640 the Esplanade Pty Ltd v Splash Bay Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

640 The Esplanade Pty Ltd v Splash Bay Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 89

File number: QUD 851 of 2015
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 14 February 2017
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application by substituted plaintiff to wind up the defendant – applicability of s 459S of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) where an application to wind up a company by a substituted plaintiff – whether a defendant company may challenge a substituted plaintiff’s statutory demand in a winding up application brought by the substituted creditor
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 459A, 459C, 459E, 459F, 459G, 459P, 459S, 465B, 465C

Duties Act 2001 (Qld) s 487

Federal Court (Corporations) Rules2000 (Cth) r 5.2

Cases cited:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Lanepoint Enterprises Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) (2011) 244 CLR 1

Bibby Financial Services Pty Ltd v Wolf Industries Pty Ltd (2004) 49 ACSR 45; [2004] NSWSC 134

Burnitt & Anor v Pacific Paradise Resort Pty Ltd [2004] QDC 218

Caxton Street Agencies Pty Ltd v Korkidas & Anor [2002] QSC 210

Franks v Norfolk Estates Pty Ltd [2004] QFC 301

In the matter of C2C Investments Pty Limited (No 9) [2013] NSWSC 269

In the matter of Gladstone Mortgagee No 1 Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1551

Kelvingrove (1993) Pty Ltd v ParatooPty Ltd (1998) 16 ACLC 964

Kisimul Holdings Pty Ltd v Clear Position Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 262

Mission Development Group Pty Ltd v RhettPty Ltd [2004] QSC 359

Vercorp Pty Ltd v Lin [2007] 2 Qd R 180

Assaf F, Statutory Demands and Winding up in Insolvency (2nd ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2012)

Seddon N, Seddon on Deeds (The Federation Press, 2015)

Date of hearing: 30 August 2016, 31 August 2016 and 15 September 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 144
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr C F O’Meara
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Hillhouse Burrough McKeown Solicitors
Counsel for the Defendant: Mr N J Shaw
Solicitor for the Defendant: Johanson Lawyers

ORDERS

QUD 851 of 2015
BETWEEN:

640 THE ESPLANADE PTY LTD ACN 161 057 638

Plaintiff

AND:

SPLASH BAY PTY LTD ACN 158 274 723

Defendant

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 FEBRUARY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The defendant be wound up.

2.William Paul Cotter and William Roland Robson be appointed as joint and several liquidators of the defendant.

3.The plaintiff’s costs (including reserved costs, if any) be taxed and reimbursed out of the property of the defendant in accordance with s 466(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. Splash Bay Pty Ltd (Splash Bay) is the trustee of the Splash Bay Unit Trust.  It holds land at Hervey Bay, Queensland which it initially proposed to develop as…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of 640 the Esplanade Pty Ltd v Splash Bay Pty Ltd (No 2), the plaintiff, 640 the Esplanade Pty Ltd, sought to wind up the defendant, Splash Bay Pty Ltd, on the basis of an unpaid debt. The dispute involved whether 640 could substitute itself as the creditor and proceed with the winding-up application after initially failing to do so. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether a substituted plaintiff in a winding-up application brought under s 459S of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) could be challenged by the defendant company. The court also considered whether the debt claimed was genuinely disputed or whether the winding-up proceedings constituted an abuse of process.

The court examined the history of the relationship between the parties, particularly the dealings between Mr Plunkett and Mr Richards, and the involvement of interests associated with Mr Plunkett in projects promoted by Mr Richards and his partner. The court found that the relationship between Mr Plunkett and Mr Richards had deteriorated significantly. Mr Richards’ desire to develop Splash Bay's land led him to raise finance at high interest rates, causing Splash Bay to incur significant debt. As of the hearing date, Splash Bay had not secured finance for its third proposed development iteration.

The court concluded that 640 could proceed with the winding-up application as a substituted plaintiff and that the debt was not genuinely disputed. The court found no evidence of abuse of process and dismissed Splash Bay's opposition on those grounds. The court also rejected the argument that the debt was trust property and that 640 was no longer the trustee of the relevant trust. The court exercised its discretion to order the winding up of Splash Bay and appointed liquidators for the company.

The final orders of the court were that Splash Bay be wound up, that William Paul Cotter and William Roland Robson be appointed as joint and several liquidators, and that the plaintiff's costs be taxed and reimbursed out of the property of Splash Bay in accordance with s 466(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The defendant be wound up.

2. William Paul Cotter and William Roland Robson be appointed as joint and several liquidators of the defendant.

3. The plaintiff’s costs (including reserved costs, if any) be taxed and reimbursed out of the property of the defendant in accordance with s 466(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The evidence filed on behalf of Splash Bay also suggested that it would raise duress as a ground of opposition to the application to wind it up but that was not pressed by Splash Bay as a separate ground.FACTS A significant amount of evidence was led by the parties in relation to the history of the dealings between them and how interests associated with Mr Plunkett came to be involved in various projects being promoted by Mr Richards and his business partner, Ian Buckeridge. To the extent that they are relevant or provide context for the consideration of the issues now before me for determination I set out those facts below. Before doing so I make some general observations. The events which led to this proceeding span a period of almost four years. It is clear that the principal protagonists, Mr Plunkett and Mr Richards, have had an irretrievable breakdown in their business relationship. The facts disclose that Mr Richards’ desire for Splash Bay to develop its land led him on a path of raising finance from non bank lenders at extremely high interest rates, causing Splash Bay to incur significant debts in order to forestall any action that might undermine the project and to keep the project alive. As at the date of hearing, Splash Bay was at its third iteration of the proposed development on its land and had not yet secured finance to proceed with that development. Both Mr Richards and Mr Plunkett gave evidence by way of affidavit and were cross examined. Neither Mr Plunkett nor Mr Richards impressed me as witnesses. Mr Plunkett’s evidence was at times confusing and at other times defensive. Mr Richards is clearly an experienced businessman but I found him to be a most unsatisfactory witness. He was intentionally evasive and, at times, argumentative. On many occasions Mr Richards did not answer the question that was put, despite it being evident that he understood what was being asked. Rather, he attempted to give answers that would suit his version of events and questioned the cross examiner’s intent in pursuing lines of questioning. Mr Richards’ attitude and demeanour in cross examination left me with the impression that at times he was less than frank in his responses.Mr Plunkett makes his first investment In or about September 2012 Mr Plunkett was approached by Guy Richards, Mr Richards’ nephew, who told Mr Plunkett that he was involved in a property development in Queensland; that Mr Richards and Mr Buckeridge were both experienced property developers and fund raisers; and that there was an opportunity for him to become involved in the development and make some money. Mr Plunkett was interested in the investment and was introduced to Messrs Richards and Buckeridge. Mr Plunkett had a series of meetings with Messrs Richards and Buckeridge at which they told Mr Plunkett about some of the developments in which they were involved; explained that in return for his investment Mr Plunkett would become a syndicate member holding units in two unit trusts, 637 The Esplanade Unit Trust and the Splash Bay Unit Trust (collectively, Syndicates), which each held a parcel of land for the syndicate investors located respectively at 637 The Esplanade Urangan, Queensland (637 Land) and 835 Boat Harbour Drive Urangan, Queensland (collectively, Syndicate Land); and provided spreadsheets demonstrating the return to investors and an investment prospectus. Between September and December 2012 Mr Plunkett invested $340,000 in the Syndicates (Mr Plunkett’s Syndicate Investment).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This proceeding commenced on 14 September 2015 when Christopher Rosch, a creditor of Splash Bay, filed an application seeking an order that Splash Bay be wound up pursuant to s 459A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) and that a liquidator be appointed based on a failure by Splash Bay to comply with a creditor’s statutory demand issued pursuant to s 459E of the Corporations Act. Mr Rosch had served a creditor’s statutory demand for payment issued pursuant to s 459E of the Corporations Act on Splash Bay (Rosch Demand) and an affidavit in support on the registered office of Splash Bay by express prepaid post despatched on 5 August 2015. Splash Bay failed to comply with the Rosch Demand or to secure or compound for that amount within 21 days after it was served. On 21 August 2015 a creditor’s statutory demand for payment was prepared on behalf of 640 and issued pursuant to s 459E of the Corporations Act and was served by registered post on Splash Bay (640 Demand). The 640 Demand sought payment of $511,080.58, described as the total of loans made by 640 to Splash Bay over the period 23 April 2013 to 21 October 2013 and accrued interest. On or about 11 September 2015 the solicitor for Splash Bay informed the solicitor for 640 that Splash Bay disputed the debt the subject of the 640 Demand on the ground that it had been forgiven by 640. Splash Bay did not file an application to set aside the 640 Demand. 640 did not commence proceedings to wind up Splash Bay based on its failure to comply with the 640 Demand because it became aware that this proceeding had been commenced by Mr Rosch. When Mr Rosch reached a compromise with Splash Bay, 640 applied pursuant to s 465B of the Corporations Act to be substituted as a creditor and on 10 December 2015 the Court made an order to that effect. Splash Bay opposes the application to wind it up on grounds that:·640 is not owed a debt or alternatively there is a genuine dispute as to whether it is owed a debt;·the winding up proceeding is an abuse of process;·the debt claimed by 640 was trust property and 640 is no longer the trustee of the relevant trust; and·the Court should exercise its discretion to dismiss the application. The evidence filed on behalf of Splash Bay also suggested that it would raise duress as a ground of opposition to the application to wind it up but that was not pressed by Splash Bay as a separate ground.FACTS A significant amount of evidence was led by the parties in relation to the history of the dealings between them and how interests associated with Mr Plunkett came to be involved in various projects being promoted by Mr Richards and his business partner, Ian Buckeridge. To the extent that they are relevant or provide context for the consideration of the issues now before me for determination I set out those facts below. Before doing so I make some general observations. The events which led to this proceeding span a period of almost four years. It is clear that the principal protagonists, Mr Plunkett and Mr Richards, have had an irretrievable breakdown in their business relationship. The facts disclose that Mr Richards’ desire for Splash Bay to develop its land led him on a path of raising finance from non bank lenders at extremely high interest rates, causing Splash Bay to incur significant debts in order to forestall any action that might undermine the project and to keep the project alive. As at the date of hearing, Splash Bay was at its third iteration of the proposed development on its land and had not yet secured finance to proceed with that development.