FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AAG15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2017] FCCA 328 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application to show cause – applicant in immigration detention – whether department conducted ITOA – whether there is an obligation to accord procedural fairness to ITOA processes – whether there was a migration decision – whether jurisdiction exclusion by s 476(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.198, 476 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, r.44.12 |
| Applicant: | AAG15 |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| File Number: | MLG 1917 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge McNab |
| Hearing date: | 14 February 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 14 February 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 14 February 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant in person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Brown |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application filed on 7 September 2016 be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5,000.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 1917 of 2016
| AAG15 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(delivered Ex Tempore and revised for transcript)
Nature of Application
By an application filed 7 September 2016, the Applicant seeks final orders that:
(a) the decision of the Minister be quashed;
(b) a writ of mandamus directed to the Minister requiring him to determine my request according to law; and
(c) an injunction restraining the Minister, by himself or by his Department, officers, delegates or agents from relying upon the decision on 31 August 2016 and from removing me from Australia.
The Applicant also seeks costs.
The Respondent has filed an application in the case seeking that the substantive application be dismissed and requiring the Applicant to show cause why it should not be dismissed in accordance with the rule 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001. That rule provides:
(1) At a hearing of an application for an order to show cause, the Court may:
(a) if it is not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed--dismiss the application; or…
The decision said to be the subject of the application is set out in a letter dated 31 August 2016 from the Director of ABF Ministerial Correspondence section of the Australian Border Force addressed to the Applicant. The correspondence reads, omitting formal parts:
Thank you for your correspondence of 8 August 2016 to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Hon. Peter Dutton MP, concerning your request for an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) due to the unintentional release of your personal information by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection in February 2014. The Minister appreciates the time you have taken to bring this matter to his attention and has asked that I reply on his behalf.
As…
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- Case
- [2017] FCCA 328
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. This involved determining whether the delegate of the Minister, in assessing the applicant's claims, had failed to consider relevant considerations or had taken into account irrelevant considerations, thereby vitiating the decision-making process.
Judge McNab found that the delegate had failed to properly consider the applicant's claims regarding past persecution and the real chance of future persecution in their country of origin. The Court reasoned that the delegate's assessment was based on an incomplete and flawed understanding of the evidence presented by the applicant, particularly concerning the specific circumstances of the alleged persecution. The legal principle applied was that a failure to consider all relevant evidence and to make findings of fact based on that evidence constitutes jurisdictional error.
Consequently, Judge McNab quashed the Minister's decision and remitted the application for a protection visa to the Minister for redetermination according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
In light of the data breach, the applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 30 October 2014, claiming that the breach provided a basis for his claimed fear of persecution in Fiji. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused to grant the protection visa on 17 November 2014. An application for review was lodged with the Refugee Review Tribunal on 24 November 2014. The Tribunal found that the data breach had not disclosed the applicant's protection visa application and that there was no evidence that it had included information about the applicant's protection claims or the nature of such claims. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision on 27 January 2015. The applicant filed an application for judicial review, which was dismissed by Judge McGuire on 24 September 2015. An appeal to the Federal Court was also dismissed on 8 February 2016. The applicant subsequently made two unsuccessful requests to the Minister for intervention under section 417 of the Migration Act and a non-compellable power under section 474.
On 31 August 2016, the Minister responded to the applicant's request for an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) by stating that the delegate had already considered the impact of the data breach when assessing the applicant's claims for protection, and thus, the request for an ITOA would not be considered. The applicant filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court seeking orders to quash the Minister's decision, a writ of mandamus, an injunction, and costs. The Minister filed an application to dismiss the substantive application for failing to raise an arguable case.
This matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application to show cause why certain relief should not be granted to the Applicant, AAG15. The Applicant, in person, sought orders quashing the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's decision not to conduct an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA) in relation to his visa application, and other relief. The Minister, represented by counsel and the Australian Government Solicitor, filed an application under rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, seeking dismissal of the substantive application on the basis that it did not raise an arguable case for the relief claimed. The substantive application, filed on 7 September 2016, arose out of a series of prior decisions and proceedings concerning the Applicant's visa status. The Applicant, a citizen of Fiji, had a history of visa applications and detention in Australia, culminating in the current application. The Minister had previously refused the Applicant's protection visa application, a decision which was affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and subsequently reviewed and dismissed by the Federal Court. The Applicant's substantive application in this Court sought to challenge the Minister's decision not to conduct an ITOA in relation to his visa application, following a data breach by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. The procedural history leading to this application involved various applications for review and appeal of prior decisions, including an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the High Court. The substantive application was heard on 14 February 2017, with the Court ultimately dismissing the application and requiring the Applicant to pay the Respondent's costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Minister not to consider the Applicant’s request for an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA).
2. Whether there is an obligation to accord procedural fairness to the processes involved in considering a request for an ITOA.
3. Whether the decision not to process the Applicant’s ITOA request constitutes a migration decision subject to judicial review.
4. Whether s 476(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) excludes the court's jurisdiction over the decision not to consider the Applicant’s request for an ITOA.
Held
1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Minister not to consider the Applicant’s request for an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA).
The court concluded that it does not have jurisdiction to review the Minister’s decision not to consider the Applicant’s request for an ITOA. The court held that there was no substantive decision made by the Minister, and no personal procedural decision whether to process an ITOA request, that could be reviewed. The result was that the court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Whether there is an obligation to accord procedural fairness to the processes involved in considering a request for an ITOA.
The court concluded that there is no obligation to accord procedural fairness to the processes involved in considering a request for an ITOA. The court held that procedural fairness can only be implied as a condition of the exercise of a statutory power, but there was no exercise of statutory power in this case. The result was that the court dismissed the claim for procedural fairness.
3. Whether the decision not to process the Applicant’s ITOA request constitutes a migration decision subject to judicial review.
The court concluded that the decision not to process the Applicant’s ITOA request does not constitute a migration decision subject to judicial review. The court held that there was no migration decision made by the Minister or the Department, and the work done by officers in considering the ITOA request was an executive function outside the conventional statutory regime. The result was that the court dismissed the claim for judicial review.
4. Whether s 476(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) excludes the court's jurisdiction over the decision not to consider the Applicant’s request for an ITOA.
The court concluded that s 476(2) of the Migration Act does exclude the court’s jurisdiction over the decision not to consider the Applicant’s request for an ITOA. The court held that the section precludes the court from reviewing the advice that the Minister would not consider the Applicant’s request for an ITOA. The result was that the court dismissed the claim for judicial review.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court of Australia in AAG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review regarding the Minister's decision not to consider a request for an International Treaties Obligations Assessment (ITOA). The court began by addressing whether it had jurisdiction to review the decision. The court concluded that the decision not to consider the request for an ITOA did not constitute a "migration decision" under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to review it. The court relied on the principles set out in the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTZ1 [2016] HCA 29, which held that procedural fairness does not apply to the processes involved in considering a request for an ITOA.
The court further held that the decision not to process the applicant's ITOA request did not constitute a migration decision subject to judicial review. The court found that there was no substantive decision made by the Minister or the Department of Immigration and Border Protection in relation to the ITOA request. The court applied the reasoning from AAG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCATrans 131, which held that the Minister is under no duty to respond to a request for consideration of the exercise of power under section 417 of the Migration Act.
Finally, the court considered whether section 476(2) of the Migration Act precluded its jurisdiction over the decision not to consider the applicant's request for an ITOA. The court found that the section did operate to exclude its jurisdiction in this matter. The court noted that the Minister had not personally made a decision on the request and that the Department had not undertaken any ITOA process.
In summary, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Minister's decision not to consider the applicant's request for an ITOA, as it did not constitute a migration decision subject to judicial review. The court also found that procedural fairness did not apply to the processes involved in considering such a request. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court does not have jurisdiction to review a decision not to consider a request for an ITOA, as it is not a migration decision under the Migration Act.