A & W
[2008] FamCAFC 65
•15 May 2008
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| A & W | [2008] FamCAFC 65 |
| FAMILY LAW - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JOINDER - APPLICATION TO JOIN NON-PARTIES TO APPEAL – Where father sought to join non-parties (Secretary, Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department and the Director-General, Department of Community Services) as parties to his appeal in respect of parenting orders made under Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where father sought leave to cross examine named persons who were not witnesses in proceedings - Where the non-parties sought the application to join them be dismissed – Where the non-parties argued they were not party to the proceedings before the trial Judge at first instance – Where the non-parties were not interested in maintaining the order under appeal or affected by that order – Application dismissed. FAMILY LAW - INJUCTIONS - INJUNCTION SOUGHT BY NON-PARTIES -Where the non-parties sought an injunction to restrain the father serving any documents on various entities and persons in respect of the appeal without leave of the Court – Where non-parties did not seek to become parties to the appeal, nor to intervene in the proceedings – Where the Secretary, Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department did not seek to intervene in the name of the Attorney General under s 91 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Whether the non-parties had standing to seek orders – Whether sufficient evidence presented to support granting of injunction – Non-parties’ applications dismissed. |
| Family Law Act 1975 - s 91, s 94(2B)(a), s 94(2B)(c), s 114(3), s 118 Family Law Rules 2004 - r 6.01, r 6.02, r 6.03, r 6.04, r 6.05, r 6.06, r 8.02(5), r 22.04 Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 – reg 16(3), reg 23, reg 24 Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction - Article 21 |
| Australian Industry Group v Automotive Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (2002) 125 FCR 529 | ||
| APPLICANT: | Mr A | |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms W |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYF | 3228 | of | 2004 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | EA | 91 | of | 2007 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 15 May 2008 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Boland J |
| HEARING DATE: | 20 November 2007, and by way of written submissions filed 27 November 2007 and 18 December 2007 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Family Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 18 July 2007 |
| LOWER COURT MNC | [2007] FamCA 1682 |
REPRESENTATION
| ADVOCATE FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr A in person via telephone linkup |
| ADVOCATE FOR THE RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY SERVICES: | Ms Pereira |
| COUNSEL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY GENERAL AND COMMONWEALTH CENTRAL AUTHORITY: | Ms Morgan |
Orders
That the application in a case filed 25 September 2007 is dismissed.
The oral application on behalf of the Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department is dismissed.
The oral application on behalf of the Director-General, Department of Community Services (NSW) is dismissed.
No orders as to costs.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym A & W is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| THE APPEAL DIVISION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
Appeal Number: EA 91 of 2007
File Number: SYF 3228 of 2004
| Mr A |
Applicant
And
| Ms W |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
Mr A, a citizen of the United States of America, and Ms W, an Australian citizen are the parents of a 13 year old child F. Mr A (who for convenience I will refer to as “the father”) has filed an appeal against parenting orders made by Le Poer Trench J in proceedings between himself and Ms W (who, again for convenience, I will refer to as “the mother”).
These reasons deal with an application in the appeal filed by the father on 27 September 2007 in which he seeks orders, including orders to join other parties to the appeal, and oral applications made on behalf of the Secretary, Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, (“the Secretary”) and the Director-General, Department of Community Services NSW, as State Central Authority (“the Director-General”) for the purposes of the Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) seeking dismissal of the father’s application, and an injunction restraining the father from serving any documents on various entities and persons in respect of the appeal without the leave of the Court.
Earlier proceedings in this Court were brought by the Central Authority in 2004 at the request of the United States Central Authority for the return of F under the Hague Convention on the basis that the father had “a right of custody” in respect of the child.
After an unusual history in this Court, those proceedings concluded with an appeal by the mother to the Full Court of the Family Court against an order for F’s return to the United States (“the US”) which appeal was heard in April 2006. After admitting further evidence, the Full Court upheld the mother’s appeal on the basis that a “defence” under regulation 16(3) of the regulations made under the Hague Convention was established (the objection of the child to his return to the United States). So far as I am aware no application for special leave to appeal the decision of the Full Court was prosecuted in the High Court of Australia.
Subsequent applications were however filed by the father in this Court including:
·An application to re-open the hearing before the Full Court. That application was dismissed by the Full Court on 19 April 2007.
·An application to review an order of a Judicial Registrar made in the Hague Convention proceedings that a sum of money be retained to pay for the father’s air-fares etc in coming to Australia to collect F be held in trust. The father was unsuccessful in the review hearing at first instance and on appeal.
·An associated application by the father in which he sought damages, inter alia, from the Director-General as Agent for the Central Authority for expenses incurred by him in Australia and the US associated with the Hague application. The father was also unsuccessful in that application at first instance and on appeal. He has deposed that he is pursuing similar proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
·An application by the father to join the Secretary, Attorney-General’s department, the Commonwealth of Australia as Central Authority and the Director-General, Department of Community Services (NSW) and other named persons as parties to the damages suit. That application was heard by me and orders made dismissing the application were made on 31 May 2007.
·An application for interim and final parenting orders under the provisions of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). Interim and final orders were made by Le Poer Trench J. The father’s appeal against interim parenting orders made by Le Poer Trench J was withdrawn. The current appeal is in respect of final parenting orders made by his Honour on 18 July 2007.
The present applications were listed before me on 20 November 2007 on which day I made orders for the filing of written submissions by the father, the Secretary and the Director-General and reserved my reasons. I will refer to the submissions in detail shortly.
The father submits in his pre-argument statement filed in the present appeal that the Family Court of Australia lacks jurisdiction to make parenting orders in respect of F, or perhaps that Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum to determine parenting issues, as the parents, whilst living in the US, submitted themselves to the courts of that country (New Orleans). The father submits the only jurisdiction this Court can exercise is to determine an application for access by him to F under the Hague Convention. He further submits that he has at no time “acquiesced as to jurisdiction”, and that his application for parenting orders was “made only in the alternative due to erroneous advice from the Full Court”(original emphasis).
In his pre-argument statement the father also refers to Article 21 of the Hague Convention, which article makes provision for applications “to make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access”. He submits, using the language of Article 21, that such applications may be “presented to the Central Authorities of the Contracting States in the same way as an application for the return of a child.” The practical implementation of Article 21 is found in regulation 23 of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (“the Regulations”). There is no evidence before me of any application filed by the father or the Central Authority under regulation 23, or regulation 24, rather the proceedings which were before the Court under the Hague Convention were proceedings for the return of the child to the US pursuant to the father’s right of custody.
Notwithstanding the father’s arguments, he has filed an appeal against final parenting orders made by Le Poer Trench J on 18 July 2007 under Part VII of the Act and the current applications arise in the course of that appeal.
As the father is no longer in Australia he made application to appear in the present application by telephone from the United States. I made orders in chambers permitting him to appear by telephone on 20 November 2007.
I was satisfied that the father had effected service of his application on the Secretary, and the Director-General, after Ms Morgan of counsel appeared on behalf of the Secretary, and Ms Pereira appeared on behalf of the Director-General. The father’s application was opposed by Ms Morgan and Ms Pereira on behalf of the Secretary and the Director-General respectively. I granted leave to the Secretary and the Director-General to make oral applications for orders which I set out below.
Orders sought in the competing applications
To aid understanding of these reasons, it is appropriate that I set out the orders sought by the parties. The father sought orders as follows:
1.Order joining respondents: (1) Commonwealth Central Authority; and/or (2) Director General of Community Services for New South Wales, Hon. Neil Shepherd.
(2) Interim “access rights” under Hague (child abduction) Convention/Australia [sic] Regulations;
(3) Order granting applicant time in which to cure any alleged deficiencies as to pleadings or evidence;
(4) Order against “Central Authority” for Future Attorney Fees;
(5) Costs Order against Central Authority.
2.Leave to cross-examine Philip Ruddock, Nan Levett (office of Commonwealth Attorney General); Audrey Pereira and Jeevani Koranthota (of NSW DoCS).
The Secretary sought the following orders:
16.The Commonwealth Attorney General and the Commonwealth Central Authority submit that the application in a case should be dismissed.
17.Further, the Court should order that the appellant not serve any documents in Appeal No EA 91 of 2007 on:
a)the Commonwealth Attorney-General;
b)the Commonwealth Central Authority;
c)the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department or any of its officers;
or
d)the Australian Government Solicitor,
without leave of the Full Court of the Family Court.
The Director General sought the following orders:
1.That the form 2 application filed by the appellant on 25 September 2007 be dismissed.
2.That the appellant be and is hereby injuncted and restrained from serving any documents in Appeal EA 91 of 2007 on:
(a)the NSW Central Authority;
(b)the Department of Community Services NSW;
(c)the Director-General [sic] the Department of Community Services NSW;
(d)Dr Neill Sheperd;
(e)Ms Jeevani Korathota; and
(f)Ms Madelaine Audrey Pereira.
without first having obtained the leave of the Full Court.
I propose to first consider the orders sought in the father’s application, and then deal with the applications of the Secretary and Director-General.
Asserted basis for joining additional parties to the appeal
The father relies on his affidavit affirmed on 25 September 2007 in support of his application. He deposes as follows:
1.Named respondents must be added as indispensable parties because the matter on appeal is moot as a matter of law. The proper judicial process for the father-applicant was/is for him to obtain and/or enforce his parental access rights by obtaining an “access order” pursuant to the Hague (Child Abduction) Convention (Australia Regulations).
2.The named respondents must be cross-examined to ascertain why they did not seek and/or protect the father’s access rights, and why they did not otherwise comply with Australia’s responsibilities as a signatory to the subject child abduction treaty; and why they breached their duty of care owed a “left-behind” parent under common law.
3.This Affidavit is in support of the deponent’s Application seeking to join the following parties, whose addresses are also listed: (a) Commonwealth Central Authority (Robert Garran Offices – National Circuit – Barton ACT); and (b) Dir. Gen. NSW Dept. Community Services, Hon. Neil Shepherd (DX 21212 – Ashfield)
4.The named respondents are all necessary parties because, among other reasons to be submitted at hearing, they were at all times indispensable parties who initially failed in their duty under Australia’s Constitution to properly and expedictiously [sic] carry out the subject court order for the return of the applicant-father’s son to America.
5.The respondents are necessary parties because, upon the father’s arrival, said respondents failed to protect the father’s access rights once obtained pursuant to the Australia Regulations, and failed to seek access for the applicant in accordance with the requirements of the Australia Regulations and Hague (child abduction) Convention.
6.This negligence by respondents regarding the applicant-father’s access rights to his child represents a failure of their “duty of care” under common law. Respondentrs’ [sic] intentional failure to perform their duty under the Constitution and Hague (child abduction) Convention Australia Regulations, caused and/or contributed to the father’s costs and expenses to date and continuing, including the cost of future attorney fees regarding the access rights issue.
7.The appellant further applicant [sic] seeks cross-examiination [sic] of the following Commonwealth Government actors:
Nan Levett, Commonwealth Attorney General Office--in regards to certain emails to appellant and US State Dept.
Neil Shepherd, Director General of NSW Dept. of Community Services -– in regards to his driections [sic] to Ms. Pereira
Audrey Pereira, NSW Dept. of Community Services -– in regards to certain false or contentious statements made in her Affidavit and Submissions to the Full Court as to who was responsible for returning the subject child;
Jeevani Korathota, NSW Dept. of Community Service--in regards to her handling of this matter for DoCS in 2004.
Relevant provisions of the Act and rules
Section 94(2B)(a) of the Act enables the Full Court, or a Judge of the Appeal Division or other Judge if no Judge of the Appeal Division is available, to join or remove a party to an appeal.
Chapter 6 of the Family Law Rules 2004 deals with “Parties”. The following rules are relevant to this application:
Rule 6.01 which defines a party to include “an appellant in an appeal”
Rule 6.02 which provides as follows:
(1) A person whose rights may be directly affected by an issue in a case, and whose participation as a party is necessary for the court to determine all issues in dispute in the case, must be included as a party to the case.
Example
If a party seeks an order of a kind mentioned in section 90AE or 90AF of the Act, a third party who will be bound by the order must be joined as a respondent to the case.
(2) If an application is made for a parenting order, the following must be parties to the case:
(a) the parents of the child;
(b) any other person in whose favour a parenting order is currently in force in relation to the child;
(c) any other person with whom the child lives and who is responsible for the care, welfare and development of the child;
(d) if a State child order is currently in place in relation to the child — the prescribed child welfare authority.
(3) If a person mentioned in subrule (2) is not an applicant in a case involving the child, that person must be joined as a respondent to the application.
Note The court may dispense with compliance with a rule (see rule 1.12).
Also relevant are Rules 6.03 and 6.04. They provide as follows:
Rule 6.03 provides:
(1) A party may include another person as a respondent by naming the person in the application.
(2) A party may add another party after a case has started by:
(a) amending the application or response, as the case may be, to add the name of the person; and
(b) by serving on the new party a copy of the application or response, and any other relevant document filed in the case.
Note 1 For amendment of an application, see Division 11.2.2.
Note 2 If a Form is amended after the first court date, the Registry Manager will set a date for a further procedural hearing (see subrule 11.10 (3)).
Note 3 A reference to application includes a reference to cross-application (see the dictionary).
Rule 6.04 provides:
A party may apply to be removed as a party to a case.
Note Rule 5.01 sets out the procedure for making an Application in a Case.
Of particular relevance is Rule 22.04. It provides as follows:
Each person who is directly affected by the orders sought in the Notice of Appeal, or who is likely to be interested in maintaining the order under appeal, must be made a respondent to the appeal.
Note An application may be made to have a person added or removed as a party to an appeal (see paragraphs 94(2B)(a) and 94AAA(8)(a) of the Act, paragraphs 102(6)(a) and 102A(7)(a) of the Assessment Act and paragraphs 107(5)(a) and 107A(7)(a) of the Registration Act). See Division 22.7.1 for how to make an application relating to an appeal.
The submissions filed by the father, the secretary and the director general
The father’s submissions as to why it is necessary to join the Secretary and the Director-General as parties to the appeal in summary are as follows:
·that the Secretary and the Director-General failed to implement the original order made by a Judicial Registrar in 2004 for the return of the child to the US;
·that as “repeat players” the “government lawyers” had an obligation to provide assistance to the Full Court hearing the mother’s appeal about the father’s access rights under the Hague Convention;
·that the effect of the trial Judge’s orders is to perpetuate the child’s “psychological trauma” thus an access order (under the Hague Convention) is required; and
·that the reference in the Secretary’s submissions at the hearing (Exhibit B) to the father’s previous joinder application in his damages/cost claim are not apposite or relevant to this application.
The Secretary opposes joinder to this appeal on the basis that the Commonwealth Central Authority was not a party to the proceedings before the trial Judge, and that the Secretary is not affected in terms of rule 22.04 of the rules. I will return to discuss rule 22.04 later in these reasons.
It is submitted on behalf of the Director-General that he was not a party in the proceedings at first instance. It is also submitted that when considering the appeal the Full Court will be limited to consideration of whether or not the trial Judge “made errors of law or principle”. It is finally submitted that the appeal is not an opportunity to re-litigate previous issues.
Discussion
It is not in dispute that the parties before the trial Judge were the mother and father, and that an independent children’s lawyer was appointed. The independent children’s lawyer is not participating in the appeal and sought leave to withdraw (see rule 8.02(5)).
I am satisfied, having regard to rule 22.04 that neither the Secretary nor the Director-General are interested in maintaining the order under appeal. The orders made by the trial Judge are relevant to the mother, the father and the child.
A narrow reading of rule 22.04 (which requires that only “a person” who is “directly affected by the orders sought in the Notice of Appeal” must be joined as a respondent to the appeal) could be construed as only referable to a party in the proceedings being named as a party to an appeal. However consistent with authority, a purposive construction is appropriate, and would indicate that a person whose interests may be affected by an order made in an appeal should be joined as a party to an appeal. The rule is consistent with general law authorities (see for example Australian Industry Group v Automotive Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (2002) 125 FCR 529; Re McBain; ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 372; (2002) 188 ALR 1).
The father seeks the following orders in the event his appeal is allowed:
1.Equal/Shared Parenting of the child during his stay in Australia;
2.A proper Court Order from Australia respecting the parents’ present (legal) American child custody orders of Honorable Madeleine Landrieu.
3.Removal to Court of competent jurisdiction to provide an Access order pursuant to the Hague Convention (Australia Regulations);a proper Form 3 has already been filed with the Office of Attorney General in accordance with the regulations;
4.Father requires an immediate turnover of custody to repair the damage done to his son;
5.Father requires permission to return his son to America when the child is comfortable about returning;
6.Father requires counselling between father and son, if necessary for them to be re-united properly;
7.Father requires equal/shared parenting, including face-to- face contact and access to his child.
8.A finding that “parental child abduction is child abuse” and -- as applied to the instant case – a finding that the abducting mother/partner/maternal relatives are abusing the subject child by being his abductors.
9.Waiver of Court filing fees, pursuant to previous Court Orders.
10.Undertakings that child’s maternal family refrain from “alienation” of child against his father.
11.Costs against “abductors” (mother, grandmother, DoCS/Commonwealth of Australia)) [sic]
It is inappropriate for me on this application to exhaustively examine the father’s proposed grounds of appeal, (many of which are generally framed and/or do not constitute proper grounds of appeal), and to consider the merits or otherwise of those grounds. It is impossible to predict whether, if the Full Court found error by the trial Judge, it would itself re-exercise the discretion of the trial Judge or would remit the matter for rehearing. I would expect however given the nature of the proceedings, it is more likely than not, in the event of a successful appeal, a re-trial would be ordered.
The orders sought by the father appear to confuse orders which can be made under Part VII of the Act, and orders made pursuant to applications made under the Regulations. It appears the father submits that the trial Judge should have determined his application as one brought on a Form 3 (or semble a Form 4 application) under the Regulations for access to the child in Australia, or that pursuant to a “right of access” the child should be returned by the Director-General to the US.
I perceive there are a number of difficulties with the position which the father advances:
(a)there is no evidence before me the father, or the US Central authority has lodged a request on a Form 3 for the Central authority to pursue a “right of access”, or if such application has been lodged, the date of its lodgement (that is, before or after the proceedings before the trial Judge);
(b)there was no application before the trial Judge to determine an access application under the Regulations for the father to spend time with the child in Australia;
(c)the Central Authority did bring an application, based on the father’s “right of custody” for orders under the Regulations for the return of the child to the US. That application has been determined, and the father’s appeal rights, the father not having pursued an application for special leave, are spent;
(d)the trial Judge had jurisdiction to make a parenting order (see s 69E of the Act).
In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the Full Court hearing the appeal would not make orders in the re-exercise of its discretion under the Regulations. That is a matter to be determined at first instance if a proper application is filed. Thus, the Court would not make an order affecting the Secretary or the Director-General. Accordingly I am satisfied that it is inappropriate to make orders joining the Secretary and the Director-General as parties to the appeal.
As I am satisfied that the Secretary and the Director-General should not be joined as parties to the appeal it is unnecessary for me to consider the relief sought by the father in paragraphs 1(2), (3), (4) and (5) of his application. However, before leaving consideration of these paragraphs I record that I see merit in the submissions filed on behalf of the Secretary on this topic.
The father seeks leave to cross-examine “Philip Ruddock, Nan Levett (office of the Commonwealth Attorney General); Audrey Pereira and Jeevani Koranthota (of NSW DoCS)”. The named persons were not parties or witnesses at the hearing before the trial Judge. It is not normal procedure for witnesses to be called at the hearing of an appeal, although I accept if the Full Court allowed the appeal, and proposed to re-exercise the discretion, it could receive further evidence from relevant witnesses who could be required for cross-examination. Such a scenario is purely speculative, and there is no basis established in the present application for Order 2 sought in the father’s application.
Orders sought by the Secretary and the Director-General
At the conclusion of the brief hearing on the papers before me on 20 November 2007 I made orders for the Secretary and the Director-General to file written submissions in respect of the orders sought on their behalf, and for the provision of any relevant authorities to support the orders sought.
The written submissions filed on behalf of the Secretary noted:
The Commonwealth is not seeking an order pursuant to s 118 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the Act) nor seeking the Court exercise power in the nature of a court, in equity, granting relief from vexatious or oppressive litigation. (paragraph 2)
On behalf of the Secretary it is submitted that this Court has jurisdiction under s 94(2B)(c) to make the orders sought to restrain the father from serving documents on the Secretary. It is submitted:
The Commonwealth submits that a s 94(2B)(c) is sufficient for a single judge of the Appeal Division to direct that the appellant not serve any further documents on persons not parties to the current appeal, without leave of the Court. (paragraph 4) [original emphasis]
The alternate suggested power to make the orders sought is s 114(3). It is submitted that:
Alternatively, as the appeal proceedings are not para (e) matrimonial cause proceedings, the Court’s general power, to order injunctions, pursuant to sub-section 114(3) of the Act may be exercised. That sub-section provides:
(3)A court exercising jurisdiction under this Act in proceedings other than proceedings to which subsection (1) applies may grant an injunction, by interlocutory order or otherwise (including an injunction in aid of the enforcement of a decree) in any case in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient to do so and either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate. (paragraph 5) [original emphasis]
As I have already noted, the Secretary’s position is that the order sought to restrain service of documents is not sought under s 118 of the Act. I therefore do not address any discussion to that section of the Act.
I propose to deal initially with the status of the Secretary and the Director-General, who are not parties to this litigation, and who have resisted being joined to the litigation to seek orders. I propose then to consider, if necessary, the legislative and evidentiary bases on which the Secretary and the Director-General seek relief.
Counsel for the Secretary, and the solicitor for the Director-General do not seek to become a party to the appeal, to intervene in the proceedings, and neither have complied with rule 6.05 of the rules, nor has the Secretary sought to intervene in the name of the Attorney General under s 91 of the Act (as provided in rule 6.06).
Thus, I must consider the standing of the Secretary and the Director-General to seek relief in these proceedings. The question of standing to seek relief was discussed by the High Court in Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27. Gibbs CJ described the proceedings in that case in the following terms (footnotes omitted):
The case is therefore one in which two private citizens who cannot show that any right of their own has been infringed bring an action for the purpose of restraining another private citizen (Alcoa) from breaking the criminal law by acting in contravention of s. 21 of the Relics Act…
and concluded:
A plaintiff has no standing to bring an action to prevent the violation of a public right if he has no interest in the subject matter beyond that of any other member of the public; if no private right of his is interfered with he has standing to sue only if he has a special interest in the subject matter of the action. The rule is obviously a flexible one since, as was pointed out in that case, the question what is a sufficient interest will vary according to the nature of the subject matter of the litigation.
(see also Rothwells Ltd (In Liquidation) v The Defendants Listed in Schedule “A” trading as KMG Hungerfords & Ors (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Adams M, 29 March 1994, 27 April 1994).
Nothing in the submissions made by the Secretary or the Director-General supports a finding that either has a special interest in the parenting proceedings between the parties the subject of the appeal. Thus I am satisfied they do not have the standing to bring an application for the relief sought.
Further, even if the Secretary and/or the Director-General had a special interest, and/or standing, there is no evidence at all before me which would justify the granting of an injunction in the terms sought, whether interlocutory or permanent, pending the disposition of the appeal. I therefore propose to dismiss the oral applications made on behalf of the Secretary and the Director-General.
I certify that the preceding forty three (43) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Boland
Associate:
Date: 15 May 2008
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