidence and submissions from both parties, focusing on when the respondent became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the material fact that her psychiatric injury had worsened to the point of medical unfitness for employment. The court also considered whether the respondent took reasonable steps to ascertain facts about her injury and potential claim.

The court concluded that the primary judge's decision was sound. The respondent did not know, and could not reasonably have known, of the material fact until the year preceding the commencement of the claim. The court found that the primary judge correctly applied the statutory provisions and identified the material fact as decisive to the respondent's right of action. The appellant's arguments that the respondent should have sought professional advice earlier due to her understanding of PTSD and her university education were not sufficient to establish that she had earlier knowledge of the material fact.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal dismissed.

3. Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent, Ms Birch, suffered a nervous shock injury as a result of her involvement in a motor vehicle accident on 3 February 2012. The accident vehicle was insured by the appellant, AAI Limited t/as Suncorp Insurance. Ms Birch did not bring a claim against the appellant until after the limitation period under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) had expired. She filed an application to extend the limitation period, arguing that a material fact of a decisive character relating to her right of action was not within her knowledge until shortly before she commenced the claim. The material fact she relied on was her becoming medically unfit to continue employment due to an aggravation of her previous psychiatric injury. Ms Birch resigned from her employment as an audiometrist more than three years after the accident, claiming it was due to increased travel requirements and conflicts with her manager. She later clarified that her resignation was inaccurately attributed to securing alternative employment.

The matter came before the court on an appeal against a decision of the primary judge who granted an extension of the limitation period under ss 30 and 32 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The primary judge found that Ms Birch’s becoming medically unfit to continue employment due to an aggravated psychiatric injury was a material fact of a decisive character that was not within her means of knowledge prior to the year preceding the commencement of the claim. The appellant challenged this finding, arguing that Ms Birch should have known earlier that she had a serious or worthwhile claim against the appellant. The court of appeal was asked to determine whether the primary judge erred in applying ss 30 and 32 of the Act and whether the primary judge failed to identify a material fact within the meaning of the Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Her evidence was that until 25 August 2015, she was unaware that she could commence “a CTP claim” with respect to the accident she had witnessed 3 February 2012. By that expression she meant a common law claim for damages for personal injury.Medical evidence Medical evidence adduced by the respondent in support of the application favoured a diagnosis of a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) caused by the motor vehicle accident in February 2012 which had later been aggravated by a range of different factors. In November 2015, in response to an inquiry from WorkCover as to the respondent’s potential to return to work, Ms Heilbronn identified two aspects to the respondent’s condition. She said:[14]“Firstly, in relation to the fatal motor vehicle accident in 2012, it became obvious that Ms Birch had not fully recovered from this accident and that treatment at the time was incomplete. Without having the strategies to deal with the triggers that contributed to her ongoing trauma, when she came across the accident on 12 August 2015, she became re-traumatised. She, once again, reported hypervigilance and a startle response.I also believe that, based on Ms Birch’s report of how she actively sought a response from her employer as acknowledgement of her work-related motor vehicle accident in 2012, that the eventual response of her employer to offer telephone counselling was inadequate. She reported that the apparent lack of interest by management as to her ongoing welfare in the period following the event indicated to her that she was not valued within the organisation.Based on Ms Birch’s report of her commitment to continue to work to her contract with the organisation, it appears that she was fulfilling the organisation’s requirements of travel to her own detriment without the benefit of having dealt with her trauma.Secondly, when Ms Birch made it clear to her manager that she was just coping with having to undertake travel that she had understood to be required when she signed the [contract], she was increasingly put under pressure to agree to additional travel when her co-workers either resigned or decided not to travel any longer for the organisation.It appears, based on Ms Birch’s report that the increased pressure she was put under aggravated her condition until it became untenable for her to continue under such pressure. Her level of distress at the organisation’s response appeared to escalate as time progressed, from her first appointment with me on 16 July 2015 to her last appointment on 22 October 2015. At each appointment, she would start to cry as soon as she walked in the door, with her reporting increasingly hostile responses from her employer. This level of responding contributed to her levels of Depression, Anxiety and Stress and she was not sleeping well, increasing her levels of distress further.”[14]Affidavit AS Wang, sworn 15 June 2016; Exhibit ASW4: AB122-123. The respondent was examined by Dr Sharon Harding, a consultant psychiatrist, in July 2016. In a report to WorkCover dated 2 August 2016, Dr Harding summarised her findings as indicating that:[15]“Ms Birch has shown some symptoms of PTSD since 2012 which were aggravated in the context of work-related stress, including conflict with her manager, poor performing administrative staff and management’s failure to take action in this respect, increased number of trips away requiring extensive driving and finally passing a probable accident site in August 2015 with the most significant factor of these being the accident in February 2012, the next most significant factor being the perceived harassment and bullying by … her manager. Other contributing factors were the problems with administrative staff and the final issue being the further accident in August 2015.”[15]Affidavit AS Wang, sworn 17 August 2016; Exhibit ASW21: AB289.The damages claimed

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the learned primary judge erred in applying ss 30 and 32 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).
2. Whether the learned primary judge failed to identify a material fact within the meaning of the Act.
3. Whether Ms Birch knew, or ought to have known, that she had a serious or worthwhile claim against the appellant at a time earlier than the year preceding the commencement of the claim.
4. Whether Ms Birch’s prior understanding of PTSD and university education inferred that she should reasonably have sought professional advice at an earlier stage.

Held
1. The court held that the learned primary judge did not err in applying ss 30 and 32 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).
2. The court held that the learned primary judge did not fail to identify a material fact within the meaning of the Act.
3. The court held that Ms Birch did not know, or ought to have known, that she had a serious or worthwhile claim against the appellant at a time earlier than the year preceding the commencement of the claim.
4. The court held that Ms Birch’s prior understanding of PTSD and university education did not infer that she should reasonably have sought professional advice at an earlier stage.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the application of ss 30 and 32 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) in the context of the respondent's claim for damages due to a motor vehicle accident. The court assessed whether the primary judge's interpretation of the statutory provisions was correct. It was found that the primary judge properly applied the sections, particularly in relation to the identification of a material fact of a decisive character and the extension of the limitation period. The court considered the evidence presented, including the medical diagnosis of PTSD and the factors that contributed to the aggravation of the respondent's condition. It was determined that the primary judge correctly identified that the respondent's unfitness to continue employment due to an aggravation of her previous psychiatric injury constituted a material fact within the meaning of the Act.

Further, the court scrutinised whether the primary judge had overlooked any material facts. The evidence indicated that the respondent's PTSD was caused by the initial accident in February 2012 and subsequently aggravated by various factors, including work-related stress and a subsequent accident in August 2015. The court agreed with the primary judge's conclusion that the identified material fact was not within the respondent's means of knowledge prior to the year preceding the commencement of the claim.

Regarding the respondent's knowledge of her claim, the court examined the timeline of events and the respondent's understanding of PTSD. It was established that the respondent was unaware of the possibility of commencing a CTP claim until August 2015. The court found that there was no basis to conclude that the respondent knew, or ought to have known, about her serious or worthwhile claim against the appellant at an earlier time.

Finally, the court considered the respondent's prior understanding of PTSD and her university education in relation to the requirement for seeking professional advice. The evidence showed that the respondent's resignation from employment was due to increased travel requirements and conflicts with her manager, not the aggravation of her PTSD. The court concluded that the respondent's background did not infer that she should have reasonably sought professional advice at an earlier stage. The court's decision was based on the application of statutory provisions and the interpretation of the evidence presented in the case.