2303859 (Refugee)

2303859 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 2584 (1 June 2023)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REPRESENTATIVE:  Ms Alison Battisson
CASE NUMBER:  2303859
COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Iran
MEMBER:Nicole Burns
DATE:1 June 2023
PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.
Statement made on 01 June 2023 at 5:43pm

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – Protection Visa – Iran –political opinion – has political views in opposition to the Iranian regime –attended anti-hijab demonstrations – political opinion as an educated female protestor –membership of the particular social group – highly educated female – a failed seeker of refuge – applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5H, 36, 65, 91, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
CASES
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
MIAC v MZYHS [2011] FCA 53

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 16 March 2023 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Iran, applied for the visa on 1 January 2023.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 5 May 2023 to give evidence and present arguments about the issues in her case. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Persian and English languages.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review. The representative attended the hearing via video link, from Sydney.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)–(6) and ss 5K–LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
The most recent DFAT country information report on Iran is dated 14 April 2020.
CONSIDERATION OF Claims and evidence
The applicant is a [age]-year-old woman originally from Amol, Iran. She arrived in Australia on [date] December 2022 holding a student visa. However given she did not hold a valid confirmation of enrolment (COE), her student visa was cancelled on arrival, and she was detained.
The applicant applied for a protection visa on 1 January 2023 and provided a copy of her Iranian passport. The delegate accepted she was an Iranian national, as does the Tribunal on review.
In a written statement dated 3 January 2023 provided in support of the protection visa application the applicant stated the following about her background and protection claims (summarised):[1]
[1] As accurately recorded by the delegate in their decision record, a copy of which the applicant provided to the Tribunal on review.
·She is from Amol, Mazandaran Province, and completed undergraduate, masters and PhD studies in Iran, undertaking [research]
·She was awarded a postgraduate scholarship in Australia, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic she was unable to take up her study, and when she later travelled to Australia in December 2022 her COE had been cancelled and she was refused entry.
·She needed to leave Iran and is afraid to return there, where there have been a lot of recent problems, including protests and riots about women not wearing hijab and not having rights.
·As a highly educated woman she is in a group of people who have been targeted because they are seen as being able to influence others, especially women.
·Friends from university have been arrested and charged because they raised their voices about the treatment of women, and she is afraid that if she says anything she will be arrested, which scares her because political prisoners in Iran are brutally treated, some dying in custody, and others executed.
·If she says nothing, many friends and family will try to force her to join the protests, which will harm her psychologically as they will make her feel like a coward who is deserting women’s causes.
·She felt she had to escape from Iran, and is afraid that she has a profile with the authorities because of her education and because of her close friendships with certain people.
·She is afraid to be deported back to Iran, because regardless of what the Australian authorities say on her paperwork as the reason for her return, the Iranian authorities see university scholars as a threat.
·She was afraid and uncomfortable to tell everything to the interviewing officer at the airport, but there were serious incidents which directly affected her before she came to Australia.
·Approximately 60 days ago she took part in protests against the regime in Esfahan, where she said many of ‘us’ were arrested by the authorities and detained, and all boys and girls who were taken experienced abuses including being sworn at, bashed, spat on and humiliated.
·She was fortunate to be released, being told that she was only because they did not see her breaking things or damaging property, but many detained students have disappeared since being taken by the authorities.
·She was in Esfahan working as a researcher, and living in university accommodation, and for two weeks after her release she was afraid to leave her room, fearing arrest again.
·Three weeks prior to leaving Iran she was followed by a car in Tehran, and then officers took her phone and downloaded all of her content and told her they would arrest her if their inspection revealed anything they did not like.
·These incidents have terrified her and mean she knows that she has a profile in Iran.
·Although she was allowed to leave the country lawfully, she has been made aware that she will be under surveillance if she returns, which terrifies her as she will not know if the authorities will try to arrest her again.
·She fears that if she returns to Iran the authorities will detain her again, and she will be subjected to mistreatment including sexual assault, which occurs commonly to break their dignity, and as a single woman she could not tolerate that abuse of her body.
·As a woman her life is in great danger if she returns to Iran as a failed protection seeker.
·She does not want to risk her safety in Iran and hopes to be allowed to stay and become a useful member of Australian society. She has a good job offer here, where she can apply her knowledge and training for the benefit of Australia.
The applicant’s (then) representative provided a written submission to the Department dated 30 January 2023. In it the representative argues that the applicant faces a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Iran for reasons of her political opinion, as an educated woman protestor and a failed seeker of refuge, and as a member of a particular social group, as a well-educated woman.
The representative refers to country information about the treatment of political prisoners in Iran, and conflict and unrest since Mahsa Amini – a 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman – died in September 2022, to support his contentions in this regard.
The applicant also provided to the Department untranslated screenshots of her [social media] profile and a selection of her [social media] posts.
On 16 March 2023 the delegate refused the visa application, not satisfied Australia had protection obligations in the applicant’s case. While they accepted the applicant was a highly educated woman, the delegate did not accept she had participated in an anti-government protest in Esfahan in late 2022 due to inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence in some respects, and given she failed to mention this at all at her interview with immigration officials on arrival in Australia. The delegate did not accept the applicant’s claims to have been arrested and detained in relation to that protest. They did however accept she had her phone confiscated by the authorities in Tehran three weeks before she left the country, as claimed, but ultimately found this would not result in a real chance of serious or significant harm on return.
On review the representative provided to the Tribunal a statutory declaration from the applicant dated 30 May 2023 in which she corrects and clarifies some points in her protection visa application about her opposition to the Iranian regime’s treatment of women, and her protest experiences in the past (before and after the death of Mahsa Amini). She also explains why she was confused about the dates she lived in Esfahan and attending a protest there (among other things).
The representative provided to the Tribunal a written submission dated 30 April 2023 setting out the applicant’s background, protection claims and a selection of country information to support her contention that the applicant’s fears on return to Iran are well founded.
The following material was also provided to the Tribunal in support of the applicant’s review application:
·A copy of a letter from [Ms A] (undated and unsigned),[2] who states she has known the applicant since 2016 when she came as a visitor student to the [University 1], Brisbane (where she was a PhD student at the time). Several photographs of the applicant in Australia (including without a hijab) were provided by Ms [A].
[2] The representative indicated a signed and dated copy would be provided subsequently. However to date this has not been provided.
·A copy of a letter from [an] Associate [Professor] of [University 2] (undated). In it they confirm the applicant was their research assistant from October 2021 to November 2022 at [University 2]; that the applicant participated in several conference papers submitted for [a seminar]; and that she was a member of the executive committee of the conference.
·A copy of a letter translated from Persian to English from the applicant’s sister, [name], dated 9 April 2023. In it she describes (among other things) the applicant’s long-held views about women’s rights in Iran; the applicant’s experiences with the morality police and university security officials when she failed to wear proper hijab in Iran; the applicant’s involvement in protests in Iran; and also her own (and her teenage daughter’s) experiences of gender discrimination and restrictions there.
·A statutory declaration signed by Dr [B], on 1 May 2023. In it Dr [B] states she is aware of the applicant’s situation and shares the applicant’s belief that should she be returned to Iran, she would be in danger of arrest and unjust imprisonment, that her phone records and social media activity would certainly be monitored, and that the authorities would have opened a file on the applicant following her arrest.
·An email showing the executive committee (listing the applicant, and others) for [a seminar].
·A translation of an Islamic Republic News article titled ‘[deleted]’ dated [date] October 2022.
·A copy of a University World News article titled ‘Students call for boycotts, strikes amid ongoing protests’ dated 28 September 2022.
·A copy of a Voice of America Persian Service article titled ‘Report: Iran May be Using Facial Recognition Technology to Police Hijab Law’ dated 13 January 2023.
·A selection of the applicant’s translated [social media] posts (using an [social media] ID different to her name).
·A selection of the applicant’s translated screenshots of virtual private network messages.
·Several social media photographs of the applicant, including some showing her without a head scarf, and some with a loose head scarf.
·A translated copy of the applicant’s [social media] profile using the name ‘[Alias]’.
At hearing the applicant gave evidence about her background, reasons she left Iran, and fears if she has to return there in the foreseeable future, summarised as follows.
The applicant said she grew up in Amol, Iran where her parents [and siblings] currently live. Her other sister – [name] – lives in Tehran. The applicant studied her bachelor’s degree, masters and PhD in different universities in Iran, completing her PhD in 2018. While undertaking her PhD she spent eight months at [University 1], in Brisbane, returning to [Iran] to finish her PhD on [date] September 2018.
After completing her PhD in Iran the applicant returned to live with her parents in Amol, where she worked as a [occupation] while looking for a job. She then obtained work as a research assistant at [University 2], Esfahan where she lived on campus, from October 2021 to November 2022.
The applicant explained that in late 2020 she had received a scholarship to undertake a second PhD (focusing on [specified] issues) at [University 3] in Australia, and was granted a student visa by the Australian government on 13 October 2020, valid until 23 November 2025. However, she was unable to travel to Australia and take up her studies at that time due to the borders being closed (and lack of flights) because of COVID-19 related restrictions. Additionally, her mother had been diagnosed with [medical condition] and as the only single daughter in their family, she had to care for her. The applicant said she lost the offer of her scholarship as a result in August 2021. She applied again through [University 3] in July 2022, and, hopeful this would eventuate, she purchased a ticket to Australia on 2 October 2022. By December that year, although she did not have confirmation from the university, she decided to leave Iran given the situation she had found herself in.
The applicant said she left Iran in December 2022 because she had been detained overnight after participating in a demonstration in Esfahan against mandatory hijab requirements, had been questioned, and had her mobile phone seized, in late September that year. Although she was released shortly after she was scared about being detained again.
The applicant described the incident in Esfahan as follows. She said she attended the protest held at [location], which is around [number of hours] drive from where she resided at [University 2], in the evening. As the crowd got bigger, security forces arrived and released tear gas and shots into the crowd. Some people managed to escape, while some plainclothes men beat other protesters. Two plainclothes men approached, shouted at her and then forced her into a van along with other protesters. Inside the van she was handcuffed and had her mobile phone confiscated before being driven to an unknown location. On arrival she was placed into a separate room and questioned about which foreign government she supported, and where she got her orders from, among other things. Sometime later they let her go, because she had not damaged any property, and returned her to the place they picked her up from (in the same van) around midnight. They returned her mobile, but took down her details.
The applicant told the Tribunal that three weeks before she left Iran, while walking along the street in Tehran, she was approached by two officers from the Ministry of Information who confiscated her phone and checked for footage of any anti-hijab demonstrations. They did not find anything, and returned her phone, however the applicant was unnerved.
The applicant said she fears the authorities on return to Iran due to these incidents and also because of her continuing support for the movement for Iranian women, including being active on social media since Mahsa Amini’s death in September 2022. She fears being arrested, sent to court and then imprisoned where she faces a risk of torture and sexual violence. The government has passed new laws to imprison those who publicly announce that they are against compulsory hijab, and are actively monitoring women and girls in this respect, she said.
The applicant said she had previously expressed her opinion to university friends against the Iranian government’s policies restricting women’s lives, and she would continue to do so on return, and continue to protest. She was motivated for several reasons, including her own experiences of harassment. This included being cautioned by university security personnel several times in the past for wearing too loose hijab and too short clothes, and by the morality police on the streets on occasion for wearing loose hijab/showing some hair.
The applicant said that she would choose not to wear a hijab in Iran if there were not significant risks in doing so. When studying at [University 1] in Australia the applicant said she wore a hijab at the university only, noting her studies were half funded by the Iranian government.
Findings about the applicant’s past experiences in Iran

Considering the evidence before it, including the applicant’s oral evidence at hearing, the Tribunal makes the following findings about her past experiences in Iran relevant to her protection claims, and profile.
The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s evidence about her family, and her background including her education and work history. It accepts she was born in Amol, Mazandaran Province where her parents, [and siblings] continue to live. Another sister resides in Tehran, [working]. The Tribunal accepts the applicant completed her undergraduate studies [in] 2006 at [a university]; her master’s degree in 2009 at [a university]; and her PhD in 2018 at [a third university] (eight months of which were spent at [University 1], Brisbane, Australia).
It accepts during her studies in Iran the applicant held some part time [positions], as well as being financially supported by her family. At hearing she said the Iranian government funded 50 per cent of her studies when she was in Australia, which the Tribunal accepts.
The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s evidence about enrolling in a PhD at [University 3], and securing a scholarship, which subsequently fell through as she was unable to take up the offer due to COVID-19 related restrictions at the time, and because she had to care for her mother.
The Tribunal also accepts the applicant worked as a research assistant at [University 2] in Esfahan from October 2021 to November 2022. (Information which, according to the current representative in her submission to the Tribunal, was mistakenly omitted from the applicant’s protection visa application by her former representative.) In their decision record the delegate noted the applicant’s confusion at interview about the dates she allegedly lived and worked in Esfahan, which led them to doubt her claims about being involved in a demonstration there (combined with other concerns). The applicant explains this was due to confusion between the Gregorian and Persian calendars, and difficulties with translation. On review she provided a letter from the professor she purportedly worked for at [University 2] at the time who confirms these dates of employment, as well as a record of a conference she helped organise at the university in the relevant period. Her sister, in her statement provided to the Tribunal, also refers to the applicant working at [University 2] in Esfahan during this period.
Although not without some doubt, particularly given the applicant failed to mention her work and residence in Esfahan in her protection visa application, the Tribunal accepts on the basis of the evidence now provided that she did work as a research assistant at [University 2] in that period as claimed. Also that she lived on campus during this period.
The Tribunal has considered the applicant’s claims to have participated in a demonstration in Esfahan towards the end of September 2022 against the Iranian government’s mandatory hijab rules, and their poor treatment of women in general. It has several concerns about her evidence in this regard, for the following reasons.
First, the applicant’s claims in this respect have grown significantly from when she first arrived in Australia to presenting them at the Tribunal hearing. She made no mention of being involved in a protest at Esfahan (and related problems including being arrested and detained) at all when interviewed by Australian immigration officials shortly after arrival, including when asked specifically if there were any reasons why she should not be removed (from Australia). According to information contained in the delegate’s decision record, at that time the applicant referred to a worsening economic situation in Iran, not having a future in Iran, not having the right to protest, feeling unsafe, and women and girls being in a vulnerable situation; yet she did not indicate that she herself had been detained, or was otherwise of adverse interest to the authorities in Iran due to her participation in a protest there.
The first time the applicant introduced this claim was in her statement provided to the Department; however she provides limited detail and some of the information – for example when the protest took place – is inconsistent with her subsequent evidence to the Department at interview and to the Tribunal. That is, she states it took place around sixty days prior in her statement (which would be around 3 November 2022), not at the end of September 2022 as she now claims. The applicant has attributed this confusion to problems with converting the Iranian calendar, as well as being stressed at the first interview with the delegate. While the Tribunal appreciates that is possible, when combined with other concerns it has with her evidence, her confusion about the date of the protest (where she claims to have been arrested and detained) casts doubt on her claims in this regard.
As to why the applicant failed to mention this matter to the immigration officials shortly after her arrival in Australia, the applicant claims it was because she was afraid, uncomfortable, confused, did not understand Australian regulations, and was worried the Australian authorities would tell the authorities in Iran. However the Tribunal is not persuaded by this explanation, particularly given she is highly educated and it was the second time she had come to Australia, having lived here for almost a year in 2016 and having had to navigate Australian regulations (albeit in respect of student visas).
Second, there are other inconsistencies between the applicant’s statement provided to the Department, her evidence at the delegate’s interview, and oral evidence to the hearing in relation to this alleged incident. For example:
·In her written statement provided to the Department the applicant states that she was sworn at, bashed (Tribunal emphasis), spat on and humiliated when arrested and detained by the authorities in Esfahan. (Her representative also indicated the applicant was beaten at the time in her submission to the Tribunal.) However at hearing she said she was not physically attacked. The Tribunal considers this to be a significant inconsistency.
·At her first interview with the delegate (on 17 January 2023)[3] the applicant said she was held for one night and early in the morning, before sunrise, was taken back to [a location] and released. However at the Tribunal hearing the applicant said she was taken back to [a location] around midnight, where she then took transport – like an Uber – back to her residence at the university.
[3] As set out in the delegate’s decision record, a copy of which the applicant provided to the Tribunal on review.
Third, aspects of the applicant’s oral evidence about this incident at hearing was vague. For example she could not remember if the persons at the place where she was detained and questioned wore uniforms or not, or whether they took her handcuffs off at any time. She said she had never had such an experience and was in shock. While that may have been the case, the applicant’s vagueness in these respects, combined with other concerns, causes the Tribunal to doubt her claims about being detained.
Fourth, despite claiming to have a profile with the Iranian authorities due to this incident (and when she was stopped in Tehran and had her mobile phone confiscated in December 2022), the applicant was able to leave Iran (on a passport issued in her own name) without any problems. Country information (as referred to by the delegate in their decision record) indicates that there are robust security procedures at Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran, which are ‘next to impossible’ to bypass.[4] The applicant claims she had no issue departing Iran because there was no court case against her. However the Tribunal considers it also indicates that she was not of any adverse interest to the authorities at that time, despite her claims to have had a profile with them.
[4] DFAT Country Information Report: Iran, 14 April 2020 at 5.44.
For these reasons the Tribunal does not accept the applicant participated in a protest in Esfahan in late September 2022, or that she was arrested, detained, questioned, humiliated or threatened by the authorities as a result. It does not accept her detainers confiscated her mobile phone and took down her details, as claimed. Given the concerns with the applicant’s evidence in this respect, the Tribunal is of the view the applicant has embellished this part of her claim, to strengthen her case for protection overall.
In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal has had regard to the statements provided by the applicant’s sister, her friend, [Ms A], and Dr [B] who refer to these incidences (among other things). However their statements do not overcome the significant concerns the Tribunal has with this aspect of the applicant’s claims, for reasons above. Furthermore, in Dr [B]’s case she appears to be relying on information provided second-hand about the applicant’s case and at hearing the representative confirmed she had told Dr [B] about the circumstances of the case. It notes that in MIAC v MZYHS [2011] FCA 53 at [31], the Court stated that given its ‘major concerns’ with the respondent’s credibility, it was open to the Tribunal to find that, insofar as the report and the other evidence tended to corroborate the respondent’s account, they were to be given little if any weight.
The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s claims to have been stopped one evening in Tehran in December 2022 (a few weeks before she left the country) by the authorities, who purportedly asked to see her mobile phone to check if it contained any demonstration footage. It notes there is an inconsistency in her evidence in this regard: specifically, at hearing she said she was stopped by two officers from the Ministry of Information (who allegedly wore ranking signs on their uniforms), yet in her statutory declaration provided to the Tribunal she states she was stopped by two officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organisation. However the Tribunal considers this inconsistency could be explained by an interpreting error and/or confusion at hearing, particularly given the similarities between ‘Ministry of Information’ and Iran’s ‘Ministry of Intelligence’ (in English at least), for example.
Although the Tribunal does not accept the applicant attended the protest at Esfahan (and related claims) it does accept she has political views in opposition to the Iranian regime, particularly about women’s rights and freedoms. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong and Pan Run Juan,[5] Foster J stated that ‘care must be taken that an over-stringent approach does not result in an unjust exclusion from consideration of the totality of some evidence where a portion of it could reasonably have been accepted.’ There may, for example, be instances where applicants have lied or exaggerated about one aspect of the evidence but this does not indicate that the applicant’s entire evidence is untrustworthy. Professor Hathaway refers to decisions of the Immigration Appeal Board in Canada, and states:
Even where the statement is material, and is not believed, a person may, nonetheless, be a refugee. “Lies do not prove the converse.” Where a claimant is lying, and the lie is material to his case, the [determination authority] must, nonetheless, look at all of the evidence and arrive at a conclusion on the entire case. Indeed, an earlier lie which is openly admitted may, in some circumstances, be a factor to consider in support of credibility.[6]
[5] (1996) 40 ALD 445.
[6] J Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, Butterworths, Canada, 1991, p 86.
A similar conclusion was reached by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [191]:
the fact that an applicant for refugee status may yield to temptation to embroider an account of his or her history is hardly surprising.
The applicant claims – in her written and oral evidence to the Tribunal – she has supported ongoing protests since Mahsa Amini’s death by setting up [a social media] account with the aim of taking a public political stand on continued mistreatment of women by the Iranian authorities. She has posted about Mahsa Amini’s death, execution of protestors, and the killing of Kian Pirfalak – a boy shot by security forces – to show objection to current events. She continues to post and share about women’s rights, as issues arise.
As noted the applicant has provided a translation of her [social media] profile and a selection of her posts and claims she did not provide them earlier because the delegate only asked for screenshots. In some posts she is critical of the government. Based on this evidence the Tribunal accepts the applicant has been active on social media, particularly since Mahsa Amini’s death, in support of the protests that followed and against the government’s handling of the matter, and its treatment of women including restrictions on dress.
At hearing the applicant said she was critical of the Iranian government via social media even before Mahsa Amini’s death – for example when the Revolutionary Guards shot down a Ukrainian plane – but did not save any of the posts (which were posted on her [social media] as a ‘story’ which is temporary). However she was more prolific after Mahsa’s death. Since then she has saved her posts (and related stories) related to women’s rights in a folder which she named ‘[name]’ as a symbol of freedom. When asked why, given the risks, the applicant said because of her own experiences being cautioned by morality police and university security personnel for not wearing proper hijab (for example), she has strong feelings about women being able to dress as they chose, and being free from violence. She added that at that time they hoped – and still do – that the revolution would be successful.
In her statutory declaration provided to the Tribunal the applicant details her motivations for protesting against mandatory hijab rules in Iran, which stem from her own mistreatment and views on the treatment of women there. Her main points were as follows:
·She was always against the Iranian government’s treatment of women, and has always been a strong advocate for women’s rights in Iran: her academic career is a testament to that fact.
·She states that while growing up in Iran in the 1980s and 1990s she saw how the government oppresses women, including their freedom to publicly criticise the government and its interpretation of Islam – which she considers is too harsh – and express themselves through their appearance. She adds that the Iranian government considers women second-class subjects, and women’s rights are half of those of men in Iran. She was always upset and disgusted by this.
·It was for these reasons, and because of the recent demonstration about the forced hijab and violence against women after the death of Mahsa Amini, that she decided to participate in the protest.
·The applicant also chooses not to wear strict Islamic hijab in Iran, instead she wore a loose headscarf in public which does not fully cover her hair. She has always been against mandatory hijab, which she never wore with relatives and friends.
·In the past she was warned by university security officials on campus and the morality police outside university [because] her scarf was not properly covering her hair. They also told her to wear longer clothes.
·She said women in Iran are always under surveillance, which angers her. She lists examples of a lack of women’s rights in Iran.
In her letter to the Tribunal the applicant’s sister speaks about the applicant’s commitment to progress women’s rights in Iran emanating from her experiences. She states (among other things) that the applicant was always cognisant of and complaining about the contradictions and paradoxes that the establishment imposed on Iranian women, that she suffered due to these contradictions, and that she used every opportunity to support women.
The Tribunal also notes at her interview with immigration officials shortly after arrival in Australia the applicant did mention concerns about women’s rights and lack of freedom of speech as some of the reasons she did not want to return to Iran.
Accordingly the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has posted anti-regime material on social media (and spoken to people in Iran prior to that about her feminist views) out of a genuine concern for women’s rights there, and a sense of injustice (evident at hearing) about the significant restrictions women in Iran face, including about what to wear, rather than because she was seeking to bolster her refugee claims. Further, it accepts she would continue to agitate in some way against the Iranian regime on return to Iran, if not for fear of persecution in doing so.
The Tribunal also accepts the applicant’s claims – set out in her written and oral evidence – that in the past in Iran she has been cautioned by university campus security personnel and morality police for not wearing proper hijab. Also, that on another occasion, as claimed at hearing, around two years ago the applicant along with friends and family were stopped by morality police and taken back to their accommodation, because they were not wearing proper hijab. Country information referred to below indicates this is a common occurrence.
The Tribunal notes in her statutory declaration provided to the Tribunal the applicant also claims to have attended protests against election results in Iran in 2009 (known as the Green Movement protests) and narrowly escaped security forces crackdown. She attended with her sister, who confirms as such in her letter to the Tribunal. The applicant failed to mention this to the Department initially, and it was not discussed at hearing. However given this occurred around 14 years ago, and noting subsequent events, this is not surprising.
The Tribunal accepts the applicant attended protests following the election in Iran in 2009 along with her sister. She has not claimed to have experienced problems from the authorities as a result since, has been supported by the Iranian government to study in Australia (among other things) in 2016, and had no issues last leaving Iran in late 2022. For these reasons the Tribunal finds remote the chance the applicant would face persecution from the authorities on return to Iran because she participated in a protest in 2009.
In the Tribunal’s view it does, nonetheless, lend weight to the applicant’s claims that she may participate in protests in the future on return to Iran, even taking into account the Tribunal does not accept her claims relating to attending a protest in Esfahan in September 2022.
Well-founded fear of persecution in the future
Given these findings about the applicant’s past experiences and profile, the Tribunal has considered if she faces a well-founded fear of persecution for any refugee reason on return to Iran in the foreseeable future.
The Tribunal notes for a person’s fear of persecution to be well-founded, there must be a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted. Consistent with the interpretation of ‘well-founded fear’ under the Refugees Convention, this ‘real chance’ requirement, contained in s 5J(1)(b) of the Act, provides an objective element to that concept;[7] not only must a person fear persecution, but there must also be a prospect of that fear being realised.
[7] UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, February 2019.
The applicant claims to fear being arrested and jailed if she returns to Iran given the previous incidents that happened and her continuing support for the movement for Iranian women, including posting a lot on social media about such matters. She noted at hearing that although it appears the demonstrations in Iran have subsided and the sensitivity of the government decreased, inside Iran the situation is boiling. Recently the military commander has openly said from now on women who fail to wear ‘severe’ hijab will be fined and prevented from taking up positions at work. Further, the presence of the morality police has become stronger, whereby they are present at metro stations, buses and in the streets, as seen in videos of Iranian women clashing with them.

The applicant is particularly fearful on return now that she has applied for asylum in Australia, and given she had left Iran on a one‍-‍way ticket with a student visa to Australia (now cancelled), she is sure she will be questioned at least.
The applicant emphasised that she is against the Iranian government who are anti-women, very religious, and who have even killed children as well as shot randomly at demonstrators. Protestors have been executed, even for as little as destruction of private property. Presently the authorities are putting pressure on family members of protestors who are active on social media, threatening them with imprisonment.
The applicant told the Tribunal given her strong feelings about these matters, if she returned to Iran she would have to undertake some activities against these sorts of issues. Even just before she left she would let her hijab fall while on the bus, and only put it on when someone told her to. If she had a choice, she would not wear a hijab at all. She said while in Australia in 2016 she only wore it at lectures inside the university, noting she was receiving partial funding from the Iranian government at the time. Her friend [Ms A] has provided photographs of the applicant in Australia in 2016 with her hair out.
Additionally the applicant told the Tribunal that as a highly educated female, even if nothing happens to her on return to Iran at the airport, she will face difficulties obtaining work at a university given part of the process is to check her background; if so they would soon discover she is against the government.
In her statutory declaration provided to the Tribunal the applicant notes that as the global sensitives about recent events in Iran have decreased, the Iranian government has increased pressure on women to adhere to dress codes, and increased monitoring of women. For example, a new law that Police Chief Sardar Radan announced in a TV interview about detaining women for not complying with hijab rules and new harsh social restrictions on them.[8] She adds that chemical gas attacks on girls continue throughout the country.[9] On this last point at hearing the applicant noted that not only has the government failed to follow-up these attacks, but they also put the blame on the students, saying they did it to themselves.
[8] The Guardian, ‘Iranian police plan to use smart cameras to identify ‘violators of hijab law’’, 9 April 2023,
[9] H Amiri, Iran Focus, ‘Iran’s Regime Resumes Chemical Gas Attacks on Schools, Denies Reports’, 14 April 2023,
Additionally in her statutory declaration the applicant explains that she fled Iran because it is very unsafe due to demonstrations against the mandatory hijab and violence against women; she is scared due to her recent arrest during a protest, interrogation and being threatened with rearrest if she continued to attend protests, and having subsequently had her mobile phone data searched. She notes that those like her have been arrested and are under the microscope more than other citizens, and subject to physical and/or mental harassment.
Furthermore, she believes her social media activity is monitored in cyberspace, which is another reason why she is afraid of being arrested again by security forces, who are constantly scattered in streets of cities and brutally suppressing the protests in Iran. Although the protests and uprising have now decreased, the applicant states that women are still struggling every day in the street by not wearing mandatory hijab, and the threats against women continue. She offers an example: the imprisonment of two women journalists, Niloufer Hamedi and Elaha Mohammadi, who published Mahsa’s death. There are also reports of women in detention being harassed, raped and beaten to force confessions.
In her submission to the Tribunal the representative argues that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Iran for reasons of:
·Her political opinion as an educated female protestor.
·Her being a member of a particular social group – an educated woman.
·Her being a member of a particular social group – a failed asylum seeker.
It is submitted the applicant has a profile among the Iranian authorities as an educated woman who participated in a protest in Esfahan, who was detained by two plainclothes officers, and warned she was under surveillance; there is a record of her detention; and because contents from her phone were downloaded by IRGC officers in Tehran a few weeks before she left Iran.
Given the Iranian regime’s recent announcement of what the UN has termed ‘repressive and draconian measures’ to enforce its hijab laws, the representative contends the applicant – who chooses not to wear the strict Islamic hijab – would be subject to gender based persecution and unacceptable levels of violations of her rights as a woman, notably her freedom of expression, if returned to Iran. Reference is made to country information about the worsening situation for women and girls in Iran, including the poison gas attacks on up to 7,000 schoolgirls in Iran’s major cities since 30 November 2022, believed to have been conducted by hard-line religious groups opposed to girls’ education, and the Iranian state’s failure to protect them. UN experts fear these attacks have been orchestrated to punish girls for being involved in protest movements,[10] it is submitted.
[10] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Press Release: ‘Iran: Deliberate poisoning of schoolgirls further evidence of continuous violence against women and girls’, 16 March 2023,
As well, the representative submits that the applicant’s profile and actions would likely attract the authorities’ attention if she was returned as a failed asylum seeker, and that she intends to continue to protest in support of women’s rights. The applicant has maintained that students from [University 2] have been arrested and charged because they protested about the treatment of women, which she fears may happen to her on return based on her profile as an educated woman and dissident and her close friendships with others like her. The representative notes country information about, among other things, the brutal treatment of political prisoners in Iran, including sexual violence.[11]
[11] For example: Amnesty International, ‘Iran 2022’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Iran – Events of 2022’; World Report 2023; and US Department of State, ‘Iran 2022 Human Rights Report’, ‘Freedom in the World 2023 – Iran,’ Freedom House, 9 March 2023.
The representative argues further that country information indicates the applicant, as a highly educated woman, is at risk of being targeted as she is seen as being able to influence others, especially women. Iranian authorities see university scholars as a threat for being activists, whom DFAT describes as being ‘perceived by the authorities to be pushing Iran’s moral boundaries’ and who ‘face a high risk of arrest and severe punishment’,[12] she submits. Country information is also referenced regarding the Iranian authorities’ attempts to limit women’s access to, and discriminate against them in, education and employment.
[12] DFAT Country Information Report: Iran 14 April 2020 at 3.135 and 3.100.
With respect to the applicant’s social media presence (and associated risks on return to Iran) the representative notes the applicant provided a screenshot of herself without a headscarf that she posted on [social media], joining other educated women to show their opposition to mandatory wearing of hijab in Iran in the wake of Mahsa Amini’s death. She also provided two other photographs, and her [social media] account showing her loose headscarf revealing her hair that she normally wears in Iran, in contrast to the compulsory, more conservative hijab. The representative goes on to note one photo was taken on 1 September 2022, after the implementation of a new order depriving women who publish such photos on the internet of certain social rights.
The representative states further that while the delegate citied country information about an official in Iran claiming morality patrols had been abolished in December 2022, more recently in March–April 2023 the Iranian authorities announced strict penalties to enforce hijab, including use of surveillance cameras, with ‘violators’ losing their driver’s licence and passport, being banned from social media, excluded from education and government or public positions, and punished with heavy fines and court action. Such treatment is much harsher than that described by DFAT in its 2020 report, the representative submits.
For reasons above the Tribunal does not accept the applicant was involved in a protest in Esfahan in late September 2022 and detained and questioned in relation to that protest, or that the authorities took her details at the time.
Nonetheless, it accepts she is a highly educated woman who does not agree with the Iranian government’s strict hijab rules or their mistreatment of women in general, and has spoken about this to university colleagues in the past. It accepts she has been cautioned by university security and morality police for wearing improper hijab in the past. It accepts she has been active on social media, in particular since Mahsa’s death, criticising the Iranian government’s treatment of women and heavy-handed response to protestors. Also, that there are photographs of her online, showing her without a headscarf to protest in solidarity with others after Mahsa’s death. It accepts she continues to post such material and would be active in these ways on return if not for fear of persecution in doing so.
Although the Tribunal does not accept the applicant’s claims to have been involved in a protest in Esfahan in September 2022, given her demonstrated commitment and outrage it accepts her claims that she is likely to protest in the future, as she did in 2009 against unfair election results. The Tribunal also accepts the applicant was randomly stopped by the authorities in Tehran in December 2022 who temporarily confiscated her phone, checking it for footage of protests.
For these reasons, combined with the following country information about the current situation in Iran, the Tribunal finds the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm from the authorities, based on her membership of a particular social group of women and her imputed (anti-government) political opinion, on return to Iran in the foreseeable future. It considers her status as a highly educated woman increases her risk.
In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal has taken into account the representative’s submissions, the applicant’s oral and written evidence, what it accepts of the applicant’s claims and profile and relevant country information (discussed below).
With respect to the situation for women in Iran, DFAT advises that while Iran’s constitution provides for equal rights for women, a number of legal provisions – including those in the penal and civil codes that deal with property, family law and rules of evidence – discriminate against women. It states further that notwithstanding the government’s official commitment to women’s equality, hard-line sharia interpretations and conservative cultural and societal norms continue to limit the extent to which women are able to participate in Iranian society.[13]
[13] DFAT Country Information Report: Iran, 14 April 2020 at 3.121.
Overall DFAT assesses that:
…most Iranian women face persistent societal discrimination and the threat of gender-based violence. Legislation, longstanding traditional values and gender roles continue to restrict the participation of women in the workforce and community. Activists attempting to promote women’s rights face a high risk of official discrimination. This may include arrest, monitoring, harassment, smear campaigns and travel bans. Women perceived by the authorities to be pushing Iran’s moral boundaries face a high risk of arrest and severe punishment.[14]
[14] DFAT Country Information Report: Iran, 14 April 2020 at 3.135.
There have been significant developments since the DFAT report was published in April 2020. The death of Mahsa Amini on 16 September 2022 in police custody three days after her arrest for allegedly failing to comply with Iran’s strict rules on women’s dress by wearing an ‘improper hijab’ sparked nationwide protests and a violent response by the authorities. According to a recent report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, this response led to the deaths of at least 476 persons (including at least 64 children and 34 women), hundreds of protestors being severely injured, and thousands being arrested, detained or incarcerated.[15] The Special Rapporteur notes that Mahsa’s death was not an isolated event, ‘but the latest in a long series of extreme violence against women and girls committed by the Iranian authorities, the obligatory wearing of the hijab and its enforcement by State authorities being emblematic of this violence and of the denial of fundamental women’s human rights and dignity for decades’.[16]
[15] United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fifty-second session, ‘Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, 7 February 2023 at para 8.
[16] Ibid, at para 14.
The Special Rapporteur also noted:
An increased emphasis on the enforcement of the law on the wearing of the hijab during the reporting period was evidenced when, in June 2022, the morality police expanded street patrols, subjecting women perceived to be wearing “loose hijabs” to verbal and physical harassment, arresting them and shutting down several businesses. Over recent years, videos on social media and other evidence have shown multiple instances of such violence.[17]
[17] Ibid.
In an April 2023 ‘factsheet’ from the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) it is stated that in the months following Mahsa’s arrest in Iran, security and intelligence forces arrested tens of thousands of peaceful protestors, and that there are reports that Iranian officials are using sexual harassment, assault and rape to shame, silence and traumatise prisoners who were arrested for protesting. The report states that:
Iranians arrested for protesting mandatory hijab laws and other religious freedom violations are being subjected to a deliberate and systematic campaign of SGBV[18] by police officers, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers, prison officials, and prison interrogators. Men and women officers participate in this violence. SGBV takes place at police stations, in prisons, and at unofficial sites at IRGC bases and facilities run by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence…This sexual violence is not the result of lax enforcement or improper training, but rather the intentional weaponization of religious belief to maximise the harm to survivors of these assaults. Many of the reported cases of Iran’s official use of SGBV would constitute torture and the flagrant denial of the security of persons under IRFA.[19]
[18] Sexual and gender based violence.
[19] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Factsheet: ‘Sexual and Gender Based Violence Against Religious Freedom Protestors in Iran’, April 2023.
USCIRF’s report also states that the Iranian government is deliberately attempting to cover this up by disseminating misinformation through Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents and state media channels; that the prison services deny the allegations; and that survivors face severe threat of government retribution and social sanction if they go public with their stories. They also note that the Iranian’s state use of SGBV is not new, nor uniquely used against those seeking greater religious freedom; however it is using SGBV ‘with unique intentions and effects against those protesting gender based restrictions on FoRB [freedom of religion or belief]’.[20]
[20] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Factsheet: ‘Sexual and Gender Based Violence Against Religious Freedom Protestors in Iran’, April 2023.
In a March 2023 report the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman, noted his deep concern about the Iranian state’s policy of mass arrests and detention of protestors. He stated that he has received consistent reports and testimonies of torture and ill-treatment of protesters, including allegations of sexual and gender-based violence; and that rape and sexual violence by Iranian officials, among other violations, may amount to crimes against humanity.[21]
[21] A/HRC/52/67: Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran examines the current human rights concerns in the country, with a focus on the events leading up to and since the death of Jina Mahsa Amini on 16 September 2022, 7 February 2023.
The same report summarises the Iranian government’s actions since mid-last year against those advocating against mandatory wearing of the hijab, which among other things highlights that President Ebrahim Raisi considers that enforcing the mandatory hijab laws is a priority for his government. It states as follows:
In July 2022, the head of the judiciary called on the intelligence services to take strong action against those advocating against mandatory wearing of the hijab. President Raisi requested all government entities to strictly implement a “chastity and hijab” law, calling the lack of compliance with rules on the wearing of the hijab “an organized promotion of moral corruption in Islamic society”. In August 2022, he signed a decree ordering further repressive measures. A month later, the authorities, announced a plan to use surveillance technology to detect women wearing “improper hijabs” on public transport and in shopping centres with a view to imposing financial penalties on them. Women without “proper hijabs” were reportedly barred from entering banks and government offices or taking public transport. On 4 September 2022, only a few days before the death of Jina Mahsa Amini, a spokesman for the Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, Ali Khan-Mohammadi, announced that the Ministry of Intelligence had arrested 300 persons for their promotion of not wearing the hijab, whom he termed “ringleaders who were fighting against the hijab” and attributed such activism to “the enemy” seeking to polarize society. In an interview at the beginning of November 2022, he stated that: “The enemy is attempting to bring down the headscarf, which is a symbol [of sharia law]” and “If they bring down this symbol, then nudity and other things will come afterwards”. On 25 December 2022, the Prosecutor General reiterated that appearing without a hijab in public was a crime.[22]
[22] Ibid at para 16 [footnotes omitted].
Additionally, Iran’s morality police are often accused of using excessive force against women deemed to be in violation of the dress codes.[23]
[23] ‘Iranian women under pressure as Raisi stiffens hijab mandate’, Al Monitor, 23 July 2022; and ‘Iran's Raisi Orders Strict Enforcement Of Hijab Amid Crackdown’, Iran International, 6 July 2022.
More recently, in January 2023, Iran’s prosecutor-general issued new penalties for women who fail to comply with Iran’s dress codes, including detention for between 10 days and two months, confiscation of vehicles, and a range of bans on work and political activity.[24]
[24] Al Monitor, ‘Iran doubles down, rolls out tougher hijab punishments’, 10 January 2023.

5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

(d) the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a) protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…

36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

(c) a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

p.60; ‘Freedom on the Net 2022 – Iran’, Freedom House, 18 October 2022; and
‘Women’s removal of veil in social media images draw s harsh reaction’, Iran Human Rights Monitor, 21 May
2020.

[2023] AATA 2584

1 June 2023

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness

Jurisdiction

Remedies

Standing

Statutory Construction